Frankly, it strikes me as incredibly low, given that there's about 100 suicides each day in the US alone... unless you're defining "person" in some particular way so as to include only cases that support your point, whatever it may be.
I remember a lot of assumption that someone might be watching, but I don't remember it actually being used, as a matter of fact. The government could simply be arresting at random on charges of thoughtcrime, and the widespread stories of cameras behind the screens just add to the fear that keeps the population in line.
The horror of 1984 is the oppressive government's literal mind control. Expertise in psychology was used to manipulate the population into ever-deepening submission. Surveillance was just supposedly how the government found dissidents... though I don't actually recall any instances of surveillance being successfully used. Rather, from what I remember of the book, a good old-fashioned informant was more successful.
Surveillance is just a widespread gathering of information. What we ultimately do with that information may be good or bad, but the facts alone are neutral. Information wants to be free and all that.
A "Devops Engineer" is an engineer working on the operations for a development environment. In other words, he's the guy who says "hey, our team needs better communications with the QA team, so let's set up a proper ticketing system, rather than just emailing problem reports".
Chuckle all you like, but ideally every dev team would have such a person. We've all heard the horror stories of developers using Word for source code, not keeping backups, and relying on a wall of Post-It notes for bug tracking.
So in other words, Apple doesn't forbid third-party browsers, they just require third-party browsers to follow particular guidelines, and one particular third-party has chosen not to follow the rules.
Unfortunately, unless this is structured data, you will be subjected to the data equivalent of dumpster diving. But surfacing insight from a rotting pile of enterprise data is a ghastly process—at best.
Sounds like this Miko Matsumura has no idea how successful Big Data projects actually work.
To refine his analogy, unstructured data is much like processing recyclables. Everything that might possibly be good gets thrown into a large bin, and several sorting processes run to extract individual relevant (though messy) pieces. While those pieces alone aren't pure enough to be useful, there's enough meaningful information in them that statistical analysis can separate the good from the bad, and that's where the insight comes from.
With a typical RDBMS, insight is readily apparent. A hypothesis that 75% of a user's purchases were widgets is simple to verify. In a non-relational database, as is often used in Big Data projects, that would be an inefficient computation (though it can be done). Rather, those databases are more aligned to produce a whole list of correlations between user demographics and purchasing habits, showing for example that users who buy widgets have often already bought foo bars. The "Data Scientist" didn't have to ever look specifically at statistics for widgets or foo bars, but the correlation is presented in a nice and accessible form, gleaned from millions or billions of independent data points.
Miko Matsumura is a Vice President at Hazelcast, an open source in-memory data grid company.
This is a SlashBI article written by executives for executives, with little basis in fact. Lovely.
I'll need to use it, since I have a decent library of XP-era software that won't work, even in compatibility mode. Turns out that compatibility mode won't actually let you ignore all the new security policies that XP didn't have.
There's easy ways to avoid that. Document all of your transactions and for any large transactions, follow the applicable laws that require a good-faith effort to determine the other party's identity.
Oh, your chosen form of exchange doesn't make that easy? Well too bad - you'll have to do it anyway, face the consequences for breaking the law, or change your chosen method. This is why we usually don't make large financial transactions via carrier pigeon.
He couldn't drive a car, but was legal to thread the needle with a tanker?
Yes, actually. They're separate licenses, from entirely separate agencies. Apparently the Coast Guard requires disclosure of such things during renewal, but that only happens every five years. I guess the Coast Guard's also negligent for not keeping up with every certification of every sailor.
Exxon did.
If Exxon itself, the collective entity, was the only entity that knew the whole risk in sending the ship out, then the next issue is responsibility. That requires a conscious decision to cause harm. Are you also going to assert that Exxon is conscious?
I'm asserting that no single person at Exxon knew the actual magnitude of the total risk prior to the crash.
Everyone up the chain from a problem receives reports in ever-diminishing detail. By the time reports of multiple risks (like the nonfunctional radar, crew condition, and lack of equipment) are actually together in one place, their relative importance has been diluted by all of the other similar reports that will not result in a disaster. The inverse also holds - successes are also diluted, which is why it seems so hard to be recognized for successes in a large organization.
It's not that the corporation is a shield as much as it is that the corporation is too big to not fail. Even if it's possible for the risks to be communicated across the organization effectively, there are so many other mundane concerns that it's unlikely anyone will every put together the fact that there are no remaining safeguards.
