Obscurity isn't an exclusive substitute for security.
But any good security model employs security in depth, including elements from security by design andsecurity through obscurity. In fact, it's foolish to not do both.
I'm sorry, but the justification that anyone can get onto some ungated bases and drive/walk around is absolutely no excuse for Google Street View coverage of US military installations.
Yes, I did mean that Google pulling them was not a bad thing. But a lot of people here will think it is.
And yes, I agree this is noteworthy, but the tone of the article is likely to be interpreted by many here as somehow negative; i.e., that a private company is "censoring" content at the request of the "government". Other posters have already said, essentially, "What's the big deal? This is all stuff I can see with my own eyes anyway!" Read through the rest of the posts and see for yourself.
Also, it seems very likely this was an ungated, or open, facility (as many large/urban installations are, which then have other levels of restricted access for controlled areas). Google probably formally asked permission to drive around, was granted it, and was allowed to drive around (since in this type of facility they are streets that are effectively accessible to the public). I find it very unlikely that this was a closed/gated/restricted facility that Google was just granted access to simply by asking. In fact, that is almost certainly NOT the case.
...one of the major questions. Jobs was explicitly asked if VoIP apps would be allowed. Jobs explicitly answered that they would be via WiFi, but not via the carrier connection.
So I think the question of how much data usage will be "allowed" for heavy use applications is essentially unlimited via WiFi.
As carriers continue to build out their data networks, as competition continues, and as higher bandwidth (e.g., 3G) iPhones become available (which has already been confirmed by Apple and AT&T several times), then we may see the landscape change for apps that use the carrier's network. It seems right now a common sense approach will be applied.
But it also seems clear that anything (as long as it's not specifically for porn, illegal, etc.) will be allowed via WiFi.
So we went from you alleging that Egypt "examined" the cable and said it was "obviously" cut (when Egypt never looked at any cable; it was just you jumping to that conclusion and making that statement -- a similar leap among many that have probably been made by many wanting to believe the conspiracy angle), to now saying that it "seems to be BS".
See how those two things are different?
There were only two failures -- the first two-- that had any real impact on the internet. Any routine failures after that, of any kind -- and some weren't even complete failures -- were all instantly viewed as "proof" by the conspiracy crowd that something was going on. The only problem? The cable operators, undersea cable experts, all governments in the mideast, and anyone who was alleged to be affected by this don't share that view.
"Cable cuts happen on average once every three days," Beckert said. There are 25 large ships that do nothing but fix cable cuts and bends, [Stephan] Beckert [of TeleGeography Research] adds. [...] "Only the first two cuts had any serious impact on the internet." [...] Once those failures sensitized a conspiracy-happy net, it was natural that other cable failures would be found to feed the frenzy, because they occur all the time. [...] "Its difficult to tell what the motive would be: is it just to annoy people?" [Todd] Underwood [, a vice president at internet analysis firm Renesys,] said. "If it were targeted, the targeting is bad. The loonies on the American left say this was us targeting Iran. If this is us targeting Iran, we are much worse than I thought we were. [...] Are we really targeting India or Pakistan?" Underwood asked incredulously.
Everything that people said was supposed to happen -- an invasion of Iran, the stopping of the Iranian Oil Bourse -- didn't happen. And considering Iran was barely affected by the cable failures, it's hard to imagine how Iran was being targeted. And if it's the other conspiracy theory do jour (see how if one conspiracy theory is wrong, there's always a backup?), which is that it was cover for splices or taps being installed elsewhere in the lines, they'd be detected by the cable operators during routine testing and maintenance. And if the backup-backup conspiracy theory is true, which is that the cable operators are allegedly "in on it" because they have some shaky ties to US companies like AT&T, if they're in on it, why would we have to cut cables underwater to install splices? For the hell of it?
See how all these conspiracy theories just fall apart and don't stand up to any kind of scrutiny? They're supported by people just literally making things up, and repeating them as fact, like you did about Egypt "examining" the cable and saying it was obviously a deliberate cut, when nothing even close to like that happened, ever. I also realize that most people who are prone to believing this was somehow deliberate probably won't have their mind changed by facts. So I guess I'm just posting this in the hopes that at least someone will read it, and understand that the conspiracy theories were just flat-out wrong.
Newsflash: any undersea cable damage that causes a partial or complete outage is called a "cut". Most undersea cable "cuts" are not caused by ships, and most don't represent a cable being completely severed. They're caused by water currents, age, underwater pressure, kinks, geologic movement, natural phenomena, power failures, equipment outages, and a whole host of other issues. That's why there is an undersea cable failure, or "cut" in industry parlance, once every three days, on average, and why there are a fleet of 25 ships that do nothing but repair undersea cables.
