WPA2 Security Flaw Puts Almost Every Wi-Fi Device at Risk of Hijack, Eavesdropping (zdnet.com)
A security protocol at the heart of most modern Wi-Fi devices, including computers, phones, and routers, has been broken, putting almost every wireless-enabled device at risk of attack. From a report: The bug, known as "KRACK" for Key Reinstallation Attack, exposes a fundamental flaw in WPA2, a common protocol used in securing most modern wireless networks. Mathy Vanhoef, a computer security academic, who found the flaw, said the weakness lies in the protocol's four-way handshake, which securely allows new devices with a pre-shared password to join the network. That weakness can, at its worst, allow an attacker to decrypt network traffic from a WPA2-enabled device, hijack connections, and inject content into the traffic stream. In other words: hackers can eavesdrop on your network traffic. The bug represents a complete breakdown of the WPA2 protocol, for both personal and enterprise devices -- putting every supported device at risk. "If your device supports Wi-Fi, it is most likely affected," said Vanhoef, on his website. News of the vulnerability was later confirmed on Monday by US Homeland Security's cyber-emergency unit US-CERT, which about two months ago had confidentially warned vendors and experts of the bug, ZDNet has learned.
Public announcement from Mathy Vanhoef is https://www.krackattacks.com/ and his research paper can be found https://papers.mathyvanhoef.co....
WPA2 enterprise doesn't use a pre-shared key. So which is it? Does the weakness lie with pre-shared key passwords? Or something else which also affects WPA2 enterprise?
Ah, here we go. The answer is "it's complicated." I'm reading through it right now, but as a PSA:
In the future can we link to original source articles or responses by authoritative organizations, instead of trade rags?
Replay packet 3 in the 4 way handshake, and the client will encrypt two different payloads with the same key and nonce. A big mistake with most encryption methods.
Worse, linux wpa_supplicant nulls out the key memory but still processes the replayed packet, causing the client to use a known (zero) key.
09F91102 no, 455FE104 nope, F190A1E8 uh-uh, 7A5F8A09 that's not it, C87294CE no. Ah! 452F6E403CDF10714E41DFAA257D313F.
Need to build a device with the special software and come within range of a router to sniff the keys. Then can eaves drop on communication between router and client.
It will take a day at least to build it and then one has to come physically close.
Vulnerable places will be coffee shops, malls, airports etc. Stores that use wi-fi between cash registers and router would be the primary target. BTW Target had security cameras and cash registers talking to the same router using same passwords. If I remember it correctly.
sed -e 's/Chuck Norris/Rajnikant/g' joke > fact
No it is an attack on both. Though it appears that patched clients would be safe while connected to an upatched AP.
And vice versa, a patched AP can prevent a client from breaking. One or the other side needs to prevent it, but either side by itself is sufficient.
XML is like violence. If it doesn't solve the problem, use more.