A warrant is not required, and never has been required, for foreign intelligence collection. The same is true for Canada's Communications Security Establishment. Sorry.
What's different is that when traffic from protected parties are intercepted (in the US, that would be a US Person), special action must be taken depending on the circumstances. But a warrant is NOT required for foreign SIGINT, even if some of the parties to the communication may sometimes be US (or Canadian) citizens.
This is the way it's been since the dawn of modern foreign SIGINT six decades ago in both the US and Canada.
Successful information handling is critical to the success of a military operation as much as anything else. But beyond classified information, there have not, to my knowledge, been any cases of embedded reporters being disallowed from reporting. This is the most realtime and extensive coverage the world has ever seen for a military operation, ever.
Does the Pentagon want to shape the message? Absolutely. But this alleged monitoring with respect to reporters was passive. I.e., it did not result in reporters' stories being suppressed. (I know that some here would ask, "How to we know?" Because no reporter has claimed that to be the case.) You're assuming reporters were targeted. They weren't. They were a part of Green Zone communication monitoring along with everyone else.
These intercept operators had no more power than they have ever had. The only new and controversial issues relating to NSA monitoring during the Bush administration have related to collection within the United States[1], and this has nothing to do with that.
Since the beginning of SIGINT and the beginning of the NSA, collectors have had effective and routine access to myriad conversations with endpoints in the United States, conversations where at least one end is a US Person, or both.
That happens all the time, and has always happened. Often, you'll hear things you're not looking for. Hell, most of what you hear isn't what you're looking for. But once you determine that a US Person is involved, you're not, however, supposed to record, store, or disseminate such information. Unfortunately, what we have here are people -- many mostly kids -- misbehaving, and sometimes misbehaving badly.
Anyone who is surprised by this or thinks it has anything to do with Bush has a serious lack of understanding about how Title 50 activities and SIGINT collection have worked for decades.
Again, to be clear: the "new" capabilities the President authorized dealt with NSA foreign intelligence collection within the United States. That doesn't mean one end of the conversation might not be a US Person. In fact, under the law, it can be...but then the information must be treated with care; e.g., identifying references to US Person redacted, and so on. What you can't do -- then or now -- is target US Persons without an individualized warrant. If traffic from US Persons is intercepted in the course of foreign SIGINT collection, it is NOT a violation of the law, and never has been, as long as it is handled properly.
So ABC is attempting to conflate Bush administration initiatives -- which don't even exist any longer (TSP) -- with NSA overseas operations, albeit with regard to US Persons. Unfortunately, the latter has nothing to do with Bush or any initiatives of the Bush administration. The intercept operators had no more or less power, save for technological improvements, than they've ever had.
And surprise, surprise: individuals with the power to listen to things sometimes listen to things they're not supposed to, and by virtue of these people having the necessary resources to actually do their jobs, there really isn't any easy way to prevent it.
From day one the handling of US Persons in the context of foreign intelligence is hammered into your head. But I guess sometimes immaturity and a cheap laugh at someone else's expense trumps common sense and the doing the right thing.
[1] NSA facilities for interception may often be physically in the United States, but the interception is still occurring outside the United States
...and reporting that I can't help but wonder has some political motivations, given the timing of its release.
That's not the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), and not related to foreign intelligence collection programs in that were in place in the United States. That's the NSA working in a foreign military operations theater, and is vastly different. These intercepts were happening in realtime and were focused on an area of military operations.
When working in the dynamic environment of an operations theater, it's difficult to make distinctions about what traffic should be monitored and when. That is not to say that US Persons should continue to be collected on after their status is known, even under these circumstances.
Additionally, we have to keep the actions of the individual vs the actions of the agency in mind. What individual intercept operators at times did with their capabilities does not necessarily represent organizational support for such actions. Individual intercept operators have misbehaved in this way forever. Does that make it right? Does that mean the organization "condones" it? Of course not. Did UCLA Medical Center support individuals looking up the medical records of Britney Spears and other celebrities, just because they were technically able to do so, and worked under the guise of UCLA Medical Center? Of course not. But these employees also need continuing access to such resources to do their jobs.
Further, "'all employees of the US government' should expect that their telephone conversations could be monitored as part of an effort to safeguard security and 'information assurance.'" The Joint COMSEC Monitoring Activity, traditionally responsible for monitoring activity on government communication lines, is hampered by the increasing use of wireless-, (unofficial) internet-, and satellite-based communications devices for official business. The distinction about where and how such communication might occur can't easily be made, and thus often falls to NSA -- which should then make the appropriate determination as to the disposition of the communication and act accordingly. That can include conversations of an embarrassing or personal nature. These are all humans here, not robots. Yes, they are trained professionals. But they're still human, with all the foibles and flaws we all share.
A spokesman for General Hayden said, "At NSA, the law was followed assiduously. The notion that General Hayden sanctioned or tolerated illegalities of any sort is ridiculous on its face." Those of you who laugh at this comment and think you know everything about the illegality of NSA surveillance would be well served to educate yourselves a bit.
It's unfortunate that ABC misunderstands -- misrepresents? -- NSA operations with respect to a military theater during wartime as having anything to do with the so-called (and now defunct) "Terrorist Surveillance Program".
In fact, two separate "whistleblowers" came forward, separately. The allegations from both, independently, only dealt with endpoints in the Middle East. Once definitively identified as as US Person who is not military personnel, an employee or contractor of the US government, or covered by an active, individualized warrant, and the other end of the communication is also a US Person who doesn't meet any of these requirements, collection should cease.
But the failure to adhere to such longstanding law and policy does not mean that the organization at large condoned such behavior. And, lest we forget, "the intercepts helped identify possible terror planning in Iraq and saved American lives. 'IED's were disarmed before they exploded, that people who were intending to harm US forces were captured ahead of time,' Faulk said."
You're frightened because the Customs has always had the power to search persons and physical objects at the border without a warrant, or that someone actually thought it might be a good idea to extend the longstanding and repeatedly upheld border search exception to include data on electronic devices? If it has always been acceptable (and repeatedly upheld by the Supreme Court[1]) to search for anything else illegal at the border without a warrant, can someone make a good argument why data on one's person or in one's possession at the time of border crossing should be excluded under those same provisions?
Or are you frightened because you subscribe to the idea that the US has turned into a fascist regime, when the EU and individual European nations have their own laundry list of controversial laws and provisions attempting to grapple with how to handle electronic data in a legal sense in the continually emerging Information Age?
[1]: United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562-563 (1976) United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004) United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (7th Cir. 1993)
I should clarify to say that the policy does mention encryption; but whether your device is encrypted is unlikely to determine whether or not it is seized.
Specifically:
(2) Assistance by Other Federal Agencies or Entities.
(a) Translation and Decryption. Officers may encounter information in documents or electronic devices that is in a foreign language and/or encrypted. To assist CBP in determining the meaning of such information, CBP may seek translation and/or decryption assistance from other Federal agencies or entities. Officers may seek such assistance absent individualized suspicion. Requests for translation and decryption assistance shall be documented.
