Police Department Loses Years Worth of Evidence In Ransomware Incident (bleepingcomputer.com)
"Police in Cockrell Hill, Texas admitted Wednesday in a press release that they lost years worth of evidence after the department's server was infected with ransomware," reports BleepingComputer. "Lost evidence includes all body camera video, some in-car video, some in-house surveillance video, some photographs, and all Microsoft Office documents." An anonymous reader writes:
Most of the data was from solved cases, but some of the evidence was from active investigations. The infection appears to be from the Locky ransomware family, one of the most active today, and took root last December, after an employee opened a document he received via via a spam email. The police department backup system apparently kicked in right after the infection took root, and created copies of the already encrypted data. The department did not pay the $4,000 ransom demand and decided to wipe all its systems.
Rubs chin, thinks camera evidence may not have been favorable. Dog ate my home work get out still works.
It sounds like they only had one backup, and that promptly got overwritten. It should be standard procedure to have an offsite backup as well. I always did.
a,e,i,o,u and sometimes w and y (at be if of up cwm by)
The police department backup system apparently kicked in right after the infection took root, and created copies of the already encrypted data.
Backup. You keep using that word. I don't think it means what you think.
If you automatically overwrite previous data with no way to restore some older state, meaning that at a given moment you may only have a copy a few minutes old and no older state - it's not backup. It's just a secondary remote copy. Useful against heavy physical damage to the primary storage (or the whole machine), but nothing else. If it's not even remote, it's not useful for anything.
Here's a better link.
"Transparent" is a shit show that trades on every stereotype going. A man in drag is NOT a transsexual.
Make America Backup Again, one ransomware exploit at a time!
sounds like in inside job cover-up.
"Most of the data was from solved cases, but some of the evidence was from active investigations...the department did not pay the $4,000 ransom demand and decided to wipe all its systems."
I'm sorry, but one legal firm can rack up more than $4000 in legal fees in a single day.
You're going to tell me that the active investigations along with the potential liability of not holding data for years worth of solved cases was somehow not worth $4000?
The numbers just don't add up here. At all. Hate to go all conspiracy theory, but this sounds more like an intentional infection and a premature decision to wipe data that might have shown a bad light on a certain law enforcement actions.
After all, Computers have complicated lives very greatly.
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Any evidence that was altered by ransomware would get challenged by a defense attorney. Maybe they decided they didn't need to pay ransom for evidence that had built-in reasonable doubt.
How do they not have a proper storage array with snapshot and remote copy functionality to provide both point in time "backups" as well as offsite replication?
Even if they couldn't afford that why weren't they doing disk to disk backups using removable drives or backing up to a local tape drive and rotating the tapes daily?
I sure hope somebody got fired for this...
Maybe they decided to do the right thing and not fund criminals. We need more people to do the same thing. If nobody payed, ransomeware would stop being a thing. Plus, the evidence should now be considered compromised anyway.
The numbers add up perfectly, you just aren't adding up the right numbers. system has already been compromised, how could they possibly trust any data as evidence after recovery? On top of that you have the government stance of never paying ransom. Looks to me like they took the right approach.
It is $4000 to a criminal organization, it's illegal (especially for government agencies like a POLICE department) to make any payment and become complicit in the criminal activity.
On the other hand, $4000 is what they start off with, I heard of a company that got hit with $10k in ransom demands, a few days later they realized their backups weren't working well so they gave them the $10k, by then the criminals realized they were attempting and failed to restore from backup so they quadrupled the demand so the company got the FBI involved, when the criminals realized the FBI got involved, they wiped EVERYTHING. It took them about 3 weeks and about $100k to recover the broken backups by a professional recovery company.
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"...hard copies of ALL documents and the vast majority of the videos and photographs are still in the possession of the Police Department on CD or DVD".
They only lost digital copies of evidence...probably why they chose to wipe rather than pay ransom.
They can trust the data by recovering it from the tamper-proof archived backups they *should* have. If they lack them, they failed and in this case it seems they failed big time.
Presumably, Windows. Balance of probability both by numeric prevalence and vulnerability. How is it responsible for police to store valuable data on a vulnerable system? Without backup no less?
