Imagine if all or some very large contingent of email clients allowed you to "retaliate" against spam messages. Highlight message, select "negative feedback" option, a daemon is spun that traces back as far as possible the route of the message and barrages it some fashion. By pings maybe? By directed replies? Imagine it does this in some scheduled fashion so as to minimize the impact on your local network. As 1 million disparate sources converge upon the last traceable source of the route of the offending spammer, some network somewhere will start to feel the load. Like the spokes of a wheel converging on the hub, the retaliation traffic will thicken as it closes in on the source. The pain increases. ISPs inundated by individuals expressing their right to freedom of speech, will feel suddenly inclined to exercise their right to refuse service to someone.
The "negative feedback" could be dosed in a coordinated fashion if there were some P2P means of establishing how many individuals had received a particular spam. If a spammer hits only a hundred people, the dose of retaliatory traffic would have to be increased to be felt. If the spam hit a million, it would require only a modest retaliation to utterly swamp the source.
Just thinking out loud. Could this be made to work? No one's free speech is curtailed, spam is dealt a serious blow.
Imagine if all or some very large contingent of email clients allowed you to "retaliate" against spam messages. Highlight message, select "negative feedback" option, a daemon is spun that traces back as far as possible the route of the message and barrages it some fashion. By pings maybe? By directed replies? Imagine it does this in some scheduled fashion so as to minimize the impact on your local network. As 1 million disparate sources converge upon the last traceable source of the route of the offending spammer, some network somewhere will start to feel the load. Like the spokes of a wheel converging on the hub, the retaliation traffic will thicken as it closes in on the source. The pain increases. ISPs inundated by individuals expressing their right to freedom of speech, will feel suddenly inclined to exercise their right to refuse service to someone.
The "negative feedback" could be dosed in a coordinated fashion if there were some P2P means of establishing how many individuals had received a particular spam. If a spammer hits only a hundred people, the dose of retaliatory traffic would have to be increased to be felt. If the spam hit a million, it would require only a modest retaliation to utterly swamp the source.
Just thinking out loud. Could this be made to work? No one's free speech is curtailed, spam is dealt a serious blow.
What do you think of some sort of ransom model solution to the problem?
If you assume once information gets into the wild, it will proliferately freely, there seems no other solution to me. And I think the above is a safe assumption, as technology moves faster than the law. I don't see how the RIAA can shutdown freenet when it explodes because other P2P systems have been squashed.
Imagine if you will, a website. You go there one morning and discover that your favorite band "Purulent Sputum" has a new album held hostage. They want $1 million for it. You download a couple of teaser tracks and oh sh17, its good. Maybe you're cheap and drop a dime in escrow. Maybe you're a big fan and you pony up 10 hoon. Maybe you drop an even buck in escrow and wait. Maybe two months go by and the 1M mark is passed, the album gets released, your buck is taken, the music starts showing up on a website and then very quickly all over p2p. Maybe a year goes by and the coffer stalls at 850K, PS decides they can forget the 150K and they release the album. Maybe a years goes by and coffer stalls at 850K, PS wants to hang on forever, but you lost your job and really need that buck. You can take it back.
Now, the band never relinquishes copyright, their music is not in the public domain. They are still entitled to royalties for public viewing/display and promotional use and all that, but the de facto problem of file sharing is just tolerated as the fact of life that it will continue to be as long as really smart people think of ways to do it faster than suits and judges can stop them.
You think a well paid middle class is a political threat, wait til you see what an unpaid middle class can do to streetside storefronts, garbage cans and cop cars.
This is exactly what they should do. You want to design tests so that no one gets a perfect score, and with high enough granularity that you can distinguish between all your students. Think about it. The prof doesn't care about exact letter grades. His goal is to distinguish and rank the students as accurately as possible. To design a test that yields a perfect gaussian distribution about the 50% mark with 1 sigma stretching between 25% and 75% is almost ideal.
This approach will work beautifully if you take care to store the drives in a cool dry place. The drives will last longer than they would under continuous use.
If you are worried about data decay, use a backup scheme that involves something like reed solomon error correction, or simply back it up twice on twice as many disks. You could get pretty paranoid with redundancy in this solution and still come out way ahead in terms of convenience and cost! IDE drives are super cheap. Go crazy.
If you don't look at ALL advertising as inherently biased, untrustworthy and disingenuous, you deserve what you buy. Advertising, the more effect, the more it should turn you off. What advertising actually presents a balanced view of a product or service, pros AND CONS? None, zero, zilch.
If you can't filter the input from your senses and discern advertising from fact, than it is a service to society to separate you from your money.