(b) Subject Matter Assistance. Officers may encounter information in documents or electronic devices that is not in a foreign language or encrypted, but that nevertheless requires referral to subject matter experts to determine whether the information is relevant to the laws enforced and administered by CBP. With supervisory approval, officers may create and transmit a copy of information to an agency or entity for the purpose of obtaining subject matter assistance when they have reasonable suspicion of activities in violation of the laws enforced by CBP. Requests for subject matter assistance shall be documented.
Actually, reading the actual policy is probably not a bad idea for those so outraged with it (or frightened of it). Keep the longstanding border search exception in mind when reading the policy, and try to imagine how it might be in the realm of possibility that it might be reasonable to also apply the border search exception, repeatedly upheld by the Supreme Court, to data inside electronic devices as well.
"travelers may be stopped [and searched] at . . . the border without individualized suspicion even if the stop [or search] is based largely on ethnicity[.]" United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985), United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562-563 (1976)
and
"may [...] conduct searches of the traveler's body -- including strip, body cavity, involuntary x-ray, and in some jurisdictions, patdown searches -- if the Customs officer has reasonable suspicion" to do so. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004), United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (7th Cir. 1993)
And you're completely wrong about the Fourth Amendment, by the way. It doesn't apply to customs searches at the border. Read up.
Also, "travelers may be stopped [and searched] at . . . the border without individualized suspicion even if the stop [or search] is based largely on ethnicity[.]" United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985), United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562-563 (1976)
Additionally, CBP may conduct searches of the traveler's body -- including strip, body cavity, involuntary x-ray, and in some jurisdictions, patdown searches -- if the Customs officer has reasonable suspicion to do so. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004); United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (7th Cir. 1993).
No, they cannot "sieze your laptop" if you don't give them the encryption password; a strict reading of the policy is that the laptop can be seized in any event, encryption or no. There is NO REQUIREMENT to provide anyone with an encryption password under any circumstances. The existing policy doesn't even speak to encryption. In fact, leading privacy advocates recommend encryption as the most deisrable solution.
You guys do realize that customs agents at the border have ALWAYS had the right -- without a warrant -- to perform reasonable search and inspection of all physical objects and persons coming into the United States; this policy was designed to expand those longstanding inspection rights to electronic data.
In its current state, it's a poorly written policy. The fact is, no one is going to look at the contents of your laptop, much less be seizing it. (Do you guys actually travel internationally?)
When you say "FISA", you appear to be talking about the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. The immunity provision protects telecommunications companies who acted in good faith to cooperate with government requests from years upon years of endless, politically-charged and ideologically-motivated lawsuits or other future legal claims stemming from partially resolved court cases and unanswered questions related to the constitutionality of various components of the defunct Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP).
Qwest didn't get fucked. They are covered by immunity inasmuch as they participated in any aspects that required immunity. The other issue about which you might be thinking is Qwest's refusal to participate in NSA programs before 9/11, which Qwest claims lost it millions of dollars in government contracts. This was also different from TSP; it was a call database, the collection of which has long been understood to be legal, albeit controversial. It is the content of the communication with respect to US Persons that is off limits without a warrant.
So there are a lot of unrelated things going on here, and it's unfair to say that some telecoms "rolled over"; what they did was cooperate in good faith with secret government programs, many components of which, while classified (and subsequently leaked), are not in legal question. The real issue here is whether we should be able to capture foreign intelligence information that has always been fair game within the US as well, as opposed to only outside of it -- including when one endpoint of a communication is within the United States, and even a US Person (the US Person cannot be the target of the monitoring without am individualized warrant, but their presence does not automatically negate the ability to collect foreign intelligence). The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 affirms that capability.
All surveillance was happening under the guise of the Protect America Act, which was designed exclusively to allow foreign intelligence collection without a warrant when the traffic travelled through the United States, whether incidentally or by design. Foreign intelligence collection is always allowed without court oversight; the changes explicitly allowed such collection on US soil as long as the target was reasonably believed to be a non-US person physically outside of the United States, regardless of the other end of the conversation.
Now the Protect America Act has expired with its automatic sunset, and all surveillance must again happen only via FISA, as amended.
Also, TSP, in its entirety, was never as clear cut as being simply "legal" or "illegal" (court decisions on individual aspects aside). Those who claimed that it was "illegal" did so largely for political reasons. The other mistake is equating "traffic that *could be* listened to" with "traffic that *is* listened to" -- unfortunately, they are not at all the same. This also ignores that to even determine whether traffic is subject to legal collection, it must -- to be blunt -- actually be able to be collected. Thus the things like "secret rooms" at telecom facilities.
Having the capability to instantaneously examine traffic of international origin, where one or both endpoints of a communication are international, necessitates such wholesale monitoring capability. However, such capability being present does not imply its use for all traffic.
There are two issues here:
1. Monitoring the contents of a communication
2. Monitoring the metadata or "envelope" (source and destination information) of a communication
The first is allowable without a warrant or court oversight when one or both endpoints of the communication are international, and when the target of such monitoring is a non-US Person outside of the United States. Such foreign signals intelligence collection does not require a warrant or court oversight.
The second point above has multiple functions. One is using advanced data mining techniques to look for troubling patterns in communications.
Such collection has been found to be legal without a warrant or court oversight by the US Supreme Court:
The telephone company, at police request, installed at its central offices a pen register to record the numbers dialed from the telephone at petitioner's home. Prior to his robbery trial, petitioner moved to suppress "all fruits derived from" the pen register. The Maryland trial court denied this motion, holding that the warrantless installation of the pen register did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Petitioner was convicted, and the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed.
Courts have subsequently found that pen register statutes apply similarly to computer network addresses known as IP addresses, lists of web sites visited, and the "envelope" of an email message -- its To: and From: addresses and related information. The NSA itself has long understood that while the capture of the "metadata" of communications is fair game, the capture of the *contents* of the conversations of US Persons is not, without a warrant:
A former senior NSA official said that the agency also worried that because these groups understood privacy laws so well, they knew how to avoi
Wikileaks is NOT down. Just accessed it, albeit slowly, at 1915 ET.
Does anyone here honestly believe that many politicians of many political stripes -- including both Republicans and Democrats -- don't maintain personal email accounts on which "government business" has sometimes been discussed or conducted?
Well, the third slide of their presentation jokes about hoping their talk isn't "evidence in court", and the fifth slide proudly trumpets, "AND THIS IS VERY ILLEGAL!"
I realize that here on slashdot, its fashionable to always err on the side of disclosure in the face of any other concerns, and I can certainly argue myself for the benefits of talking about such issues instead of sweeping them under the rug and pretending they don't exist; the notion that if these students can figure it out, anyone can.* Indeed, many compelling such arguments can be made.
However, there is a balance; namely, that entities, even (especially?) public entities providing infrastructure and transportation services, don't like their vulnerabilities paraded around for all to see. Security through obscurity isn't security on its own, but security through obscurity is a time-tested and reliable component to any system of security, and it is always balanced with cost, difficulty, technical issues, and other concerns.
It's easy to sit here and say that because they were so "cheap", they are getting what they "deserve" by having heroic, bright, geeky MIT students humorously show how they can own them. Has anyone ever considered that public agencies are pulled in n different directions -- including financially and technically -- and sometimes the solution that comes out at the end is simply making the best of what imperfect resources they've got?
