What you said was that the federal government didn't have the ability to regulate an election in Texas. I think we can now agree that they do indeed have that ability, that the 10th Amend. is no impediment, but that in the present case, the people who want to monitor the election can't exercise or rely upon that power. (I haven't read the agreement or determined if its the relevant document, but if your information on it is correct, that conclusion sounds likely.)
But that is not what would have to be argued; rather, you'd say that in order to ensure that Texas has and continues to have a republican form of government, the federal government (or a body it authorizes to act in its stead) is monitoring the situation so that if corrective action is ever required, this fact will be known immediately, rather than after things have gotten so bad that its obvious without people carefully scrutinizing Texas.
Elections monitoring as fact finding prior to intervention (and which may indicate that no intervention is required -- something you'd need monitoring to determine) seems pretty solid to me.
So you don't think that an argument could successfully be made under the Art. IV guarantee by the federal governments that the states shall enjoy a republican form of government, nor under the federal government's enforcement powers under Amends. 14, 15, 19, and 26? The federal government already has the power to regulate state elections quite a bit, I think you'll find.
Yes, that's true, I think. Just today I saw a funny article here, which begins by claiming that piracy is the reason that the newspaper industry is on the decline. (The site is focused on the music industry, but the author seems to blame piracy for every bad thing that happens in the world.)
Well, the most common example in modern times was probably phone books attached to pay phones by steel cables or other devices so that people didn't walk off with them. They still got vandalized though, pages got ripped out, etc. And it's moot now; cellphones have mostly killed them off.
Aw, that's like watching the movie instead of reading the book. It's a fairly straightforward opinion, and the article doesn't cover everything.
I particularly enjoyed the section on standing; it was basically a double-loss to the Authors' Guild. (If they win, they win only on behalf of themselves, and not the class of copyright holders they represent; if they lose, they lose on behalf of everyone)
It does not say that they are never "lawfully made"
But neither do they say that they might be. Saying that there is a less than 100% chance doesn't mean that it has to be more than 0%. Given the strong, unambiguous language repeated throughout--
109(a) is best interpreted as applying only to copies manufactured domestically.... In sum, we hold that the phrase "lawfully made under this Title" in 109(a) refers specifically and exclusively to copies that are made in territories in which the Copyright Act is law, and not to foreign-manufactured works.... To summarize, we hold that (1) the first sale doctrine does not apply to copies manufactured outside of the United States;
--I think they're not leaving open the hole you think they are.
As for which imported copies you think would be subject to first sale, could I have a quote?
No, the appellate opinion in the case being heard said that what mattered was the place of manufacture, regardless of whether it was imported with or without the authorization of the US rightsholder.
There are actually two opposing rulings on this caseâ"if you read the summary of the question before the court [supremecourt.gov] from their web site, you can get a clear picture.
Actually that is saying that there is a circuit split; different courts in the US have different rulings on this question, and the Supreme Court is being asked to resolve the split and set a single nationwide precedent. But in this actual case, John Wiley & Sons v. Kirtsaeng, both the trial and appellate courts ruled against Kirtsaeng with regard to the first sale defense.
But my point is that it doesn't apply to patents.
I don't know enough patent law to know about the details of patet rights exhaustion, but there is sometimes cross pollenization of ideas between copyright and patent, e.g. inducement liability, so I wouldn't want to say that this will have no effect on patents at all.
And you should read the appellate court decision more carefullyâ"it explicitly refers to "Importation into the United States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under this title..." IOW, not what you said.
Oh, as for the bit on p. 218, the specific case they are talking about is where the copyright holder has granted publication rights in the U.S. to one company, and in Great Britain to another, and this second company attempts to import works printed in Great Britain into the U.S. In this case, they would not have permission from the copyright holder to do so, and hence the sale of these products in the U.S. would not be allowed.
