Slashdot Mirror
1 in 3 Michigan Workers Tested Opened A Password-Phishing Email (go.com)
An anonymous reader quotes the AP:
Michigan auditors who conducted a fake "phishing" attack on 5,000 randomly selected state employees said Friday that nearly one-third opened the email, a quarter clicked on the link and almost one-fifth entered their user ID and password. The covert operation was done as part of an audit that uncovered weaknesses in the state government's computer network, including that not all workers are required to participate in cybersecurity awareness training... Auditors made 14 findings, including five that are "material" -- the most serious. They range from inadequate management of firewalls to insufficient processes to confirm if only authorized devices are connected to the network. "Unauthorized devices may not meet the state's requirements, increasing the risk of compromise or infection of the network," the audit said.
We have similar results during my companies initial phishing test so I suspect that this result is not uncommon. Sending out training and multiple rounds of phishing test emails (which then require more training if you click) is the ONLY way to bring this number down. The users need to be made as paranoid as possible before clicking ANY links. After a year and a 1/2 we still have a few repeat offenders who still click on the links or enter username/passwords so Multi factor authentication was implemented, but its far far less then we previously had. Posting as AC for obvious reasons.
I've got the sender and subject visible to me, if they look legit of course I'm gonna open it. I don't click links unless it's something like a new website setup or lost password reset or somesuch where I'm expecting a message. I never enter logins nor passwords to links I get in email.
In other words, opening the email isn't (err, shouldn't be) the problem. It's what you do after that that's the problem.
Then again, I don't use Outlook so opening the email isn't all that hazardous to me.
1/3 opened the email? That means that 2/3 don't read their email.
You can't tell if it's a phish just by the subject line and the displayed sender name, you have to at least check the sender email address, path headers and link html to make an informed decision.
the email system never verified the URL nor where the email was from
so your email system is so poor you have to rely on the end user not to click on a link ?
simply block / rewrite URL's that have not been verified
only accept mail from domains that have been verified and claim the email is from them
(for example that have DNSSEC and DANE setup correctly as gov address's have this and can therefore prove that they sent the email)
simple basics that are not the end users fault
... and I dealt with it during my career. I'm a retired IT.
I held seminars, talked to employees one-on-one, and damned if we didn't still get hit.
It was a law firm and the staff never fell for phishing.
My problem was the fucking lawyers, especially the managing partner!
That bastard would click on anything.
He got a goddam email that said his UPS package wasn't going anywhere unless he looked at the invoice and corrected the address.
I asked him if he sent anything via UPS and he said, no.
I asked him if he remembered signing an exclusive with FedEx that I negotiated and he did.
I asked him if he, personally, ever sent a package anywhere or if he let his staff do that -- he said staff.
He did that shit over and over again.
--
I'm waiting for AI to step in; predict the outcome of clicking on a link and forbidding forward progress until an IT person concurs.
It little behooves the best of us to comment on the rest of us.
The 20% is the important statistic and that's scary enough already; no need for ABC News to embellish the story.
I've been a part of aggressive, well crafted phishing tests in Silicon Valley companies. Some of those tests were secret enough that only 3 people were aware of the test in advance... and the results were terrifying. Thanks to HTML abuse, forged headers and very good copy, I've seen 70% of storied security teams fall for the phishing attempt, going as far as to enter their 2fa values for AWS. In a real world situation, just one person falling for it would have been a problem.
In practice, what I have learned is that against a sophisticated opponent, any security system that relies on just usernames, passwords, and simple 2fa might as well not exist. The bare minimum is unique usernames and passwords just to double check that the right human is on the other side, attached to client certificates that are unique to each machine, and strong mechanisms to make sure that nobody generates user + certificate pairs for new computers without big flashing signs popping up. Anything weaker is just relying on being an uninteresting target, which is not a good thing to rely on.
The 1/5 entering their password into the website is the buried lead IMHO. That's absolutely ridiculous.
I read the internet for the articles.
I have found that when the security team sends out "phishing" emails about once a month, that helps. Opening the link takes the employee to a page reminding them about phishing. If instead they click the "report" button in Outlook, they get a happy message. It changes behavior after a few months.