But introns and "junk" dna are not the same thing. Junk DNA usually refers to the incredibly huge spans of noncoding dna that usually seperate genes. Introns are relatively small regions of noncoding DNA interspersed with the exons (coding DNA). There's a lot more junk dna than introns.
Imagine if all or some very large contingent of email clients allowed you to "retaliate" against spam messages. Highlight message, select "negative feedback" option, a daemon is spun that traces back as far as possible the route of the message and barrages it some fashion. By pings maybe? By directed replies? Imagine it does this in some scheduled fashion so as to minimize the impact on your local network. As 1 million disparate sources converge upon the last traceable source of the route of the offending spammer, some network somewhere will start to feel the load. Like the spokes of a wheel converging on the hub, the retaliation traffic will thicken as it closes in on the source. The pain increases. ISPs inundated by individuals expressing their right to freedom of speech, will feel suddenly inclined to exercise their right to refuse service to someone.
The "negative feedback" could be dosed in a coordinated fashion if there were some P2P means of establishing how many individuals had received a particular spam. If a spammer hits only a hundred people, the dose of retaliatory traffic would have to be increased to be felt. If the spam hit a million, it would require only a modest retaliation to utterly swamp the source.
Just thinking out loud. Could this be made to work? No one's free speech is curtailed, spam is dealt a serious blow.
That would imply that your typical fluorescent light bulb is almost 10 times brighter than a 100W incandescent bulb. That is patently incorrect to anyone who has ever looked at a fluorescent tube bulb and an incandescent bulb.
Imagine if all or some very large contingent of email clients allowed you to "retaliate" against spam messages. Highlight message, select "negative feedback" option, a daemon is spun that traces back as far as possible the route of the message and barrages it some fashion. By pings maybe? By directed replies? Imagine it does this in some scheduled fashion so as to minimize the impact on your local network. As 1 million disparate sources converge upon the last traceable source of the route of the offending spammer, some network somewhere will start to feel the load. Like the spokes of a wheel converging on the hub, the retaliation traffic will thicken as it closes in on the source. The pain increases. ISPs inundated by individuals expressing their right to freedom of speech, will feel suddenly inclined to exercise their right to refuse service to someone.
The "negative feedback" could be dosed in a coordinated fashion if there were some P2P means of establishing how many individuals had received a particular spam. If a spammer hits only a hundred people, the dose of retaliatory traffic would have to be increased to be felt. If the spam hit a million, it would require only a modest retaliation to utterly swamp the source.
Just thinking out loud. Could this be made to work? No one's free speech is curtailed, spam is dealt a serious blow.
1. Regardless of any attempts by anyone to prevent it, reproduction of data will occur. No matter how good your copy protection, if I can play it, I can copy it. I can even reproduce it with an arbitrary fidelity approaching perfection by sampling it many times.
2. Once copied, the data will proliferate in the wild. No law is going to make everyone agree on the ethics of the issue or behave with restraint. There will always be some people who want and will copy and share.
If you assume these two items, the only way it seems artists will be able to gaurantee a certain amount of compensation for their efforts (something almost everyone unanimously agrees is necessary for w/out it we would see a great deal less effort invested in creating good art) is the ransom model.
This will require most artists to "pay their dues" by producing some amount of good quality free music so that they become known as good artists. At some point, they will be able to propose a ransom for their next work.
The ransom can be paid in any combination/way you like, 100 people willing to pay $10, 100,000 people willing to pay $1 and 200,000 people willing to pay a dime. Anyone can up their contribution anytime they like to speed release, but once the ransom is reached, the item is released into the wild.
This also provides a direct means of observing the compensation and will allow a sense of fair play to enter the equation of compensation, whereas now compensation is sort of open ended and indeterminable. Sometimes inordinately large, and other times non-existant. Also, a reputation for honesty becomes important. If an artist stiffs the public with a POS, they'll remember.
Chances are that if you can think of a problem with this system, with a little more thought you can think of a fix for that problem.
1. Regardless of any attempts by anyone to prevent it, reproduction of data will occur. No matter how good your copy protection, if I can play it, I can copy it. I can even reproduce it with an arbitrary fidelity approaching perfection by sampling it many times.
2. Once copied, the data will proliferate in the wild. No law is going to make everyone agree on the ethics of the issue or behave with restraint. There will always be some people who want and will copy and share.
If you assume these two items, the only way it seems artists will be able to gaurantee a certain amount of compensation for their efforts (something almost everyone unanimously agrees is necessary for w/out it we would see a great deal less effort invested in creating good art) is the ransom model.
