A huge difference is that in this case, there is analysis to show the plant can withstand the postulated event. In the case of the tsunami, it was not so, as the plant was never designed to handle a tsunami. The key failing being placing a plant not designed to handle a tsunami in a potential tsunami path.
Diablo Canyon is designed to withstand an earthquake.
FWIW, in Fukishima one of the main problems was with the cooling of spent reactor rods that were stored on site.
No, the spent fuel in each of the pools was determined to be just fine, although there were concerns as the event unfolded because access to the spent fuel pools was pretty much non-existent.
SCRAM in 10 seconds is fine. But a SCRAMmed plant does not instantly become safe nor is it considered completely shut down. You still need heat removal for quite some time afterword ( which varies between designs) . That is where the seismic requirements come in. The heat removal systems must withstand the event and remain operational. Every single safety system and backup safety system is required to endure the event.
I think we are saying the same thing. The 'requirements' are in the form of the licensing basis of the plant. They did the evaluation but did not revise the basis. When the actual fault data was finalized and useful is, however, unclear to me.
Meanwhile, there is a fleet wide re-evaluation of all sites underway to ensure any new seismic data for each regions/site is evaluated against the plants' existing capabilities.
However there are many technologies and combined together they form a robust and comparatively clean solutions.
And that is the answer. Too bad it eludes so many in search of their own vision of the holy grail of green. Unfortunately, politics and ideology will get in the way, rather than a common sense evaluation of cost, risk, reliability, environmental impact, technological maturity, and ability to implement given our current state.
This is not a new story, basically a reprint. With that said, if there is any indication the the plant cannot withstand postulated earthquake levels it should be shut down. This was not ignored, and the article does mention that an evaluation was performed based on the new information.
"In 2012, the agency endorsed preliminary findings that found shaking from the Shoreline fault would not pose any additional risk for the reactors. Those greater ground motions were “at or below those for which the plant was evaluated previously,” referring to the Hosgri fault, it concluded."
Given our experience with plants holding up extremely well to seismic events and the large margins that are included in seismic design of these plants, the finding is not surprising. Work continues, as it should, to look for anything that could possibly have been missed or not enveloped by the new data.
The basis for the inspectors complaint is, in large part, not that the plant is not capable of withstanding the quake, nor that the analsyis is faulty or incorrect, but rather that the licensing basis document has not been revised to require a higher peak acceleration design level. It is debateable whether such a would make any difference, since they are already required to analyze for the higher levels. Meanwhile, the concern is being handled through the appropriate processes.
But they don't seem to worry about the CO2 production when discussing the 'devouring' of the known releases, so maybe they missed that. Isn't CO2 a much less potent greenhouse gas, and won't a lot of it still remain dissolved? Just stuff the models should factor in.
I don't have a pony in this race. Don't know much about it. But the title says I gotta choose a side, and from the looks of things the new guard is winning, at least with this systemd thingy, so I'll go with them. GO NG GO!
3 blocks square is what I would call a local distribution issue, and hardly a grid issue. Your local power company needs to do a better job, be it keeping trees off the local distributions lines or whatever else the problem is.
Just a passing though; A large release would not happen all at once & might be offset to some extent by a large explosion in the microbial life that "devours" this stuff.
There are certainly certain areas where service is unreliable for a variety of reasons. But overall, your experience is on the worst end and does not reflect the grid as a whole, which, despite some local distribution issues, probably was still quite intact in your general area during most of those disturbances. I live in a rural area, I think my power may have been out for a total of an hour for the past four or five years.
Lovins repetitively misses the underlying issues with his solutions. Just look up his Hypercar predictions, or backyard microturbines. Despite those laughers, he continues to be popular amongst the extreme greens simply by telling people what they want to hear.
They have some pretty sharp folks working on grid security at INL. While I've seen some disturbing government R&D waste in many areas, this is actually one where I have been highly impressed.