When all you have is a hammer, every problem starts to look like a thumb.
legal fees?
>$4000 in IT costs to do the wipe and reconfigure.
It's good they decided not to perpetuate the randomware industry by paying the ransom. That was the right choice on their part.
However: "...after an employee opened a document he received via via a spam email...."
There are all kinds of problems with this, starting with the general lack of technical awareness of the whole population (I won't blame it specifically on that one lady or gent: they have a billion or so to keep them company, and if you only try to hire technically literate people, you won't have many to pick from). Then there are the holes in the backup strategy, and the fact that just "opening a document" has any ability to let randomware infiltrate the network. Heck that isn't even true of my personal network at home, so I wonder what their IT staff is doing...
It's disheartening to realize that I, just an average Joe, have better, more secure backup procedures than the police department in Cockrell Hill, Texas.
Yeah, maybe they're just a podunk little town in the middle of nowhere, but still...
Just cruising through this digital world at 33 1/3 rpm...
Maybe the police department will now move on a backup system with multiple iterated backups so that if this ever happens in the future they can recover everything.
Chas - The one, the only.
THANK GOD!!!
Rubs chin, thinks it would be a shame if the IRS similarly lost their records. Also the student loan people. I would be sad if nobody had a record of the $60,000 in student loans that my wife owes.
If the ransomware was able to modify the evidence, it wasn't really evidence.
Expect future lawsuits involving evidence collected by this police department to be challenged in court.
How could you trust any evidence once you know the system is open to change? More than one person should be fired for this.
EU's right to be forgotten has been criticized as impossible to enforce, but here is its implementation: get infected, refuse to pay, wipe data.
Right to be enforced is enforced with the help of ransomware, though the citizen cannot choose when it happens.
exactly, so under no circumstances does paying the ransom make sense. Either they have proper backups with non repudiation in which case it is not necessary or they don't in which case you can't trust what is recovered anyway
completely agree. A properly audited and controlled system can be subject to change and still able to be trusted and I am somewhat stunned that this is not what they had given it is evidence that will be used in court.
Just make the person who opened the spam mail pay the $4000. You get the ransom paid and that person will definitely be more careful next time.
Whether it's called backup or archive, their system was inadequate. Multiple full copies taken at various points in time - of all data - should be in more than one offsite location.
Don't step on the baby.
We are being lied to.
This was an inside job. That data was wiped to protect some dirty cops.
You don't fix problems like these by hiring competent IT to work for police departments. You fix this through IT audits by non-police public agencies. With all the audit data made available for public review.
Where there is not transparency, there is corruption. Every moment you blink is a moment in which your authorities betray you.
remember: Police is the only profession where if you score too high on an intelligence test, they won't take you
Jordan v. City of New London, 3:97CV1012 (1999).
So are we to understand there is just a single backup which, when running, overwrites the previous backup? So if you backup at the wrong moment, everything is gone? That is extremely, extremely incompetent...
I can understand losing maybe a few days of work, but beyond that point, an older backup should be recoverable. Why wasn't it?
They did have a prior backup right?
I agree with the general consensus that they should have more than one backup. Having only one is foolish.
.cmd scripts that use robocopy to back up key directories weekly to both an on-site and off-site NAS. But, it's effective. It outright refuses to run the backup if any of the files I told it to check are changed or missing.
That said, regardless of how many backups a location maintains, there should be a standard mechanism that analyzes key files BEFORE starting a backup, verifies that they have not been modified or deleted, i.e. by ransomware, and if it detects that they have been modified or deleted, displays an alert and stops the automatic backup before it even begins, thereby protecting the integrity of the existing backup.
I was able to code such a mechanism myself into the automatic backup on our computer systems at work, which admittedly are simple
Any evidence that is not stored as such ( https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4998 ) cannot be validated as such and should not be called that.
Maybe we should also making serious efforts to track down ransomware authors and slice off their faces. What about that, a price on the heads of anyone programming ransomware. After the first couple is disposed of, the rest will see the light.
What did you expect from a Texas Police Department, after all they got a president killed on their watch.