This will require most artists to "pay their dues" by producing some amount of good quality free music so that they become known as good artists. At some point, they will be able to propose a ransom for their next work.
The ransom can be paid in any combination/way you like, 100 people willing to pay $10, 100,000 people willing to pay $1 and 200,000 people willing to pay a dime. Anyone can up their contribution anytime they like to speed release, but once the ransom is reached, the item is released into the wild.
This also provides a direct means of observing the compensation and will allow a sense of fair play to enter the equation of compensation, whereas now compensation is sort of open ended and indeterminable. Sometimes inordinately large, and other times non-existant. Also, a reputation for honesty becomes important. If an artist stiffs the public with a POS, they'll remember.
Chances are that if you can think of a problem with this system, with a little more thought you can think of a fix for that problem.
Imagine if all or some very large contingent of email clients allowed you to "retaliate" against spam messages. Highlight message, select "negative feedback" option, a daemon is spun that traces back as far as possible the route of the message and barrages it some fashion. By pings maybe? By directed replies? Imagine it does this in some scheduled fashion so as to minimize the impact on your local network. As 1 million disparate sources converge upon the last traceable source of the route of the offending spammer, some network somewhere will start to feel the load. Like the spokes of a wheel converging on the hub, the retaliation traffic will thicken as it closes in on the source. The pain increases. ISPs inundated by individuals expressing their right to freedom of speech, will feel suddenly inclined to exercise their right to refuse service to someone.
The "negative feedback" could be dosed in a coordinated fashion if there were some P2P means of establishing how many individuals had received a particular spam. If a spammer hits only a hundred people, the dose of retaliatory traffic would have to be increased to be felt. If the spam hit a million, it would require only a modest retaliation to utterly swamp the source.
Just thinking out loud. Could this be made to work?
Slashdot Mirror
Counter Spam Measure: Negative Feedback.
Imagine if all or some very large contingent of email clients allowed you to
"retaliate" against spam messages. Highlight message, select "negative feedback"
option, a daemon is spun that traces back as far as possible the route of the
message and barrages it some fashion. By pings maybe? By directed replies? Imagine
it does this in some scheduled fashion so as to minimize the impact on your local
network. As 1 million disparate sources converge upon the last traceable source of
the route of the offending spammer, some network somewhere will start to feel the
load. Like the spokes of a wheel converging on the hub, the retaliation traffic will
thicken as it closes in on the source. The pain increases. ISPs inundated by
individuals expressing their right to freedom of speech, will feel suddenly inclined
to exercise their right to refuse service to someone.
The "negative feedback" could be dosed in a coordinated fashion if there were some
P2P means of establishing how many individuals had received a particular spam. If a
spammer hits only a hundred people, the dose of retaliatory traffic would have to be
increased to be felt. If the spam hit a million, it would require only a modest
retaliation to utterly swamp the source.
Just thinking out loud. Could this be made to work? No one's free speech is
curtailed, spam is dealt a serious blow.
fight fire with fire.
Counter Spam Measure: Negative Feedback.
Imagine if all or some very large contingent of email clients allowed you to
"retaliate" against spam messages. Highlight message, select "negative feedback"
option, a daemon is spun that traces back as far as possible the route of the
message and barrages it some fashion. By pings maybe? By directed replies? Imagine
it does this in some scheduled fashion so as to minimize the impact on your local
network. As 1 million disparate sources converge upon the last traceable source of
the route of the offending spammer, some network somewhere will start to feel the
load. Like the spokes of a wheel converging on the hub, the retaliation traffic will
thicken as it closes in on the source. The pain increases. ISPs inundated by
individuals expressing their right to freedom of speech, will feel suddenly inclined
to exercise their right to refuse service to someone.
The "negative feedback" could be dosed in a coordinated fashion if there were some
P2P means of establishing how many individuals had received a particular spam. If a
spammer hits only a hundred people, the dose of retaliatory traffic would have to be
increased to be felt. If the spam hit a million, it would require only a modest
retaliation to utterly swamp the source.
Just thinking out loud. Could this be made to work? No one's free speech is
curtailed, spam is dealt a serious blow.
fight fire with fire.
What do you think of some sort of ransom model solution to the problem?
If you assume once information gets into the wild, it will proliferately freely, there seems no other solution to me. And I think the above is a safe assumption, as technology moves faster than the law. I don't see how the RIAA can shutdown freenet when it explodes because other P2P systems have been squashed.
