'Fatal' Flaws Found in Medical Implant Software (bbc.com)
Security researchers have warned of flaws in medical implants in what they say could have fatal consequences. The flaws were found in the radio-based communications used to update implants, including pacemakers, and read data from them. From a BBC report:By exploiting the flaws, the researchers were able to adjust settings and even switch off gadgets. The attacks were also able to steal confidential data about patients and their health history. A software patch has been created to help thwart any real-world attacks. The flaws were found by an international team of security researchers based at the University of Leuven in Belgium and the University of Birmingham.
and it hasn't done that yet. The medical profession kills a million a year who would otherwise not have died if they'd have stayed away from a hospital.
Medsec partners with short-sellling specialists Muddy Waters LLC. Go public with claims of serious vulns in St Jude pacemakers, implanted defibrilators and remote programming tool. St-Jude takes them to court.
Interesting situation ethically with the short selling & with respect to the whole responsible disclosure vs public disclosure debate
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-24/muddy-waters-fights-st-jude-lawsuit-over-pacemaker-reports
Technic details of vulns here (with redactions):
http://medsec.com/stj_expert_witness_report.pdf
"The team reverse-engineered the proprietary wireless signalling systems used by the implants which revealed flaws in the way data was broadcast."
From this sentence alone, it is entirely obvious: The signals are not encrypted; there is no security to hack. These aren't flaws at all - they are design decisions. The manufacturers have some command protocol that they developed and use; while this may not be publicly documented, it is hardly secret: monitor the signals used, and you can figure it out. This doesn't take a "security researcher", all it takes is a kid with the right radio kit.
People then rush to ask: Why do these devices not secure their signals? It may be that they never thought about it. However, the answer may also be that they want an open interface. Consider: you have a pacemaker and suddenly have a heart problem, and you are taken to the nearest hospital. With a secure interface, how does that hospital get the private key required to talk to your pacemaker? Which is the lesser risk to the patient's health: leaving the interface open, or securing it?
Enjoy life! This is not a dress rehearsal.