"Cable cuts happen on average once every three days," Beckert said. There are 25 large ships that do nothing but fix cable cuts and bends, [Stephan] Beckert [of TeleGeography Research] adds. [...] "Only the first two cuts had any serious impact on the internet." [...] Once those failures sensitized a conspiracy-happy net, it was natural that other cable failures would be found to feed the frenzy, because they occur all the time. [...] "Its difficult to tell what the motive would be: is it just to annoy people?" [Todd] Underwood [, a vice president at internet analysis firm Renesys,] said. "If it were targeted, the targeting is bad. The loonies on the American left say this was us targeting Iran. If this is us targeting Iran, we are much worse than I thought we were. [...] Are we really targeting India or Pakistan?" Underwood asked incredulously.
I love how conspiracy theories can explain away everything. If oil traders were really afraid of using the Iranian bourse because they think they're going to get on the US's bad side, and have made that decision because of the cable failures, you'd be able to find at least one person -- indeed, many -- saying that. Also, even though it would be in Iran's interests to finger the US for trying to stop the bourse, you claim that Iran is instead trying to hide that, because they are afraid it would scare people away from using the bourse. Iran was barely affected by this, so how can they be assumed to be the target? Even that can be explained away as, "Well, the US didn't want to make it too obvious, and knew that potential bourse clients would 'get the message'," all while everyone remains miraculously silent?
Look, I know you and others may want to believe this was deliberate US action against Iran. Unfortunately, the facts just don't support that claim. Even the fantasies people have come up with don't support that claim. This whole Iranian Oil Bourse plot is nothing more than a figment of the blogosphere's overworked imagination. The bourse is here, and, as everyone except Iran's state-run press predicted, it has been met with a lukewarm reception.
What exactly is nefarious about intercepting an enemy's communications?
Nothing; my point, though, is that we don't need to deliberately destroy internet infrastructure to do so, as has been alleged. There are much more unobtrusive ways to collect foreign intelligence.
I originally had this in my message, but removed it since I thought it was obvious:
I'm not looking for stories that say that Egypt said there were no ships in the area in question. Even my linked article makes reference to that.
I'm asking for a reference that supports your claim that the Egyptian government examined the cables and said they had clearly been deliberately cut. But there is no such reference, since the Egyptian government has done nothing of the sort, given that they're not the ones examining anything, and no such claim has ever been made.
Egypt saying there were no ships in an area (and therefore wasn't an anchor drag in that area) is a far cry from what you claim Egypt said in your original message, namely, that Egypt "publicly stated after examining the damage, that the cables were obviously 'cut' and not accidentally severed."
To be clear, no such thing ever occurred; in fairness to you, you're probably extrapolating things out of what others have incorrectly inferred/assumed, but are simply not the case.
Please provide references for your claims about Russian military exercises to "protect" undersea cables, and Egypt's "claims" that the cables were cut.
I don't expect there will be a response, given that it is the cable operators, not the Egyptian government (since it is not their cable), who would be "examining the damage", and no cable operator has said any such thing. In fact, numerousexperts have dismissed such claims.
How on earth does Iran's internet connectivity being barely disrupted -- never mind that the cable operators and undersea cable experts completely dismissed claims there were any intentional cuts -- "spread fear, uncertainty, and doubt among potential non-dollar oil investors"?
Was it supposed to be a signal that if anyone invests in Iran's bourse, the US is going to incompetently attempt to disrupt their internet connectivity, and utterly fail at doing so? Better yet, since no major entity interested in investing in Iran's bourse believed that the cable cuts were deliberate, how would the disruption affect their decision making?
(I take it you were one of those who believe it was a US plot against the Iranian Oil Bourse?)
Interesting argument style you have of late, by the way. You don't really counter anything I say, which is all easily verifiable...you just toss around "intelligence business", as if that somehow removes validity from easily verifiable statements.
And if I were really part of some subtle US intelligence plot to disrupt the bourse -- which, if it were, we all would have done an absolutely atrocious job of -- why on earth would it be ridiculously easy for me to be identified? Would it instead not be far more effective for me to be completely anonymous?
Or are we going to have some Princess Brideesque, "But you'd know that I'd know that you'd know," back-and-forth now, where you claim it's all part of the subtle trickery?
I have an idea: how about you realize that the cable failures, which didn't substantively affect anything related with Iran's internet connectivity at all, were all just coincidental failures, like the numerous other partial and complete failures of undersea cables that happen constantly? There are fleets of ships that go around the world doing nothing but undersea cable raising and repair.
Or is it really more plausible to you that I'm an overt intelligence officer assigned to secretly astroturf slashdot, to throw people off of the truth that the US cut the cables, somehow making the cuts seem accidental, in such a way that even the cable operators themselves claim them to be accidental, and not actually disrupting any nation's connectivity in any meaningful way, all as a plot to scare people away from the Iranian bourse, though they don't admit that publicly, even though, if they believed that, it would be in their -- and Iran's -- interests to do so?
I mean, even Iran doesn't believe this garbage. And they're more than content to go around saying "no one likes Americans".
But really, if you do believe that, bravo. The bounds of your imagination are indeed limitless!
And the hundreds of non-US and non-Western individuals involved on the flotilla of vessels needed for undersea cable repair -- which are constantly roving the world repairing cables -- don't notice this, and/or have all kept it a secret?
