W3C Approves WebAuthn as the Web Standard For Password-Free Logins (venturebeat.com)
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) today declared that the Web Authentication API (WebAuthn) is now an official web standard. From a report: First announced by the W3C and the FIDO Alliance in February 2016, WebAuthn is now an open standard for password-free logins on the web. It is supported by W3C contributors, including Airbnb, Alibaba, Apple, Google, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Mozilla, PayPal, SoftBank, Tencent, and Yubico. The specification lets users log into online accounts using biometrics, mobile devices, and/or FIDO security keys. WebAuthn is supported by Android and Windows 10. On the browser side, Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, and Microsoft Edge all added support last year. Apple has supported WebAuthn in preview versions of Safari since December.
Use a *mobile device* for logging in somewhere? That seems like an extraordinarily bad idea. I wouldn't trust a mobile device for anything that requires security. They come already compromised by Google/Apple, and then most people load them up with all sorts of "apps" that are actually tracking/monitoring programs.
I'm sure most people will love it.
I don't respond to AC's.
W3C meet your new friend Unintended Consequences. I'm sure you two will get along great...
"using biometrics"
I sure have no such hardware, nor any want to use one...
"mobile devices"
Would never use a surveillance device, and neither would any sane person.
"FIDO security keys"
I haven't the faintest idea what this even is. Fidonet?
"W3C Approves WebAuthn as the Web Standard For Password-Free Logins"
"WebAuthn is now an open standard for password-free logins on the web"
So is there one standard or many?
How do I, for example, log in using a CLI? How is this any different than, say, storing my private key in ~/.ssh? How do I, for that matter, do anything with this that doesn't involve a web browser?
First the Dark Web. Then the Deep State. Now this. Awfuln. Just awfuln.
Back when backdoors were shaken out of software (like OpenSSL, the RSA debacle, etc), after the NSA leaks, it came out that anything "FIDO" was basically backdoored by design and should always be disabled and sometimes even patched out of the code base.
Nowadays, the "FIDO alliance" is basically who's pushing this whole "all eggs in one basket" solution to web security, of all things.
I don't have a smartphone. I don't want to buy additional hardware. I want to keep my very, very long passphrases. The goal of "eliminating" the password makes me think that this is an attempt to undermine my ability to use secure passphrases.
It doesn't necessarily need to completely overtake the traditional methods in order to remove them as an option. On the web, there's a percentage of users that is considered not worth supporting. The exact percentages differ depending on vendor, but many hover around 10%. If less than 10% of your userbase uses a thing, they can be considered collateral damage.
It's for app consumers. (The app deveropers are the ones using the computer in that case.)
Computer users will just use the same proper security solutions they have used for decades.
E.g.: Don't go grabbing data out of a web page with login via console. Not even if it's SOAP. Use a proper protocol that builds directly on TCP/IP. Preferably one with its own port number.
10% is really high to consider dropping support for.
Have passwords for it to be sincere and not just an insincere path to understanding movies from the 90's.
the usb-slot is gonna get alot of wear-and-tear with all this plug-in and remove maneuver. ...
i am all for "something you have" but it could lead to:
- a hardware ever-cookie. people just leave the usb-key plugged-in when at home. google et al. got permission to access the key when plugged in and will access it even when not actively logging in to a google et al. website?
- a identification. the possessor is assumed to be a certain person, for example at airport or such, confiscating the key to figure out who someone really is by plugging it in? in turn having the key can lead to framing someone with data: hacking under the name of someone else?
- can be legally (?) confiscated, unlike say a password that is encrypted inside a brain, to access the latest and greatest bomb threats?
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>> sell users' info the the highest bidder.
Nope. They sell your data to any bidder. Why would they limit themselves to only one ?
aaaaaaa
Use a *mobile device* for logging in somewhere? That seems like an extraordinarily bad idea. I wouldn't trust a mobile device for anything that requires security.
That's kind of hilarious because the OPPOSITE is true. You are an idiot if you trust any desktop OS to truly secure material, with years of hidden security holes and apps not really that well sandboxed.
I only deal with banks now through mobile apps if I can help it, because it is WAY more secure. I can control what updates go on my device, I can be far more sure that some random app cannot see what is going on with the banking app.
most people load them up with all sorts of "apps" that are actually tracking/monitoring programs.
Only while I'm using the apps. I'm on iOS, I choose what and when they can see anything related to what I am doing.
"There is more worth loving than we have strength to love." - Brian Jay Stanley
Why is the server standard not also a W3C standard? Then maybe we would have EdDSA as required instead of recommended like in the FIDO2 clusterfuck.
We put several authentication options in the HTTP spec back in the 1990s. Some pretty secure, one was specifically marked as not secure. It was intended to be used the same way you'd use the latch on a bathroom stall. Of the three standards, the only one anyone ever used was trivial one, basic authentication. After that most people started coding their own really bad authentication schemes, often based on PHP sessions.
Then came SAML. A lot of larger companies used SAML, for handing off users after they were originally authenticated by crap homemade authentication.
Now we have an effort by the major companies to standardize on actually using a non-crap (but not perfect) protocol. There are plenty of other decent protocols you can use, but virtually nobody uses them. The problem isn't a lack of decent protocols. The problem is that nobody uses the decent protocols, either because they don't know about them or they think that it'll be easier to come up with some homemade crap. We'll see if this effort gets people actually using a non-crap design.
Isn't this the best answer? Mr. Gibson's carefully thought out technology - and open.
https://www.grc.com/sqrl/sqrl.htm
hi
Wow, is this a serious question?! Anyway, the correct (and obvious) answer is YES. We definitely have not only evidence that they're a security threat, but the evidence also happens to be ironclad proof. Yes, they definitely are a security threat to 100.0% certainty. With the evidence we have, there is absolutely no possibility at all, that they aren't a threat.
The evidence is this: both companies use proprietary software and deploy that to the users. So the users are running things that they can't audit for safety. That kind of thing is always going to be an enormous threat to security. It's impossible to secure; you will never know whether you can trust iOS (bot the OS and the bundled apps), or Google's proprietary apps. (Theoretically, you can compiled an Android kernel from source, where it's at least possible to make sure that part it doesn't have malware, though I haven't heard of many people who actually do that. But you cannot compile Google Maps from source, because you don't have source.)
They rolled their own custom elliptic curve, amateurishly.
They have mandatory support for weak/broken RSA modes.
https://paragonie.com/blog/201...
This sounds more like theory than practice.
Who actually audits everything in a desktop Linux system end-to-end, including the hardware and the network?
https://xkcd.com/927/