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Russian Hackers Exploited Kaspersky Antivirus To Steal NSA Data on US Cyber Defense: WSJ (wsj.com)
An NSA contractor brought home highly classified documents that detailed how the U.S. penetrates foreign computer networks and defends against cyberattacks. The contractor used Kaspersky antivirus on his home computer, which hackers working for the Russian government exploited to steal the documents, the WSJ reported on Thursday (the link could be paywalled; alternative source), citing multiple people with knowledge of the matter. From the report: The hackers appear to have targeted the contractor after identifying the files through the contractor's use of a popular antivirus software made by Russia-based Kaspersky Lab, these people said. The theft, which hasn't been disclosed, is considered by experts to be one of the most significant security breaches in recent years. It offers a rare glimpse into how the intelligence community thinks Russian intelligence exploits a widely available commercial software product to spy on the U.S. The incident occurred in 2015 but wasn't discovered until spring of last year, said the people familiar with the matter. Having such information could give the Russian government information on how to protect its own networks, making it more difficult for the NSA to conduct its work. It also could give the Russians methods to infiltrate the networks of the U.S. and other nations, these people said. Ahead of the publication of WSJ report, Kaspersky founder Eugene Kaspersky tweeted, "New conspiracy theory, anon sources media story coming. Note we make no apologies for being aggressive in the battle against cyberthreats."
The problem here isn't Kaspersky and Russian hackers, they're just being opportunistic.
The REAL problem here is a dumb @$$ contractor who stole classified information and brought it home.
Why isn't the contractor, both company and employee, being punished for breach of secure information? Any other countries' spooks would want this info, including our allies.
Ahh that's right, let's just take this as an opportunity to bash Russia some more while our real enemy China is cleaning out both our industrial trade and military secrets! /sarcasm
The idiot Hal Smith, former NSA employee, apparently put stuff that shouldn't have been seen outside a SCIF on his home system. His content was exfiltrated, presumably by Russians. But now it's the vector of the exfiltration's fault that classified material was stolen.
News flash: the system was broken the moment the stuff saw a computer outside of an airgapped network. For that matter, Mr. Smith put himself in criminal jeopardy at that moment.
If the guy had been using Avast or Bitdefender, would that have made you feel better? Do you really think the Russians couldn't penetrate the firms providing those products? Think again.
While we're at it, do you really think that the Russians are the only people soaking up data from the US like a sponge? Why so much focus on their activities? You'd think people had a political axe to grind, almost...
HBI's Law: Frequency of calling others Nazis is directly correlated with the likelihood of the accuser being Communist.
Although doesn't this:
Note we make no apologies for being aggressive in the battle against cyberthreats.
Sound like a tacit admission?
No, it does not. It merely says that if the Kaspersky scanner detected files it suspected of being malware but did not know yet (e.g. because the identification was via suspicious behavior pattern, not code signature), it phones home. That is standard behavior and no secret. In fact, you agree to that in the license and it can, I believe, be switched off.
So what likely happened here is that the Kaspersky product was configured to send suspected, but yet unknown, malware files to Kaspersky and it did correctly identify some NSA malware as such and sent them to Kaspersky. I men, seriously, this is what correctly working AV is supposed to do. This whole thing is much more likely about the NSA being butthurt that their criminal activity (criminal everywhere outside the US that is) was discovered and that their respective malware is now detected by Kaspersky. Add to that a few creatively misleading statements to the WSJ reporters (who have zero understanding of what is going on and how the respective technology works) and you have what the WSJ is reporting now.
Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
Sadly, yes it is.
Many years ago when I was doing the Navy thing, I would find classified stuff just laying about, unsecured in staterooms.
( Security patrols in case you're wondering why I was even in Officer's Country )
The vast majority of it was documentation of various things found on a ship that was tossed onto a table or rack ( bed ) in a stateroom. Easy to spot due to the color of the cover sheets. ( blue, red, orange, etc )
Apparently the junior officers thought closing the door to their stateroom was enough to protect it. :|
I thought about hiding it from them just to watch the panic set in when they realized a Secret book was now missing, but it would have ended their careers, so I usually just educated them on it.
Stuff up to Secret levels only. Most TS+ and Crypto related stuff required 2-person control and they were much more protective of it.
I'm willing to buy the argument that they were more easily exploitable because of their domestic Russian base -- that means vulnerable humans who can turned through the usual apparatus of spycraft and domestic security services, as well as increased general vulnerability because of their geographic location.
That being said, I think any software producer whose products are expected to run at "ring zero" of security should be thought of as vulnerable, regardless of where they are based. I'm sure the intelligence services and security services long ago made the conceptual leap that these were vulnerable targets that would give them direct entry into high value targets due to the nature of their functional security requirements.
I think the chain of trust anymore is pretty much broken and it's not really very paranoid to consider anything secure.