We have other means of undersea cable traffic interception and surveillance. And even if the cuts were cover for the insertion of a tap at another location by a vessel like the Carter, there isn't any way to prove that one way or another.
I think the most interesting thing is that people seem to be looking for explanations that somehow involve nefarious US activity -- anything other than a string of coincidental cable failures in one geographic region. That aspect is especially interesting: given the sophistication that would be needed to carry out such an operation undetected from a technical standpoint, we somehow don't have the foresight to make it unnoticeable in other ways?
The "nefarious activity" in relation to Iran's internet connectivity is right under our nose, and it's the draconian restrictions the government imposes on its own people, not that a splice might possibly have been installed somewhere as part of an operation that requires incredible technological sophistication and wherewithal, but can't manage to make cable cuts not appear too "obvious".
The cable operators have numerous mechanisms to detect splices installed in their lines. So unless the cable operators themselves are in on it -- as some have alleged -- I don't think this hypothesis is plausible, either. And if the cable operators are in on it, then we wouldn't have needed to cut undersea cables and install splices, would we?
Slashdot readers may recall the assertions, roundly dismissed by undersea cable experts, that the cables were deliberately cut to sever Iran's internet connectivity, which, contrary to popular belief, never occurred.
Many fervently believed the cable "cuts" were a prelude to war; still others insisted they were part of a plot to prevent the opening of the Iranian Oil Bourse. Interestingly, no one could explain how cutting only one of several mechanisms of Internet connectivity to Iran would stop the bourse from opening...
Well, there was no secret invasion of Iran, and the Iranian Oil Bourse, after many self-incurred delays, still opened, to little fanfare. The opening of the bourse -- which doesn't deal in US dollars -- was supposed to be the turning point that sent the dollar into a freefall; however, myriad other factors seem to be hurting the dollar just fine on their own.
Why am I mentioning this? Because I think it is incredibly important to take a step back, get some perspective on things, and realize that actual totalitarian regimes are far more dangerous and damaging to individual freedoms and the free flow of information, in a very real and tangible sense, than even the wildest imagined conspiracy theories.
The actual explanation is a heck of a lot more detailed than I or the person who replied to me could have given (or that I have time to give in a slashdot comment). Suffice it to say that there is no general or routine connectivity between SIPR and the commodity internet. Given that all of the cyber attacks to which I assume the OP was referring are against resources on unclassified networks, the suggestion to "unplug" doesn't really apply, as SIPR and JWICS are sufficiently segregated. SIPR resources are inaccessible in any practical or meaningful way from the commodity internet.
The classified networks (such as SIPRnet and JWICS) are already not connected to the commodity internet. Only unclassified networks (which can still contain troves of sensitive and other information, and whose interruption can cause havoc in all manner of other ways) are connected to the commodity internet.
The answer is the same for anything else that is connected to the internet: that the benefits -- real or perceived -- of being connected to the internet on the unclassified side, with proper security controls, etc., outweighs the risks.
There has been a lot of concern of late about how much information individuals are giving out online. The Air Force is particularly concerned, and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) has done a number of studies into just how much sensitive information is getting out, intentionally or no, via social media.
For me, it's kind of a mixed bag. We have people posting photos and information that are an OPSEC nightmare. Then we have the other end of the spectrum; the notion that one should never participate in any online communities or use any online "social networking" or Web 2.0 tools at all. I think there is a balance: be aware of what you are giving out, use privacy controls vigorously, and don't post anything to the internet, even "privately", that is sensitive or questionable from a security perspective. We already know that blogs, social networking, etc., are valuable tools, but it can also be a big problem. So where do we draw the line?
The key is awareness, and constant vigilance about what we're posting, and where.
Here are some great presentations and resources dealing with just this topic in a broader sense:
"Killer Keyboard" (.pps) - This short OPSEC lays out exactly an example scenario of how ignoring security directives combined with seemingly benign information posted online can be used for an influence operation.
Adversary Influence Operations Social Networking Case Study (.pdf) - This AFRL presentation is a case study of real information personnel have been giving out online, and then lays out some hypothetical scenarios. This is exactly what the Air Force is responding to. Even though there are probably better ways to handle this, this is viewed as a necessary interim solution.
There are numerous ways around any official restrictions. People act as if this is some kind of censorship. By definition as applied to personnel in their official role, it is not. I also notice the article is tagged "keepemdumb". Real nice. Shows you have pretty much no idea about the real concerns related to security and actually carrying out a mission.
Of course, if one's interest is in fundamentally crippling or limiting the military's ability to effectively carry out it's mission because one disagrees with a particular policy, I can see why such a person could not possibly see any legitimate reasons for any kind of internet restrictions on official networks, and would instead see it as either "proof" of trying to "hide" the grim realities of war, or to keep military personnel "brainwashed", neither of which are true.
I found one of the other posts in this thread amusing: that people would never support a war -- any war -- if all they saw were dead bodies and were constantly barraged with images of severed limbs and coffins. Does such a person believe it is possible for ANY military action, at any time, for any reason, to be warranted, reasonable, or necessary? If so, I wonder of that person want such a mission continually subverted by the actions of others as well?
