I created something. I want to keep it private, or limit distribution. I invested my time and possibly my money - I want to recoup this investment. Someone out there likes my idea - my work - but they do not want to pay for it. I should be able to have my work protected from people like that.
None of that supports a claim of immorality as to infringement. You're just saying that you are greedy and want to be paid, and other people are greedy and don't want to pay, and therefore their greed is not merely distinguishable from your greed, but that they're outright immoral.
Seems like the pot calling the kettle black to me.
Let me put it in another way - -- you go to work everyday (i presume) - would you appreciate it if your boss said "you are not getting paid for your work"?
No, but this is different. Labor is not the same thing as the fruit of labor. Since no one is compelling artists to create things, their labor is not being forced, which would be morally wrong. On the other hand, waiting for artists to expend labor, and then sharing in the reward of that labor doesn't force anything.
Furthermore, we can demonstrate that while some fruits of labor are worthy of protection, not all are. E.g. if I plant a lot of plants, I cannot charge people for breathing the oxygen that my plants produce, nor for enjoying the nice view. (I might block off other people's access to that by erecting a wall or something, but this transforms the fruit being charged for into granting access to this, since if the growing itself were enough, the wall wouldn't matter)
Copyright infringement is stealing someone elses work - it may not be tangeable like a car - but that should not demean its value.
Well, work is never tangible. It's intangible. Hell, it's a verb, not a noun, as far as we're concerned. This is important.
Or do you believe taking something that does not belong to you as morally correct?
If it does not belong to anyone, and it is not a taking in that no one else is deprived of the thing in question, then I think that it is not morally incorrect. It is amoral. I won't go so far as to say that copyright infringement is moral either. Don't impose a simpleminded dichotomy here.
I think that we might create some control over these things arbitrarily if it seems like a good idea, but that doesn't elevate or depress the issue into a good/evil sort of thing. It's still amoral, as I see it. Just like how it's no sin to jaywalk or trivially violate building ordinances, even though those things aren't legal either.
Oh, well, I don't know from Australian copyright law, but in the US it's quite easy for one person to be found liable for the infringements of another person. (not as a substitute, mind; they're both liable)
The first way to do this is contributory liability: material contributions to the infringement of another, knowing of the infringement, are themselves infringing.
The second way is vicarious liability: if you have the right and ability to prevent someone from infringing but you don't, and you profit from their infringement, you are liable for it regardless of whether or not you knew of it.
Both theories were successfully used against Napster: the necessary direct infringements were committed by the users who uploaded and downloaded illegally. Napster contributed by providing the P2P service and while they were not imputed to know of the infringement by virtue of the fact that their technology could be used to do it, they did have actual knowledge in that record companies were telling them about infringements. As they failed to stop contributing by providing the service to upon the instant that they found out, and they could have done, this made them contributorially liable. Napster was also vicariously liable since it did have the power to block some files which were being illegally transferred about, but didn't, while profiting from drawing users to the network who would then see ads which brought Napster revenue.
This all shakes down to mean that in the post Napster world, if you don't want to be sued into oblivion, it is essential to not have the ability to stop contributing or to prevent others from infringing. Only then can liability be escaped.
Whether Australia has similar doctrines, I can't say.
Ah, but BT both reproduces and distributes. Claiming that it isn't infringing to reproduce so as to time shift doesn't help a bit when it comes to distribution. Giving out portions of the work to others isn't necessary for time shifting.
So I think your argument would fail, particularly as just because courts don't normally let people stand in the shoes of other fair uses -- you have to show that the distribution is fair by itself without reference to who's on the other end.
I would caution against reading Sony to support the notion that timeshifting (or indeed anything) is always a fair use. Only that it may be. Whenever the fair use defense is employed, the court must examine the specific circumstances involved to determine if a fair use occurred in the case before it. Sony doesn't contradict this IIRC.
So it's more accurate to say that some, perhaps even most or all actual instances of time shifting are fair uses, but not that every possible or actual time shift necessarily are fair.
The only reason we even can have IP laws is the constution allows it.
Oh, that's hardly true. The federal government got its power from the states and people. There have been state copyright laws for longer than there have been federal copyright laws, and the idea itself goes back to England when we were still colonies.
You just don't hear much about state copyright law these days because the federal government has decided to handle most everything by itself.
I seem to recall that the movie is in the public domain; it's other dominant works that aren't, which has the unfortunate, stupid, result under Stewart v. Abend of denying the public their due for the time being.
I guess that you're not in the US. (or in fact, in just about any country I can think of)
Here, companies are perfectly able to own copyrights, both as authors under the work for hire doctrine currently codified in 17 USC 201 and 101, and through assignments from other authors as provided for in 17 USC 204.
In fact, I don't recall that it's ever been impossible for companies to own copyrights. The work for hire doctrine dates back over a century, and assignments to another who would then become the copyright proprietor were possible.
