Hackers Breached Virginia Bank Twice in Eight Months, Stole $2.4M (krebsonsecurity.com)
Brian Krebs reports: Hackers used phishing emails to break into a Virginia bank in two separate cyber intrusions over an eight-month period, making off with more than $2.4 million total. Now the financial institution is suing its insurance provider for refusing to fully cover the losses. According to a lawsuit filed last month in the Western District of Virginia, the first heist took place in late May 2016, after an employee at The National Bank of Blacksburg fell victim to a targeted phishing email. The email allowed the intruders to install malware on the victim's PC and to compromise a second computer at the bank that had access to the STAR Network, a system run by financial industry giant First Data that the bank uses to handle debit card transactions for customers. That second computer had the ability to manage National Bank customer accounts and their use of ATMs and bank cards.
...the clerk never got that $100 Applebee's gift card.
Care killed the cat, but satisfaction brought it back.
It's no longer about preventing attacks from happening, but accepting that they are going to happen and hardening systems to minimize or eliminate theft and damage when they do. This might seem obvious to a lot of people in the tech industry, but it represents a major paradigm shift for banking.
I think they just found out that "cybersecurity insurance" is a joke: one missing patch or badly configured machine and your insurer will deny you. Remember, these are that same folks that manage medical insurance - you sure you want a bunch of "claim denied" messages when your IT systems go t**s up?
Now the financial institution is suing its insurance provider for refusing to fully cover the losses.
Hack me once, shame on you, hack me twice, shame on me?
Seriously, 8 months passed between the phishing incidents. That's plenty enough time to do a security audit and train your staff, and the insurance company knows that.
If you post as Anonymous Coward, don't expect a reply.
Sony, Home Depot, and a number of others have been compromised because they failed to separate what should be secure systems from the rest of their infrastructure. This behaviour is blatantly negligent.
Things always go in threes.
Slashdot, fix the reply notifications... You won't get away with it...
You may have had experience related to insurance and the fire code. Someone may have walked through your office building doing a fire inspection, looking for things like power strips plugged into other power strips, which are in turn plugged into another power strip. That fire inspection was likely done for insurance reasons. The insurance companies created the National Fire Protection Association, which writes the fire codes, and also created Underwriters Laboratories (UL), which does fire testing and allows it's logo to be put on tested products. You've certainly seen products that are UL listed, UL registered, and UL certified. These are some of the ways that insurance companies encourage fire safety.
If you don't comply with fire code, if you're using electrical appliances that aren't UL listed or better, the insurance company will start taking actions that encourage safety compliance. That can range from simply issuing a recommendation to raising your rates until you comply, and even saying "if this problem isn't fixed within three months, we will no longer cover you for electrical fires". The insurance company analyzes the risks and sets rates and other conditions appropriate for the level of risk.
My company, which does cybersecurity, is working with insurance companies to rate cyber risk the same way the rate fire risk. A company's rates will depend on what safeguards they have in place. Take Windows updates for example. If you roll out all Windows updates within 24 hours of release, you'll get the best rate. Roll them out within 2 weeks and you'll get a middle rate. Have XP servers exposed to the internet? The insurance company will probably give you 60 days to fix that, or you're no longer covered for certain things. It's not an all or nothing thing. We deliver a big report, it can be over 100 pages. Each thing in the report can increase or decrease the rate they pay for insurance, or cause the insurance company to not cover certain things until they get fixed.
Here they had a huge loss due to phishing. When paying out that first phishing claim, the insurance company probably said "we don't want this to happen again. In order to be covered for future phishing, you need to reduce your risk by doing x, y, and z". Sure enough 8 months later, another huge loss due to phishing. The bank probably didn't put proper measures in place to mitigate the risk.
One way to reduce phishing risk is for corporate security to send out a "phishing" email about once per month. Employees who click the link see a page reminding them about phishing. Employees who click the "report this email" button in Outlook get a smiley acknowledgement that they did the right thing.
Part of the problem, if judging by the existing 41 comments here on Slashdot, is IT people either *can't* or *won't* read. All y'all are bitching about an insurance company denying the claim, etc.
They didn't deny the claim! There are *two* policy riders possibly that cover situation and the insurance company is claiming the one with the $250,000 cap is the one that applies -- so paid that one.
It is an interesting *legal* situation, but totally not at all what the slashmob is whining about.
Learning HOW to think is more important than learning WHAT to think.
FTFA: "the 2017 breach was embedded in a booby-trapped Microsoft Word document."
Unfortunately most people are too dumb to dump MS, and crackers will continue to win.
This case has nothing to do with claims being denied. The bank has two types of coverage. The first is for 'computer and electronic fraud'. The coverage on that is $8M. That coverage explicitly EXCLUDES 'loses due to purported use of cards to obtain funds or credit'. It also explicity EXCLUDES 'loses from automatic mechanical devices which ... disburse money ...'.
The second coverage they have is for 'debit card/ATM fraud'. The coverage on that is $250K.
So what happened? The thieves, by phishing, got access to the computers and changed PINs, disabled fraud protection and daily limits, etc. They did not steal any money (wire transfers, etc). Then they went to 'hundreds of ATMs' and used fraudulent cards to get money.
So which coverage applies? The insurance company says it was card/ATM fraud, here's your $250K. The bank says if it wasn't for the computer fraud there would have been no ATM fraud, so the higher coverage should apply.
Interesting legal question, but hardly indicative that 'cybersecurity insurance is a joke'.