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Access Codes For United Cockpit Doors Accidentally Posted Online (techcrunch.com)
According to the Wall Street Journal, the access codes to United's cockpit doors were accidentally posted on a public website by a flight attendant. "[United Continental Holdings], which owns United Airlines and United Express, asked pilots to follow security procedures already in use, including visually confirming someone's identity before they are allowed onto the flight deck even if they enter the correct security code into the cockpit door's keypad," reports TechCrunch. From the report: The Air Line Pilots Association, a union that represents 55,000 pilots in the U.S. and Canada, told the WSJ on Sunday that the problem had been fixed. The notable thing about this security breach is that it was caused by human error, not a hack, and illustrates how vulnerable cockpits are to intruders despite existing safety procedures. The Air Line Pilots Association has advocated for secondary barriers made from mesh or steel cables to be installed on cockpits doors to make it harder to break into, but airlines have said that they aren't necessary.
Here, have a link to a paper:
"The first part of this paper presents an experimental investigation on explosive spalling of six full-scale normal strength reinforced concrete slabs subjected to conventional fire curve ISO834 and severe hydrocarbon fire curve, performed at the Fire Research Centre, University of Ulster, UK focusing on concrete thermal behaviour and the explosive spalling phenomenon. Each slab was loaded with 65% of its BS8110 design load and was heated from the bottom side only. Temperatures profile was recorded at three depths within the slabs and the moisture content was also measured before and after the tests."
If that's not enough info for you, you can read this entire PhD thesis on the topic.
i.e. at high temperatures high-strength concrete comes apart. If the temperature is high enough it will lose all cohesion.
The airplanes were fully fueled. The fuel basically ignited on crash and flooded the top floors and then dripped down over the elevator shafts and stairs. The temperature was high enough that the concrete lost cohesion and you basically ended up with what looked like a controlled implosion. OBL was a civil engineer. He certainly had the know how to analyze the problem and know this would happen in the first place.
The code doesn't matter that much. There are two codes, a normal one and an emergency one.
The normal code just makes an audible signal in the cockpit. The pilots then look at the camera screen to make sure that it's a crew member with no terrorists behind him/her. If all looks OK, they flip a switch to unlock the door. So what if a terrorists knows the code? The pilots will see "hey, that person's not supposed to enter" and keep the door shut. And yes, we do always check the camera. Our life could depend on it.
Then what about the emergency code? It causes a similar sound that goes on for 30 seconds. If no action is taken by the pilots during those 30 seconds, the door is briefly unlocked so it can be pushed open. However, the pilots can simply block entry with a single switch. Since they have 30 seconds to do so, this is not really a big security risk either. The purpose is just to allow a crew member to enter if the pilot(s) are incapacitated.
People get freaked out "OMG they have the access codes to the cockpit" but in reality this really is a non-issue. We had the same problem in my company, some comedian said the codes on a radio show and we got all these memos changing the codes and reminding us how vitally important it supposedly was that they were kept secret. Big deal. They might as well install a simple button instead of a keypad, it wouldn't make a difference.
Technology for remote (or alternatively autonomous) operation is existing, it 'only' needs certification for passenger transport.
It would need a little more than just certification.
People always go "80% of crashes are due to pilot error, so let's get rid of the pilots, the autopilot can fly the plane by itself anyway". What they don't know, is how often automation screws up and no crash occurs because the pilots were there to prevent it. In 20 years of flying I've had quite a few of those.
In fact, a lot of "pilot error" crashes were really due to automation failures where the pilots were (rightfully) blamed for not having intervened. Autothrottle pulls the throttles back to idle at 1000 ft because a failing radio altimeter said the plane was about to touch down? Pilot error, they should have seen the throttles move backward and the speed decrease, and should have immediately reacted by taking manual control. As other pilots have on numerous occasions.
Another example, the Air France flight from Rio that stalled and crashed into the Atlantic. Yes, the pilots stalled the airplane. But the only reason they were flying manually was because the automation had already given up. The same situation had already occurred with other crews and they had corrected the situation without crashing.
Take the pilots out, with the current state of technology, and you'll see two orders of magnitude more crashes.
How many military drones do they have flying around? Only a few, a ridiculously small number compared to passenger aircraft, yet drone crashes are a pretty frequent occurrence. Even though their missions are usually extremely simple: take off in good weather, fly a predetermined GPS trajectory, come back along a fixed trajectory and land in good weather. And they are vastly simpler mechanically because they don't need things like air conditioning, seats, etc. Yet they crash all the time.
Come on, we can't even write a word processor or spreadsheet that doesn't crash occasionally, and you want to make automatic planes?
Look, this is Slashdot. Without fail some guy will spend maybe three seconds thinking and then post his pin-headed conclusion about what's wrong with something, as if everyone else in the world is an idiot and can't consider even the simplest things. That guy is always wrong.