New Evidence of Hacked Supermicro Hardware Found in US Telecom: Bloomberg (bloomberg.com)
A major U.S. telecommunications company discovered manipulated hardware from Super Micro Computer in its network and removed it in August, fresh evidence of tampering in China of critical technology components bound for the U.S., Bloomberg reported Tuesday. From the report: The security expert, Yossi Appleboum, provided documents, analysis and other evidence of the discovery following the publication of an investigative report in Bloomberg Businessweek that detailed how China's intelligence services had ordered subcontractors to plant malicious chips in Supermicro server motherboards over a two-year period ending in 2015. Appleboum previously worked in the technology unit of the Israeli Army Intelligence Corps and is now co-chief executive officer of Sepio Systems in Gaithersburg, Maryland. His firm specializes in hardware security and was hired to scan several large data centers belonging to the telecommunications company. Bloomberg is not identifying the company due to Appleboum's nondisclosure agreement with the client. Unusual communications from a Supermicro server and a subsequent physical inspection revealed an implant built into the server's Ethernet connector, a component that's used to attach network cables to the computer, Appleboum said.
Has any other news media outfit independently verified the Bloomberg claims?
Where is the evidence? They keep saying they have it. Why don't they show it?
Now Apple and others claim they have no idea what Bloomberg is talking about. Clearly something was installed on Supermicro servers to cause Apple and others to stop using them.
Report from early 2017
https://www.marketwatch.com/st...
Also from that era that they say. I haven't seen anything anomalous. The fact is that some of their IPMI stuff is vulnerable and they're not updating the firmware (eg. old versions of Dropbear SSH), so if you leave it on the Internet, it may get compromised.
On the other hand, I also don't leave that stuff on a routable VLAN. If it tries to connect to anything (and I haven't seen it reach out), I'd notice and it wouldn't work anyway. Sure the IPMI has some hooks into the rest of the hardware so it is potentially capable of doing 'weird stuff' to my Linux or Windows kernels (although it'd have to be pretty smart to intercept keyboard authentication, wait for someone to be away from the keyboard, automatically replay credentials, then load a workable kernel module to do that) and have the OS compromised do the dirty work, but then again, I haven't seen anything there either and we've used various integrity and antivirus systems from TripWire, Sophos and Cylance that probably would've noticed.
Custom electronics and digital signage for your business: www.evcircuits.com
According to the original article - the alleged Chinese culprit chip exploited via the BMC. Aspeed is the company that makes 99% of the BMC controllers in Supermicro boards. If China really did go through the trouble to develop a chip to exploit via Aspeed controllers.... why limit themselves to Supermicro? I know at least Tyan and Lenovo also use Aspeed. From China's intelligence perspective, they would want a solution that could work across multiple board vendors.
According to latest:
Really wish they would give us more to go on than just that. Not sure about other Slashdotters, but I have Tyan/Supermicro/Insert-Taiwanese-Motherboard-Manufacturer boards in production, and would really appreciate more information on what to look for.
Pics or it didn't happen.
"Appleboum said one key sign of the implant is that the manipulated Ethernet connector has metal sides instead of the usual plastic ones."
Take a look at a google image search for "motherboard" and see if you can find an RJ-45 socket that doesn't have a metal shield around it for RF blocking.
Awesome furniture, accessories and cabinetry in Santa Rosa, CA: http://humanity-home.com/
Put in a tightly-configured firewall so your data doesn't get sent anywhere without your approval.
Keep management systems isolated so the data-holding servers can't modify that firewall.
Don't rely on tightly-integrated single-source solutions, so one vendor being compromised won't leave that firewall ineffectual.
Maintain independent layers of security that protect in case of another layer's failure.
That's defense in depth.
You do not have a moral or legal right to do absolutely anything you want.
Do you think that your corporate security team wants to admit that you were infiltrated?
The first dozen companies that admit this will likely see their stock price decline. Do you want your company to go first?
Why put the chip on the Ethernet connector? You know this doesn't decrypt encrypted traffic.
To give it the ability to exchange command-and-control traffic with a remote controller while keeping it from the rest of the system (by "eating" the incoming packets for itself without handing them to the processor's stack, and sending outbound packets directly, again without processing them through the rest of the system.)
This is both convenient, and lets the C&C communicate with the victim box even when the bulk of the victim is shut down.
The Ethernet controller has lots of processing power to play with once it's subverted, control-channel access to the board management system, and already has power-when-the-system-is-down specifically so it can hear the wake-on-LAN packets and bring the machine up to full function - one less mechanism to build.
That's exactly what Intel did when they first started doing Management engines. It was only later versions where they moved it in deeper.
Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way
implant in ethernet connector point to NSA's ANT catalog,
either "COTTONMOUTHIII" https://nsa.gov1.info/dni/nsa-...
or "FIREWALK" https://nsa.gov1.info/dni/nsa-...