When the presenters themselves are not even hiding the questionable legality of what they demonstrate -- even though it's just "talk", like "talking" about how to kill someone with poison, as opposed to doing it -- speech has consequences, and sometimes those consequences will result in things like temporary injunctions, and agencies who serve at the pleasure of the people trying to protect what semblance of security they're able to hold together.
Yes, this is all fun, and clever, and interesting. But why does this seem to be viewed, here, as the MIT students being 100% in the right, and the MBTA being 100% in the wrong?
* This is acually debatable. These are very bright people, and just because they can figure something out, it doesn't at all mean "anyone can". It means people with the means, time, expertise, and will may be able to duplicate what they have done...and will be able to do so a LOT easier when the work has already been done for them.
Nothing, in particular. It means that ZFS isn't going to be officially supported and/or promoted on client. But, since Mac OS X and Mac OS X Server are essentially the same OS with some different/additional pieces on the top of Server, and like other filesystems that were exposed via the GUI tools and supported on Mac OS X Server, but not on Mac OS X, in the past -- such as Mac OS Extended (Journaled, Case-Sensitve) -- it will likely be available via the command line tools, and usable by people savvy enough to work with other boot devices to format the volume in the desired fashion, etc.
SEC. 1068. REPEAL OF PROVISIONS IN SECTION 1076 OF PUBLIC LAW 109-364 RELATING TO USE OF ARMED FORCES IN MAJOR PUBLIC EMERGENCIES.
(a) Interference With State and Federal Laws-
(1) IN GENERAL- Section 333 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
`Sec. 333. Interference with State and Federal law
`The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it--
`(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or
`(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.
In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.'.
(2) PROCLAMATION TO DISPERSE- Section 334 of such title is amended by striking `or those obstructing the enforcement of the laws' after `insurgents'.
(3) HEADING AMENDMENT- The heading of chapter 15 of such title is amended to read as follows:
`CHAPTER 15--INSURRECTION'.
(4) CLERICAL AMENDMENTS-
(A) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 15 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 333 and inserting the following new item:
`333. Interference with State and Federal law.'.
(B) The tables of chapters at the beginning of subtitle A of title 10, United States Code, and at the beginning of part I of such subtitle, are each amended by striking the item relating to chapter 15 and inserting the following new item:
331'.
(b) Repeal of Section Relating to Provision of Supplies, Services, and Equipment-
(1) IN GENERAL- Section 2567 of title 10, United States Code, is repealed.
(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT- The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 152 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 2567.
(c) Conforming Amendment- Section 12304(c) of such title is amended by striking `Except to perform' and all that follows through `this section' and inserting `No unit or member of a reserve component may be ordered to active duty under this section to perform any of the functions authorized by chapter 15 or section 12406 of this title or, except as provided in subsection (b),'.
(d) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
-----
For the sake of completeness:
It is a common misunderstanding that the 2007 Defense Appropriations act modified what is commonly known as the "Insurrection Act", codified in 10 USC 331-335, to allow the President to arbitrarily declare an "emergency", and impose martial law at will. However, the changes were actually much more benign and restrictive, at least compared to the existing 200-year-old law. The relevant portion of the current code is:
(1) The President may employ the armed forces, including the National Guard in Federal service, to--
(A) restore public order and enforce the
(I am posting this in response to all +5 moderated incorrect information about Posse Comitatus, because it is a very important issue. I would appreciate a direct response from each poster, but doubt I will get one.)
SEC. 1068. REPEAL OF PROVISIONS IN SECTION 1076 OF PUBLIC LAW 109-364 RELATING TO USE OF ARMED FORCES IN MAJOR PUBLIC EMERGENCIES.
(a) Interference With State and Federal Laws-
(1) IN GENERAL- Section 333 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
`Sec. 333. Interference with State and Federal law
`The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it--
`(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or
`(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.
In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.'.
(2) PROCLAMATION TO DISPERSE- Section 334 of such title is amended by striking `or those obstructing the enforcement of the laws' after `insurgents'.
(3) HEADING AMENDMENT- The heading of chapter 15 of such title is amended to read as follows:
`CHAPTER 15--INSURRECTION'.
(4) CLERICAL AMENDMENTS-
(A) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 15 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 333 and inserting the following new item:
`333. Interference with State and Federal law.'.
(B) The tables of chapters at the beginning of subtitle A of title 10, United States Code, and at the beginning of part I of such subtitle, are each amended by striking the item relating to chapter 15 and inserting the following new item:
331'.
(b) Repeal of Section Relating to Provision of Supplies, Services, and Equipment-
(1) IN GENERAL- Section 2567 of title 10, United States Code, is repealed.
(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT- The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 152 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 2567.
(c) Conforming Amendment- Section 12304(c) of such title is amended by striking `Except to perform' and all that follows through `this section' and inserting `No unit or member of a reserve component may be ordered to active duty under this section to perform any of the functions authorized by chapter 15 or section 12406 of this title or, except as provided in subsection (b),'.
(d) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
-----
For the sake of completeness:
It is a common misunderstanding that the 2007 Defense Appropriations act modified what is commonly known as the "Insurrection Act", codified in 10 USC 331-335, to allow the President to arbitrarily declare an "emergency", and impose martial law at will. However, the changes were actually much more benign and restrictive, at least compared to the existing 200-year-old law. The relevant portion of the current code is:
(1) The President may employ the armed forces, including
(I am posting this in response to all +5 moderated incorrect information about Posse Comitatus, because it is a very important issue. I would appreciate a direct response from each poster, but doubt I will get one.)
SEC. 1068. REPEAL OF PROVISIONS IN SECTION 1076 OF PUBLIC LAW 109-364 RELATING TO USE OF ARMED FORCES IN MAJOR PUBLIC EMERGENCIES.
(a) Interference With State and Federal Laws-
(1) IN GENERAL- Section 333 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
`Sec. 333. Interference with State and Federal law
`The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it--
`(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or
`(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.
In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.'.
(2) PROCLAMATION TO DISPERSE- Section 334 of such title is amended by striking `or those obstructing the enforcement of the laws' after `insurgents'.
(3) HEADING AMENDMENT- The heading of chapter 15 of such title is amended to read as follows:
`CHAPTER 15--INSURRECTION'.
(4) CLERICAL AMENDMENTS-
(A) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 15 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 333 and inserting the following new item:
`333. Interference with State and Federal law.'.
(B) The tables of chapters at the beginning of subtitle A of title 10, United States Code, and at the beginning of part I of such subtitle, are each amended by striking the item relating to chapter 15 and inserting the following new item:
331'.
(b) Repeal of Section Relating to Provision of Supplies, Services, and Equipment-
(1) IN GENERAL- Section 2567 of title 10, United States Code, is repealed.
(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT- The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 152 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 2567.
(c) Conforming Amendment- Section 12304(c) of such title is amended by striking `Except to perform' and all that follows through `this section' and inserting `No unit or member of a reserve component may be ordered to active duty under this section to perform any of the functions authorized by chapter 15 or section 12406 of this title or, except as provided in subsection (b),'.
