'Fatal' Flaws Found in Medical Implant Software (bbc.com)
Security researchers have warned of flaws in medical implants in what they say could have fatal consequences. The flaws were found in the radio-based communications used to update implants, including pacemakers, and read data from them. From a BBC report:By exploiting the flaws, the researchers were able to adjust settings and even switch off gadgets. The attacks were also able to steal confidential data about patients and their health history. A software patch has been created to help thwart any real-world attacks. The flaws were found by an international team of security researchers based at the University of Leuven in Belgium and the University of Birmingham.
Back in 2007, Dick Chaney's cardiologist disabled his pacemaker - article also talks about the Homeland episode where this happened.
LOL that most anything is controllable these days
and it hasn't done that yet. The medical profession kills a million a year who would otherwise not have died if they'd have stayed away from a hospital.
So you're saying the firmware embedded in the devices to allow the operational parameters to be changed allows the operational parameters to be changed?
Anyone have a map to Wyoming?
The "Blue Scream of Death" would be the first hint.
Early pacemakers were "programmed" by magnetic pulses from a wire coiled wand. They could get reset to default by getting too close to any magnetic signal.
"A person is smart. People are dumb, panicky dangerous animals and you know it." - K
You need to be in close proximity to the person with the implanted device. Poisoning the person is probably more simple and effective. I see both having equal difficulty in catching the assailant.
Go figure - outsource development to Pajeets that shit out in the road and you end up with crappy software.
Medsec partners with short-sellling specialists Muddy Waters LLC. Go public with claims of serious vulns in St Jude pacemakers, implanted defibrilators and remote programming tool. St-Jude takes them to court.
Interesting situation ethically with the short selling & with respect to the whole responsible disclosure vs public disclosure debate
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-24/muddy-waters-fights-st-jude-lawsuit-over-pacemaker-reports
Technic details of vulns here (with redactions):
http://medsec.com/stj_expert_witness_report.pdf
"The team reverse-engineered the proprietary wireless signalling systems used by the implants which revealed flaws in the way data was broadcast."
From this sentence alone, it is entirely obvious: The signals are not encrypted; there is no security to hack. These aren't flaws at all - they are design decisions. The manufacturers have some command protocol that they developed and use; while this may not be publicly documented, it is hardly secret: monitor the signals used, and you can figure it out. This doesn't take a "security researcher", all it takes is a kid with the right radio kit.
People then rush to ask: Why do these devices not secure their signals? It may be that they never thought about it. However, the answer may also be that they want an open interface. Consider: you have a pacemaker and suddenly have a heart problem, and you are taken to the nearest hospital. With a secure interface, how does that hospital get the private key required to talk to your pacemaker? Which is the lesser risk to the patient's health: leaving the interface open, or securing it?
Enjoy life! This is not a dress rehearsal.
If the compromised devices still function, even in a reduced capacity, is it really a fatal flaw?
(Score: -1, Stupid)
I spent my career in the medical device industry, and can tell you that there is NOT ONE DEVICE made in the u.s that can prevent a 12-year old from getting all device data, and even the ability to control or disable the device.
The lab information systems (software) that connect medical devices are just as bad.
There are no 'whistleblowers' in the medical industry because you are told from day 1 that if you do not go with the program you are fired.
You would not believe the vowel-movements that medical C-level execs make about patient data and security. They are not centered in reality, and believe that nothing will ever happen to them.
I guess everyone forgot about the first case of this (where software killed patients):
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Therac-25
The Therac-25 was a radiation therapy machine produced by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) in 1982 after the Therac-6 and Therac-20 units (the earlier units had been produced in partnership with CGR of France).
It was involved in at least six accidents between 1985 and 1987, in which patients were given massive overdoses of radiation.[1]:425 Because of concurrent programming errors, it sometimes gave its patients radiation doses that were hundreds of times greater than normal, resulting in death or serious injury.[2] These accidents highlighted the dangers of software control of safety-critical systems, and they have become a standard case study in health informatics and software engineering. Additionally the overconfidence of the engineers[1]:428 and lack of proper due diligence to resolve reported software bugs, is highlighted as an extreme case where the engineer's overconfidence in his or her initial work and failure to believe the end users' claims caused drastic repercussions.