My apologies, I gave you a bad cite. The correct pages are 221-222. I'll just quote it directly:
This reading of the Copyright Act militates in favor of finding that 109(a) only applies to domestically manufactured works. While the Ninth Circuit in Omega held that 109(a) also applies to foreign-produced copies of works sold in the United States with the permission of the copyright holder, that holding relied on Ninth Circuit precedents not adopted by other courts of appeals. Accordingly, while perhaps a close call, we think that, in light of its necessary interplay with 602(a)(1), 109(a) is best interpreted as applying only to copies manufactured domestically....
In sum, we hold that the phrase "lawfully made under this Title" in  109(a) refers specifically and exclusively to copies that are made in territories in which the Copyright Act is law, and not to foreign-manufactured works.
Thus, the court is saying that even if a copyright holder manufactures a copy abroad and imports it into the US itself for sale here, because it was not made here, first sale as codified at section 109 does not apply.
It may be that the Court limits the case to that, but the appellate court that already heard this case said that first sale as codified does not apply to copies manufactured abroad even if imported by the copyright holder.
The lower court directly addressed that question and said that authorized importation of a work manufactured abroad would not be sufficient for the first sale statute to apply. Perhaps they went further than they needed to to decide the case that was before them, but the case is not really being misrepresented.
While the Ninth Circuit in Omega held that 109(a) also applies to foreign-produced copies of works sold in the United States with the permission of the copyright holder, that holding relied on Ninth Circuit precedents not adopted by other courts of appeals. Accordingly, while perhaps a close call, we think that, in light of its necessary interplay with 602(a)(1), 109(a) is best interpreted as applying only to copies manufactured domestically.
Not quite. Different appellate courts appear to be of different minds about whether 17 USC 109 (permitting unauthorized resale, etc. after the first sale under the auspices of the copyright holder) applies to works manufactured abroad but imported by or under the authorization of the US copyright holder.
Here is the language from the appellate decision in this case, which is what is being appealed:
While the Ninth Circuit in Omega held that  109(a) also applies to foreign-produced copies of works sold in the United States with the permission of the copyright holder, that holding relied on Ninth Circuit precedents not adopted by other courts of appeals. Accordingly, while perhaps a close call, we think that, in light of its necessary interplay with  602(a)(1),  109(a) is best interpreted as applying only to copies manufactured domestically.
I also have no vested interest in Google Book Search, though I think it sounds useful, and I'd probably use it as a research tool if it were available, regardless of whatever legal wrangling had to go on behind the scenes to enable it to work. To me it's basically just an improved card catalog; rather than searching by subject, we can now search for strings or even just individual words. Whether or not Google can profit from it is irrelevant to me. Certainly it is okay to profit from a fair use, such as in the Pretty Woman case (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 US 569 (1994)).
With regard to the ownership of copies, making any copy of a copyrighted work is infringing, unless there's an applicable exception, or you have permission. It doesn't matter whether or not you own the copy. There may be agreements with the owners of the copies being scanned (which appear to be major libraries) which could be relevant here (eg selling google a limited undivided property right in the collections), and it is arguable that it's not particularly relevant. It mainly pertains to the fourth fair use factor; does this project harm the commercial interests of authors materially less merely because Google owns one copy in paper form? Maybe not so much.
Regarding copyright notices, those are restatements of law, and usually boilerplate. For example the "all rights reserved" are magic words meant to trigger the provisions of the 1910 Buenos Aires Convention. They're anachronistic now, in fact, but survive as traditional cruft. In any event, it can't be construed as an opt out.
Copyright isn't a blanket right to control a work in its entirety. Rather it is a collection of fairly narrowly defined forms of control, which may or may not apply depending on relevant circumstances, and which are subject to numerous limitations which put so many holes in those rights as to make them look like Swiss cheese. Copyright is powerful, but not all-powerful.
For example, everyone has a free speech right to make copies of computer programs. But if the program is copyrighted, this free speech right is temporarily not allowed to be exercised. But if you own a copy of the program (as distinct from owning the copyright), the right to prohibit the making of copies does not apply when you make copies for the purpose of making the program run, or for backing it up. Since no prohibition stops you from doing the things under that circumstance, you're back to exercising your free speech right. (17 USC 106 and 117 deal with all this)
Authors cannot exercise their copyright to opt out of fair use. If google is offering an opt out, it's more out of politeness than necessity. And since this is boilerplate language which usually was fixed before Google Books came along it doesn't do a good job of indicating a desire to opt out of this. Besides, having copyright holders come forward is needed for dealing with orphan works. It's bad policy to allow authors to have power passively.