(d) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
-----
For the sake of completeness:
It is a common misunderstanding that the 2007 Defense Appropriations act modified what is commonly known as the "Insurrection Act", codified in 10 USC 331-335, to allow the President to arbitrarily declare an "emergency", and impose martial law at will. However, the changes were actually much more benign and restrictive, at least compared to the existing 200-year-old law. The relevant portion of the current code is:
(1) The President may employ the armed forces, including
What's really too bad is that rising powers like China are looking for ways to use -- and have been using -- information to their advantage in every realm, from conventional media to the internet to electronic and unrestricted information warfare. Hint: "information warfare" doesn't just mean cyber attack and DDoSing Pentagon web servers. It means bringing an entire nation dependent on electronic infrastructure in nearly every sector of society from news and entertainment, to finance and medicine, to airlines and transportation, to its knees from multiple angles.
Meanwhile, we're asking whether this is "dirty pool".
"I think that we should start to consider that regret factors associated with a cyber attack could, in fact, be in the magnitude of a weapon of mass destruction."
-- General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Following the announcement in 2001 that the 2008 Games had been awarded to Beijing, the government of the People's Republic initiated $40 billion of new construction there, bringing 120,000 Chinese migrant workers into the city (at about $130 each a month) and triggering a five-year steel shortage worldwide. [...] the Geneva-based Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions estimates that 1.5 million of Beijing's natives will have been displaced from their homes by government edict when the Olympics finally begins. This preemptory modernization is of a piece with China's scale, its 1.32 billion population, and the authoritarian control exerted by its Communist central government, which nowadays is dominated by technocrats and engineers who favor mega-projects like the world's largest dam (the Three Gorges dam over the Yangtze River), its highest railway (the Qinghai-Tibet line), and even its biggest Ferris wheel (in Beijing, opening in 2009).
Someone please try to justify evicting one and a half million people for the Olympics.
I'm sure someone will try...which just proves that China's subtle information campaigns to attempt to make the world think that everything is rosy or somehow justified are working like a charm.
I fundamentally believe that, in the current and established international system of sovereign nation-states and governments, US Persons should be afforded more than non-US Persons with respect to the protections granted by US Constitution.
The reason I believe this is because I believe there should be a discernible benefit to living in a free and open society based on a rule of law and the diligent protection of its own citizenry.
Implicit in the protection of its citizenry is using the mechanics of defense and intelligence, including foreign intelligence collection unfettered by unnecessary restrictions -- for example, court oversight. I do not believe that foreign intelligence collection on non-US Persons outside of the US should require a warrant. For those not following along, this type of collection has NEVER required a warrant. I believe collection should not be arbitrary, and that it should be justifiable by some measure, but oversight and proceduralization of this sort can and does happen via other channels than a court and a judge. In fact, it is necessary to ensure that US Persons -- either inside or outside of the United States -- are not inappropriately surveilled in such collection.
Your logical fallacy that I support enslaving Puerto Rico if I think that the current and historical situation that foreign intelligence collection on foreign persons outside of the US shouldn't require a warrant is correct unfortunately doesn't follow. It's not a case of whether a "law" allowing this is Constitutional. Such collection has always been intrinsically and explicitly allowed, because such persons do not have Constitutional protections with respect to activities such as surveillance. Additionally, in order to be on an even playing field with other nations -- if you believe that using one's capacity to maintain a defense and collect intelligence is valuable to the preservation of security of a nation -- foreign intelligence collection that is not burdened with the same requirements for protection of our own citizens is simply one of those realities.
What are you saying here? That corruption and covering it up is acceptable in the present day simply because we've had corrupt men in power before?
Um, no? I'm addressing the curious choice of the timeframe of "the last 7 years", not justifying any occurrences just because it has happened before.
Basic decency? Human rights?
That is a fundamentally different issue than whether court oversight or warrants are required for foreign intelligence collection outside of the United States. Neither is, in fact, required. If you believe foreign intelligence collection runs counter to basic decency or human rights, that is an entirely separate discussion; not the least of which would begin with the fact that any arguments that the US or Western nations should stop such collection would put them at a distinct, marked, and very real disadvantage on the world stage against governments who might not have have similar scruples.
Foreign intelligence is a reality.
Would you also endorse monitoring the traffic of US citizens? After all it passes through equipment physically located within the US, so it must be alright.
No, the argument isn't that all traffic passing through the US is fair game; the argument is that traffic of non-US Persons outside of the United States traveling through the United States should be fair game. There have traditionally been restrictions on intercepting traffic within the United States, because the implication was that it would be used to monitor US citizens. However, with the advent of the Internet and advanced telecommunications systems, the reality is that some traffic that is exclusively foreign is suddenly off-limits because it happens to be routed through the United States. That is, quite simply, ridiculous. The extension of this argument is that any foreign intelligence surveillance of non-US Persons outside of the United States should also be able to be use equipment physically located within the United States for monitoring when possible.
If not, from where do US citizens draw their superior qualities that put them above the rest of the world in regard to basic respect for the individual?
US Persons have greater rights and protections under the Constitution than do non-US Persons. As such, the monitoring of US Persons is carefully controlled, and requires court oversight in the form of judicial review and sworn court orders or warrants to execute. Foreign intelligence outside of the United States is subject to no similar legal restrictions or judicial oversight. It is an intelligence function of a sovereign nation; one that is performed by all nations in one form or another.
Yes, it is the unfortunate reality that militaries and military intelligence are necessities. As long as the need for them exists, there will be instances where there is also a need to violate the human rights of someone, somewhere. That doesn't mean we need to take the arrogant approach and treat every non-US citizen as a second class human. When US citizens are surveilled, there is a formal process that must first take place to ensure (or at least help ensure) that it is an appropriate action. Personally, I don't see any reason why the same shouldn't take place for a non-US citizen but even if it doesn't, intelligence gathering should still be conducted in a respectful manner. Go after the targets of interest or relevance to national security, but why monitor and collect the personal information of everyone just because it passes through a router that just happens to be in the US?
Now we really get to the meat of the argument. There is indeed a distinction between US Persons and everyone else. This doesn't mean that US citizens or residents are "better" than anyone else. What it means is that we have decided to afford protections, rights, and liberties to individuals who live in our system of government, those who come to visit, learn, or work here legally, and t
It's fine to play devil's advocate, but can you really argue there is no compelling national security reason to not have easily navigable and searchable street level photography of military installations, even ones which are quasi-open/public, online?
You acknowledge that secrecy and classification systems have a purpose, but then go on to say that "every scandal" in the last "7 years" (interesting choice of timeframe; poilitical much?) have used secrecy arguments as an excuse. You then seem to make the logical leap that any use of secrecy in the last 7 years has been to cover up corruption (and this has never happened at any other time in US history...?).
Consider this: gathering foreign intelligence outside of the United States on non-US Persons has ALWAYS been allowable without any form of court oversight or warrants. As it should be. Now, there are two issues:
1. Some exclusively foreign traffic between foreign individuals can now travel through equipment located physically in the United States. Why should that be off limits? Indeed, if telecommunications operators are willing to assist, we should absolutely leverage the fact that we have direct access to the traffic.
