Trivial Authentication Bypass In Libssh Leaves Servers Wide Open (arstechnica.com)
Ars Technica reports of "a four-year-old bug in the Secure Shell implementation known as libssh that makes it trivial for just about anyone to gain unfettered administrative control of a vulnerable server." It's not clear how many sites or devices may be vulnerable since neither the widely used OpenSSH nor Github's implementation of libssh was affected. From the report: The vulnerability, which was introduced in libssh version 0.6 released in 2014, makes it possible to log in by presenting a server with a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS message rather than the SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST message the server was expecting, according to an advisory published Tuesday. Exploits are the hacking equivalent of a Jedi mind trick, in which an adversary uses the Force to influence or confuse weaker-minded opponents. The last time the world saw an authentication-bypass bug with such serious consequences and requiring so little effort was 11 months ago, when Apple's macOS let people log in as admin without entering a password.
On the brighter side, there were no immediate signs of any big-name sites being bitten by the bug, which is indexed as CVE-2018-10933. While Github uses libssh, the site officials said on Twitter that "GitHub.com and GitHub Enterprise are unaffected by CVE-2018-10933 due to how we use the library." In a follow-up tweet, GitHub security officials said they use a customized version of libssh that implements an authentication mechanism separate from the one provided by the library. Out of an abundance of caution, GitHub has installed a patch released with Tuesday's advisory. Another limitation: only vulnerable versions of libssh running in server mode are vulnerable, while the client mode is unaffected. Peter Winter-Smith, a researcher at security firm NCC who discovered the bug and privately reported it to libssh developers, told Ars the vulnerability is the result of libssh using the same machine state to authenticate clients and servers. Because exploits involve behavior that's safe in the client but unsafe in the server context, only servers are affected.
On the brighter side, there were no immediate signs of any big-name sites being bitten by the bug, which is indexed as CVE-2018-10933. While Github uses libssh, the site officials said on Twitter that "GitHub.com and GitHub Enterprise are unaffected by CVE-2018-10933 due to how we use the library." In a follow-up tweet, GitHub security officials said they use a customized version of libssh that implements an authentication mechanism separate from the one provided by the library. Out of an abundance of caution, GitHub has installed a patch released with Tuesday's advisory. Another limitation: only vulnerable versions of libssh running in server mode are vulnerable, while the client mode is unaffected. Peter Winter-Smith, a researcher at security firm NCC who discovered the bug and privately reported it to libssh developers, told Ars the vulnerability is the result of libssh using the same machine state to authenticate clients and servers. Because exploits involve behavior that's safe in the client but unsafe in the server context, only servers are affected.
Users of the OpenBSD versions (including portable) of SSH is not vulnerable to this issue. The OpenBSD OpenSSH uses its own version of libssh. You guys are safe.
This has long been a pet peeve of mine in the design of these systems.
People always feel the need to include messages indicating success or failure which is something I personally find to be dangerous and redundant.
If it is ever possible for any peer to be at all confused about whether authentication was successful or not you are having a bad day and no amount of status indications are going to make the hole you are standing in any shallower.
This doesn't affect openssh servers or clients. Only *some* things using libssh *might* be vulnerable. A bit overhyped.
A finite state machine is a two dimensional array. You have your states and you have your events. Depending on your state you react to the events differently. If you write out your state machine on paper it should be obvious which {state, event} you have missed or implemented incorrectly. Yet I see so many state machines that:
don't have a variable stating what state they are in
have variables called previous state and current state
have state names that are the action they intend to perform (usually you do something (transition) and then wait for something, hint your state name should probably be what you are waiting for)
but the worst offenders are the ones that try and infer the state they are in based on only the event. javascript coders who try and make everything restful are the worst offenders here but it looks like the libssh authors are also guilty. How the fuck do you get your server into a client state? The only possible way is if you didn't actually define different states for client and server.
No Jedi shit is involved here
Server: Authentication please
Client: My authentication was successful, I may enter
Server: Your authentication was successful, you may enter
I think that "Jedi mind trick" is a good analogy.
You don't happen to be confusing libssh with openssh, or libssh2 are you?
Shodan shows a few thousand servers in the world using libssh, and half of those aren't vulnerable.
Except is more like:
Server: Authentication please
Client: Your authentication was successful, you may enter
Server: ??? Okay, thanks
Client enters
In the original Star Wars, Obi-Wan, R2, and C3PO are sneaking through the city when they are stopped by Storm Troopers who are looking for them. The lead Storm Trooper demands to see identification (just as an openssh server would). Obi-Wan responds "you don't need to see his identification". Unprepared for this response, the lead Storm Trooper takes it at face value and announces to the others "we don't need to see his identification".
The next line has become a meme, "there aren't the droids you're looking for".
Why do IoT devices use BSD or Linux?
This. They should be using Windows.