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Suspicious Event Hijacks Amazon Traffic For 2 hours, Steals Cryptocurrency (arstechnica.com)
Amazon lost control of some of its widely used cloud services for two hours on Tuesday morning when hackers exploited a known Internet-protocol weakness that allowed them to redirect traffic to rogue destinations, according to media reports. ArsTechnica: The attackers appeared to use one server masquerading as cryptocurrency website MyEtherWallet.com to steal digital coins from unwitting end users. They may have targeted other customers of Amazon's Route 53 service as well. The incident, which started around 6am California time, hijacked roughly 1,300 IP addresses, Oracle-owned Internet Intelligence said on Twitter. The malicious redirection was caused by fraudulent routes that were announced by Columbus, Ohio-based eNet, a large Internet service provider that is referred to as autonomous system 10297. Once in place, the eNet announcement caused some of its peers to send traffic over the same unauthorized routes. [...] Tuesday's event may also have ties to Russia, because MyEtherWallet traffic was redirected to a server in that country, security researcher Kevin Beaumont said in a blog post. The redirection came by rerouting domain name system traffic and using a server hosted by Chicago-based Equinix to perform a man-in-the-middle attack. MyEtherWallet officials said the hijacking was used to send end users to a phishing site. Participants in this cryptocurrency forum appear to discuss the scam site. Further reading: Hacker Hijacks DNS Server of MyEtherWallet to Steal $160,000 (BleepingComputer).
This was not dns hijacking. It’s BGP hijacking. The routing protocol is horribly outdated and has no security at all. No authentication, no validation. We need a new version of BGP that includes some way to authenticate updates and ensure the routes are for addresses the AS number is authoritative for in some way.
If he explores all forms and substances Straight homeward to their symbol-essences; He shall not die.
It has security. The edge providers have responsibility to not accept announces from customers for IP subtest that do not belong to them. It seems like the guys in Ohio screwed up and allowed receiving and redistributing any announce whatsoever. This is not backbone. Edges should use BGP filters from customers
You are confusing two technologies. The DNS systems employed by lets encrypt doo foot server lookups, and it would be difficult to have a coordinated attack hijack all of their authorization servers. The vulnerability here is in BGP, which advertises routes to public IPs. There are no defenses or security against route hijacking, which allows an attack to take place.