Regarding limits on the rights of authors, there are countless cases, but one of the most fundamental to my mind would be Baker v. Selden, 101 US 99 (1879). An author tried to claim copyright over something that copyright didn't apply to; he was shot down because authors do not get to define the extent of their rights unless it is to lessen them from the maximum that we deign to grant them. Certainly they cannot expand them.
Clauses like that are fairly common in book publishing in my experience, but they are not obligatory and a shady publisher could surely slip one by an unsuspecting author (likely one without good representation).
Meanwhile, check out all the 203 and 304 terminations showing up or about to; plenty of them are the result of a lack of a termination or reversion clause in the license or assignment.
1) To the best of my knowledge, the results that Google intended to display consisted of a few lines from any particular book. They had to have an entire copy scanned in because the lines that matched one search would of course be different from the lines that match another. But the users wouldn't see the whole thing in one go. Also, fair use can encompass the entirety of a work. Whether a use is fair will depend on the circumstances involved; there are no bright line rules in fair use.
2) It's irrelevant that web pages are already on the Internet. Scanning in books and providing an opt out is just the same as indexing the web and providing an opt out.
3) Perhaps we should respect the rights of copyright holders, but those rights have limits beyond which no respect is owed. The authors are going too far in this case.
In ancient times all people who came into the city of Alexandria were searched for books. Any books that were brought into the city which were of interest were copied in order to add to the collection of the great and famous Library of Alexandria, the biggest and best archive in the classical world.
But only a few works of antiquity which would've been found there have survived to the present day. Most were lost to decay, fire, deliberate destruction, etc. Some books survive only as notes written by a student. Some we only know the titles of. Many, not even that.
Archives are good, but what ultimately preserves knowledge is copying and distribution. The works that survived were works with lots of copies around the world, frequently being recopied and further disseminated. We'll soon have the ability to all carry around a full copy of the entire Library of Congress in drives we can fit in our pockets or on a keychain. It would be better if we used them productively, rather than suffering the embarrassment of copyrights used in such a way as to impede the use, dissemination, and preservation of knowledge -- and for nothing more than money.
I agree that copyright is basically a good idea, very badly implemented. But I would say that it doesn't eliminate patronage, in that 1) you can still have patrons; and 2) even where mass market published copies and royalties are the basis for an author's livelihood, it really just shifts the patronage to the reading public. If a patron doesn't like a book, the author may lose his job. If the world doesn't like a book, the author is in just the same pickle. Copyright enables a kind of distributed, passive patronage. Kickstarter and similar things are interesting in that they enable distributed semi-active patronage. All we need to round out the set is a Kickstarter where the works are created according to the stated preferences of the audience, much like storytellers of old. (IIRC The Princess Bride reportedly began when the author asked his daughters what bedtime story they wanted him to tell; one said she wanted to hear about a princess, the other said she wanted to hear about a bride.)
Of course that didn't stop other people from publishing it. (And anyway, it's not like Shakespeare was a particularly original guy -- He merely wrote a new adaptation of Romeo and Juliet, a story which was already around)
My favorite is the bad version of Hamlet with the hilariously dictated soliloquy. (You can find it in Wikipedia)
Plus, for copyright purposes, we may as well consider performances or displays of fixed works to be publication. Ideally, yes, copies would be sold or given to the public. But if they're basically publicly available in performance or display form (eg aired on tv) then it may as well count.
The last thing we want is a uniform global copyright law; it would inevitably be terrible for most of the countries involved.
