None of Google's 85,000 Employees Have Been Phished in More Than a Year After Company Required Them to Use Physical Security Keys For 2FA (krebsonsecurity.com)
Google has not had any of its 85,000+ employees successfully phished on their work-related accounts since early 2017, when it began requiring all employees to use physical Security Keys in place of passwords and one-time codes, the company told KrebsOnSecurity. From the report: Security Keys are inexpensive USB-based devices that offer an alternative approach to two-factor authentication (2FA), which requires the user to log in to a Web site using something they know (the password) and something they have (e.g., a mobile device). A Google spokesperson said Security Keys now form the basis of all account access at Google. "We have had no reported or confirmed account takeovers since implementing security keys at Google," the spokesperson said. "Users might be asked to authenticate using their security key for many different apps/reasons. It all depends on the sensitivity of the app and the risk of the user at that point in time." The basic idea behind two-factor authentication is that even if thieves manage to phish or steal your password, they still cannot log in to your account unless they also hack or possess that second factor.
It was this article that finally made me switch from SMS verification codes for my personal email (gmail): Wired article
And I went to Google Authenticator only after I figured out how to put the same code on multiple devices and assure myself that I had enough backup hard copies of keys that I would not likely get locked out permanently should I ever lose my phone, etc.
The U2F works great for corporate, etc. where you have a support team who can help you in case you lose it or forget anything. They can make you come in person and prove that you are you.
The problem with implementing this (without enough backups) for personal is that if you ever lose all of your key info or code generator, you are absolutely fucked because there is no way to prove who you are to Google and have them reset your password / security. So you've got to have multiple backups in different places should your house ever burn down, etc.
Every time I log into a new box, the checkbox to remember this computer (and thus bypass 2FA in future) is pre-checked when inserting my hardware token.
Yes, signing into a machine means that to a certain degree I believe it's not already compromised. However, if I was wrong, and it was compromised, at least the hardware token should prevent password replays after 20 seconds had elapsed. Not with Google's defaults though! AFAIK there isn't even an option to change the default to unchecked if I wanted to.
Earlier this summer, Yubico mentioned this as part of a conference. For something as large as Google, this is pretty notable.
The biggest advantage the Yubikeys give is the proof there is some type of living being at the machine, via the button press. Of course, this doesn't mean 100% security in the future, but it means that an attack has to be done and queued up when someone is using the machine.
We started requiring a YubiKey USB key, and hours worked by people from home dropped over 20%! YubiKey claims to be FIPS compliant which is what our SSAE 16 requirements require. Security is important, but blocking people working extra hours is a huge cost.
Maybe I'm being totally clueless here, but I'm sure some of you more well versed in system security than I am can provide insight.
What I don't get about 2 factor is, it seems like only the "second step" provides the true security? I mean, considering you already have the additional hassle of having to enter a randomly generated key code, produced on your piece of hardware you're carrying around, why even bother with the first part; the traditional password, anymore?
Passwords are regularly getting hacked or stolen from databases containing them, so they're failing at serving as good security. So why even bother with them anymore? Wouldn't it be just as secure, really, to log in as a user and immediately ask for that randomized, rotating code that the owner's device displays for them to enter?