2. Capturing communications of a foreign individual outside of the US -- even if the other end of the conversation ended on US soil or was a US Person -- is also always allowable without court oversight or warrants (however, the identity and conversation content of the US Person may be masked for legal reasons). Again, since warrants protect individuals, why shouldn't telecommunications operators be allowed to voluntary assist in the interception of such traffic via much, much easier means?
Foreign intelligence is a necessity, even for free nations. It always has been. Any denial of this is the denial of reality. The Constitution only applies to US citizens or persons with a legal status within the United States. It does NOT apply to foreign persons outside of the US; any argument that it does flies in the face of the very notion of nation-states, borders, and international relationships. This is precisely why the surveillance of such persons does not require a warrant. In the past, there was no earthly reason to conduct any such surveillance within the United States. Now there is.
I'm not saying taking such surveillance of non-US Persons within the United States' physical borders isn't rife with controversy, much of it valid. But can you see how it's possible for this to not be so clear cut when you just throw out the blanket statement that it's "illegal"? Can you actually envision a scenario in which the Intelligence Community is trying to aggressively leverage all of the foreign SIGINT capability it possibly can given the circumstances? I know that certain folks can only see this as an obvious plot to destroy the Constitution, strip away civil liberties, and create a police state. However, where I live -- aka, the real world -- this was simply an aggressive attempt to make a lot of foreign intelligence collection, especially when one of the endpoints is in the US, a lot more practical. That doesn't mean it's not controversial.
And Walter Reed...I try watching the "exposés" on Walter Reed, and you know what? Kill me for saying this, but water damage on some ceiling tiles and peeling paint? Is that really affecting the level of care? This is what people are up in arms about? Granted, there are a wide variety of other problems with military medical care and facilities, but they're not classified.
This isn't to say that secrecy has never been used to cover up for corruption or illegal behavior. But you're making some sweeping statements and coming to conclusions that aren't warranted. There is a compelling national security interest to not have easy-to-use street level photography of US military installations available globally. Basic principles of operational security and defense in depth would easily validate that. Does that mean some
Slashdot Mirror
You're completely wrong.
A warrant is not required, and never has been required, for foreign intelligence collection. The same is true for Canada's Communications Security Establishment. Sorry.
What's different is that when traffic from protected parties are intercepted (in the US, that would be a US Person), special action must be taken depending on the circumstances. But a warrant is NOT required for foreign SIGINT, even if some of the parties to the communication may sometimes be US (or Canadian) citizens.
This is the way it's been since the dawn of modern foreign SIGINT six decades ago in both the US and Canada.
Successful information handling is critical to the success of a military operation as much as anything else. But beyond classified information, there have not, to my knowledge, been any cases of embedded reporters being disallowed from reporting. This is the most realtime and extensive coverage the world has ever seen for a military operation, ever.
Does the Pentagon want to shape the message? Absolutely. But this alleged monitoring with respect to reporters was passive. I.e., it did not result in reporters' stories being suppressed. (I know that some here would ask, "How to we know?" Because no reporter has claimed that to be the case.) You're assuming reporters were targeted. They weren't. They were a part of Green Zone communication monitoring along with everyone else.
The latter is the most likely.
To expand on that, it's an oversimplification.
These intercept operators had no more power than they have ever had. The only new and controversial issues relating to NSA monitoring during the Bush administration have related to collection within the United States[1], and this has nothing to do with that.
Since the beginning of SIGINT and the beginning of the NSA, collectors have had effective and routine access to myriad conversations with endpoints in the United States, conversations where at least one end is a US Person, or both.
That happens all the time, and has always happened. Often, you'll hear things you're not looking for. Hell, most of what you hear isn't what you're looking for. But once you determine that a US Person is involved, you're not, however, supposed to record, store, or disseminate such information. Unfortunately, what we have here are people -- many mostly kids -- misbehaving, and sometimes misbehaving badly.
Anyone who is surprised by this or thinks it has anything to do with Bush has a serious lack of understanding about how Title 50 activities and SIGINT collection have worked for decades.
Again, to be clear: the "new" capabilities the President authorized dealt with NSA foreign intelligence collection within the United States. That doesn't mean one end of the conversation might not be a US Person. In fact, under the law, it can be...but then the information must be treated with care; e.g., identifying references to US Person redacted, and so on. What you can't do -- then or now -- is target US Persons without an individualized warrant. If traffic from US Persons is intercepted in the course of foreign SIGINT collection, it is NOT a violation of the law, and never has been, as long as it is handled properly.
So ABC is attempting to conflate Bush administration initiatives -- which don't even exist any longer (TSP) -- with NSA overseas operations, albeit with regard to US Persons. Unfortunately, the latter has nothing to do with Bush or any initiatives of the Bush administration. The intercept operators had no more or less power, save for technological improvements, than they've ever had.
And surprise, surprise: individuals with the power to listen to things sometimes listen to things they're not supposed to, and by virtue of these people having the necessary resources to actually do their jobs, there really isn't any easy way to prevent it.
From day one the handling of US Persons in the context of foreign intelligence is hammered into your head. But I guess sometimes immaturity and a cheap laugh at someone else's expense trumps common sense and the doing the right thing.
[1] NSA facilities for interception may often be physically in the United States, but the interception is still occurring outside the United States
...and reporting that I can't help but wonder has some political motivations, given the timing of its release.
That's not the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), and not related to foreign intelligence collection programs in that were in place in the United States. That's the NSA working in a foreign military operations theater, and is vastly different. These intercepts were happening in realtime and were focused on an area of military operations.
When working in the dynamic environment of an operations theater, it's difficult to make distinctions about what traffic should be monitored and when. That is not to say that US Persons should continue to be collected on after their status is known, even under these circumstances.
Additionally, we have to keep the actions of the individual vs the actions of the agency in mind. What individual intercept operators at times did with their capabilities does not necessarily represent organizational support for such actions. Individual intercept operators have misbehaved in this way forever. Does that make it right? Does that mean the organization "condones" it? Of course not. Did UCLA Medical Center support individuals looking up the medical records of Britney Spears and other celebrities, just because they were technically able to do so, and worked under the guise of UCLA Medical Center? Of course not. But these employees also need continuing access to such resources to do their jobs.
Further, "'all employees of the US government' should expect that their telephone conversations could be monitored as part of an effort to safeguard security and 'information assurance.'" The Joint COMSEC Monitoring Activity, traditionally responsible for monitoring activity on government communication lines, is hampered by the increasing use of wireless-, (unofficial) internet-, and satellite-based communications devices for official business. The distinction about where and how such communication might occur can't easily be made, and thus often falls to NSA -- which should then make the appropriate determination as to the disposition of the communication and act accordingly. That can include conversations of an embarrassing or personal nature. These are all humans here, not robots. Yes, they are trained professionals. But they're still human, with all the foibles and flaws we all share.
A spokesman for General Hayden said, "At NSA, the law was followed assiduously. The notion that General Hayden sanctioned or tolerated illegalities of any sort is ridiculous on its face." Those of you who laugh at this comment and think you know everything about the illegality of NSA surveillance would be well served to educate yourselves a bit.
It's unfortunate that ABC misunderstands -- misrepresents? -- NSA operations with respect to a military theater during wartime as having anything to do with the so-called (and now defunct) "Terrorist Surveillance Program".