Better to have each country write their own copyright laws (or not) from scratch, with the one core principle being that it should best serve the people of that country -- not authors, not publishers, not people elsewhere in the world. The only things I'd want to see done globally are 1) national treatment so that anyone who seeks a copyright in a given jurisdiction isn't discriminated agains on the basis of their nationality, citizenship, language, etc. Whatever the locals can get, foreigners can get too. 2) That copyright laws not be mutually exclusive in such a way that an author would have to decide between getting a copyright in one jurisdiction or another. Getting rights one place shouldn't shut you out of another.
The comment about different amounts of toner in the cartridge is probably correct in terms of how it would work out, but alternatively you could redesign the printers so that the toner cartridge projects partway out of the printer's case, with the height of the thing varying depending on how much toner it held.
The executive branch and industry and compliant members of congress pushed for Berne and other recent copyright treaties so as to generally remove Congress from the loop on copyright matters and to prevent meaningful debate and opportunities to modify proposed legislation. But it's mainly a matter of throwing our weight around. If we wanted to get out of Berne, TRIPS, et al whilst otherwise keeping the WTO, we could, fairly easily.
The issue is the lack of will to do so by the people who could do it (in fact, hostility toward the notion) and our broken political system that keeps them in power.
Prior to 1710 in England for copyrights, copyrights didn't exist anywhere. Yet plenty of works were created. And even today, most creative works are created due to motives other than seeking to profit from a copyright on those works.
That said, I don't think copyright abolition is needed presently, just massive reform.
Patents are somewhat better, but we'd be better off treating different domains of the useful arts differently. Software and business methods seem to not only not need the incentivizing effect of patents, but are actively being harmed by patents. For those fields, abolition would be appropriate for the time being. Maybe later things will change and we could revisit the issue. In other fields, patents still seem to have some use.
Slashdot Mirror
What you said was that the federal government didn't have the ability to regulate an election in Texas. I think we can now agree that they do indeed have that ability, that the 10th Amend. is no impediment, but that in the present case, the people who want to monitor the election can't exercise or rely upon that power. (I haven't read the agreement or determined if its the relevant document, but if your information on it is correct, that conclusion sounds likely.)
But that is not what would have to be argued; rather, you'd say that in order to ensure that Texas has and continues to have a republican form of government, the federal government (or a body it authorizes to act in its stead) is monitoring the situation so that if corrective action is ever required, this fact will be known immediately, rather than after things have gotten so bad that its obvious without people carefully scrutinizing Texas.
Elections monitoring as fact finding prior to intervention (and which may indicate that no intervention is required -- something you'd need monitoring to determine) seems pretty solid to me.
Got any other arguments against it?
So you don't think that an argument could successfully be made under the Art. IV guarantee by the federal governments that the states shall enjoy a republican form of government, nor under the federal government's enforcement powers under Amends. 14, 15, 19, and 26? The federal government already has the power to regulate state elections quite a bit, I think you'll find.
Yes, that's true, I think. Just today I saw a funny article here, which begins by claiming that piracy is the reason that the newspaper industry is on the decline. (The site is focused on the music industry, but the author seems to blame piracy for every bad thing that happens in the world.)
What was the movie where the foreigner was saying "Piece of pie" and "easy as cake"?
That was 2010. One of the Russian cosmonauts tended to screw up his English idioms, but an American astronaut would give him friendly corrections.
Well, the most common example in modern times was probably phone books attached to pay phones by steel cables or other devices so that people didn't walk off with them. They still got vandalized though, pages got ripped out, etc. And it's moot now; cellphones have mostly killed them off.
Chained to the lecterns.
(And if anyone is interested in the history of book storage technology, The Book on the Bookshelf is an excellent read on the subject)
Aw, that's like watching the movie instead of reading the book. It's a fairly straightforward opinion, and the article doesn't cover everything.