They knowingly sent a ship to sea in an unsafe manner.
Sending out the ship without radar wasn't necessarily unsafe. After all, there's still the skill of the pilot to consider, and the planned route goes through known-safe waters, and the Coast Guard tracks ships to warn of any danger. The radar's just an extra sensor.
Unfortunately, the Coast Guard stopped their tracking, the route was changed to avoid icebergs, and the third mate was piloting. What are the odds that any single person was actually aware that all of the safety mechanisms were failing at once? Sure, HR might have known about the captain's drinking, but it may not have been considered a serious issue (at a corporate level) because of the other safeguards in place. Similarly, the radar's maintenance wouldn't have been considered a high priority, especially if it wasn't often relied on, and the ship's crew changed course with no knowledge that the Coast Guard wasn't watching.
So who, exactly, sent the ship out knowing that it was unsafe to do so?
My better idea is to stop looking for scapegoats every time there's a catastrophe. Bad events happen because humans (including the suit-wearing ones) can't predict the future. Sometimes a whole set of good decisions lead to bad events, and we don't accomplish anything good be punishing people for things they can't foresee.
You say that like you think every executive gets out of bed in the morning saying "Today, I'm going to fuck over the world. I think I'll start with that pesky Alaskan wildlife."
...Because, of course, it's the board that chooses what route to take through a narrow channel, and the maintenance plan for the radar, and the sleeping schedule on the ship.
Maybe instead, it should be the ones who had direct control over the incident whom we hold directly responsible... but then, what punishment can be extracted from lowly ships' officers? How about $50,000 and community service?
We could always try to dig into the bureaucracy of the company and figure out exactly who ordered what bad things, but everybody has a long list of factors that went into their well-justified decisions. Hindsight's 20/20, of course, so it seems just to forgive them for what they couldn't have foreseen.
Or maybe, just maybe, we could abandon the idea of punishment as an effective means of change. It doesn't work for addicts, gamblers, criminals, or students, so why should it magically work for corporations? We could try adding incentives for doing good things, like allowing tax write-offs for new safety equipment, but then the public just whines about subsidizing the big companies.
Personally, I have a better idea: Let's just accept the fact that life is complicated and there are no easy answers, regardless of how fun it may be to blame those evil nasty rich folks.
But if you can show that the producer was intentionally deceptive- that he planned the whole time to make an anti-Islam hit piece but told the actors something else, then that's a different story.
It's a different story, then. Pretty much every aspect of the movie's production and release is shady.
I didn't realize that laws now singled out YouTube. I also didn't realize that my rights are somehow more important than anybody else's. In fact, usually it's the opposite - I'm not usually allowed to exercise my rights if doing so would infringe on others' rights.
There are three relevant laws in this case. First is the long precedent of case law saying that a contract must be made in good faith to be enforceable. Second is the long-standing interpretation of copyright law saying that people own copyright on their own appearance. Finally, there's the DMCA's takedown provisions.
Typically, when making a movie or taking pictures of a person, you need the actors' or models' permission*. This is a pretty standard part of the release contracts, which are indeed covered under contract law. However, in this case it seems the producers didn't make the release contract in good faith. That means the contract is thrown out, so the actress still owns copyright on her likeness as used in the movie, so she has legal standing to issue a DMCA takedown request.
This is not an erosion of our rights. This is enforcing the rights we already have. Cindy Lee Garcia's right to control her identity is being upheld.
* Especially for photos, model appearance is usually pretty weakly protected, actually. If the picture's subject is even a little famous, there's an easy argument to be made for fair use. Similarly, movie extras don't really get legal grounds to claim the whole movie, but responsible producers will have them sign releases anyway. Main characters, on the other hand, can easily claim that their appearance is significant to the final work, defeating any fair-use defense.
Slashdot Mirror
...and an equally-long history of being illegal and getting people thrown in jail or slapped with fines. "Noble cause" isn't a defense in itself.
How's that rate compare to any other industry?
Frankly, it strikes me as incredibly low, given that there's about 100 suicides each day in the US alone... unless you're defining "person" in some particular way so as to include only cases that support your point, whatever it may be.
Are you sure of that, though?
I remember a lot of assumption that someone might be watching, but I don't remember it actually being used, as a matter of fact. The government could simply be arresting at random on charges of thoughtcrime, and the widespread stories of cameras behind the screens just add to the fear that keeps the population in line.
