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Blockchain-Based Elections Would Be a Disaster For Democracy (arstechnica.com)
An anonymous reader quotes a report from Ars Technica: If you talk to experts on election security (I studied with several of them in graduate school) they'll tell you that we're nowhere close to being ready for online voting. "Mobile voting is a horrific idea," said election security expert Joe Hall when I asked him about a West Virginia experiment with blockchain-based mobile voting back in August. But on Tuesday, The New York Times published an opinion piece claiming the opposite. "Building a workable, scalable, and inclusive online voting system is now possible, thanks to blockchain technologies," writes Alex Tapscott, whom the Times describes as co-founder of the Blockchain Research Institute. Tapscott is wrong -- and dangerously so. Online voting would be a huge threat to the integrity of our elections -- and to public faith in election outcomes.
Tapscott focuses on the idea that blockchain technology would allow people to vote anonymously while still being able to verify that their vote was included in the final total. Even assuming this is mathematically possible -- and I think it probably is -- this idea ignores the many, many ways that foreign governments could compromise an online vote without breaking the core cryptographic algorithms. For example, foreign governments could hack into the computer systems that governments use to generate and distribute cryptographic credentials to voters. They could bribe election officials to supply them with copies of voters' credentials. They could hack into the PCs or smartphones voters use to cast their votes. They could send voters phishing emails to trick them into revealing their voting credentials -- or simply trick them into thinking they've cast a vote when they haven't.
Tapscott focuses on the idea that blockchain technology would allow people to vote anonymously while still being able to verify that their vote was included in the final total. Even assuming this is mathematically possible -- and I think it probably is -- this idea ignores the many, many ways that foreign governments could compromise an online vote without breaking the core cryptographic algorithms. For example, foreign governments could hack into the computer systems that governments use to generate and distribute cryptographic credentials to voters. They could bribe election officials to supply them with copies of voters' credentials. They could hack into the PCs or smartphones voters use to cast their votes. They could send voters phishing emails to trick them into revealing their voting credentials -- or simply trick them into thinking they've cast a vote when they haven't.
You would think that if there was more than a minuscule amount of voter/voting fraud happening, people would be slinging proof from the rooftops. The lack of proof leads credence to the fact that is not a large factor for anything, which means our current processes, while not that great are still reliable.
Postal voting seems much better to me in some cases. For instance, I had about 90 questions on my ballot (2 very long and double sided pages). If I wasn't able to remember or write down all the things I wanted, that would be near impossible to remember for something so crucial while filling it out. Having the mail in form in front of me so I can deliberate and look up information seems like a much better way to do this, no?
The problem with mail-in voting is that it's possible to coerce people to vote a certain way. I'm not even talking about broad conspiracies to alter the vote en masse. For example, I wouldn't be surprised if many spouses said they were voting one way, for the sake of marital harmony, but in fact voted another.
You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make it dissolve.
"A political party sending in 10000 extra postal votes under names that should not be voting any more?"
If someone is not at the address they are registered, the ballot will be returned. People are required to sign their name on the outside of the envelope the ballot is mailed in and it is matched to the signature on the voting roll. If there is a question, it can be challenged. Once the signature is verified, the ballot is removed from the envelope it was mailed in while still in its own inside privacy envelope so the vote can't be read. These are all put with other ballots and are counted on the day of the election so that it is impossible to connect a particular ballot to the person who cast it.