ISPs Could Take Down Large Parts of Bitcoin Ecosystem If They Wanted To (bleepingcomputer.com)
An anonymous reader writes: A rogue ISP could take down large parts of the Bitcoin ecosystem, according to new research that will be presented in two weeks at the 38th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy in San Jose, USA. According to the researchers, there are two types of attack scenarios that could be leveraged via BGP hijacks to cripple the Bitcoin ecosystem: hijacking mining proceeds, causing double-spending errors, and delaying transactions. These two (partition and delay) attacks are possible because most of the entire Bitcoin ecosystem isn't as decentralized as most people think, and it still runs on a small number of ISPs. For example, 13 ISPs host 30% of the entire Bitcoin network, 39 ISPs host 50% of the whole Bitcoin mining power, and 3 ISPs handle 60% of all Bitcoin traffic. Currently, researchers found that around 100 Bitcoin nodes are the victims of BGP hijacks each month.
hide everything?
Oh you mean using steganography in Cat Videos?
I'd rather be riding my '63 Triumph T120.
Bitcoin has plenty of problems that need, but these issues aren't them.
This article describes fairly generic things and jumps to insane conclusions, eg:
"These attacks can be used to sneakily siphon off some of the mining proceeds into an attacker’s account."
This sort of statement is totally wrong and not backed up by how that can work (It can't)
ISPs Could Take Down Large Parts of ANY Ecosystem If They Wanted To.
They can divert or block any traffic it's flowing through.
And there's little the users can do against it.
So that article isn't bringing anything new!
Sent as ripples into the electromagnetic field. No single photon has been harmed in the process.
For crying out loud. They still haven't fixed BGP? I remember reading about stuff like this in the 90s.
If the Wiki article is anything to go by this is through complacency.:
Although security extensions are available for BGP, and third-party route DB resources exist for validating routes, by default the BGP protocol is designed to trust all route announcements sent by peers, and few ISPs rigorously enforce checks on BGP sessions.
This sort of thing is really frustrating, a fix available but nobody bothers!
I don't think that was Einsteins point.
So is a fix for other horribly insecure critical internet infrastructure like DNS and DHCP. But using them costs money. And in this particular case of BGP, the ones that could secure it even have a good reason to leave it insecure.
We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
These attacks can be used to sneakily siphon off some of the mining proceeds into an attacker’s account.
Wrong. Mining proceeds are protected by a private key. Nothing an ISP can do will reveal that private key, thus they cannot siphon proceeds.