The horror of 1984 is the oppressive government's literal mind control. Expertise in psychology was used to manipulate the population into ever-deepening submission. Surveillance was just supposedly how the government found dissidents... though I don't actually recall any instances of surveillance being successfully used. Rather, from what I remember of the book, a good old-fashioned informant was more successful.
Surveillance is just a widespread gathering of information. What we ultimately do with that information may be good or bad, but the facts alone are neutral. Information wants to be free and all that.
Y'know, once your pile covers a large enough area of land, there's bound to be a pony in there somewhere.
A "Devops Engineer" is an engineer working on the operations for a development environment. In other words, he's the guy who says "hey, our team needs better communications with the QA team, so let's set up a proper ticketing system, rather than just emailing problem reports".
Chuckle all you like, but ideally every dev team would have such a person. We've all heard the horror stories of developers using Word for source code, not keeping backups, and relying on a wall of Post-It notes for bug tracking.
So in other words, Apple doesn't forbid third-party browsers, they just require third-party browsers to follow particular guidelines, and one particular third-party has chosen not to follow the rules.
I don't see the big deal here.
Unfortunately, unless this is structured data, you will be subjected to the data equivalent of dumpster diving. But surfacing insight from a rotting pile of enterprise data is a ghastly process—at best.
Sounds like this Miko Matsumura has no idea how successful Big Data projects actually work.
To refine his analogy, unstructured data is much like processing recyclables. Everything that might possibly be good gets thrown into a large bin, and several sorting processes run to extract individual relevant (though messy) pieces. While those pieces alone aren't pure enough to be useful, there's enough meaningful information in them that statistical analysis can separate the good from the bad, and that's where the insight comes from.
With a typical RDBMS, insight is readily apparent. A hypothesis that 75% of a user's purchases were widgets is simple to verify. In a non-relational database, as is often used in Big Data projects, that would be an inefficient computation (though it can be done). Rather, those databases are more aligned to produce a whole list of correlations between user demographics and purchasing habits, showing for example that users who buy widgets have often already bought foo bars. The "Data Scientist" didn't have to ever look specifically at statistics for widgets or foo bars, but the correlation is presented in a nice and accessible form, gleaned from millions or billions of independent data points.
Miko Matsumura is a Vice President at Hazelcast, an open source in-memory data grid company.
This is a SlashBI article written by executives for executives, with little basis in fact. Lovely.
...Apple not only puts their own web browser in their OS, *BUT FORBIDS INSTALLING ANY OTHER THIRD-PARTY BROWSER*...
[citation needed]
Can I get the full text of that legal guarantee?
I'll need to use it, since I have a decent library of XP-era software that won't work, even in compatibility mode. Turns out that compatibility mode won't actually let you ignore all the new security policies that XP didn't have.
Creating 50,000 small piles of paperwork for an investigator could be worth quite a lot to certain people.
the largest bitcoin mining operation has sufficient horsepower that it can manipulate any bitcoin it wants.
...but they promised they wouldn't! That's good for something, right?
There's easy ways to avoid that. Document all of your transactions and for any large transactions, follow the applicable laws that require a good-faith effort to determine the other party's identity.
Oh, your chosen form of exchange doesn't make that easy? Well too bad - you'll have to do it anyway, face the consequences for breaking the law, or change your chosen method. This is why we usually don't make large financial transactions via carrier pigeon.
He couldn't drive a car, but was legal to thread the needle with a tanker?
Yes, actually. They're separate licenses, from entirely separate agencies. Apparently the Coast Guard requires disclosure of such things during renewal, but that only happens every five years. I guess the Coast Guard's also negligent for not keeping up with every certification of every sailor.
Exxon did.
If Exxon itself, the collective entity, was the only entity that knew the whole risk in sending the ship out, then the next issue is responsibility. That requires a conscious decision to cause harm. Are you also going to assert that Exxon is conscious?
I'm asserting that no single person at Exxon knew the actual magnitude of the total risk prior to the crash.
Everyone up the chain from a problem receives reports in ever-diminishing detail. By the time reports of multiple risks (like the nonfunctional radar, crew condition, and lack of equipment) are actually together in one place, their relative importance has been diluted by all of the other similar reports that will not result in a disaster. The inverse also holds - successes are also diluted, which is why it seems so hard to be recognized for successes in a large organization.