It's not "WikiLeaks" that has the funding; it's the people who have set up WikiLeaks. From the article (which I know is mandatory not to read):
Laurie is an international consultant on internet security. Earlier he set up a business that bought two military bunkers, at the abandoned US base at Greenham Common, and at an old RAF radar station in Kent. His company rents them out to firms and banks who want to protect their servers from attack. The Kent bunker is deep underground: "The radar operators were supposed to survive 30 days after a nuclear strike."
Also, by virtue of WikiLeaks being here, it really isn't protected significantly more than it would be in any conventional secure datacenter. But it sure sounds cool, doesn't it?
The funny part of the article is that the online version ends with:
Laurie cautions that Wikileaks' vaunted encryption is not completely unbreakable. Codebreakers such as the US National Security Agency could prob
And then, nothing. Just a little mistake at the Guardian, but still kind of funny.;-)
On a more serious note, the reason why WikiLeaks' DNS provider in the US was shut down was, well, because they didn't show up for court. At all.
The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand make up the "UKUSA Community", have been sharing intelligence in this landmark and longstanding alliance since World War II. The purpose is intelligence cooperation amongst Anglophone allies, not to do end-runs around respective nations' restrictions on spying on their own citizens. That is prohibited, regardless of the source of the intelligence. Whether or not one actually trusts their intelligence apparatus is a different matter entirely.
The Terrorist Surveillance Program has not existed for over a year, since 17 January 2007. All foreign intelligence collection in the meantime has occurred under the guise of FISA and the temporary and recently-sunset FISA modifications provided by the Protect America Act. With the expiry of the Protect America Act, ALL foreign SIGINT collection reverts to the 30-year old FISA rules.
If someone could point out the warrantless surveillance program that is known to exist today, I'd appreciate it. And yes, the burden of proof is on you, as simply asserting that one must exist doesn't quite cut it. Remember how TSP came to light: leaks to the New York Times. The government simply cannot keep such controversial programs secret. There is no evidence of any current, ongoing "warrantless" surveillance.
The other important thing to remember is that foreign intelligence collection never requires a warrant or court oversight of any kind; the FISA modifications were designed to enable easy foreign intelligence collection via assets on US soil or traffic that may travel physically through the United States. It does not matter in the least if the other end of the conversation is a US person on US soil, as long as they are not the target of such collection.
Such collection is always legal and allowable without a warrant if the collection occurs outside of the United States and the US person is not the target of such surveillance. Special and very extensive measures are undertaken to conceal the identity of US persons in such collection.
The main difference with what became known as TSP, and refined in the Protect America Act, was the provision to enable such collection via means to which we have easy and routine access; namely, the massive amounts of communication traffic flowing through equipment under US control. Whether or not you may agree with that is a different issue entirely. The purpose was never to target US citizens without a warrant. The purpose was to collect foreign intelligence via US assets. Currently (after PAA expiration), if traffic travels through the United States, even if BOTH ends are non-US persons physically outside of the United States, the Intelligence Community is prohibited from collection without a warrant. That's the "Intel Gap" we wanted to close.
ALL surveillance was happening under the guise of the Protect America Act, which was designed exclusively to allow foreign intelligence collection without a warrant when the traffic travelled through the United States, whether incidentally or by design. Foreign intelligence collection is always allowed without court oversight; the changes explicitly allowed such collection on US soil as long as the target was reasonably believed to be a non-US person physically outside of the United States, regardless of the other end of the conversation. The change was absolutely done to make such surveillance easy.
There is no TSP or any warrantless surveillance program. What a horrible summary.
Of course, I'm sure a bunch of people will respond, "Oh, sure, there is no warrantless surveillance...THAT WE KNOW OF." Oh, how convenient: arguing about something that we can't prove one way or another? Please, let's keep the discussion in the realm of known facts, namely, that TSP no longer exists. The article even says as much. Did the submitter not even RTFA?
Thus, Thomson is justified in asserting copyright on materials which represent unique, original, or significant contributions to the content, and does not assert any copyright whatever on material which is in the public domain.
And if this work helps provide greater access information which is already publicly, but not easily, available, then it's a Good Thing.
But Westlaw and LexisNexis do a lot more than just make case law available online. There is a lot of editorial work, summarizing, organization, not to mention costs often imposed by the courts themselves, and Carl Malamud correctly acknowledges that.
Given the level of comments to this article so far, I'm guessing that is not the case.
This is part of the spirit of the mandate of the sweeping Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which prioritizes information sharing, including between federal, state, and local entities, and enabling state/local/tribal governments to leverage federal intelligence resources across the spectrum.
Slashdot Mirror
Story -> Google Pulls Map Images At Pentagon's Request
Reply -> How or why this is a bad thing?
"this" = Google pulling the images
Make more sense now?
Obscurity isn't an exclusive substitute for security.
But any good security model employs security in depth, including elements from security by design and security through obscurity. In fact, it's foolish to not do both.
