Are Flawed Languages Creating Bad Software? (techcrunch.com)

"Most software, even critical system software, is insecure Swiss cheese held together with duct tape, bubble wrap, and bobby pins..." writes TechCrunch. An anonymous reader quotes their article: Everything is terrible because the fundamental tools we use are, still, so flawed that when used they inevitably craft terrible things... Almost all software has been bug-ridden and insecure for so long that we have grown to think that this is the natural state of code. This learned helplessness is not correct. Everything does not have to be terrible...

Vast experience has shown us that it is unrealistic to expect programmers to write secure code in memory-unsafe languages...as an industry, let's at least set a trajectory. Let's move towards writing system code in better languages, first of all -- this should improve security and speed. Let's move towards formal specifications and verification of mission-critical code.
Their article calls for LangSec testing, and applauds the use of languages like Go and Rust over memory-unsafe languages like C. "Itâ(TM)s not just systemd, not just Linux, not just software; the whole industry is at fault."

Comments

Software isn't enough, hardware must change

[Required Snark]

Back in the early days of computers, when the world had many hardware architectures, there were machines that had co-designed hardware and software. They were designed from the ground up to avoid certain types of problems, and they worked really well.

Burroughs Large System stack machines were one example and Symbolics Lisp Machines were another. Burroughs had array descriptors that did bounds checking at run time and tagged memory. Tagging added non-user accessible bits to each memory word. The tag defined what kind of data the word contained and the hardware detected any attempt to use a memory value illegally. Symbolics machines also had tag bits, but their implementation was microcoded, so the tag interpretation was also in microcode.

Until computer implementations include features like tagged memory and hardware array bounds checking they will never be truly secure. Some problems cannot be addressed by an isolated software layer: they can only be made secure by hardware enforcement of fundamental features that prohibit some classes of software errors.

Re:what a waste of article

[mccalli]

How many rock solid kernels, games or video editing suites are you aware of? I'm aware of zero. Do you not install your updates?