Slashdot Mirror
A Worry For Some Pilots: Their Hands-On Flying Skills Are Lacking (nytimes.com)
An anonymous reader shares a report: Pilots now spend more time learning automated systems than practicing hands-on flying, so newer pilots are less comfortable with taking manual control when the computer steers them wrong, according to interviews with a dozen pilots and pilot instructors at major airlines and aviation universities around the world. "The automation in the aircraft, whether it's a Boeing or an Airbus, has lulled us into a sense of security and safety," said Kevin Hiatt, a former Delta Air Lines pilot who later ran flight safety for JetBlue. Pilots now rely on autopilot so often, "they become a systems operator rather than a stick-and-rudder pilot."
As a result, he said, "they may not exactly know or recognize quickly enough what is happening to the aircraft, and by the time they figure it out, it may be too late." [...] While automation has contributed to the airline industry's stellar safety record in recent years, it has also been a factor in many of the crashes that have still occurred around the world. A 2011 study by a federal task force found that in about 60 percent of 46 recent accidents, pilots had trouble manually flying the plane or handling the automated controls. Complicated automation systems can also confuse pilots and potentially cause them to take action they shouldn't, pilots said.
As a result, he said, "they may not exactly know or recognize quickly enough what is happening to the aircraft, and by the time they figure it out, it may be too late." [...] While automation has contributed to the airline industry's stellar safety record in recent years, it has also been a factor in many of the crashes that have still occurred around the world. A 2011 study by a federal task force found that in about 60 percent of 46 recent accidents, pilots had trouble manually flying the plane or handling the automated controls. Complicated automation systems can also confuse pilots and potentially cause them to take action they shouldn't, pilots said.
This issue has been a concern for more than a decade. The more pilots use automation, the more their manual flying skills languish. Manual flying is a skill that one must practice to stay current. It may be like riding a bicycle, you never forget, but the fine skills required to fly accurately without the automation is something you can loose. It takes practice to stay current and proficient. It takes practice to be smooth and accurate, like playing a musical instrument it takes regular playing to keep your skills sharp.
There have been a couple of instances where the pilots where faced with the loss of automation and made mistakes with their manual flying. Or situations like Asiana Airlines Flight 214 where the automation wasn't set properly and the manual flying skill and experience wasn't enough to notice and avoid the accident. Pilots and airlines LOVE automation. Pilots like it because it makes their job easier (when it works). Even an unskilled pilot can fly like a pro using automation. I've been in simulators, and although I've never flown anything more complicated than a Cessna 172, I can get the simulator on the ground without balling it up, usually. Airlines love it because it allows the aircraft to be operated in the most efficient way, saving them fuel and maintenance costs.
But button pushing and turning dials isn't flying. Pilots are spending lots of their time managing and monitoring the automation and very little flying the aircraft. It's hard to keep your manual flying skills in top form, when you do mostly button pushing and turning dials
When the automation fails, and you are forced to grab the controls and fly while trying to diagnose what's wrong with your aircraft, Navigate, Communicate with ATC under high stress, you really want those "stick and rudder" skills sharp and current. It's one less thing to think about while you are trying to wrap your head around what is wrong with the aircraft.
"File to fit, pound to insert, paint to match" - Aircraft Maintenance 101
How about training pilots how to fly?
Also, does anyone else read this story as, "I don't know how to do my job, but I want to keep getting paid to do it."?
Fucking stupid.
Stick and Rudder skills are like playing a musical instrument. They require constant practice and exercise to stay "current".
This is not a new realization, but one that's been enshrined in the FAA regulations for decades longer than I've been alive. Pilots are required to "be current" meaning they have flown a minimum number of landings as PIC in the last few months before they can fly. I am also are required to "be current" with a flight instructor every year. Airline pilots must be "current" in their type ratings, which includes both training, check rides and flight time.
So it actually makes sense.. We are taking away the On the Job training opportunity in Stick and Rudder operation, replacing it with button pushing and dial turning. What's a pilot to do? Company regulations likely REQUIRE he/she use the automation for safety, efficiency and passenger comfort so it's hands off the controls while "Auto Pilot" flies for you.
"File to fit, pound to insert, paint to match" - Aircraft Maintenance 101
But to be fair, in the case of 447, they were flying in the coffin corner, meaning a small amount of airspeed between an aerodynamic stall due to flying to slow, and a stall due to flying too fast (yes, that exists). The first officer of that flight clearly did not recognize the state they were in and yes, essentially flew the plane to the ground.
AF447 crashed because one of the pilots was holding the stick all the way back. I won't speculate as to why, but there was a lot going on in the cockpit. The other pilot was pushing the stick all the way forward, presumably because he recognized what the airplane was doing. In the A330, the control sticks are not physically coupled, so it was possible to have one stick all the way forward and one all the way back simultaneously. In the mode that the automation was running, it's resolution to the discrepancy was to average the two inputs, so the stick was effectively neutral. Since the place was already in a deep stall at that point, it did not recover. The captain was on a rest break at the start of the trouble. When he got into the cockpit, he quickly (and correctly) assessed the situation, but realized that it was too late.
Go and read the cockpit recorder transcript (easily found online). It is chilling.
Regarding stall recognition, I am a private pilot. My father was an airline pilot for about 30 years, most of it on the 737. He passed a way a while ago, so I can't talk to him about this incident. We did talk about flying frequently, and he assured me that it was possible to recognize an impending stall without the systems warning you about it. He loved to fly the 737. It was his favorite aircraft after flying everything from DC-3s, up to 737-300 and just about everything in between, including a large number of small planes.
Up until very recently airline training in stall recovery emphasized minimum altitude loss. If you allowed the nose to drop, by reducing the AOA, you might loose too much altitude and fail the training event. You were supposed to use thrust and preserve altitude. This procedure works in an approach to a stall, where the airplane isnât yet in a stalled condition, but is ineffective in a fully developed stall. After Colgan Air, the industry has changed how Stall recovery is trained to, emphasizing reducing the angle of attack then recovery from the unusual attitude. Itâ(TM)s not that airline pilots forgot how to recover from a stall, itâ(TM)s more that they were trained in the Simulator wrongly and then utilized an inappropriate procedure in an actual emergency.