Licensure is also an option, as you note. But it's hardly the only one!
And of course, corporate ownership of copyrights is a totally pedestrian idea throughout the world. I can't think of any place that doesn't allow it altogether. Perhaps you know of one?
It would probably be a good idea for you to do some learnin' on this subject before you post about it again.
It's funny you mention Romeo and Juliet. Shakespeare rather closely ripped off earlier (sometimes lost) sources, for virtually everything he wrote. He wasn't a very original writer. Just an exceptionally good one.
Don't fetishize original works. They're on an equal footing with derivative works: most suck, and a few of each are really good.
Can't you understand how useful it will be for an MPAA plantiff to pull out the following (ellided) law?
Nope. That's why they've been fighting it.
The law says that some things are legal. It says nothing more than that. There is no affirmative statement that anything is illegal; only that some things might not be legalized by that subsection.
This is a lot like the world of patent validity. As we know, patents can be invalid. And, in a specific case, a patent might not be invalid. But no court ever says that a patent is valid, because that would preclude later challenges as to validity that might be successful. So while a dunce might think that when a patent is not invalid that it is therefore valid, no one who works in this field does.
Now the creation of someone to coordinate the United States' efforts to enforce international copyright law would be a good thing; who here thinks that its a good thing that you can buy "Oceans 12" or "Half Life 2" on the streets of Hong Kong today for 50 cents?
I think that there should be only two precepts of international copyright law: 1) National treatment, i.e. that you treat foreigners the same as one's own people, and 2) Avoidance of conflicts so that obtaining a copyright in one place doesn't preclude you from being able to in some other place.
There should NOT be any minimum standards, however. If a country feels it is in its own best interests to have more copyright or less copyright than another, or no copyright at all, then that is a perfectly valid decision and should be respected.
So to answer your question, if China thinks it's okay to have cheap pirated copies of just-released or unreleased works, then I think that that's fine. It's their decision. We don't have to follow it, but by the same token, they shouldn't have to follow us.
I'm all for leveling the playing field and making sure that US companies and artists get compensated for their work.
The problem is that the level playing field is still in the advantage of the US and Europe basically, because it is up to their level. And anyway, why should other countries care if we make money? Let it be our concern, and let their law be their concern.
You are totally not understanding what I am saying, not to mention the proposed exemption in the House. The exemption does not ban machines. It does not ban activity. It does not ban anything. It is the opposite of a ban, in fact! It explicitly allows things, and disallows nothing!
You totally don't understand how the law is structured, and so you just keep on getting this nonsensical crap out of it that you blather on about the way you do.
At the top are fundamental laws, such as freedom of speech. They permit people to say or print one's own words, or other people have said or printed.
Copyright laws are a subset of this. For example, the 106(2) right says that you cannot make a derivative work based upon a preexisting copyrighted work unless you have the authorization of the pertinent copyright holder. This is a really broad prohibition! One kind of derivative work is a translation into a different language.
So let us say that Alice writes a book in English. If there were no copyright law, anyone could reproduce the book, distribute new copies of the book, and prepare derivatives such as sequels, stage adaptations, or translations into other languages. So if this public domain world, Bob could take Alice's book and write a Spanish translation of it, and this would be entirely legal.
That's what the law was like until well into the 19th century, with regards to derivatives, since there was no equivalent of the 106(2) right yet.
Once the right was added to the statute, Bob could no longer do that.
But let's say that Congress decided that we ought to be better friends with the rest of the world, and that the best way to do that is to permit everyone to translate whatever they'd like into different languages. They COULD just take away the 106(2) right to prepare derivatives; after all, they created it, and they can abolish it.
But this would open the door too wide. They only want to allow translations. They don't want to allow for other kinds of derivatives to be made.
So now they write up an exemption. It says something like 'Notwithstanding the exclusive right to prepare derivatives, it is not infringing to prepare translations of a work.'
Now PART of the 106(2) right is gone. But not all of it. If Bob writes a sequel to Alice's book, he breaks the law. If he writes a translation to the book, he is hunky-dory.
Now comes the kicker. Congress is happy with this, except for one thing. They don't like the people of Pottsylvania for some reason. So the new exemption they're writing that permits translations finally says, when it passes, 'Notwithstanding the exclusive right to prepare derivatives, it is not infringing to prepare translations of a work, except for translations into Pottsylvanian.'
See what this does?
If they do not pass the bill, it is illegal to make translations into Pottsylvanian. That's because it's illegal to make any kind of translations.
If they do pass the bill, then it is legal to make translations into everything BUT Pottsylvanian.
What's really important however, is that the bill itself NEVER says that it is illegal to make translations into Pottsylvanian. The PREEXISTING 106(2) right does that. This just says that THIS exemption doesn't legalize it.
