True, they are 45mb from what I have read. The ones I have are like 20mb of data, 19mb, 23mb, etc. The disc is less than 6cm tall. a good cm of each end.
Yes, ROM drives read them without a problem. They are rectangle with the ends rounded. I have seen/used a few of these. Motorola, ON semi. And some Limousine service.
Actually, I have seen a few of these. I just received one in the mail the other day from ON Semiconductor. I was wondering where I could get writeables in that size. It woul be neat to make my own.
Hah, looking through your collection was interesting. Last week I set a Toshiba T5200/100 out with the rest of the rubbish. I once had a Compaq Portable 386 but that preceded the Toshiba to the curb by a month or two.
Neither of which were all that portable if you ask me.
Or not just read the article, but actually look into the topic and know what you are about to post about. Which is a very good idea and I hope that more people can learn to do this.
Yes, I believe that you made availiable something that most already have. The demo TEST is about 50,000k and yours is v1.08 which is about 34,000k. But it is the thought that counts, right?
I wish to God that CmdrTaco did not post this. I have been having fun reading my friends mail and what not (hehe.. not really) for a while. Then it is on/. and in turn everyone knows about it. So of course they close it up. Too bad we could not have kept this one silent.
I have been working on a clear case design based on the In-Win A500. Plexie(sp) glass and I will use the chassis from the A500. No neon lights (what is that about anyway?), and all of the awesome benefits of the A500. These cases rule! Everyone should have an A500.
I'm in the process of cleanup - my day job employer got hit, and we're NT with no 95/98 to speak of. Here are some interesting tidbits that I haven't seen on some of the commercial Anti-Virus web sites regarding NT.
Payload:
- The trojan can come into any email client, obviously. If executed, it will proceed to go active in memory. In other words, you do not need Outlook for the Payload to activate, just a Win32 machine. A Notes mail client user probably did the most damage in our environment to network NT file servers. - It will have a process running called _setup.exe, zipped_f.exe, and possibly explore.exe. - One of our users reported seeing explore.exe running as an application, although I wasn't able to confirm this. - It deletes files with *.h, *.c, *.cpp, *.asm, *.doc, *.xls, and *.ppt extensions on all drives (C through Z) that are currently mapped. - Every few minutes it will repeat the deletion process. This is particularly nasty if you are trying to do restores to network drives while the virus is still active in your environment.
Progation:
- On the Melissa-style method of propagation, it checks the user's Inbox in Outlook. The Outlook client does not have to be running, as the trojan uses MAPI calls. - Propagation is triggered by the arrival of a new message into the Outlook's Inbox. - Once triggered, the virus takes the first two names in the header and uses it to plug into the text of the message. If more than one user name is in the message header (possible if you are using distribution lists or role-based mail boxes that forward mail to multiple people) it is possible the names will not be in the correct order. Also if you use Lastname, Firstname as a naming convention you will get Lastname, plugged into the messages. - It creates the message with the names and attaches the trojan, naming it zipped_files.exe with the happy message as reported on most Anti-Virus vendor sites. - In other words, you send an email to billg@microsoft.com with a subject of Microsoft Sucks, he's infected and his machine is up and running, you will get a reply with a subject of Re: Microsoft Sucks with the attachment. I mean he says he'll get back with you and to read the attached zipped docs, and you being Joe/Josey corporate user check it out. False message saying it's a corrupt zip, blah, blah, blah, and now you're sending out trojans.
We got hit when email was sent to some engineers at Microsoft, and the reply came back with the trojan. The nature of the email sent to Microsoft was "where is the info we requested" so it seemed natural that the attachment was supposed to be a self-extracting zip. That's right, Microsoft got hit, so I would guess a few source code files and Office docs were wiped. Hopefully as Microsoft starts the slow process of restoring Office docs and source code (!) they will discover what the rest of us have known all along -- the security model is less than ideal (which is, um, an understatement).
Another interesting note, the APIs that the Exchange Anti-Virus vendors use to scan Exchange mailstores only scan on messages inbound to the mailstore. This means that outbound messages are not scanned. We had an affected machine that replied to messages from the Internet with the trojan attachment as our Exchange outbound goes straight to a Unix machine on its way to the Internet. Fortunately we had a process running on the Unix box to catch inbound and outbound email with the attachments named zipped_files.exe and it was stopped, but this was why we saw our Exchange AntiVirus *not* catch the message. Why do the Anti-Virus vendors only use APIs that catch inbound messages? Because that is all Microsoft has given them. Most of the vendors have really been pressuring Microsoft to release info about coding to check for outbound messages.
Final tidbits (sorry if this message isn't very coherent, it's late and I've been up a long time): the trojan was written using Borland Delphi, and was possibly compiled on April 14, 1999. Obviously the virus writer got the idea for the propagation method from Melissa, and one can only wonder what the next worm/trojan/virus will do.
Yes, but it is takes web censorship before the consider changing.
As they were "Founded in 1853" and all of this time
they had no changed there name, they are obviously not concerned about jokes being made of them.
True, they are 45mb from what I have read.
The ones I have are like 20mb of data, 19mb, 23mb, etc.
The disc is less than 6cm tall.
a good cm of each end.
Yes, ROM drives read them without a problem.
They are rectangle with the ends rounded.
I have seen/used a few of these. Motorola, ON semi. And some Limousine service.
Actually, I have seen a few of these.
I just received one in the mail the other
day from ON Semiconductor.