In fact, two separate "whistleblowers" came forward, separately. The allegations from both, independently, only dealt with endpoints in the Middle East. Once definitively identified as as US Person who is not military personnel, an employee or contractor of the US government, or covered by an active, individualized warrant, and the other end of the communication is also a US Person who doesn't meet any of these requirements, collection should cease.
But the failure to adhere to such longstanding law and policy does not mean that the organization at large condoned such behavior. And, lest we forget, "the intercepts helped identify possible terror planning in Iraq and saved American lives. 'IED's were disarmed before they exploded, that people who were intending to harm US forces were captured ahead of time,' Faulk said."
This is, again, how a few individuals
You're frightened because the Customs has always had the power to search persons and physical objects at the border without a warrant, or that someone actually thought it might be a good idea to extend the longstanding and repeatedly upheld border search exception to include data on electronic devices? If it has always been acceptable (and repeatedly upheld by the Supreme Court[1]) to search for anything else illegal at the border without a warrant, can someone make a good argument why data on one's person or in one's possession at the time of border crossing should be excluded under those same provisions?
Or are you frightened because you subscribe to the idea that the US has turned into a fascist regime, when the EU and individual European nations have their own laundry list of controversial laws and provisions attempting to grapple with how to handle electronic data in a legal sense in the continually emerging Information Age?
[1]:
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562-563 (1976)
United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004)
United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (7th Cir. 1993)
I should clarify to say that the policy does mention encryption; but whether your device is encrypted is unlikely to determine whether or not it is seized.
Specifically:
(2) Assistance by Other Federal Agencies or Entities.
(a) Translation and Decryption. Officers may encounter information in documents or electronic devices that is in a foreign language and/or encrypted. To assist CBP in determining the meaning of such information, CBP may seek translation and/or decryption assistance from other Federal agencies or entities. Officers may seek such assistance absent individualized suspicion. Requests for translation and decryption assistance shall be documented.
(b) Subject Matter Assistance. Officers may encounter information in documents or electronic devices that is not in a foreign language or encrypted, but that nevertheless requires referral to subject matter experts to determine whether the information is relevant to the laws enforced and administered by CBP. With supervisory approval, officers may create and transmit a copy of information to an agency or entity for the purpose of obtaining subject matter assistance when they have reasonable suspicion of activities in violation of the laws enforced by CBP. Requests for subject matter assistance shall be documented.
Actually, reading the actual policy is probably not a bad idea for those so outraged with it (or frightened of it). Keep the longstanding border search exception in mind when reading the policy, and try to imagine how it might be in the realm of possibility that it might be reasonable to also apply the border search exception, repeatedly upheld by the Supreme Court, to data inside electronic devices as well.
Darned border search exception.
"travelers may be stopped [and searched] at . . . the border without individualized suspicion even if the stop [or search] is based largely on ethnicity[.]" United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985), United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562-563 (1976)
and
"may [...] conduct searches of the traveler's body -- including strip, body cavity, involuntary x-ray, and in some jurisdictions, patdown searches -- if the Customs officer has reasonable suspicion" to do so. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004), United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (7th Cir. 1993)
Memorize this document.
And you're completely wrong about the Fourth Amendment, by the way. It doesn't apply to customs searches at the border. Read up.
Also, "travelers may be stopped [and searched] at . . . the border without individualized suspicion even if the stop [or search] is based largely on ethnicity[.]" United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985), United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562-563 (1976)
Additionally, CBP may conduct searches of the traveler's body -- including strip, body cavity, involuntary x-ray, and in some jurisdictions, patdown searches -- if the Customs officer has reasonable suspicion to do so. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152-53 (2004); United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (7th Cir. 1993).
No, they cannot "sieze your laptop" if you don't give them the encryption password; a strict reading of the policy is that the laptop can be seized in any event, encryption or no. There is NO REQUIREMENT to provide anyone with an encryption password under any circumstances. The existing policy doesn't even speak to encryption. In fact, leading privacy advocates recommend encryption as the most deisrable solution.
You guys do realize that customs agents at the border have ALWAYS had the right -- without a warrant -- to perform reasonable search and inspection of all physical objects and persons coming into the United States; this policy was designed to expand those longstanding inspection rights to electronic data.
In its current state, it's a poorly written policy. The fact is, no one is going to look at the contents of your laptop, much less be seizing it. (Do you guys actually travel internationally?)
...encrypt it. Full disk encryption is relatively cheap, easy, and unobtrusive.
You gave one such example in your post.
But uh, mind if I ask: exactly what kind of pictures are you planning on taking on your vacation? ;-)
When you say "FISA", you appear to be talking about the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. The immunity provision protects telecommunications companies who acted in good faith to cooperate with government requests from years upon years of endless, politically-charged and ideologically-motivated lawsuits or other future legal claims stemming from partially resolved court cases and unanswered questions related to the constitutionality of various components of the defunct Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP).
Qwest didn't get fucked. They are covered by immunity inasmuch as they participated in any aspects that required immunity. The other issue about which you might be thinking is Qwest's refusal to participate in NSA programs before 9/11, which Qwest claims lost it millions of dollars in government contracts. This was also different from TSP; it was a call database, the collection of which has long been understood to be legal, albeit controversial. It is the content of the communication with respect to US Persons that is off limits without a warrant.
So there are a lot of unrelated things going on here, and it's unfair to say that some telecoms "rolled over"; what they did was cooperate in good faith with secret government programs, many components of which, while classified (and subsequently leaked), are not in legal question. The real issue here is whether we should be able to capture foreign intelligence information that has always been fair game within the US as well, as opposed to only outside of it -- including when one endpoint of a communication is within the United States, and even a US Person (the US Person cannot be the target of the monitoring without am individualized warrant, but their presence does not automatically negate the ability to collect foreign intelligence). The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 affirms that capability.
...encapsulated in one, simplistic know-it-all sentence.
The so-called Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) no longer exists, and hasn't since 17 January 2007.
All surveillance was happening under the guise of the Protect America Act, which was designed exclusively to allow foreign intelligence collection without a warrant when the traffic travelled through the United States, whether incidentally or by design. Foreign intelligence collection is always allowed without court oversight; the changes explicitly allowed such collection on US soil as long as the target was reasonably believed to be a non-US person physically outside of the United States, regardless of the other end of the conversation.
Now the Protect America Act has expired with its automatic sunset, and all surveillance must again happen only via FISA, as amended.
Also, TSP, in its entirety, was never as clear cut as being simply "legal" or "illegal" (court decisions on individual aspects aside). Those who claimed that it was "illegal" did so largely for political reasons. The other mistake is equating "traffic that *could be* listened to" with "traffic that *is* listened to" -- unfortunately, they are not at all the same. This also ignores that to even determine whether traffic is subject to legal collection, it must -- to be blunt -- actually be able to be collected. Thus the things like "secret rooms" at telecom facilities.
Having the capability to instantaneously examine traffic of international origin, where one or both endpoints of a communication are international, necessitates such wholesale monitoring capability. However, such capability being present does not imply its use for all traffic.