Meanwhile, the US grid has been quite reliable overall throughout the years, and the few major events that have caused large disturbances have been analyzed in detail so the preventative measures can be taken.
Had this been a NASA test, or maybe a DOD test, it more likely would have been billed as a blatant failure. This article goes a bit out of its way to remind us this 'its a good thing to learn' this way.
You can have vendor lock with or without standards. Standards can often contribute to vendor lock.
Why do I think there are standards? For one, the article refers to them, albeit vaguely. For two, purchasing standards or requirements for commonplace items such as stoplights typically fall under some type of code/standard/requirement system, and that makes sense when you want to make sure equipment is similar throughout a large system or state. Be that for vendor lock, or simple management simplicity, you choose, that part is irrelevant to my point.
And how exactly would a simple password result in a higher price?
That completely misses the point, even if adding a simple password were the answer. If a standard is not sufficient, it should be changed. Don't blame the buyer or the vendor. For things like traffic lights, you want them all to be as alike as possible to save costs, be it purchasing requirements, maintenance and troubleshooting, and operation. That is why there are standards and why they are followed and why there are costs associated with deviating from the standard.
Most of those who do the purchasing are required to enforce the standards. Deviating, even with the intent of improvement, can bring unintended consequences and blame. For instance, add security, then all of the sudden maintenance access doesn't work because its different, complaints and blame fly. Just one possible example of many things that can happen, thus they have standards and are required to use them.
In fact, the most upsetting passage in the entire paper is the dismissive response issued by the traffic controller vendor when the research team presented its findings. According to the paper, the vendor responsible stated that it "has followed the accepted industry standard and it is that standard which does not include security."
Don't blame the vendor, blame the standard. The vendor that includes security in his bid will have a higher price and lose to the vendor that doesn't.
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A huge difference is that in this case, there is analysis to show the plant can withstand the postulated event. In the case of the tsunami, it was not so, as the plant was never designed to handle a tsunami. The key failing being placing a plant not designed to handle a tsunami in a potential tsunami path.
Diablo Canyon is designed to withstand an earthquake.
FWIW, in Fukishima one of the main problems was with the cooling of spent reactor rods that were stored on site.
No, the spent fuel in each of the pools was determined to be just fine, although there were concerns as the event unfolded because access to the spent fuel pools was pretty much non-existent.
SCRAM in 10 seconds is fine. But a SCRAMmed plant does not instantly become safe nor is it considered completely shut down. You still need heat removal for quite some time afterword ( which varies between designs) . That is where the seismic requirements come in. The heat removal systems must withstand the event and remain operational. Every single safety system and backup safety system is required to endure the event.
I think we are saying the same thing. The 'requirements' are in the form of the licensing basis of the plant. They did the evaluation but did not revise the basis. When the actual fault data was finalized and useful is, however, unclear to me.
Meanwhile, there is a fleet wide re-evaluation of all sites underway to ensure any new seismic data for each regions/site is evaluated against the plants' existing capabilities.
However there are many technologies and combined together they form a robust and comparatively clean solutions.
And that is the answer. Too bad it eludes so many in search of their own vision of the holy grail of green. Unfortunately, politics and ideology will get in the way, rather than a common sense evaluation of cost, risk, reliability, environmental impact, technological maturity, and ability to implement given our current state.
Safe before, during, and after. No warning needed. That's the only way.
This is not a new story, basically a reprint. With that said, if there is any indication the the plant cannot withstand postulated earthquake levels it should be shut down. This was not ignored, and the article does mention that an evaluation was performed based on the new information.
"In 2012, the agency endorsed preliminary findings that found shaking from the Shoreline fault would not pose any additional risk for the reactors. Those greater ground motions were “at or below those for which the plant was evaluated previously,” referring to the Hosgri fault, it concluded."
Given our experience with plants holding up extremely well to seismic events and the large margins that are included in seismic design of these plants, the finding is not surprising. Work continues, as it should, to look for anything that could possibly have been missed or not enveloped by the new data.