I was wondering where I could get writeables
in that size. It woul be neat to make my own.
Hah, looking through your collection was interesting.
Last week I set a Toshiba T5200/100 out with the rest of the rubbish.
I once had a Compaq Portable 386 but that preceded the Toshiba to the curb by a month or two.
Neither of which were all that portable if you ask me.
There's no way that "script kiddies" did this
Hey! come on, I think we deserve a little more credit than that.
Hehe...
Maybe the script kiddies just don't want to do it.
Or not just read the article, but actually look into the topic and know what you are about to post about.
Which is a very good idea and I hope that more people can learn to do this.
http://members.spree.com/sip/wavrider/Hal/hal.html
Linux and BSD Napster client
that can be found here:
http://www.gis.net/~nite/
Although, I suppose I would have been more accurate if I would have sated the exchange rate.
12,000,000 * 1.019300 = 12,231,599.81
$12,231,599.81 to be exact.
Alright, I love to hear about my favorite distro especially to hear that it is growing. :^)
More good new: 6.3 will be out in stores December first.
or is that just v1.08 of the test?
Yes, I believe that you made availiable something
that most already have.
The demo TEST is about 50,000k and yours is v1.08 which is about 34,000k.
But it is the thought that counts, right?
Hah, Yes, excuse me.
+"
My mistake.
This is also quite humorous.
I wish to God that CmdrTaco did not post this. /. and in turn everyone knows
I have been having fun reading my friends mail
and what not (hehe.. not really) for a while.
Then it is on
about it. So of course they close it up.
Too bad we could not have kept this one silent.
Okay.
I have been working on a clear case design based on the
In-Win A500. Plexie(sp) glass and I will use the chassis
from the A500. No neon lights (what is that about anyway?),
and all of the awesome benefits of the A500. These cases
rule! Everyone should have an A500.
----------Forwarded message--------------
From: Simple Nomad
I'm in the process of cleanup - my day job employer got hit, and we're NT
with no 95/98 to speak of. Here are some interesting tidbits that I
haven't seen on some of the commercial Anti-Virus web sites regarding NT.
Payload:
- The trojan can come into any email client, obviously. If executed, it
will proceed to go active in memory. In other words, you do not need
Outlook for the Payload to activate, just a Win32 machine. A Notes mail
client user probably did the most damage in our environment to network NT
file servers.
- It will have a process running called _setup.exe, zipped_f.exe, and
possibly explore.exe.
- One of our users reported seeing explore.exe running as an application,
although I wasn't able to confirm this.
- It deletes files with *.h, *.c, *.cpp, *.asm, *.doc, *.xls, and *.ppt
extensions on all drives (C through Z) that are currently mapped.
- Every few minutes it will repeat the deletion process. This is
particularly nasty if you are trying to do restores to network drives
while the virus is still active in your environment.
Progation:
- On the Melissa-style method of propagation, it checks the user's Inbox
in Outlook. The Outlook client does not have to be running, as the trojan
uses MAPI calls.
- Propagation is triggered by the arrival of a new message into the
Outlook's Inbox.
- Once triggered, the virus takes the first two names in the header and
uses it to plug into the text of the message. If more than one user name
is in the message header (possible if you are using distribution lists or
role-based mail boxes that forward mail to multiple people) it is possible
the names will not be in the correct order. Also if you use Lastname,
Firstname as a naming convention you will get Lastname, plugged into the
messages.
- It creates the message with the names and attaches the trojan, naming it
zipped_files.exe with the happy message as reported on most Anti-Virus
vendor sites.
- In other words, you send an email to billg@microsoft.com with a subject
of Microsoft Sucks, he's infected and his machine is up and running, you
will get a reply with a subject of Re: Microsoft Sucks with the
attachment. I mean he says he'll get back with you and to read the
attached zipped docs, and you being Joe/Josey corporate user check it out.
False message saying it's a corrupt zip, blah, blah, blah, and now you're
sending out trojans.
We got hit when email was sent to some engineers at Microsoft, and the
reply came back with the trojan. The nature of the email sent to Microsoft
was "where is the info we requested" so it seemed natural that the
attachment was supposed to be a self-extracting zip. That's right,
Microsoft got hit, so I would guess a few source code files and Office
docs were wiped. Hopefully as Microsoft starts the slow process of
restoring Office docs and source code (!) they will discover what the
rest of us have known all along -- the security model is less than ideal
(which is, um, an understatement).
Another interesting note, the APIs that the Exchange Anti-Virus vendors
use to scan Exchange mailstores only scan on messages inbound to the
mailstore. This means that outbound messages are not scanned. We had an
affected machine that replied to messages from the Internet with the
trojan attachment as our Exchange outbound goes straight to a Unix machine
on its way to the Internet. Fortunately we had a process running on the
Unix box to catch inbound and outbound email with the attachments named
zipped_files.exe and it was stopped, but this was why we saw our Exchange
AntiVirus *not* catch the message. Why do the Anti-Virus vendors only use
APIs that catch inbound messages? Because that is all Microsoft has given
them. Most of the vendors have really been pressuring Microsoft to release
info about coding to check for outbound messages.
Final tidbits (sorry if this message isn't very coherent, it's late and
I've been up a long time): the trojan was written using Borland Delphi,
and was possibly compiled on April 14, 1999. Obviously the virus writer
got the idea for the propagation method from Melissa, and one can only
wonder what the next worm/trojan/virus will do.