There are two issues here:
1. Monitoring the contents of a communication
2. Monitoring the metadata or "envelope" (source and destination information) of a communication
The first is allowable without a warrant or court oversight when one or both endpoints of the communication are international, and when the target of such monitoring is a non-US Person outside of the United States. Such foreign signals intelligence collection does not require a warrant or court oversight.
The second point above has multiple functions. One is using advanced data mining techniques to look for troubling patterns in communications.
Such collection has been found to be legal without a warrant or court oversight by the US Supreme Court:
Source: Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)
Courts have subsequently found that pen register statutes apply similarly to computer network addresses known as IP addresses, lists of web sites visited, and the "envelope" of an email message -- its To: and From: addresses and related information. The NSA itself has long understood that while the capture of the "metadata" of communications is fair game, the capture of the *contents* of the conversations of US Persons is not, without a warrant:
Wikileaks is NOT down. Just accessed it, albeit slowly, at 1915 ET.
Does anyone here honestly believe that many politicians of many political stripes -- including both Republicans and Democrats -- don't maintain personal email accounts on which "government business" has sometimes been discussed or conducted?
Well, the third slide of their presentation jokes about hoping their talk isn't "evidence in court", and the fifth slide proudly trumpets, "AND THIS IS VERY ILLEGAL!"
I realize that here on slashdot, its fashionable to always err on the side of disclosure in the face of any other concerns, and I can certainly argue myself for the benefits of talking about such issues instead of sweeping them under the rug and pretending they don't exist; the notion that if these students can figure it out, anyone can.* Indeed, many compelling such arguments can be made.
However, there is a balance; namely, that entities, even (especially?) public entities providing infrastructure and transportation services, don't like their vulnerabilities paraded around for all to see. Security through obscurity isn't security on its own, but security through obscurity is a time-tested and reliable component to any system of security, and it is always balanced with cost, difficulty, technical issues, and other concerns.
It's easy to sit here and say that because they were so "cheap", they are getting what they "deserve" by having heroic, bright, geeky MIT students humorously show how they can own them. Has anyone ever considered that public agencies are pulled in n different directions -- including financially and technically -- and sometimes the solution that comes out at the end is simply making the best of what imperfect resources they've got?
When the presenters themselves are not even hiding the questionable legality of what they demonstrate -- even though it's just "talk", like "talking" about how to kill someone with poison, as opposed to doing it -- speech has consequences, and sometimes those consequences will result in things like temporary injunctions, and agencies who serve at the pleasure of the people trying to protect what semblance of security they're able to hold together.
Yes, this is all fun, and clever, and interesting. But why does this seem to be viewed, here, as the MIT students being 100% in the right, and the MBTA being 100% in the wrong?
* This is acually debatable. These are very bright people, and just because they can figure something out, it doesn't at all mean "anyone can". It means people with the means, time, expertise, and will may be able to duplicate what they have done...and will be able to do so a LOT easier when the work has already been done for them.
Nothing, in particular. It means that ZFS isn't going to be officially supported and/or promoted on client. But, since Mac OS X and Mac OS X Server are essentially the same OS with some different/additional pieces on the top of Server, and like other filesystems that were exposed via the GUI tools and supported on Mac OS X Server, but not on Mac OS X, in the past -- such as Mac OS Extended (Journaled, Case-Sensitve) -- it will likely be available via the command line tools, and usable by people savvy enough to work with other boot devices to format the volume in the desired fashion, etc.
(I am posting this in response to all +5 moderated incorrect information about Posse Comitatus, because it is a very important issue.)
:
-----
The changes made in the 2007 Defense Appropriations act have been repealed in their entirety by H.R. 4986: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008
Full text of the relevant section:
SEC. 1068. REPEAL OF PROVISIONS IN SECTION 1076 OF PUBLIC LAW 109-364 RELATING TO USE OF ARMED FORCES IN MAJOR PUBLIC EMERGENCIES.
(a) Interference With State and Federal Laws-
(1) IN GENERAL- Section 333 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
`Sec. 333. Interference with State and Federal law
`The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it--
`(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or
`(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.
In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.'.
(2) PROCLAMATION TO DISPERSE- Section 334 of such title is amended by striking `or those obstructing the enforcement of the laws' after `insurgents'.
(3) HEADING AMENDMENT- The heading of chapter 15 of such title is amended to read as follows:
`CHAPTER 15--INSURRECTION'.
(4) CLERICAL AMENDMENTS-
(A) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 15 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 333 and inserting the following new item:
`333. Interference with State and Federal law.'.
(B) The tables of chapters at the beginning of subtitle A of title 10, United States Code, and at the beginning of part I of such subtitle, are each amended by striking the item relating to chapter 15 and inserting the following new item:
331'.
(b) Repeal of Section Relating to Provision of Supplies, Services, and Equipment-
(1) IN GENERAL- Section 2567 of title 10, United States Code, is repealed.
(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT- The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 152 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 2567.
(c) Conforming Amendment- Section 12304(c) of such title is amended by striking `Except to perform' and all that follows through `this section' and inserting `No unit or member of a reserve component may be ordered to active duty under this section to perform any of the functions authorized by chapter 15 or section 12406 of this title or, except as provided in subsection (b),'.
(d) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
-----
For the sake of completeness:
It is a common misunderstanding that the 2007 Defense Appropriations act modified what is commonly known as the "Insurrection Act", codified in 10 USC 331-335, to allow the President to arbitrarily declare an "emergency", and impose martial law at will. However, the changes were actually much more benign and restrictive, at least compared to the existing 200-year-old law. The relevant portion of the current code is:
(1) The President may employ the armed forces, including the National Guard in Federal service, to--
(A) restore public order and enforce the
(I am posting this in response to all +5 moderated incorrect information about Posse Comitatus, because it is a very important issue. I would appreciate a direct response from each poster, but doubt I will get one.)
:
-----
First of all, the changes made in the 2007 Defense Appropriations act have been repealed in their entirety by H.R. 4986: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008
Full text of the relevant section:
SEC. 1068. REPEAL OF PROVISIONS IN SECTION 1076 OF PUBLIC LAW 109-364 RELATING TO USE OF ARMED FORCES IN MAJOR PUBLIC EMERGENCIES.
(a) Interference With State and Federal Laws-
(1) IN GENERAL- Section 333 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
`Sec. 333. Interference with State and Federal law
`The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it--
`(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or
`(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.
In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.'.
(2) PROCLAMATION TO DISPERSE- Section 334 of such title is amended by striking `or those obstructing the enforcement of the laws' after `insurgents'.
(3) HEADING AMENDMENT- The heading of chapter 15 of such title is amended to read as follows:
`CHAPTER 15--INSURRECTION'.
(4) CLERICAL AMENDMENTS-
(A) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 15 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 333 and inserting the following new item:
`333. Interference with State and Federal law.'.
(B) The tables of chapters at the beginning of subtitle A of title 10, United States Code, and at the beginning of part I of such subtitle, are each amended by striking the item relating to chapter 15 and inserting the following new item:
331'.
(b) Repeal of Section Relating to Provision of Supplies, Services, and Equipment-
(1) IN GENERAL- Section 2567 of title 10, United States Code, is repealed.
(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT- The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 152 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 2567.