Imagine if you will, a website. You go there one morning and discover that your favorite band "Purulent Sputum" has a new album held hostage. They want $1 million for it. You download a couple of teaser tracks and oh sh17, its good. Maybe you're cheap and drop a dime in escrow. Maybe you're a big fan and you pony up 10 hoon. Maybe you drop an even buck in escrow and wait. Maybe two months go by and the 1M mark is passed, the album gets released, your buck is taken, the music starts showing up on a website and then very quickly all over p2p. Maybe a year goes by and the coffer stalls at 850K, PS decides they can forget the 150K and they release the album. Maybe a years goes by and coffer stalls at 850K, PS wants to hang on forever, but you lost your job and really need that buck. You can take it back.
Now, the band never relinquishes copyright, their music is not in the public domain. They are still entitled to royalties for public viewing/display and promotional use and all that, but the de facto problem of file sharing is just tolerated as the fact of life that it will continue to be as long as really smart people think of ways to do it faster than suits and judges can stop them.
It worked for Stephen King.
You think a well paid middle class is a political threat, wait til you see what an unpaid middle class can do to streetside storefronts, garbage cans and cop cars.
A friend once asked me, "When will computers be so easy to program that a six year old child can do it?"
I replied, "When six year old children can specify a task with zero ambiguity."
Its perfectly fine to have some english like programming, it simply must be as unambiguous as possible:
Computer, load memory location 40343 into register 6.
Computer, add register 6 to register 8.
Computer, if overflow, jump to address 52895.
I'll stick with C++.
Somebody had to say it.
This is exactly what they should do. You want to design tests so that no one gets a perfect score, and with high enough granularity that you can distinguish between all your students. Think about it. The prof doesn't care about exact letter grades. His goal is to distinguish and rank the students as accurately as possible. To design a test that yields a perfect gaussian distribution about the 50% mark with 1 sigma stretching between 25% and 75% is almost ideal.
This approach will work beautifully if you take care to store the drives in a cool dry place. The drives will last longer than they would under continuous use.
If you are worried about data decay, use a backup scheme that involves something like reed solomon error correction, or simply back it up twice on twice as many disks. You could get pretty paranoid with redundancy in this solution and still come out way ahead in terms of convenience and cost! IDE drives are super cheap. Go crazy.
Who gives a shit what tactic they take?
If you don't look at ALL advertising as inherently biased, untrustworthy and disingenuous, you deserve what you buy. Advertising, the more effect, the more it should turn you off. What advertising actually presents a balanced view of a product or service, pros AND CONS? None, zero, zilch.
If you can't filter the input from your senses and discern advertising from fact, than it is a service to society to separate you from your money.
But introns and "junk" dna are not the same thing. Junk DNA usually refers to the incredibly huge spans of noncoding dna that usually seperate genes. Introns are relatively small regions of noncoding DNA interspersed with the exons (coding DNA). There's a lot more junk dna than introns.
Imagine if all or some very large contingent of email clients allowed you to
"retaliate" against spam messages. Highlight message, select "negative feedback"
option, a daemon is spun that traces back as far as possible the route of the
message and barrages it some fashion. By pings maybe? By directed replies? Imagine
it does this in some scheduled fashion so as to minimize the impact on your local
network. As 1 million disparate sources converge upon the last traceable source of
the route of the offending spammer, some network somewhere will start to feel the
load. Like the spokes of a wheel converging on the hub, the retaliation traffic will
thicken as it closes in on the source. The pain increases. ISPs inundated by
individuals expressing their right to freedom of speech, will feel suddenly inclined
to exercise their right to refuse service to someone.
The "negative feedback" could be dosed in a coordinated fashion if there were some
P2P means of establishing how many individuals had received a particular spam. If a
spammer hits only a hundred people, the dose of retaliatory traffic would have to be
increased to be felt. If the spam hit a million, it would require only a modest
retaliation to utterly swamp the source.
Just thinking out loud. Could this be made to work? No one's free speech is
curtailed, spam is dealt a serious blow.
fight fire with fire.
Ummmmm....NOT
That would imply that your typical fluorescent light bulb is almost 10 times brighter than a 100W incandescent bulb. That is patently incorrect to anyone who has ever looked at a fluorescent tube bulb and an incandescent bulb.
Counter Spam Measure: Negative Feedback.
Imagine if all or some very large contingent of email clients allowed you to
"retaliate" against spam messages. Highlight message, select "negative feedback"
option, a daemon is spun that traces back as far as possible the route of the
message and barrages it some fashion. By pings maybe? By directed replies? Imagine
it does this in some scheduled fashion so as to minimize the impact on your local
network. As 1 million disparate sources converge upon the last traceable source of
the route of the offending spammer, some network somewhere will start to feel the
load. Like the spokes of a wheel converging on the hub, the retaliation traffic will
thicken as it closes in on the source. The pain increases. ISPs inundated by
individuals expressing their right to freedom of speech, will feel suddenly inclined
to exercise their right to refuse service to someone.