If there is ANOTHER statute on the books, that says that it is not infringing to translate into languages that start with P, then although the first exemption doesn't apply, the second one does. That the first one doesn't apply has no impact on the first one!
The House bill is the same deal.
If it would be illegal under the new bill to skip commercials, then that can ONLY be because it is illegal NOW. That's because the new bill makes NOTHING illegal. It only is very strict and limited about what it makes legal; that is, first it gives, and then it takes a little bit back. Like that thingy in Raiders of the Lost Ark; it says to have a staff six feet long, and then it tells you to take away a foot.
No, this law doesn't specifically make it a crime to skip a commercial. But still, it means that skipping commercials will become illegal.
It means absolutely nothing of the sort. It will be no more illegal than it is now.
There was no real doubt. Fair-Use and First-Sale are clear
You're right, there was no real doubt. First sale has nothing to do with it, and fair use doesn't apply to Clean Flicks since it cannot stand in the shoes of its customers. It was breaking the law by offering up derivatives and reproductions.
As with most/.ers, this thing just totally is incomprehensible to you. I swear, I can't figure out why.
Matters little, though. Basically the same provision, minus some, but not enough, of the actually bad stuff, cleared the Senate today. This'll be a law, and it'll have zero effect on tivos and such.
Where I am I contradicting myself? I don't recall saying the standard was very high.
What I'm saying is that currently P2P sharing can easily be prosecuted where either: 1) it is for financial gain (which includes the receipt or expectation of receipt of other works in trade) or 2) works having a total retail value of over $1,000 are shared within a 180 day period.
This bill would make it easier still. It would make it criminal to knowingly distribute works, with reckless disregard for future infringement, where 1) any of those works haven't been publicly released for sale/rental yet, 2) the total retail value is over $10,000 (n.b. the $1,000 limit above would still be in force there as well), or 3) 1,000 or more works regardless of value.
So we've got a low standard, and it's dropping fast.
This is more nuanced, and as to that, I can see a valid argument being made. But that isn't the argument being made by pretty much everyone else here. (Of course, while I agree with his interpretation of the copyright clause, n.b. that no court that heard Eldred did)
I'm not sure how much I agree with the good professor here. I agree that where this exemption doesn't apply, some other exemption would have to. But one exemption doesn't raise an implication against another; that's not how they work. For example, consider the 120 exemption's interaction with fair use. Does the fact that I can lawfully photograph a copyrighted architectural work in its expression as a building ordinarily viewable from a public place mean that there could not be a fair use to photograph such works if not within the exemption? I doubt it, given that a court can't reject fair use out of hand, but instead must engage in a fairly searching analysis. (Of course a lot of stuff commonly felt to be fair is not; I'm talking about things that really might fall within 107)
Rather, his line of argument is better applied to issues of whether copyright pertains to some activity at all. Where there is an exemption, e.g. 117, then it's hard to accept that there's no or little need for an exemption, since why else would Congress pass it?
But where there are multiple exemptions, the second one doesn't harm the first. Congress felt both needed to be passed.
Probably the best example is the 1008 exemption. The one time it's been looked at in court, IIRC, the court found it wasn't applicable, and then took the time in dicta to suggest that fair use probably was, even though it had to read fair use very broadly in order to do so.
I'm not worried about this 110 exemption. It's the rest of the bill that is extremely dangerous.
Basically the way this works is that we have something very broad, such as:
Everything not prohibited is permitted.
Then we take a bite out of that:
You can't create derivatives of copyrighted works.
Then we put a little bit of that bite back:
You can't create derivatives of copyrighted works except where those works are movies.
Then we take a bite out of that little bit again:
You can't create derivatives of copyrighted works except where those works are movies and where doing so does not skip over ads.
NONE OF THIS MEANS THAT THERE ARE NOT OTHER BITES.
This specific provision -- which again is good, and not bad like 99.44% of the rest of the bill, which you are ignoring -- only says that it's not infringing to do certain editing of movies.
It doesn't say you can't do other editing. But this wouldn't permit it. Something ELSE would have to permit it.
So if it is permitted now, it will still be permitted in the future. If it is not permitted now, then unless it is of the type this exemption does permit, it still won't be permitted in the future. And if it is confused now as to whether it's permitted or not, this might clarify things.
Given current attitudes toward copyright this amounts to a prohibition of devices meant to allow this
No it fucking well does not do that. You aren't reading the fucking law properly! I am sick of everyone here parroting this insane claim with no basis in reality.
Please also consider the fact that Slashdot posters aren't the only people to interpret the law in the manner in which you object. Senator John McCain, for example
Yes, he is ALSO misreading it.
Probably he either a) is just responding to his constituents, who are misreading it, or b) is acting rather deviously.
By that I mean, this is basically the only good thing in HR 2391, and the movie studios hate it. They love all the other crap that's in there though, all of which (other than one tiny thing in the 108 exemption) is very, very bad.