I particularly enjoyed the section on standing; it was basically a double-loss to the Authors' Guild. (If they win, they win only on behalf of themselves, and not the class of copyright holders they represent; if they lose, they lose on behalf of everyone)
It does not say that they are never "lawfully made"
But neither do they say that they might be. Saying that there is a less than 100% chance doesn't mean that it has to be more than 0%. Given the strong, unambiguous language repeated throughout--
109(a) is best interpreted as applying only to copies manufactured domestically. ... In sum, we hold that the phrase "lawfully made under this Title" in 109(a) refers specifically and exclusively to copies that are made in territories in which the Copyright Act is law, and not to foreign-manufactured works. ... To summarize, we hold that (1) the first sale doctrine does not apply to copies manufactured outside of the United States;
--I think they're not leaving open the hole you think they are.
As for which imported copies you think would be subject to first sale, could I have a quote?
No, the appellate opinion in the case being heard said that what mattered was the place of manufacture, regardless of whether it was imported with or without the authorization of the US rightsholder.
There are actually two opposing rulings on this caseâ"if you read the summary of the question before the court [supremecourt.gov] from their web site, you can get a clear picture.
Actually that is saying that there is a circuit split; different courts in the US have different rulings on this question, and the Supreme Court is being asked to resolve the split and set a single nationwide precedent. But in this actual case, John Wiley & Sons v. Kirtsaeng, both the trial and appellate courts ruled against Kirtsaeng with regard to the first sale defense.
But my point is that it doesn't apply to patents.
I don't know enough patent law to know about the details of patet rights exhaustion, but there is sometimes cross pollenization of ideas between copyright and patent, e.g. inducement liability, so I wouldn't want to say that this will have no effect on patents at all.
And you should read the appellate court decision more carefullyâ"it explicitly refers to "Importation into the United States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under this title..." IOW, not what you said.
Oh, as for the bit on p. 218, the specific case they are talking about is where the copyright holder has granted publication rights in the U.S. to one company, and in Great Britain to another, and this second company attempts to import works printed in Great Britain into the U.S. In this case, they would not have permission from the copyright holder to do so, and hence the sale of these products in the U.S. would not be allowed.
My apologies, I gave you a bad cite. The correct pages are 221-222. I'll just quote it directly:
This reading of the Copyright Act militates in favor of finding that 109(a) only applies to domestically manufactured works. While the Ninth Circuit in Omega held that 109(a) also applies to foreign-produced copies of works sold in the United States with the permission of the copyright holder, that holding relied on Ninth Circuit precedents not adopted by other courts of appeals. Accordingly, while perhaps a close call, we think that, in light of its necessary interplay with 602(a)(1), 109(a) is best interpreted as applying only to copies manufactured domestically. ...
In sum, we hold that the phrase "lawfully made under this Title" in  109(a) refers specifically and exclusively to copies that are made in territories in which the Copyright Act is law, and not to foreign-manufactured works.
Thus, the court is saying that even if a copyright holder manufactures a copy abroad and imports it into the US itself for sale here, because it was not made here, first sale as codified at section 109 does not apply.
It may be that the Court limits the case to that, but the appellate court that already heard this case said that first sale as codified does not apply to copies manufactured abroad even if imported by the copyright holder.
You can read it here if you like: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2678020953327425749&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr
The relevant bit is on p. 218 (look for the page numbers on the left hand side).
The lower court directly addressed that question and said that authorized importation of a work manufactured abroad would not be sufficient for the first sale statute to apply. Perhaps they went further than they needed to to decide the case that was before them, but the case is not really being misrepresented.
While the Ninth Circuit in Omega held that 109(a) also applies to foreign-produced copies of works sold in the United States with the permission of the copyright holder, that holding relied on Ninth Circuit precedents not adopted by other courts of appeals. Accordingly, while perhaps a close call, we think that, in light of its necessary interplay with 602(a)(1), 109(a) is best interpreted as applying only to copies manufactured domestically.
Not quite. Different appellate courts appear to be of different minds about whether 17 USC 109 (permitting unauthorized resale, etc. after the first sale under the auspices of the copyright holder) applies to works manufactured abroad but imported by or under the authorization of the US copyright holder.
