Across US, Police Officers Abuse Confidential Databases (ap.org)
Sadie Gurman and Eric Tucker, reporting for Associated Press:Police officers across the country misuse confidential law enforcement databases to get information on romantic partners, business associates, neighbors, journalists and others for reasons that have nothing to do with daily police work, an Associated Press investigation has found. Criminal-history and driver databases give officers critical information about people they encounter on the job. But the AP's review shows how those systems also can be exploited by officers who, motivated by romantic quarrels, personal conflicts or voyeuristic curiosity, sidestep policies and sometimes the law by snooping. In the most egregious cases, officers have used information to stalk or harass, or have tampered with or sold records they obtained. No single agency tracks how often the abuse happens nationwide, and record-keeping inconsistencies make it impossible to know how many violations occur. But the AP, through records requests to state agencies and big-city police departments, found law enforcement officers and employees who misused databases were fired, suspended or resigned more than 325 times between 2013 and 2015. They received reprimands, counseling or lesser discipline in more than 250 instances, the review found.
Am I just paranoid, or does it seem that everywhere personal data is collected, it is abused?
-- Sometimes you have to turn the lights off in order to see.
That's *if you get caught*. More likely, if you get caught more than once or twice, or get caught in some really egregious violation (like bulk selling the data).
Perhaps "a significant number" do get caught, but is that 90% or only 1% of the total occurances? I'd lean more towards the latter. What are the odds of getting caught the first time you do it?
The solution is pretty simple, but often skipped:
1) The reason for every search should be required and logged by the searcher. Example: "Related to case 12345, this person was a close match to the suspect description given by clerk at robbed market, who was interviewed by officer 84923 on Aug 7th." (In practice short-cut lingo can be used to reduce typing.)
2) The logs be randomly spot-checked by an auditor(s) who verifies the reasons given by interviewing the person(s) who searched.
3) The depth of the investigation will vary such that some will be pretty thorough. (Not every spot-check can be deep, but make enough deep to keep users on their toes.)
4) Those who've failed past audits or enter poor records are audited more often.
This won't catch every violation, but greatly reduces it because the search-user doesn't know which search will be audited and how deep the audit will be.
The reason this is not implemented is that governments and/or tax-payers don't want to pay for logging features and auditors.
Table-ized A.I.
World hunger is over because you ate today, too. Just because you don't see police brutality doesn't mean it's not infesting every police force in the country like a disease. Follow copblock or similar, watch all the videos. It's non-stop.
Back when I was working at a call center (processing credit applications for several different companies) we had access to credit reports. If we looked up someone's credit report that was not applying for credit, it was immediate termination. I couldn't even look up credit reports for people that had the same last name as myself. If that situation came up, we had to transfer the application to a different service rep.
Years later, I worked at a hospital. They had similar restrictions and consequences regarding patient records due to HIPPA regulations.