So I'm really beginning to suspect that some lobbyist that wants all the bad portions of the bill to pass has started spreading this dumbass idea around in hopes that the 110 exemption will get dropped from the bill (making MPAA happy and us unhappy) and that no one will pay attention to the rest of it, avoiding challenges to the things that actually need to get challenged.
Basically, all of you idiots are playing right into the 'bad guys' hands. Whether it's by design or coincidence, I don't know, but you're all being really stupid about it.
Right. I would appreciate it if you'd noted that the bill is otherwise very bad, but I'm glad to see someone else understands how these rights are enumerated and then exempted.
Currently a small independent publisher basicly has no option of going after non comemrcial copyright infringement, regardless of the scale at which it happens.
The problem is that that's simply untrue. Not only are damage awards great enough that contingency fees will readily attract lawyers, but 17 USC 505 allows awards of reasonable attorneys fees!
Money is NOT an issue.
Of course, in a criminal suit, restitution is impossible, and likely precluded in the future due to an exhaustion of funds!
Also, currently the DoH can't go after individuals sharing files on a non comemrcial basis and obviously they don't bother trying either.
Which a) would change under this bill, and b) is irrelevant since what constitutes a commercial basis is amazingly more than you'd think. You need to read the law!
Actually P2P filesharing is easily prosecuted under the current laws, and would be even more easily prosecuted under the proposed law. It generally is commercial, the way that term is specifically defined in the law.
This really only goes to show that you haven't read through the law carefully and that you don't have a good understanding of the issues.
The interesting thing is that criminalizing copyright violations in the end favors the 'little' guy a lot more then the big music and movie producers. It gives a level of protection to the idnependent publisher that they simply cannot afford right now.
See, that's totally wrong.
First, whether or not a criminal action is brought is entirely up to the DoJ. They don't bother with small cases. They go after large scale piracy operations, which are pretty inevitably dealing with works whose copyrights are held by the big copyright interests.
Second, there have been criminal penalties on the books for over a century. So if it were going to have a positive impact, it would've already done so, one would imagine.
Third, if your copyright has been infringed, it is generally quite easy to afford litigation as damages can be extraordinarily high and cases are easy to win and this results in lawyers being happy to take cases on a contingency basis.
Also, currently copyright is mostly enforced by big corporations bullying individuals with civil suits. Imho that is not a proper way to enforce a law.
Wrong, wrong, wrong. Civil suits are PERFECT. It places the entire discretion as to whether or not to proceed in the hands of the copyright holder. It's easy, it's effective, but it isn't as overly harsh as it would be to make someone a felon and put them in jail for several years. Particularly given that most infringements are of a trivial nature.
I'm glad that you are interested in reducing the scope of copyright law, but frankly, you don't understand it at all.
But that's just the thing! The law that has everyone pissed off is actually about the only good one! It's all the others that we ought to be objecting to.
So it's much more clever than you give them credit for.
It's impossible for a computer to view anything without making or already having a copy in local memory.
Check out the Intellectual Reserve v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry case for a discussion of how it's possible to infringe on a copyright by means of going to the wrong web page via a computer.
Plus of course, even if we were to consider this to be a performance, leaving something open to anyone that wants to access it is to leave it open to the public.
This is the third article on/. in a week that totally misreads the proposed addition to 17 USC 110.
It does NOT make it illegal to skip commercials.
It just says that this new exemption doesn't apply to skipping commercials. If there is an EXISTING exemption (or if the manner by which the commercials are skipped isn't even prima face infringement) then those still remain in effect just as they do now.
This is little more than a clarification.
That said, it is a bad bill overall, since there are a lot of other provisions attached with this one which suck, such as criminalizing copyright infringement even more than it is now, permitting the government to file civil suits for infringement, further gutting registration formalities, etc.
But this is one of the only halfway decent parts of it -- as it would tend to remove any doubt as to the legality of what Clean Flicks has been doing, and would permit other creative uses of EDLs, such as to edit Jar Jar out of Star Wars movies -- and so it annoys me quite a lot to see people's outrage arising out of a misreading of the bill. Be outraged at the rest of the bill, dammit.
I'm not making it up. This is how the courts have interpreted the clause, and it's hardly nonsensical to imagine that in order to regulate interstate commerce that Congress might have the power to regulate the methods by which it occurs.
Interstate commerce includes not merely the act of an interstate commercial transaction, but also the vehicles by which it might occur, entities engaged in it, the goods in motion, etc.
So it's a tax on the line because the line can be used in interstate commerce.
This isn't a very contentious thing. I'd get all up in arms over the Wickard case first. It's much more expansive.
Slashdot Mirror
I created something. I want to keep it private, or limit distribution. I invested my time and possibly my money - I want to recoup this investment. Someone out there likes my idea - my work - but they do not want to pay for it. I should be able to have my work protected from people like that.