Here is the language from the appellate decision in this case, which is what is being appealed:
While the Ninth Circuit in Omega held that  109(a) also applies to foreign-produced copies of works sold in the United States with the permission of the copyright holder, that holding relied on Ninth Circuit precedents not adopted by other courts of appeals. Accordingly, while perhaps a close call, we think that, in light of its necessary interplay with  602(a)(1),  109(a) is best interpreted as applying only to copies manufactured domestically.
I also have no vested interest in Google Book Search, though I think it sounds useful, and I'd probably use it as a research tool if it were available, regardless of whatever legal wrangling had to go on behind the scenes to enable it to work. To me it's basically just an improved card catalog; rather than searching by subject, we can now search for strings or even just individual words. Whether or not Google can profit from it is irrelevant to me. Certainly it is okay to profit from a fair use, such as in the Pretty Woman case (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 US 569 (1994)).
With regard to the ownership of copies, making any copy of a copyrighted work is infringing, unless there's an applicable exception, or you have permission. It doesn't matter whether or not you own the copy. There may be agreements with the owners of the copies being scanned (which appear to be major libraries) which could be relevant here (eg selling google a limited undivided property right in the collections), and it is arguable that it's not particularly relevant. It mainly pertains to the fourth fair use factor; does this project harm the commercial interests of authors materially less merely because Google owns one copy in paper form? Maybe not so much.
Regarding copyright notices, those are restatements of law, and usually boilerplate. For example the "all rights reserved" are magic words meant to trigger the provisions of the 1910 Buenos Aires Convention. They're anachronistic now, in fact, but survive as traditional cruft. In any event, it can't be construed as an opt out.
Copyright isn't a blanket right to control a work in its entirety. Rather it is a collection of fairly narrowly defined forms of control, which may or may not apply depending on relevant circumstances, and which are subject to numerous limitations which put so many holes in those rights as to make them look like Swiss cheese. Copyright is powerful, but not all-powerful.
For example, everyone has a free speech right to make copies of computer programs. But if the program is copyrighted, this free speech right is temporarily not allowed to be exercised. But if you own a copy of the program (as distinct from owning the copyright), the right to prohibit the making of copies does not apply when you make copies for the purpose of making the program run, or for backing it up. Since no prohibition stops you from doing the things under that circumstance, you're back to exercising your free speech right. (17 USC 106 and 117 deal with all this)
Authors cannot exercise their copyright to opt out of fair use. If google is offering an opt out, it's more out of politeness than necessity. And since this is boilerplate language which usually was fixed before Google Books came along it doesn't do a good job of indicating a desire to opt out of this. Besides, having copyright holders come forward is needed for dealing with orphan works. It's bad policy to allow authors to have power passively.
Regarding limits on the rights of authors, there are countless cases, but one of the most fundamental to my mind would be Baker v. Selden, 101 US 99 (1879). An author tried to claim copyright over something that copyright didn't apply to; he was shot down because authors do not get to define the extent of their rights unless it is to lessen them from the maximum that we deign to grant them. Certainly they cannot expand them.
Clauses like that are fairly common in book publishing in my experience, but they are not obligatory and a shady publisher could surely slip one by an unsuspecting author (likely one without good representation).
Meanwhile, check out all the 203 and 304 terminations showing up or about to; plenty of them are the result of a lack of a termination or reversion clause in the license or assignment.
1) To the best of my knowledge, the results that Google intended to display consisted of a few lines from any particular book. They had to have an entire copy scanned in because the lines that matched one search would of course be different from the lines that match another. But the users wouldn't see the whole thing in one go. Also, fair use can encompass the entirety of a work. Whether a use is fair will depend on the circumstances involved; there are no bright line rules in fair use.
2) It's irrelevant that web pages are already on the Internet. Scanning in books and providing an opt out is just the same as indexing the web and providing an opt out.
3) Perhaps we should respect the rights of copyright holders, but those rights have limits beyond which no respect is owed. The authors are going too far in this case.
And then there is their hard on for microfilm.
http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Double_Fold
In ancient times all people who came into the city of Alexandria were searched for books. Any books that were brought into the city which were of interest were copied in order to add to the collection of the great and famous Library of Alexandria, the biggest and best archive in the classical world.