I'm sorry, but the justification that anyone can get onto some ungated bases and drive/walk around is absolutely no excuse for Google Street View coverage of US military installations.
Yes, I did mean that Google pulling them was not a bad thing. But a lot of people here will think it is.
And yes, I agree this is noteworthy, but the tone of the article is likely to be interpreted by many here as somehow negative; i.e., that a private company is "censoring" content at the request of the "government". Other posters have already said, essentially, "What's the big deal? This is all stuff I can see with my own eyes anyway!" Read through the rest of the posts and see for yourself.
Also, it seems very likely this was an ungated, or open, facility (as many large/urban installations are, which then have other levels of restricted access for controlled areas). Google probably formally asked permission to drive around, was granted it, and was allowed to drive around (since in this type of facility they are streets that are effectively accessible to the public). I find it very unlikely that this was a closed/gated/restricted facility that Google was just granted access to simply by asking. In fact, that is almost certainly NOT the case.
...how or why this is a bad thing.
Do we think there should be street level maps inside military installations on Google Street View?
Whether someone "screwed up" in the meantime, at Google, the installation, or both, is beside the point of whether the imagery should be removed.
The issue of how/why the crew was granted access, whether it was a gated or "open" installation, etc., are all unanswered.
...one of the major questions. Jobs was explicitly asked if VoIP apps would be allowed. Jobs explicitly answered that they would be via WiFi, but not via the carrier connection.
So I think the question of how much data usage will be "allowed" for heavy use applications is essentially unlimited via WiFi.
As carriers continue to build out their data networks, as competition continues, and as higher bandwidth (e.g., 3G) iPhones become available (which has already been confirmed by Apple and AT&T several times), then we may see the landscape change for apps that use the carrier's network. It seems right now a common sense approach will be applied.
But it also seems clear that anything (as long as it's not specifically for porn, illegal, etc.) will be allowed via WiFi.
Whoops, that should be du jour, of course. ;-)
So we went from you alleging that Egypt "examined" the cable and said it was "obviously" cut (when Egypt never looked at any cable; it was just you jumping to that conclusion and making that statement -- a similar leap among many that have probably been made by many wanting to believe the conspiracy angle), to now saying that it "seems to be BS".
See how those two things are different?
There were only two failures -- the first two-- that had any real impact on the internet. Any routine failures after that, of any kind -- and some weren't even complete failures -- were all instantly viewed as "proof" by the conspiracy crowd that something was going on. The only problem? The cable operators, undersea cable experts, all governments in the mideast, and anyone who was alleged to be affected by this don't share that view.
This post pretty much sums it up.
"Cable cuts happen on average once every three days," Beckert said. There are 25 large ships that do nothing but fix cable cuts and bends, [Stephan] Beckert [of TeleGeography Research] adds. [...] "Only the first two cuts had any serious impact on the internet." [...] Once those failures sensitized a conspiracy-happy net, it was natural that other cable failures would be found to feed the frenzy, because they occur all the time. [...] "Its difficult to tell what the motive would be: is it just to annoy people?" [Todd] Underwood [, a vice president at internet analysis firm Renesys,] said. "If it were targeted, the targeting is bad. The loonies on the American left say this was us targeting Iran. If this is us targeting Iran, we are much worse than I thought we were. [...] Are we really targeting India or Pakistan?" Underwood asked incredulously.
Everything that people said was supposed to happen -- an invasion of Iran, the stopping of the Iranian Oil Bourse -- didn't happen. And considering Iran was barely affected by the cable failures, it's hard to imagine how Iran was being targeted. And if it's the other conspiracy theory do jour (see how if one conspiracy theory is wrong, there's always a backup?), which is that it was cover for splices or taps being installed elsewhere in the lines, they'd be detected by the cable operators during routine testing and maintenance. And if the backup-backup conspiracy theory is true, which is that the cable operators are allegedly "in on it" because they have some shaky ties to US companies like AT&T, if they're in on it, why would we have to cut cables underwater to install splices? For the hell of it?
See how all these conspiracy theories just fall apart and don't stand up to any kind of scrutiny? They're supported by people just literally making things up, and repeating them as fact, like you did about Egypt "examining" the cable and saying it was obviously a deliberate cut, when nothing even close to like that happened, ever. I also realize that most people who are prone to believing this was somehow deliberate probably won't have their mind changed by facts. So I guess I'm just posting this in the hopes that at least someone will read it, and understand that the conspiracy theories were just flat-out wrong.
Newsflash: any undersea cable damage that causes a partial or complete outage is called a "cut". Most undersea cable "cuts" are not caused by ships, and most don't represent a cable being completely severed. They're caused by water currents, age, underwater pressure, kinks, geologic movement, natural phenomena, power failures, equipment outages, and a whole host of other issues. That's why there is an undersea cable failure, or "cut" in industry parlance, once every three days, on average, and why there are a fleet of 25 ships that do nothing but repair undersea cables.
Okay...
