Slashdot Mirror
EFF Warns Most Of Intel's Chipsets Contain 'A Security Hazard' (eff.org)
The EFF is issuing a warning about the "tiny homunculus computer" in most of Intel's chipsets -- the largely-undocumented "Management Engine" which houses more than just the AMT module. An anonymous reader quotes their report:
While AMT can be disabled, there is presently no way to disable or limit the Management Engine in general. Intel urgently needs to provide one....vulnerabilities in any of the other modules could be as bad, if not worse, for security. Some of the other modules include hardware-based authentication code and a system for location tracking and remote wiping of laptops for anti-theft purposes... It should be up to hardware owners to decide if this code will be installed in their computers or not. Perhaps most alarmingly, there is also reportedly a DRM module that is actively working against the user's interests, and should never be installed in a Management Engine by default...
While Intel may put a lot of effort into hunting for security bugs, vulnerabilities will inevitably exist, and having them lurking in a highly privileged, low-level component with no OS visibility or reliable logging is a nightmare for defensive cybersecurity. The design choice of putting a secretive, unmodifiable management chip in every computer was terrible, and leaving their customers exposed to these risks without an opt-out is an act of extreme irresponsibility... EFF believes that Intel needs to provide a minimum level of transparency and user control of the Management Engines inside our computers, in order to prevent this cybersecurity disaster from recurring. Unless that happens, we are concerned that it may not be appropriate to use Intel CPUs in many kinds of critical infrastructure systems.
TLDR: "We have reason to fear that the undocumented master controller inside our Intel chips could continue to be a source of serious vulnerabilities in personal computers, servers, and critical cybersecurity and physical infrastructure."
While Intel may put a lot of effort into hunting for security bugs, vulnerabilities will inevitably exist, and having them lurking in a highly privileged, low-level component with no OS visibility or reliable logging is a nightmare for defensive cybersecurity. The design choice of putting a secretive, unmodifiable management chip in every computer was terrible, and leaving their customers exposed to these risks without an opt-out is an act of extreme irresponsibility... EFF believes that Intel needs to provide a minimum level of transparency and user control of the Management Engines inside our computers, in order to prevent this cybersecurity disaster from recurring. Unless that happens, we are concerned that it may not be appropriate to use Intel CPUs in many kinds of critical infrastructure systems.
TLDR: "We have reason to fear that the undocumented master controller inside our Intel chips could continue to be a source of serious vulnerabilities in personal computers, servers, and critical cybersecurity and physical infrastructure."
AMD has a similar feature. the FSF warned about these backdoors in both
Intel and AMD CPUs a while ago. I think the said the last processor made
without this "backdoor" was an AMD processor made in 2011.
I roll my eyes every time I see the EFF go on any tirade against DRM. Ignore that part and focus on what the intent is.
If the intent is anti-consumer, or anti-privacy, then the feature should be disabled. If the feature is meant for easier remote management of systems in a data center, then the feature should be be scrutinized.
Like we have had IPMI for over a decade, and IPMI tends to be even less secure, despite typically being completely independent of the system even being powered on. AMT/vPro is just Intel's version of the same idea.
If we appeal to paranoid delusional idiots like some of the fringe people in the EFF, then remote management features will not be in any system, thus even shittier, expensive, remote management tools end up being implemented instead. Look at Dell's DRAC and SuperMicro's IPMI cards, these are additional 300$ parts that are a completely self-contained ARM-based Linux computer that has access to the host machines sensors and power, without having network access. They typically emulate a serial port or directly interface with the VGA/PS2 keyboard and Mouse on later models. So if you're afraid of Intel AMT, consider that there are millions of systems that have poorly configured IPMI in data centers because these self-contained linux systems NEVER RECEIVE A SINGLE UPDATE.
Now this is the feature that screams of interference by a spy agency. If this feature was for Management, then YOU COULD MANAGE IT! It would be turned off by default. You could turn it off. You could permanently disable it. I have been asking for these capabilities for years. I know I am not the only one. When I talk to other security folks and IT admins, the majority of them want to be able to manage and control the possibility of remote management.
This is the best info on what it is I found:
"Built into many Intel-based platforms is a small, low power computer subsystem called the Intel Management Engine (Intel ME). This can perform various tasks while the system is booting, running or sleeping. It operates independently from the main CPU, BIOS & OS but can interact with them if needed. The ME is responsible for many parts of an Intel-based system. Such functionality extends, but it's not limited, to Platform Clocks Control (ICC), Thermal Monitoring, Fan Control, Power Management, Overclocking, Silicon Workaround (resolves silicon bugs which would have otherwise required a new cpu stepping), Identity Protection Technology, Rapid Start Technology, Smart Connect Technology, Sensor Hub Controller (ISHC), Active Management Technology (AMT), Small Business Advantage (SBA), Wireless Display, Protected Video/Audio Path etc. For certain advanced/corporate features (AMT, SBA etc) the ME uses an out-of-band (OOB) network interface to perform functions even when the system is powered down, the OS and/or hard drivers are non-functional etc. Thus it's essential for it to be operational in order for the platform to be working properly, no matter if the advanced/corporate features are available or not."
Sure, the remote management bits can be disabled (and in many cases aren't even supported), but part of that sounds pretty impossible to disable. From what I gather AMD is using ARM's TrustZone to achieve pretty much the same things.
Live today, because you never know what tomorrow brings
Aren't Intel and AMD pretty much the only games in town?
Among x86, yeah, pretty much. There used to be some others, like Cyrix and Transmeta, but I don't think they're around any more.
Non-x86 might be the only practical escape at the moment, or much older x86 stuff. Which means open source software, and also, will preclude almost all PC based gaming. For basic web browsing, local email, and similar, I imagine you could do OK with an ARM based device.
AMD actually goes even further with TrustZone, literally implementing a full arm core on die.
if I am going to be buying a chipset then who do I buy it from if I want to talk with my wallet? Aren't Intel and AMD pretty much the only games in town?
Regrettably the alternative is quite expensive. IBM's Power8 chip is the open-source hardware alternative.
The Talos would be an example of a libre computer using this hardware.
Your are so wrong it's not even funny. The intel ME is included in every single Intel chip produced since 2008. If you own an Intel computer that you haven't had since before Obama was president your computer is vulnerable. Period. There is no doubt about this and it's fully acknowledged and published in all the releases from Intel about this vulnerability. It's remotely executable and the code to do so is live in the hacker community.