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Intel's 10nm Cannon Lake CPUs Won't Arrive in Mass Quantities Until 2019, Company Says (pcgamer.com)
Intel said this week that it is once again delaying the mass production of its 10-nanometer "Cannon Lake" chips. The company insists that it is already building the chips in low volumes, but said it "now expects 10-nanometer volume production to shift to 2019 [rather than the end of 2018]." From a report: Intel is on solid footing, in other words, though pesky challenges remain in manufacturing its next-generation 10nm parts. CEO Brian Krzanich acknowledged as much during an earnings call, attributing the delay to difficulties in getting 10nm yields to where they need to be. So rather than push to ship 10nm in volume this year, Intel is giving itself some additional time to sort things out.
First, these are Cannon Lake chips. Remember Cannon Lake, due late 2016? Delayed until late 2017? Delayed until late in the first half of 2018? Yup, that Cannon Lake. Among other things, Cannon Lake was scheduled to introduce LPDDR4, so would be the first Intel mobile chips that could manage 32GB of RAM without using a huge power budget. If you think it's bad for Intel now, wait for the Apple fanboys to notice...
Second, one of the features that people have been waiting for since it was originally announced in 2016 and was expected to debut with Cannon Lake is Intel's Control-flow Enforcement Technology. This comprises two parts. The first is a set of magic nops that indicate a valid branch target and protect forward control flow arcs (any jump that isn't to a designated landing pad will trap in code marked as supporting the feature). The second is a secure stack. Every call instruction pushes the return address onto the main stack, but also onto a second stack (which is not readable or writeable by normal instructions). Each ret instruction checks the top of both stacks and traps if they disagree. Sounds great? That's what everyone thought last year, but unfortunately it is incompatible with the retpoline Spectre mitigation that is now fairly widely deployed, so CET is now impossible to deploy in the presence of code using retpolines (e.g. Chrome) and so needs to be redesigned very late in the schedule or skipped entirely.
I am TheRaven on Soylent News
. I'm looking forward to trying out AMD for the first time,
You won't be disappointed with AMD this go around. Take a look at the specs for the new 2700X.
https://www.cpubenchmark.net/c...
That is a $329 chip and has better performance than the closest intel chip in that class, the 8700K. The 8700K is also $30 bucks more. Sure there are more powerful intel chips but those chips are in the $1000+ range.
You can also find AMD chips in that range too but if you are going to do a bitch'n build and not break the bank the 2700X seems to be the way to go.
I read at +2. If your post doesn't reach that level I will not see or respond to it.
The best way to describe spectre is that's it's fundamental to how all out of order instruction processors work. All out of order processors will suffer from spectre.
Getting rid of spectre would require the return to in order execution at a MASSIVE performance penalty, more than 50% and probably closer to 75% drop in compute power. It's mitigateable but it's going to have hundreds of edge cases that will be found for years so it's going to take a long time (years) and a lot of rewriting in the fundamental parts of OS's to negate Spectre based attacks.
Spectre is fundamental to the design assumptions of all modern processors, as I like to say it's the bug that's going to give and give and give. They probably won't have found most of the edge cases until after 2020 so we should expect yearly/quarterly patches to spectre like attacks for a long time.
One thing that's not mentioned in a lot of the articles but the timing based attacks that comprise the spectre attacks were discovered years ago. It took several years for someone to find and demonstrate the first version of these attacks but most experts think this is just the beginning and that we're looking toward years of these type of attacks on all aspects of operating systems and CPU's.
In other words, spectre was just the first timing attack, there will be more, probably a lot more now that there is an actual example of how to do them.
ESXi is it's own OS that runs the bare metal that's known as the host. The entire purpose of that OS is to be the hypervisor for all VMs that will run on it. Technically, ESXi is known as a Type-1 hypervisor. VMWare Workstation as an application that runs on Windows, that would be a Type-2.
Trivia time: Did you know that Microsoft Hyper-V is technically a Type-1. It's true. Hyper-V isn't a seperate application that runs on Windows; it gets away with being a Type-1 because it's part of Windows.
In regards to the AC post - He/she is correct. You can't VMotion a running VM in HA mode from AMD to Intel and vice versa. In fact, even in a pure Intel host cluster, the entire cluster is rated at the lowest common denominator in CPU generations. So if one of your host boxes has an older CPU, all hosts within that cluster must be configured to only use instructions sets of that generation. Conversely if you wanted to upgrade the CPU instruction set capability, you just replace that one host.
Life is not for the lazy.