It's not that the corporation is a shield as much as it is that the corporation is too big to not fail. Even if it's possible for the risks to be communicated across the organization effectively, there are so many other mundane concerns that it's unlikely anyone will every put together the fact that there are no remaining safeguards.
They knowingly sent a ship to sea in an unsafe manner.
Sending out the ship without radar wasn't necessarily unsafe. After all, there's still the skill of the pilot to consider, and the planned route goes through known-safe waters, and the Coast Guard tracks ships to warn of any danger. The radar's just an extra sensor.
Unfortunately, the Coast Guard stopped their tracking, the route was changed to avoid icebergs, and the third mate was piloting. What are the odds that any single person was actually aware that all of the safety mechanisms were failing at once? Sure, HR might have known about the captain's drinking, but it may not have been considered a serious issue (at a corporate level) because of the other safeguards in place. Similarly, the radar's maintenance wouldn't have been considered a high priority, especially if it wasn't often relied on, and the ship's crew changed course with no knowledge that the Coast Guard wasn't watching.
So who, exactly, sent the ship out knowing that it was unsafe to do so?
The Hivemind doesn't want justice. It wants vengeance.
My better idea is to stop looking for scapegoats every time there's a catastrophe. Bad events happen because humans (including the suit-wearing ones) can't predict the future. Sometimes a whole set of good decisions lead to bad events, and we don't accomplish anything good be punishing people for things they can't foresee.
You say that like you think every executive gets out of bed in the morning saying "Today, I'm going to fuck over the world. I think I'll start with that pesky Alaskan wildlife."
Take it out of the board members' pockets.
...Because, of course, it's the board that chooses what route to take through a narrow channel, and the maintenance plan for the radar, and the sleeping schedule on the ship.
Maybe instead, it should be the ones who had direct control over the incident whom we hold directly responsible... but then, what punishment can be extracted from lowly ships' officers? How about $50,000 and community service?
We could always try to dig into the bureaucracy of the company and figure out exactly who ordered what bad things, but everybody has a long list of factors that went into their well-justified decisions. Hindsight's 20/20, of course, so it seems just to forgive them for what they couldn't have foreseen.
Or maybe, just maybe, we could abandon the idea of punishment as an effective means of change. It doesn't work for addicts, gamblers, criminals, or students, so why should it magically work for corporations? We could try adding incentives for doing good things, like allowing tax write-offs for new safety equipment, but then the public just whines about subsidizing the big companies.
Personally, I have a better idea: Let's just accept the fact that life is complicated and there are no easy answers, regardless of how fun it may be to blame those evil nasty rich folks.
...Bad Sarten. No Slashdotting while drunk...
But if you can show that the producer was intentionally deceptive- that he planned the whole time to make an anti-Islam hit piece but told the actors something else, then that's a different story.
It's a different story, then. Pretty much every aspect of the movie's production and release is shady.
If the hiring was fraudulent, being based on false pretenses, then the copyright assignment is consequently void.
I didn't realize that laws now singled out YouTube. I also didn't realize that my rights are somehow more important than anybody else's. In fact, usually it's the opposite - I'm not usually allowed to exercise my rights if doing so would infringe on others' rights.
There are three relevant laws in this case. First is the long precedent of case law saying that a contract must be made in good faith to be enforceable. Second is the long-standing interpretation of copyright law saying that people own copyright on their own appearance. Finally, there's the DMCA's takedown provisions.
Typically, when making a movie or taking pictures of a person, you need the actors' or models' permission*. This is a pretty standard part of the release contracts, which are indeed covered under contract law. However, in this case it seems the producers didn't make the release contract in good faith. That means the contract is thrown out, so the actress still owns copyright on her likeness as used in the movie, so she has legal standing to issue a DMCA takedown request.
This is not an erosion of our rights. This is enforcing the rights we already have. Cindy Lee Garcia's right to control her identity is being upheld.
* Especially for photos, model appearance is usually pretty weakly protected, actually. If the picture's subject is even a little famous, there's an easy argument to be made for fair use. Similarly, movie extras don't really get legal grounds to claim the whole movie, but responsible producers will have them sign releases anyway. Main characters, on the other hand, can easily claim that their appearance is significant to the final work, defeating any fair-use defense.
Portal 2 crashes on my Windows system whenever I load the Workshop menu. I'm hoping for better stability under Linux.
Linux is stable enough for my servers, so why wouldn't it be stable for my games, too?