None of that supports a claim of immorality as to infringement. You're just saying that you are greedy and want to be paid, and other people are greedy and don't want to pay, and therefore their greed is not merely distinguishable from your greed, but that they're outright immoral.
Seems like the pot calling the kettle black to me.
Let me put it in another way - -- you go to work everyday (i presume) - would you appreciate it if your boss said "you are not getting paid for your work"?
No, but this is different. Labor is not the same thing as the fruit of labor. Since no one is compelling artists to create things, their labor is not being forced, which would be morally wrong. On the other hand, waiting for artists to expend labor, and then sharing in the reward of that labor doesn't force anything.
Furthermore, we can demonstrate that while some fruits of labor are worthy of protection, not all are. E.g. if I plant a lot of plants, I cannot charge people for breathing the oxygen that my plants produce, nor for enjoying the nice view. (I might block off other people's access to that by erecting a wall or something, but this transforms the fruit being charged for into granting access to this, since if the growing itself were enough, the wall wouldn't matter)
Copyright infringement is stealing someone elses work - it may not be tangeable like a car - but that should not demean its value.
Well, work is never tangible. It's intangible. Hell, it's a verb, not a noun, as far as we're concerned. This is important.
Or do you believe taking something that does not belong to you as morally correct?
If it does not belong to anyone, and it is not a taking in that no one else is deprived of the thing in question, then I think that it is not morally incorrect. It is amoral. I won't go so far as to say that copyright infringement is moral either. Don't impose a simpleminded dichotomy here.
I think that we might create some control over these things arbitrarily if it seems like a good idea, but that doesn't elevate or depress the issue into a good/evil sort of thing. It's still amoral, as I see it. Just like how it's no sin to jaywalk or trivially violate building ordinances, even though those things aren't legal either.
Oh, well, I don't know from Australian copyright law, but in the US it's quite easy for one person to be found liable for the infringements of another person. (not as a substitute, mind; they're both liable)
The first way to do this is contributory liability: material contributions to the infringement of another, knowing of the infringement, are themselves infringing.
The second way is vicarious liability: if you have the right and ability to prevent someone from infringing but you don't, and you profit from their infringement, you are liable for it regardless of whether or not you knew of it.
Both theories were successfully used against Napster: the necessary direct infringements were committed by the users who uploaded and downloaded illegally. Napster contributed by providing the P2P service and while they were not imputed to know of the infringement by virtue of the fact that their technology could be used to do it, they did have actual knowledge in that record companies were telling them about infringements. As they failed to stop contributing by providing the service to upon the instant that they found out, and they could have done, this made them contributorially liable. Napster was also vicariously liable since it did have the power to block some files which were being illegally transferred about, but didn't, while profiting from drawing users to the network who would then see ads which brought Napster revenue.
This all shakes down to mean that in the post Napster world, if you don't want to be sued into oblivion, it is essential to not have the ability to stop contributing or to prevent others from infringing. Only then can liability be escaped.
Whether Australia has similar doctrines, I can't say.
Ah, but BT both reproduces and distributes. Claiming that it isn't infringing to reproduce so as to time shift doesn't help a bit when it comes to distribution. Giving out portions of the work to others isn't necessary for time shifting.
So I think your argument would fail, particularly as just because courts don't normally let people stand in the shoes of other fair uses -- you have to show that the distribution is fair by itself without reference to who's on the other end.
I would caution against reading Sony to support the notion that timeshifting (or indeed anything) is always a fair use. Only that it may be. Whenever the fair use defense is employed, the court must examine the specific circumstances involved to determine if a fair use occurred in the case before it. Sony doesn't contradict this IIRC.
So it's more accurate to say that some, perhaps even most or all actual instances of time shifting are fair uses, but not that every possible or actual time shift necessarily are fair.
I'm sorry, but I don't see why copyright infringement is morally wrong. Perhaps you'd care to share your thoughts on the matter?
The only reason we even can have IP laws is the constution allows it.
Oh, that's hardly true. The federal government got its power from the states and people. There have been state copyright laws for longer than there have been federal copyright laws, and the idea itself goes back to England when we were still colonies.
You just don't hear much about state copyright law these days because the federal government has decided to handle most everything by itself.
I seem to recall that the movie is in the public domain; it's other dominant works that aren't, which has the unfortunate, stupid, result under Stewart v. Abend of denying the public their due for the time being.
I guess that you're not in the US. (or in fact, in just about any country I can think of)
Here, companies are perfectly able to own copyrights, both as authors under the work for hire doctrine currently codified in 17 USC 201 and 101, and through assignments from other authors as provided for in 17 USC 204.
In fact, I don't recall that it's ever been impossible for companies to own copyrights. The work for hire doctrine dates back over a century, and assignments to another who would then become the copyright proprietor were possible.