"Cable cuts happen on average once every three days," Beckert said. There are 25 large ships that do nothing but fix cable cuts and bends, [Stephan] Beckert [of TeleGeography Research] adds. [...] "Only the first two cuts had any serious impact on the internet." [...] Once those failures sensitized a conspiracy-happy net, it was natural that other cable failures would be found to feed the frenzy, because they occur all the time. [...] "Its difficult to tell what the motive would be: is it just to annoy people?" [Todd] Underwood [, a vice president at internet analysis firm Renesys,] said. "If it were targeted, the targeting is bad. The loonies on the American left say this was us targeting Iran. If this is us targeting Iran, we are much worse than I thought we were. [...] Are we really targeting India or Pakistan?" Underwood asked incredulously.
I love how conspiracy theories can explain away everything. If oil traders were really afraid of using the Iranian bourse because they think they're going to get on the US's bad side, and have made that decision because of the cable failures, you'd be able to find at least one person -- indeed, many -- saying that. Also, even though it would be in Iran's interests to finger the US for trying to stop the bourse, you claim that Iran is instead trying to hide that, because they are afraid it would scare people away from using the bourse. Iran was barely affected by this, so how can they be assumed to be the target? Even that can be explained away as, "Well, the US didn't want to make it too obvious, and knew that potential bourse clients would 'get the message'," all while everyone remains miraculously silent?
Look, I know you and others may want to believe this was deliberate US action against Iran. Unfortunately, the facts just don't support that claim. Even the fantasies people have come up with don't support that claim. This whole Iranian Oil Bourse plot is nothing more than a figment of the blogosphere's overworked imagination. The bourse is here, and, as everyone except Iran's state-run press predicted, it has been met with a lukewarm reception.
Nothing; my point, though, is that we don't need to deliberately destroy internet infrastructure to do so, as has been alleged. There are much more unobtrusive ways to collect foreign intelligence.
I originally had this in my message, but removed it since I thought it was obvious:
I'm not looking for stories that say that Egypt said there were no ships in the area in question. Even my linked article makes reference to that.
I'm asking for a reference that supports your claim that the Egyptian government examined the cables and said they had clearly been deliberately cut. But there is no such reference, since the Egyptian government has done nothing of the sort, given that they're not the ones examining anything, and no such claim has ever been made.
Egypt saying there were no ships in an area (and therefore wasn't an anchor drag in that area) is a far cry from what you claim Egypt said in your original message, namely, that Egypt "publicly stated after examining the damage, that the cables were obviously 'cut' and not accidentally severed."
To be clear, no such thing ever occurred; in fairness to you, you're probably extrapolating things out of what others have incorrectly inferred/assumed, but are simply not the case.
Except that any disruption was very temporary, and the Iranian bourse opened as planned.
So what's the explanation, again...?
And there has been an explanation for the FALCON cable failure.
Please provide references for your claims about Russian military exercises to "protect" undersea cables, and Egypt's "claims" that the cables were cut.
I don't expect there will be a response, given that it is the cable operators, not the Egyptian government (since it is not their cable), who would be "examining the damage", and no cable operator has said any such thing. In fact, numerous experts have dismissed such claims.
How on earth does Iran's internet connectivity being barely disrupted -- never mind that the cable operators and undersea cable experts completely dismissed claims there were any intentional cuts -- "spread fear, uncertainty, and doubt among potential non-dollar oil investors"?
Was it supposed to be a signal that if anyone invests in Iran's bourse, the US is going to incompetently attempt to disrupt their internet connectivity, and utterly fail at doing so? Better yet, since no major entity interested in investing in Iran's bourse believed that the cable cuts were deliberate, how would the disruption affect their decision making?
(I take it you were one of those who believe it was a US plot against the Iranian Oil Bourse?)
Interesting argument style you have of late, by the way. You don't really counter anything I say, which is all easily verifiable...you just toss around "intelligence business", as if that somehow removes validity from easily verifiable statements.
And if I were really part of some subtle US intelligence plot to disrupt the bourse -- which, if it were, we all would have done an absolutely atrocious job of -- why on earth would it be ridiculously easy for me to be identified? Would it instead not be far more effective for me to be completely anonymous?
Or are we going to have some Princess Brideesque, "But you'd know that I'd know that you'd know," back-and-forth now, where you claim it's all part of the subtle trickery?
I have an idea: how about you realize that the cable failures, which didn't substantively affect anything related with Iran's internet connectivity at all, were all just coincidental failures, like the numerous other partial and complete failures of undersea cables that happen constantly? There are fleets of ships that go around the world doing nothing but undersea cable raising and repair.
Or is it really more plausible to you that I'm an overt intelligence officer assigned to secretly astroturf slashdot, to throw people off of the truth that the US cut the cables, somehow making the cuts seem accidental, in such a way that even the cable operators themselves claim them to be accidental, and not actually disrupting any nation's connectivity in any meaningful way, all as a plot to scare people away from the Iranian bourse, though they don't admit that publicly, even though, if they believed that, it would be in their -- and Iran's -- interests to do so?
I mean, even Iran doesn't believe this garbage. And they're more than content to go around saying "no one likes Americans".