But only a few works of antiquity which would've been found there have survived to the present day. Most were lost to decay, fire, deliberate destruction, etc. Some books survive only as notes written by a student. Some we only know the titles of. Many, not even that.
Archives are good, but what ultimately preserves knowledge is copying and distribution. The works that survived were works with lots of copies around the world, frequently being recopied and further disseminated. We'll soon have the ability to all carry around a full copy of the entire Library of Congress in drives we can fit in our pockets or on a keychain. It would be better if we used them productively, rather than suffering the embarrassment of copyrights used in such a way as to impede the use, dissemination, and preservation of knowledge -- and for nothing more than money.
Cory Doctrow famously has all of his books in Creative Commons. You can download them for free legally if you don't want to pay. He does alright.
I agree that copyright is basically a good idea, very badly implemented. But I would say that it doesn't eliminate patronage, in that 1) you can still have patrons; and 2) even where mass market published copies and royalties are the basis for an author's livelihood, it really just shifts the patronage to the reading public. If a patron doesn't like a book, the author may lose his job. If the world doesn't like a book, the author is in just the same pickle. Copyright enables a kind of distributed, passive patronage. Kickstarter and similar things are interesting in that they enable distributed semi-active patronage. All we need to round out the set is a Kickstarter where the works are created according to the stated preferences of the audience, much like storytellers of old. (IIRC The Princess Bride reportedly began when the author asked his daughters what bedtime story they wanted him to tell; one said she wanted to hear about a princess, the other said she wanted to hear about a bride.)
Of course that didn't stop other people from publishing it. (And anyway, it's not like Shakespeare was a particularly original guy -- He merely wrote a new adaptation of Romeo and Juliet, a story which was already around)
My favorite is the bad version of Hamlet with the hilariously dictated soliloquy. (You can find it in Wikipedia)
Plus, for copyright purposes, we may as well consider performances or displays of fixed works to be publication. Ideally, yes, copies would be sold or given to the public. But if they're basically publicly available in performance or display form (eg aired on tv) then it may as well count.
The last thing we want is a uniform global copyright law; it would inevitably be terrible for most of the countries involved.
Better to have each country write their own copyright laws (or not) from scratch, with the one core principle being that it should best serve the people of that country -- not authors, not publishers, not people elsewhere in the world. The only things I'd want to see done globally are 1) national treatment so that anyone who seeks a copyright in a given jurisdiction isn't discriminated agains on the basis of their nationality, citizenship, language, etc. Whatever the locals can get, foreigners can get too. 2) That copyright laws not be mutually exclusive in such a way that an author would have to decide between getting a copyright in one jurisdiction or another. Getting rights one place shouldn't shut you out of another.
The comment about different amounts of toner in the cartridge is probably correct in terms of how it would work out, but alternatively you could redesign the printers so that the toner cartridge projects partway out of the printer's case, with the height of the thing varying depending on how much toner it held.
The executive branch and industry and compliant members of congress pushed for Berne and other recent copyright treaties so as to generally remove Congress from the loop on copyright matters and to prevent meaningful debate and opportunities to modify proposed legislation. But it's mainly a matter of throwing our weight around. If we wanted to get out of Berne, TRIPS, et al whilst otherwise keeping the WTO, we could, fairly easily.
The issue is the lack of will to do so by the people who could do it (in fact, hostility toward the notion) and our broken political system that keeps them in power.
This is demonstrably untrue.
Prior to 1710 in England for copyrights, copyrights didn't exist anywhere. Yet plenty of works were created. And even today, most creative works are created due to motives other than seeking to profit from a copyright on those works.
That said, I don't think copyright abolition is needed presently, just massive reform.
Patents are somewhat better, but we'd be better off treating different domains of the useful arts differently. Software and business methods seem to not only not need the incentivizing effect of patents, but are actively being harmed by patents. For those fields, abolition would be appropriate for the time being. Maybe later things will change and we could revisit the issue. In other fields, patents still seem to have some use.