Licensure is also an option, as you note. But it's hardly the only one!
And of course, corporate ownership of copyrights is a totally pedestrian idea throughout the world. I can't think of any place that doesn't allow it altogether. Perhaps you know of one?
It would probably be a good idea for you to do some learnin' on this subject before you post about it again.
It's funny you mention Romeo and Juliet. Shakespeare rather closely ripped off earlier (sometimes lost) sources, for virtually everything he wrote. He wasn't a very original writer. Just an exceptionally good one.
Don't fetishize original works. They're on an equal footing with derivative works: most suck, and a few of each are really good.
Can't you understand how useful it will be for an MPAA plantiff to pull out the following (ellided) law?
Nope. That's why they've been fighting it.
The law says that some things are legal. It says nothing more than that. There is no affirmative statement that anything is illegal; only that some things might not be legalized by that subsection.
This is a lot like the world of patent validity. As we know, patents can be invalid. And, in a specific case, a patent might not be invalid. But no court ever says that a patent is valid, because that would preclude later challenges as to validity that might be successful. So while a dunce might think that when a patent is not invalid that it is therefore valid, no one who works in this field does.
Now the creation of someone to coordinate the United States' efforts to enforce international copyright law would be a good thing; who here thinks that its a good thing that you can buy "Oceans 12" or "Half Life 2" on the streets of Hong Kong today for 50 cents?
I think that there should be only two precepts of international copyright law: 1) National treatment, i.e. that you treat foreigners the same as one's own people, and 2) Avoidance of conflicts so that obtaining a copyright in one place doesn't preclude you from being able to in some other place.
There should NOT be any minimum standards, however. If a country feels it is in its own best interests to have more copyright or less copyright than another, or no copyright at all, then that is a perfectly valid decision and should be respected.
So to answer your question, if China thinks it's okay to have cheap pirated copies of just-released or unreleased works, then I think that that's fine. It's their decision. We don't have to follow it, but by the same token, they shouldn't have to follow us.
I'm all for leveling the playing field and making sure that US companies and artists get compensated for their work.
The problem is that the level playing field is still in the advantage of the US and Europe basically, because it is up to their level. And anyway, why should other countries care if we make money? Let it be our concern, and let their law be their concern.
You are totally not understanding what I am saying, not to mention the proposed exemption in the House. The exemption does not ban machines. It does not ban activity. It does not ban anything. It is the opposite of a ban, in fact! It explicitly allows things, and disallows nothing!
You totally don't understand how the law is structured, and so you just keep on getting this nonsensical crap out of it that you blather on about the way you do.
At the top are fundamental laws, such as freedom of speech. They permit people to say or print one's own words, or other people have said or printed.
Copyright laws are a subset of this. For example, the 106(2) right says that you cannot make a derivative work based upon a preexisting copyrighted work unless you have the authorization of the pertinent copyright holder. This is a really broad prohibition! One kind of derivative work is a translation into a different language.
So let us say that Alice writes a book in English. If there were no copyright law, anyone could reproduce the book, distribute new copies of the book, and prepare derivatives such as sequels, stage adaptations, or translations into other languages. So if this public domain world, Bob could take Alice's book and write a Spanish translation of it, and this would be entirely legal.
That's what the law was like until well into the 19th century, with regards to derivatives, since there was no equivalent of the 106(2) right yet.
Once the right was added to the statute, Bob could no longer do that.
But let's say that Congress decided that we ought to be better friends with the rest of the world, and that the best way to do that is to permit everyone to translate whatever they'd like into different languages. They COULD just take away the 106(2) right to prepare derivatives; after all, they created it, and they can abolish it.
But this would open the door too wide. They only want to allow translations. They don't want to allow for other kinds of derivatives to be made.
So now they write up an exemption. It says something like 'Notwithstanding the exclusive right to prepare derivatives, it is not infringing to prepare translations of a work.'
Now PART of the 106(2) right is gone. But not all of it. If Bob writes a sequel to Alice's book, he breaks the law. If he writes a translation to the book, he is hunky-dory.
Now comes the kicker. Congress is happy with this, except for one thing. They don't like the people of Pottsylvania for some reason. So the new exemption they're writing that permits translations finally says, when it passes, 'Notwithstanding the exclusive right to prepare derivatives, it is not infringing to prepare translations of a work, except for translations into Pottsylvanian.'
See what this does?
If they do not pass the bill, it is illegal to make translations into Pottsylvanian. That's because it's illegal to make any kind of translations.
If they do pass the bill, then it is legal to make translations into everything BUT Pottsylvanian.
What's really important however, is that the bill itself NEVER says that it is illegal to make translations into Pottsylvanian. The PREEXISTING 106(2) right does that. This just says that THIS exemption doesn't legalize it.