The basis for the inspectors complaint is, in large part, not that the plant is not capable of withstanding the quake, nor that the analsyis is faulty or incorrect, but rather that the licensing basis document has not been revised to require a higher peak acceleration design level. It is debateable whether such a would make any difference, since they are already required to analyze for the higher levels. Meanwhile, the concern is being handled through the appropriate processes.
Very interesting. Thanks.
But they don't seem to worry about the CO2 production when discussing the 'devouring' of the known releases, so maybe they missed that. Isn't CO2 a much less potent greenhouse gas, and won't a lot of it still remain dissolved? Just stuff the models should factor in.
I don't have a pony in this race. Don't know much about it. But the title says I gotta choose a side, and from the looks of things the new guard is winning, at least with this systemd thingy, so I'll go with them. GO NG GO!
3 blocks square is what I would call a local distribution issue, and hardly a grid issue. Your local power company needs to do a better job, be it keeping trees off the local distributions lines or whatever else the problem is.
Just a passing though; A large release would not happen all at once & might be offset to some extent by a large explosion in the microbial life that "devours" this stuff.
LOL, just saw this
"VW hasn’t decided, but any sticker price should exceed $120,000. "
Mass adoption right around the corner! LOL again.
No, that is a plug in hybrid with 'theoretical" mpg not actual. Try again.
There are certainly certain areas where service is unreliable for a variety of reasons. But overall, your experience is on the worst end and does not reflect the grid as a whole, which, despite some local distribution issues, probably was still quite intact in your general area during most of those disturbances. I live in a rural area, I think my power may have been out for a total of an hour for the past four or five years.
not even close..... to the 130+ mpg Lovins completely botched not to mention the rate of adoption.
Lovins repetitively misses the underlying issues with his solutions. Just look up his Hypercar predictions, or backyard microturbines. Despite those laughers, he continues to be popular amongst the extreme greens simply by telling people what they want to hear.
Good Point. INL only working on the data/security end of things. FERC and NERC are the ones responsible for the reserve aspects of reliability.
They have some pretty sharp folks working on grid security at INL. While I've seen some disturbing government R&D waste in many areas, this is actually one where I have been highly impressed.
Meanwhile, the US grid has been quite reliable overall throughout the years, and the few major events that have caused large disturbances have been analyzed in detail so the preventative measures can be taken.
Had this been a NASA test, or maybe a DOD test, it more likely would have been billed as a blatant failure. This article goes a bit out of its way to remind us this 'its a good thing to learn' this way.
You can have vendor lock with or without standards. Standards can often contribute to vendor lock.
Why do I think there are standards? For one, the article refers to them, albeit vaguely. For two, purchasing standards or requirements for commonplace items such as stoplights typically fall under some type of code/standard/requirement system, and that makes sense when you want to make sure equipment is similar throughout a large system or state. Be that for vendor lock, or simple management simplicity, you choose, that part is irrelevant to my point.
If they raise their test scores, we should give them faster internet as a reward.
And how exactly would a simple password result in a higher price?
That completely misses the point, even if adding a simple password were the answer. If a standard is not sufficient, it should be changed. Don't blame the buyer or the vendor. For things like traffic lights, you want them all to be as alike as possible to save costs, be it purchasing requirements, maintenance and troubleshooting, and operation. That is why there are standards and why they are followed and why there are costs associated with deviating from the standard.
Most of those who do the purchasing are required to enforce the standards. Deviating, even with the intent of improvement, can bring unintended consequences and blame. For instance, add security, then all of the sudden maintenance access doesn't work because its different, complaints and blame fly. Just one possible example of many things that can happen, thus they have standards and are required to use them.
In fact, the most upsetting passage in the entire paper is the dismissive response issued by the traffic controller vendor when the research team presented its findings. According to the paper, the vendor responsible stated that it "has followed the accepted industry standard and it is that standard which does not include security."
Don't blame the vendor, blame the standard. The vendor that includes security in his bid will have a higher price and lose to the vendor that doesn't.