The "negative feedback" could be dosed in a coordinated fashion if there were some
P2P means of establishing how many individuals had received a particular spam. If a
spammer hits only a hundred people, the dose of retaliatory traffic would have to be
increased to be felt. If the spam hit a million, it would require only a modest
retaliation to utterly swamp the source.
Just thinking out loud. Could this be made to work? No one's free speech is
curtailed, spam is dealt a serious blow.
fight fire with fire.
Assume the following:
1. Regardless of any attempts by anyone to prevent it, reproduction of data will occur. No matter how good your copy protection, if I can play it, I can copy it. I can even reproduce it with an arbitrary fidelity approaching perfection by sampling it many times.
2. Once copied, the data will proliferate in the wild. No law is going to make everyone agree on the ethics of the issue or behave with restraint. There will always be some people who want and will copy and share.
If you assume these two items, the only way it seems artists will be able to gaurantee a certain amount of compensation for their efforts (something almost everyone unanimously agrees is necessary for w/out it we would see a great deal less effort invested in creating good art) is the ransom model.
This will require most artists to "pay their dues" by producing some amount of good quality free music so that they become known as good artists. At some point, they will be able to propose a ransom for their next work.
The ransom can be paid in any combination/way you like, 100 people willing to pay $10, 100,000 people willing to pay $1 and 200,000 people willing to pay a dime. Anyone can up their contribution anytime they like to speed release, but once the ransom is reached, the item is released into the wild.
This also provides a direct means of observing the compensation and will allow a sense of fair play to enter the equation of compensation, whereas now compensation is sort of open ended and indeterminable. Sometimes inordinately large, and other times non-existant. Also, a reputation for honesty becomes important. If an artist stiffs the public with a POS, they'll remember.
Chances are that if you can think of a problem with this system, with a little more thought you can think of a fix for that problem.
Assume the following:
1. Regardless of any attempts by anyone to prevent it, reproduction of data will occur. No matter how good your copy protection, if I can play it, I can copy it. I can even reproduce it with an arbitrary fidelity approaching perfection by sampling it many times.
2. Once copied, the data will proliferate in the wild. No law is going to make everyone agree on the ethics of the issue or behave with restraint. There will always be some people who want and will copy and share.
If you assume these two items, the only way it seems artists will be able to gaurantee a certain amount of compensation for their efforts (something almost everyone unanimously agrees is necessary for w/out it we would see a great deal less effort invested in creating good art) is the ransom model.
This will require most artists to "pay their dues" by producing some amount of good quality free music so that they become known as good artists. At some point, they will be able to propose a ransom for their next work.
The ransom can be paid in any combination/way you like, 100 people willing to pay $10, 100,000 people willing to pay $1 and 200,000 people willing to pay a dime. Anyone can up their contribution anytime they like to speed release, but once the ransom is reached, the item is released into the wild.
This also provides a direct means of observing the compensation and will allow a sense of fair play to enter the equation of compensation, whereas now compensation is sort of open ended and indeterminable. Sometimes inordinately large, and other times non-existant. Also, a reputation for honesty becomes important. If an artist stiffs the public with a POS, they'll remember.
Chances are that if you can think of a problem with this system, with a little more thought you can think of a fix for that problem.
Imagine if all or some very large contingent of email clients allowed you to "retaliate" against spam messages. Highlight message, select "negative feedback" option, a daemon is spun that traces back as far as possible the route of the message and barrages it some fashion. By pings maybe? By directed replies? Imagine it does this in some scheduled fashion so as to minimize the impact on your local network. As 1 million disparate sources converge upon the last traceable source of the route of the offending spammer, some network somewhere will start to feel the load. Like the spokes of a wheel converging on the hub, the retaliation traffic will thicken as it closes in on the source. The pain increases. ISPs inundated by individuals expressing their right to freedom of speech, will feel suddenly inclined to exercise their right to refuse service to someone.
The "negative feedback" could be dosed in a coordinated fashion if there were some P2P means of establishing how many individuals had received a particular spam. If a spammer hits only a hundred people, the dose of retaliatory traffic would have to be increased to be felt. If the spam hit a million, it would require only a modest retaliation to utterly swamp the source.
Just thinking out loud. Could this be made to work?