If there is ANOTHER statute on the books, that says that it is not infringing to translate into languages that start with P, then although the first exemption doesn't apply, the second one does. That the first one doesn't apply has no impact on the first one!
The House bill is the same deal.
If it would be illegal under the new bill to skip commercials, then that can ONLY be because it is illegal NOW. That's because the new bill makes NOTHING illegal. It only is very strict and limited about what it makes legal; that is, first it gives, and then it takes a little bit back. Like that thingy in Raiders of the Lost Ark; it says to have a staff six feet long, and then it tells you to take away a foot.
And it
No, this law doesn't specifically make it a crime to skip a commercial. But still, it means that skipping commercials will become illegal.
/.ers, this thing just totally is incomprehensible to you. I swear, I can't figure out why.
It means absolutely nothing of the sort. It will be no more illegal than it is now.
There was no real doubt. Fair-Use and First-Sale are clear
You're right, there was no real doubt. First sale has nothing to do with it, and fair use doesn't apply to Clean Flicks since it cannot stand in the shoes of its customers. It was breaking the law by offering up derivatives and reproductions.
As with most
Matters little, though. Basically the same provision, minus some, but not enough, of the actually bad stuff, cleared the Senate today. This'll be a law, and it'll have zero effect on tivos and such.
Where I am I contradicting myself? I don't recall saying the standard was very high.
What I'm saying is that currently P2P sharing can easily be prosecuted where either: 1) it is for financial gain (which includes the receipt or expectation of receipt of other works in trade) or 2) works having a total retail value of over $1,000 are shared within a 180 day period.
This bill would make it easier still. It would make it criminal to knowingly distribute works, with reckless disregard for future infringement, where 1) any of those works haven't been publicly released for sale/rental yet, 2) the total retail value is over $10,000 (n.b. the $1,000 limit above would still be in force there as well), or 3) 1,000 or more works regardless of value.
So we've got a low standard, and it's dropping fast.
This is more nuanced, and as to that, I can see a valid argument being made. But that isn't the argument being made by pretty much everyone else here. (Of course, while I agree with his interpretation of the copyright clause, n.b. that no court that heard Eldred did)
I'm not sure how much I agree with the good professor here. I agree that where this exemption doesn't apply, some other exemption would have to. But one exemption doesn't raise an implication against another; that's not how they work. For example, consider the 120 exemption's interaction with fair use. Does the fact that I can lawfully photograph a copyrighted architectural work in its expression as a building ordinarily viewable from a public place mean that there could not be a fair use to photograph such works if not within the exemption? I doubt it, given that a court can't reject fair use out of hand, but instead must engage in a fairly searching analysis. (Of course a lot of stuff commonly felt to be fair is not; I'm talking about things that really might fall within 107)
Rather, his line of argument is better applied to issues of whether copyright pertains to some activity at all. Where there is an exemption, e.g. 117, then it's hard to accept that there's no or little need for an exemption, since why else would Congress pass it?
But where there are multiple exemptions, the second one doesn't harm the first. Congress felt both needed to be passed.
Probably the best example is the 1008 exemption. The one time it's been looked at in court, IIRC, the court found it wasn't applicable, and then took the time in dicta to suggest that fair use probably was, even though it had to read fair use very broadly in order to do so.
I'm not worried about this 110 exemption. It's the rest of the bill that is extremely dangerous.
No, you're still not reading it properly.
Basically the way this works is that we have something very broad, such as:
Everything not prohibited is permitted.
Then we take a bite out of that:
You can't create derivatives of copyrighted works.
Then we put a little bit of that bite back:
You can't create derivatives of copyrighted works except where those works are movies.
Then we take a bite out of that little bit again:
You can't create derivatives of copyrighted works except where those works are movies and where doing so does not skip over ads.
NONE OF THIS MEANS THAT THERE ARE NOT OTHER BITES.
This specific provision -- which again is good, and not bad like 99.44% of the rest of the bill, which you are ignoring -- only says that it's not infringing to do certain editing of movies.
It doesn't say you can't do other editing. But this wouldn't permit it. Something ELSE would have to permit it.
So if it is permitted now, it will still be permitted in the future. If it is not permitted now, then unless it is of the type this exemption does permit, it still won't be permitted in the future. And if it is confused now as to whether it's permitted or not, this might clarify things.
Given current attitudes toward copyright this amounts to a prohibition of devices meant to allow this
No it fucking well does not do that. You aren't reading the fucking law properly! I am sick of everyone here parroting this insane claim with no basis in reality.
Please also consider the fact that Slashdot posters aren't the only people to interpret the law in the manner in which you object. Senator John McCain, for example
Yes, he is ALSO misreading it.
Probably he either a) is just responding to his constituents, who are misreading it, or b) is acting rather deviously.
