A Year After Mirai: DVR Torture Chamber Test Shows Two Minutes Between Exploits (sans.edu)

UnderAttack writes: Over two days, the Internet Storm Center connected a default configured DVR to the internet, and rebooted it every 5 minutes in order to allow as many bots as possible to infect it. They detected about one successful attack (using the correct password xc3511) every 2 minutes. Most of the attackers were well known vulnerable devices. A year later, what used to be known as the "Mirai" botnet has branched out into many different variants. But it looks like much hyped "destructive" variants like Brickerbot had little or no impact.

Comments

Re:Honey pot?

[duke_cheetah2003]

Wouldn't it have just been simpler to create a honey pot that answered to the correct password?

Malware authors are getting increasingly good at detecting honey pot environments. Using the real deal is a good call, IMHO.

Re:PhD?

[J053]

OK, the drawing accompanying the report could have used something other than a "camera" icon for the DVR under test, and yes, it was probably an "Anran" DVR. Having said that, Dr. Ullrich has a PhD in physics from SUNY Albany, and the SANS Institute has been a well-respected source of systems administration and network security education since the mid 90s, at least.

I really don't understand why GP felt the need to throw shade on the producer of the report, rather than address the findings themselves, but whatever.

Re:What about NATs?

[AmiMoJo]

UPNP: Hay, just let anyone who wants access to your house bash a hole in the wall!