Georgia Defends Electronic Voting Machines Despite 243-Percent Turnout In One Precinct (arstechnica.com)

"In Chicago, it used to be claimed that even death couldn't stop a person from voting," writes Slashdot reader lunchlady55. "But in the Deep South, there are new reports of discrepancies in voter turnout with the approval of new electronic voting systems." Ars Technica reports: [I]f any state is a poster child for terrible election practices, it is surely Georgia. Bold claims demand bold evidence, and unfortunately there's plenty; on Monday, McClatchy reported a string of irregularities from the state's primary election in May, including one precinct with a 243-percent turnout.

McClatchy's data comes from a federal lawsuit filed against the state. In addition to the problem in Habersham County's Mud Creek precinct, where it appeared that 276 registered voters managed to cast 670 ballots, the piece describes numerous other issues with both voter registration and electronic voting machines. (In fact it was later corrected to show 3,704 registered voters in the precinct.) Multiple sworn statements from voters describe how they turned up at their polling stations only to be turned away or directed to other precincts. Even more statements allege incorrect ballots, frozen voting machines, and other issues. "George is one of four states in the U.S. that continues to use voting machines with no ability to provide voters a paper record so that they can verify the machine counted their vote correctly," the report adds.

Comments

What good is the paper?

[jfdavis668]

The machine could be faulty, print out exactly who you voted for, yet still record your vote wrong. How would having a piece of paper help? You can't go back and change your vote.

Re: What good is the paper?

[ShanghaiBill]

Assuming you get to keep the paper, it makes it possible to audit the results to a much higher degree of certainty.

Not really. It is just a receipt, not a list of who/what you voted for. You can use it to confirm that your vote was counted, but not that the vote was recorded correctly, nor that additional fake ballots were not also counted.

Opponents of electronic voting talk about "paper ballots" like they are some magical thing than ensures fair elections. That is nonsense.

It is easy to have a verified vote.

It is easy to have a secret vote.

It is very, very difficult to have both.

Re: What good is the paper?

[currently_awake]

Make your choices on the computer. Print out ballot. Verify choices printed. If wrong do over or complain. Once satisfied put ballot into ballot box to be counted. There is no need to have the computer count the votes or transmit them to a central location or be connected to a network.

Re: What good is the paper?

[phantomfive]

Where do you get the idea of human vote counters being a huge vulnerability/risk?

Basically from a long history of humans manipulating the vote.

Re: What good is the paper?

[Anonymous Coward]

That's no longer a truly anonymous vote.

Consider: How does your proposed scheme prevent someone threatening me unless I give them the receipt that proves I voted the way they wanted me to?

Re: What good is the paper?

[SuiteSisterMary]

Paper ballots have all kinds of problems, though, including people marking two different candidates,

This at least shifts the source of the problem to 'idiot who marks two candidates' and away from 'random programmer somewhere unknowable, who can do unverifiable things to the software.'

and sometimes needing recounts.

This is a feature, and a very desirable feature at that.

I think we could make electronic voting secure

[rsilvergun]

I also think we don't want to. America is not and has never been a Democracy. And no, I don't mean "We're a Republic". Our entire political system (most notably the Senate and the Electoral college) is built to lesson the effects of Democracy and disenfranchise the 'wrong' type of voter.

Re:Why not just count them?

[SirSlud]

The US is founded on the principle that if there's a right way to do something, they have the freedom to also do it 49 worse ways.

Idea how to do robust electronic voting

[CptJeanLuc]

Here is how one could set up electronic voting. The challenge: votes are anonymous, but transparency in the voting process is needed. How to handle both. Here is the process as I see it:

TL;DR: A public ledger of non-person-identifiable votes that were cast, a system for voters to identify "their" vote and prove whether it was registered correctly, as well as a public register of who casted votes (the vote is still secret) in order to help prevent fake votes from being cast. All enabled through some randomness and cryptographic signatures.

• There needs to be a public register of "who voted". Though voting is anonymous, the fact that you voted does not need to be. This enables accountability because the system cannot produce "fake votes" without significant risk, as they have to produce a person for each vote that is case, and this can be checked later.
• You enter the voting booth. You select your vote (candidate X, abstain, pro/con Brexit, ...).
• The system gives you a (very long) unique receipt number for the vote. You have to add some digits to that number yourself (so the system is not allowed to cheat in choosing a number). The resulting number becomes the "vote ID" for that vote.
• Upon confirming the vote, the system signs the vote (vote ID + vote), and provides a signature to the voter (also available in the form of e.g. a QR code), signed with a private key for that voting maching (which is at the end point of some trust chain). Also, it provides a signature of only vote ID
• If the voter wants, (s)he could e.g. use a mobile app to scan the signatures, to store them and to verify it has been signed, as proof that the signature is valid, so that it can be used as proof that (a) the vote was delivered (vote ID only), or that a vote was cast in a particular way (vote ID + vote).
• The vote ID, the vote and the signatures are printed as a paper receipts for the voter and for the vote handling organization, to ensure there is a paper trail that cannot be tampered with. If tree hugging is an issue, print on recycled diapers or something like that. Voters are requested to retain their receipt (helpful in case of later having to do some random checking of the integrity of the election).
• When voting ends, all votes are published publically in the form of (vote ID + vote). This allows counting votes and identifying unique votes, however only the voters know which vote is his/her vote.
• There is now accountability, because voters can find "their" vote in the ledger, and check whether it has tracked the correct vote. If not, they have proof (in the form of a cryptographic signature) that it is invalid.
• Post-election, notifications are sent to all registered voters, that they have been registered in the system (which helps prevent fraud that people are casting votes in your name, in the name of dead people, etc)

So this kind of setup would make it very risky to try to generate fake votes, as well as allowing the integrity of the votes to be verified after the fact.

Not bad for 5 minutes of thinking (plus some time to refine the idea while typing it up). I am sure some really smart heads could cook up something even better, but this is already miles beyond whatever they have going on in Georgia.

Re:Idea how to do robust electronic voting

[Anonymous Coward]

There is now accountability, because voters can find "their" vote in the ledger, and check whether it has tracked the correct vote.

Show me you voted the way I ordered you to or face the consequences. If you can verify your vote someone willing to threaten people can influence the elections. That is not what you want, and the anonymity requirement should cover this situation. Your idea is not good enough.

Re:Idea how to do robust electronic voting

[Anonymous Coward]

Any system that allows you to check if you voted correctly allows a third party to coerce you into proving how you voted. That allows family, friends, employers, religious leaders etc to demand that people vote the "right way", and encourages the buying of votes by allowing the buyer to verify that they are paying for a real vote.

For democracy to function, it needs to be anonymous, verifiable and SECRET. Paper ballots plus observers hit all three, and scales perfectly well to any size of population.