Slashdot Asks: Are Password Rules Bullshit? (codinghorror.com)
Here's what Jeff Atwood, a founder of Stack Overflow thinks: Password rules are bullshit. They don't work.
They heavily penalize your ideal audience, people that use real random password generators. Hey, guess what, that password randomly didn't have a number or symbol in it. I just double checked my math textbook, and yep, it's possible. I'm pretty sure.
They frustrate average users, who then become uncooperative and use "creative" workarounds that make their passwords less secure.
Are often wrong, in the sense that they are grossly incomplete and/or insane.
Seriously, for the love of God, stop with this arbitrary password rule nonsense already. If you won't take my word for it, read this 2016 NIST password rules recommendation. It's right there, "no composition rules". However, I do see one error, it should have said "no bullshit composition rules". What do you think?
They heavily penalize your ideal audience, people that use real random password generators. Hey, guess what, that password randomly didn't have a number or symbol in it. I just double checked my math textbook, and yep, it's possible. I'm pretty sure.
They frustrate average users, who then become uncooperative and use "creative" workarounds that make their passwords less secure.
Are often wrong, in the sense that they are grossly incomplete and/or insane.
Seriously, for the love of God, stop with this arbitrary password rule nonsense already. If you won't take my word for it, read this 2016 NIST password rules recommendation. It's right there, "no composition rules". However, I do see one error, it should have said "no bullshit composition rules". What do you think?
https://www.xkcd.com/936/
It's right there, "no composition rules". However, I do see one error, it should have said "no bullshit composition rules".
But you repeat yourself....
Also in there:
Verifiers SHOULD NOT require memorized secrets to be changed arbitrarily (e.g., periodically) and SHOULD only require a change if the subscriber requests a change or there is evidence of compromise of the authenticator.
Holy crap, sanity!
Also need to scrap the minimum change interval some things impose (you *can't* change your password, even if you know you exposed it to someone accidently).
I'd also want to be very careful about account lockout policies. Yes, they are a tool to rate limit an attacker, but they are *also* a vector to DoS an account by locking it out on purpose.
XML is like violence. If it doesn't solve the problem, use more.
That's not necessarily true.
When you set your password, they could extract various 4-character permutations, and store a salted hash of those characters along with their positions within the password.
They're basically making a number of smaller passwords out of the alphabet you supplied via the characters in your password. Then they can salt, hash, and store these small passwords just like would be done for a full password. The plain text password is not stored.
If they do this for, say, 20 permutations, and select one randomly each time you log in, you likely wouldn't be smart enough to see any pattern in the prompting. You'd wrongly think they're selecting the characters dynamically. Then you'd go off on Slashdot claiming that they're storing plain text passwords when they very well may not be, making yourself look like a silly goose.
Things you should never use as a password:
1) Your first pet's name
2) The street you grew up on
3) The model of your first car
Things banks use for "security questions":
see above.
Someone had to do it.