But really, if you do believe that, bravo. The bounds of your imagination are indeed limitless!
And the hundreds of non-US and non-Western individuals involved on the flotilla of vessels needed for undersea cable repair -- which are constantly roving the world repairing cables -- don't notice this, and/or have all kept it a secret?
We have other means of undersea cable traffic interception and surveillance. And even if the cuts were cover for the insertion of a tap at another location by a vessel like the Carter, there isn't any way to prove that one way or another.
I think the most interesting thing is that people seem to be looking for explanations that somehow involve nefarious US activity -- anything other than a string of coincidental cable failures in one geographic region. That aspect is especially interesting: given the sophistication that would be needed to carry out such an operation undetected from a technical standpoint, we somehow don't have the foresight to make it unnoticeable in other ways?
The "nefarious activity" in relation to Iran's internet connectivity is right under our nose, and it's the draconian restrictions the government imposes on its own people, not that a splice might possibly have been installed somewhere as part of an operation that requires incredible technological sophistication and wherewithal, but can't manage to make cable cuts not appear too "obvious".
The cable operators have numerous mechanisms to detect splices installed in their lines. So unless the cable operators themselves are in on it -- as some have alleged -- I don't think this hypothesis is plausible, either. And if the cable operators are in on it, then we wouldn't have needed to cut undersea cables and install splices, would we?
This was trimmed from the original submission:
Slashdot readers may recall the assertions, roundly dismissed by undersea cable experts, that the cables were deliberately cut to sever Iran's internet connectivity, which, contrary to popular belief, never occurred.
Many fervently believed the cable "cuts" were a prelude to war; still others insisted they were part of a plot to prevent the opening of the Iranian Oil Bourse. Interestingly, no one could explain how cutting only one of several mechanisms of Internet connectivity to Iran would stop the bourse from opening...
Well, there was no secret invasion of Iran, and the Iranian Oil Bourse, after many self-incurred delays, still opened, to little fanfare. The opening of the bourse -- which doesn't deal in US dollars -- was supposed to be the turning point that sent the dollar into a freefall; however, myriad other factors seem to be hurting the dollar just fine on their own.
Why am I mentioning this? Because I think it is incredibly important to take a step back, get some perspective on things, and realize that actual totalitarian regimes are far more dangerous and damaging to individual freedoms and the free flow of information, in a very real and tangible sense, than even the wildest imagined conspiracy theories.
The actual explanation is a heck of a lot more detailed than I or the person who replied to me could have given (or that I have time to give in a slashdot comment). Suffice it to say that there is no general or routine connectivity between SIPR and the commodity internet. Given that all of the cyber attacks to which I assume the OP was referring are against resources on unclassified networks, the suggestion to "unplug" doesn't really apply, as SIPR and JWICS are sufficiently segregated. SIPR resources are inaccessible in any practical or meaningful way from the commodity internet.
The classified networks (such as SIPRnet and JWICS) are already not connected to the commodity internet. Only unclassified networks (which can still contain troves of sensitive and other information, and whose interruption can cause havoc in all manner of other ways) are connected to the commodity internet.
The answer is the same for anything else that is connected to the internet: that the benefits -- real or perceived -- of being connected to the internet on the unclassified side, with proper security controls, etc., outweighs the risks.
There has been a lot of concern of late about how much information individuals are giving out online. The Air Force is particularly concerned, and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) has done a number of studies into just how much sensitive information is getting out, intentionally or no, via social media.
For me, it's kind of a mixed bag. We have people posting photos and information that are an OPSEC nightmare. Then we have the other end of the spectrum; the notion that one should never participate in any online communities or use any online "social networking" or Web 2.0 tools at all. I think there is a balance: be aware of what you are giving out, use privacy controls vigorously, and don't post anything to the internet, even "privately", that is sensitive or questionable from a security perspective. We already know that blogs, social networking, etc., are valuable tools, but it can also be a big problem. So where do we draw the line?
The key is awareness, and constant vigilance about what we're posting, and where.
Here are some great presentations and resources dealing with just this topic in a broader sense:
"Killer Keyboard" (.pps) - This short OPSEC lays out exactly an example scenario of how ignoring security directives combined with seemingly benign information posted online can be used for an influence operation.
Adversary Influence Operations Social Networking Case Study (.pdf) - This AFRL presentation is a case study of real information personnel have been giving out online, and then lays out some hypothetical scenarios. This is exactly what the Air Force is responding to. Even though there are probably better ways to handle this, this is viewed as a necessary interim solution.
There are numerous ways around any official restrictions. People act as if this is some kind of censorship. By definition as applied to personnel in their official role, it is not. I also notice the article is tagged "keepemdumb". Real nice. Shows you have pretty much no idea about the real concerns related to security and actually carrying out a mission.
Of course, if one's interest is in fundamentally crippling or limiting the military's ability to effectively carry out it's mission because one disagrees with a particular policy, I can see why such a person could not possibly see any legitimate reasons for any kind of internet restrictions on official networks, and would instead see it as either "proof" of trying to "hide" the grim realities of war, or to keep military personnel "brainwashed", neither of which are true.
