MINIX: Intel's Hidden In-chip Operating System (zdnet.com)

Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, writing for ZDNet: Matthew Garrett, the well-known Linux and security developer who works for Google, explained recently that, "Intel chipsets for some years have included a Management Engine [ME], a small microprocessor that runs independently of the main CPU and operating system. Various pieces of software run on the ME, ranging from code to handle media DRM to an implementation of a TPM. AMT [Active Management Technology] is another piece of software running on the ME." [...] At a presentation at Embedded Linux Conference Europe, Ronald Minnich, a Google software engineer reported that systems using Intel chips that have AMT, are running MINIX. So, what's it doing in Intel chips? A lot. These processors are running a closed-source variation of the open-source MINIX 3. We don't know exactly what version or how it's been modified since we don't have the source code. In addition, thanks to Minnich and his fellow researchers' work, MINIX is running on three separate x86 cores on modern chips. There, it's running: TCP/IP networking stacks (4 and 6), file systems, drivers (disk, net, USB, mouse), web servers. MINIX also has access to your passwords. It can also reimage your computer's firmware even if it's powered off. Let me repeat that. If your computer is "off" but still plugged in, MINIX can still potentially change your computer's fundamental settings. And, for even more fun, it "can implement self-modifying code that can persist across power cycles." So, if an exploit happens here, even if you unplug your server in one last desperate attempt to save it, the attack will still be there waiting for you when you plug it back in. How? MINIX can do all this because it runs at a fundamentally lower level. [...] According to Minnich, "there are big giant holes that people can drive exploits through." He continued, "Are you scared yet? If you're not scared yet, maybe I didn't explain it very well, because I sure am scared." Also read: Andrew S. Tanenbaum's (a professor of Computer Science at Vrije Universiteit) open letter to Intel.

Comments

Three questions

[Anonymous Coward]

1) Do AMD processors have similar vulnerabilities or is this an Intel issue only?

2) Why isn't Intel being held responsible to fix this, either by action of lawmakers or through lawsuits for providing a faulty product?

3) Shouldn't Intel either have to patch the vulnerabilities or issue a recall?

The years of the Minux desktop

[sinij]

Apparently, we have been having years of Minux desktop all this time and never knew.

Re:So it's a backdoor///

[swillden]

Let's call this what it is: A variation of the "clipper chip" like the government tried to do years ago, except this is more powerful and way worse.

That's a mischaracterization so egregious it could be called a lie.

The ME (and AMD's analogous PSP) have nothing to do with government, and nothing to do with cryptography (though they make heavy use of it). Clipper was about enforcing a standardized encryption mechanism with a built-in backdoor specifically for law enforcement. Completely different thing.

ME and PSP are remote system management tools. Their purpose is to enable enterprises to remotely administer systems, including not only being able to remotely install a new operating system, but to strongly verify the installation from the running OS. The reason it's in all systems, not just systems targeted at enterprise use, is that it's more economical to have a single solution

That said... you are absolutely correct that these tools *could* be used by malicious parties, whether for corporate espionage, government intrusion or anything else, and they are incredibly powerful, and not understood nearly well enough outside of the teams at Intel and AMD who build them. I know some of the people at Intel who work on this stuff and I'm pretty confident that they're doing good work, and doing the right things... but the lack of transparency makes me really nervous.

Remote management tools make sense, but it should be possible for end users to disable them, or to take ownership of them and use them for their own ends. The details of exactly how they work, including their source code, should be published. Indeed, I think government should mandate the publication of low-level system management tools and firmware. We need a lot more academic research into the security and operation of these systems.