Sucks to be that company, but on the upside the criminals also apparently got nothing out of it.
Seriously, 4K is NOTHING compared to what any of those cases costs. So, the question is, why did they not pay?
And the back-up only went with 1 level? Seriously?
Normally, I stick up for the police, but Gut feeling says that there was a case that they did not want tried and the police were in on that.
I prefer the "u" in honour as it seems to be missing these days.
The problem here isn't that the police failed to take measure x, y, or z. The problem is that police depts are run by people with very little education who have a superiority complex and therefore think they know a lot more than they actually do. This has repercussions everywhere: statistically wrong profiling, bogus "expert" testimony, using psychics to find perps or evidence, even false belief in chances of being wrong with DNA evidence, and especially with fingerprint evidence, bogus bite-mark evidence, bogus hair type evidence, even bogus ballistics evidence, and the list goes on and on, because, well, these people are gullible idiots.
If these idiots had no backups it was just a matter of time before a hard drive failure did the same thing.
"Assault Charges Against Officers Dropped After In-car and Body Camera Video Lost"
Bingo! It's not that they know the ransomware changed their data, it's the mere possibility that it might. Opens up a whole can of worms for defense challenges. Imagine a courtroom conversation, between the defense lawyer and a poor Sherriff/Officer:
Defense: "Is it true that all the evidence presented in this courtroom, was at one time encrypted by ransomware?"
Sherriff: "Um, yes, but we got all the evidence back again..."
Defense: "Unaltered?"
Sherriff: "I don't understand..."
Defense: "You lost the chain of custody. Your evidence was in the hands of a hostile hacker or hacking group. How do you know they didn't tamper with the evidence?"
Sherriff: "Look, I'm just a Sherriff, I'm not IT. But I don't think ransomware changes the system..."
Defense: "So you admit you are not an IT expert?"
Sherriff: "Yeah, I mean no, I'm no computer expert!"
Defense: "So you think the evidence was unaltered, but you really have no idea do you?"
Sherriff: "I guess not, no."
And that's before we even get to the issue of a Police Department paying ransoms. Which looks bad, absolutely terrible, and will grate on any police officer.
You're going to tell me that the active investigations along with the potential liability of not holding data for years worth of solved cases was somehow not worth $4000?
What legal liability? Some cases might get dismissed but why would that matter for the police department?
You're going to tell me that the active investigations along with the potential liability of not holding data for years worth of solved cases was somehow not worth $4000?
What legal liability? Some cases might get dismissed but why would that matter for the police department?
And some cases might get re-opened because of new evidence brought to light that might benefit the wrongly accused, which would be essentially impossible to further such an investigation because of evidence being destroyed.
Regardless, the chain of custody issue has to be validated with such an intrusion anyway, which even furthers my point regarding this being used as a scapegoat excuse for evidence being destroyed deliberately by those holding it.
And some cases might get re-opened because of new evidence brought to light that might benefit the wrongly accused, which would be essentially impossible to further such an investigation because of evidence being destroyed.
Why would the police care about that either? Most prosecutors certainly do not and go to great lengths to prevent review.
And some cases might get re-opened because of new evidence brought to light that might benefit the wrongly accused, which would be essentially impossible to further such an investigation because of evidence being destroyed.
Why would the police care about that either? Most prosecutors certainly do not and go to great lengths to prevent review.
If years of evidence is truly worthless to the organization holding it, then why the hell did they even save it.
And some cases might get re-opened because of new evidence brought to light that might benefit the wrongly accused, which would be essentially impossible to further such an investigation because of evidence being destroyed.
Why would the police care about that either? Most prosecutors certainly do not and go to great lengths to prevent review.
If years of evidence is truly worthless to the organization holding it, then why the hell did they even save it.
Often they do not. There may be statutory requirements.
By this rule 'live backups' that are (semi) online and available for users without other human interaction are actually archives. They don't technically become backups until you put them in vault or take them off-site. (and put them in storage).
The reason why I make this distinction is that archives (like RAID) are still vulnerable to online corruption.
Sometimes boldness is in fashion. Sometimes only the brave will be bold.