I found one of the other posts in this thread amusing: that people would never support a war -- any war -- if all they saw were dead bodies and were constantly barraged with images of severed limbs and coffins. Does such a person believe it is possible for ANY military action, at any time, for any reason, to be warranted, reasonable, or necessary? If so, I wonder of that person want such a mission continually subverted by the actions of others as well?
Or would they want it to succeed?
Also, by virtue of WikiLeaks being here, it really isn't protected significantly more than it would be in any conventional secure datacenter. But it sure sounds cool, doesn't it?
The funny part of the article is that the online version ends with:
And then, nothing. Just a little mistake at the Guardian, but still kind of funny.
On a more serious note, the reason why WikiLeaks' DNS provider in the US was shut down was, well, because they didn't show up for court. At all.
For some more on WikiLeaks:
Court Issues Injunction Against Wikileaks.org
A Word from Wikileaks
Looks like WikiLeaks doesn't want anything negative said about their operation. Which is fairly ironic, if you stop to think for a moment...
The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand make up the "UKUSA Community", have been sharing intelligence in this landmark and longstanding alliance since World War II. The purpose is intelligence cooperation amongst Anglophone allies, not to do end-runs around respective nations' restrictions on spying on their own citizens. That is prohibited, regardless of the source of the intelligence. Whether or not one actually trusts their intelligence apparatus is a different matter entirely.
The Terrorist Surveillance Program has not existed for over a year, since 17 January 2007. All foreign intelligence collection in the meantime has occurred under the guise of FISA and the temporary and recently-sunset FISA modifications provided by the Protect America Act. With the expiry of the Protect America Act, ALL foreign SIGINT collection reverts to the 30-year old FISA rules.
If someone could point out the warrantless surveillance program that is known to exist today, I'd appreciate it. And yes, the burden of proof is on you, as simply asserting that one must exist doesn't quite cut it. Remember how TSP came to light: leaks to the New York Times. The government simply cannot keep such controversial programs secret. There is no evidence of any current, ongoing "warrantless" surveillance.
The other important thing to remember is that foreign intelligence collection never requires a warrant or court oversight of any kind; the FISA modifications were designed to enable easy foreign intelligence collection via assets on US soil or traffic that may travel physically through the United States. It does not matter in the least if the other end of the conversation is a US person on US soil, as long as they are not the target of such collection.
Such collection is always legal and allowable without a warrant if the collection occurs outside of the United States and the US person is not the target of such surveillance. Special and very extensive measures are undertaken to conceal the identity of US persons in such collection.
The main difference with what became known as TSP, and refined in the Protect America Act, was the provision to enable such collection via means to which we have easy and routine access; namely, the massive amounts of communication traffic flowing through equipment under US control. Whether or not you may agree with that is a different issue entirely. The purpose was never to target US citizens without a warrant. The purpose was to collect foreign intelligence via US assets. Currently (after PAA expiration), if traffic travels through the United States, even if BOTH ends are non-US persons physically outside of the United States, the Intelligence Community is prohibited from collection without a warrant. That's the "Intel Gap" we wanted to close.
The only problem with the submission?
TSP no longer exists, and hasn't since 17 January 2007.
ALL surveillance was happening under the guise of the Protect America Act, which was designed exclusively to allow foreign intelligence collection without a warrant when the traffic travelled through the United States, whether incidentally or by design. Foreign intelligence collection is always allowed without court oversight; the changes explicitly allowed such collection on US soil as long as the target was reasonably believed to be a non-US person physically outside of the United States, regardless of the other end of the conversation. The change was absolutely done to make such surveillance easy.
Now the Protect America Act has expired with its automatic sunset, and ALL surveillance must again happen only via FISA.
There is no TSP or any warrantless surveillance program. What a horrible summary.
Of course, I'm sure a bunch of people will respond, "Oh, sure, there is no warrantless surveillance...THAT WE KNOW OF." Oh, how convenient: arguing about something that we can't prove one way or another? Please, let's keep the discussion in the realm of known facts, namely, that TSP no longer exists. The article even says as much. Did the submitter not even RTFA?
...from Thomson, the provider of Westlaw services:
http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/letter_to_west_response.pdf
Seems a pretty reasonable response to his initial query:
http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/letter_to_west.pdf
Thus, Thomson is justified in asserting copyright on materials which represent unique, original, or significant contributions to the content, and does not assert any copyright whatever on material which is in the public domain.
And if this work helps provide greater access information which is already publicly, but not easily, available, then it's a Good Thing.
But Westlaw and LexisNexis do a lot more than just make case law available online. There is a lot of editorial work, summarizing, organization, not to mention costs often imposed by the courts themselves, and Carl Malamud correctly acknowledges that.
...and the date has been confirmed
That is, if you even care.
Given the level of comments to this article so far, I'm guessing that is not the case.
This is part of the spirit of the mandate of the sweeping Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which prioritizes information sharing, including between federal, state, and local entities, and enabling state/local/tribal governments to leverage federal intelligence resources across the spectrum.