By that I mean, this is basically the only good thing in HR 2391, and the movie studios hate it. They love all the other crap that's in there though, all of which (other than one tiny thing in the 108 exemption) is very, very bad.
So I'm really beginning to suspect that some lobbyist that wants all the bad portions of the bill to pass has started spreading this dumbass idea around in hopes that the 110 exemption will get dropped from the bill (making MPAA happy and us unhappy) and that no one will pay attention to the rest of it, avoiding challenges to the things that actually need to get challenged.
Basically, all of you idiots are playing right into the 'bad guys' hands. Whether it's by design or coincidence, I don't know, but you're all being really stupid about it.
Right. I would appreciate it if you'd noted that the bill is otherwise very bad, but I'm glad to see someone else understands how these rights are enumerated and then exempted.
Currently a small independent publisher basicly has no option of going after non comemrcial copyright infringement, regardless of the scale at which it happens.
The problem is that that's simply untrue. Not only are damage awards great enough that contingency fees will readily attract lawyers, but 17 USC 505 allows awards of reasonable attorneys fees!
Money is NOT an issue.
Of course, in a criminal suit, restitution is impossible, and likely precluded in the future due to an exhaustion of funds!
Also, currently the DoH can't go after individuals sharing files on a non comemrcial basis and obviously they don't bother trying either.
Which a) would change under this bill, and b) is irrelevant since what constitutes a commercial basis is amazingly more than you'd think. You need to read the law!
Actually P2P filesharing is easily prosecuted under the current laws, and would be even more easily prosecuted under the proposed law. It generally is commercial, the way that term is specifically defined in the law.
This really only goes to show that you haven't read through the law carefully and that you don't have a good understanding of the issues.
The interesting thing is that criminalizing copyright violations in the end favors the 'little' guy a lot more then the big music and movie producers. It gives a level of protection to the idnependent publisher that they simply cannot afford right now.
See, that's totally wrong.
First, whether or not a criminal action is brought is entirely up to the DoJ. They don't bother with small cases. They go after large scale piracy operations, which are pretty inevitably dealing with works whose copyrights are held by the big copyright interests.
Second, there have been criminal penalties on the books for over a century. So if it were going to have a positive impact, it would've already done so, one would imagine.
Third, if your copyright has been infringed, it is generally quite easy to afford litigation as damages can be extraordinarily high and cases are easy to win and this results in lawyers being happy to take cases on a contingency basis.
Also, currently copyright is mostly enforced by big corporations bullying individuals with civil suits. Imho that is not a proper way to enforce a law.
Wrong, wrong, wrong. Civil suits are PERFECT. It places the entire discretion as to whether or not to proceed in the hands of the copyright holder. It's easy, it's effective, but it isn't as overly harsh as it would be to make someone a felon and put them in jail for several years. Particularly given that most infringements are of a trivial nature.
I'm glad that you are interested in reducing the scope of copyright law, but frankly, you don't understand it at all.
But that's just the thing! The law that has everyone pissed off is actually about the only good one! It's all the others that we ought to be objecting to.
So it's much more clever than you give them credit for.
It's impossible for a computer to view anything without making or already having a copy in local memory.
Check out the Intellectual Reserve v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry case for a discussion of how it's possible to infringe on a copyright by means of going to the wrong web page via a computer.
Plus of course, even if we were to consider this to be a performance, leaving something open to anyone that wants to access it is to leave it open to the public.
This is the third article on /. in a week that totally misreads the proposed addition to 17 USC 110.
It does NOT make it illegal to skip commercials.
It just says that this new exemption doesn't apply to skipping commercials. If there is an EXISTING exemption (or if the manner by which the commercials are skipped isn't even prima face infringement) then those still remain in effect just as they do now.
This is little more than a clarification.
That said, it is a bad bill overall, since there are a lot of other provisions attached with this one which suck, such as criminalizing copyright infringement even more than it is now, permitting the government to file civil suits for infringement, further gutting registration formalities, etc.
But this is one of the only halfway decent parts of it -- as it would tend to remove any doubt as to the legality of what Clean Flicks has been doing, and would permit other creative uses of EDLs, such as to edit Jar Jar out of Star Wars movies -- and so it annoys me quite a lot to see people's outrage arising out of a misreading of the bill. Be outraged at the rest of the bill, dammit.
The method to whic I refer is the Internet. Have you read that case cited above, btw?
I'm not making it up. This is how the courts have interpreted the clause, and it's hardly nonsensical to imagine that in order to regulate interstate commerce that Congress might have the power to regulate the methods by which it occurs.
Interstate commerce includes not merely the act of an interstate commercial transaction, but also the vehicles by which it might occur, entities engaged in it, the goods in motion, etc.
So it's a tax on the line because the line can be used in interstate commerce.
This isn't a very contentious thing. I'd get all up in arms over the Wickard case first. It's much more expansive.