(c) Conforming Amendment- Section 12304(c) of such title is amended by striking `Except to perform' and all that follows through `this section' and inserting `No unit or member of a reserve component may be ordered to active duty under this section to perform any of the functions authorized by chapter 15 or section 12406 of this title or, except as provided in subsection (b),'.
(d) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
-----
For the sake of completeness:
It is a common misunderstanding that the 2007 Defense Appropriations act modified what is commonly known as the "Insurrection Act", codified in 10 USC 331-335, to allow the President to arbitrarily declare an "emergency", and impose martial law at will. However, the changes were actually much more benign and restrictive, at least compared to the existing 200-year-old law. The relevant portion of the current code is:
(1) The President may employ the armed forces, including
(I am posting this in response to all +5 moderated incorrect information about Posse Comitatus, because it is a very important issue. I would appreciate a direct response from each poster, but doubt I will get one.)
:
-----
First of all, the changes made in the 2007 Defense Appropriations act have been repealed in their entirety by H.R. 4986: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008
Full text of the relevant section:
SEC. 1068. REPEAL OF PROVISIONS IN SECTION 1076 OF PUBLIC LAW 109-364 RELATING TO USE OF ARMED FORCES IN MAJOR PUBLIC EMERGENCIES.
(a) Interference With State and Federal Laws-
(1) IN GENERAL- Section 333 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
`Sec. 333. Interference with State and Federal law
`The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it--
`(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or
`(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.
In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.'.
(2) PROCLAMATION TO DISPERSE- Section 334 of such title is amended by striking `or those obstructing the enforcement of the laws' after `insurgents'.
(3) HEADING AMENDMENT- The heading of chapter 15 of such title is amended to read as follows:
`CHAPTER 15--INSURRECTION'.
(4) CLERICAL AMENDMENTS-
(A) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 15 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 333 and inserting the following new item:
`333. Interference with State and Federal law.'.
(B) The tables of chapters at the beginning of subtitle A of title 10, United States Code, and at the beginning of part I of such subtitle, are each amended by striking the item relating to chapter 15 and inserting the following new item:
331'.
(b) Repeal of Section Relating to Provision of Supplies, Services, and Equipment-
(1) IN GENERAL- Section 2567 of title 10, United States Code, is repealed.
(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT- The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 152 of such title is amended by striking the item relating to section 2567.
(c) Conforming Amendment- Section 12304(c) of such title is amended by striking `Except to perform' and all that follows through `this section' and inserting `No unit or member of a reserve component may be ordered to active duty under this section to perform any of the functions authorized by chapter 15 or section 12406 of this title or, except as provided in subsection (b),'.
(d) Effective Date- The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.
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For the sake of completeness:
It is a common misunderstanding that the 2007 Defense Appropriations act modified what is commonly known as the "Insurrection Act", codified in 10 USC 331-335, to allow the President to arbitrarily declare an "emergency", and impose martial law at will. However, the changes were actually much more benign and restrictive, at least compared to the existing 200-year-old law. The relevant portion of the current code is:
(1) The President may employ the armed forces, including
What's really too bad is that rising powers like China are looking for ways to use -- and have been using -- information to their advantage in every realm, from conventional media to the internet to electronic and unrestricted information warfare. Hint: "information warfare" doesn't just mean cyber attack and DDoSing Pentagon web servers. It means bringing an entire nation dependent on electronic infrastructure in nearly every sector of society from news and entertainment, to finance and medicine, to airlines and transportation, to its knees from multiple angles.
Meanwhile, we're asking whether this is "dirty pool". -- General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
OMG! John Titor's story is true!
Following the announcement in 2001 that the 2008 Games had been awarded to Beijing, the government of the People's Republic initiated $40 billion of new construction there, bringing 120,000 Chinese migrant workers into the city (at about $130 each a month) and triggering a five-year steel shortage worldwide. [...] the Geneva-based Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions estimates that 1.5 million of Beijing's natives will have been displaced from their homes by government edict when the Olympics finally begins. This preemptory modernization is of a piece with China's scale, its 1.32 billion population, and the authoritarian control exerted by its Communist central government, which nowadays is dominated by technocrats and engineers who favor mega-projects like the world's largest dam (the Three Gorges dam over the Yangtze River), its highest railway (the Qinghai-Tibet line), and even its biggest Ferris wheel (in Beijing, opening in 2009).
Someone please try to justify evicting one and a half million people for the Olympics.
I'm sure someone will try...which just proves that China's subtle information campaigns to attempt to make the world think that everything is rosy or somehow justified are working like a charm.
The Radioactive Boy Scout in more recent times...and he ended up going to jail.
And check out the mug shot...
Police say that Hahn's face was covered with open sores, possibly from constant exposure to radioactive materials.
Yikes.
I'm sorry, but I'm not hiding behind anything.
I fundamentally believe that, in the current and established international system of sovereign nation-states and governments, US Persons should be afforded more than non-US Persons with respect to the protections granted by US Constitution.
The reason I believe this is because I believe there should be a discernible benefit to living in a free and open society based on a rule of law and the diligent protection of its own citizenry.
Implicit in the protection of its citizenry is using the mechanics of defense and intelligence, including foreign intelligence collection unfettered by unnecessary restrictions -- for example, court oversight. I do not believe that foreign intelligence collection on non-US Persons outside of the US should require a warrant. For those not following along, this type of collection has NEVER required a warrant. I believe collection should not be arbitrary, and that it should be justifiable by some measure, but oversight and proceduralization of this sort can and does happen via other channels than a court and a judge. In fact, it is necessary to ensure that US Persons -- either inside or outside of the United States -- are not inappropriately surveilled in such collection.
Your logical fallacy that I support enslaving Puerto Rico if I think that the current and historical situation that foreign intelligence collection on foreign persons outside of the US shouldn't require a warrant is correct unfortunately doesn't follow. It's not a case of whether a "law" allowing this is Constitutional. Such collection has always been intrinsically and explicitly allowed, because such persons do not have Constitutional protections with respect to activities such as surveillance. Additionally, in order to be on an even playing field with other nations -- if you believe that using one's capacity to maintain a defense and collect intelligence is valuable to the preservation of security of a nation -- foreign intelligence collection that is not burdened with the same requirements for protection of our own citizens is simply one of those realities.
What are you saying here? That corruption and covering it up is acceptable in the present day simply because we've had corrupt men in power before?
Um, no? I'm addressing the curious choice of the timeframe of "the last 7 years", not justifying any occurrences just because it has happened before.
Basic decency? Human rights?
That is a fundamentally different issue than whether court oversight or warrants are required for foreign intelligence collection outside of the United States. Neither is, in fact, required. If you believe foreign intelligence collection runs counter to basic decency or human rights, that is an entirely separate discussion; not the least of which would begin with the fact that any arguments that the US or Western nations should stop such collection would put them at a distinct, marked, and very real disadvantage on the world stage against governments who might not have have similar scruples.
Foreign intelligence is a reality.
Would you also endorse monitoring the traffic of US citizens? After all it passes through equipment physically located within the US, so it must be alright.
No, the argument isn't that all traffic passing through the US is fair game; the argument is that traffic of non-US Persons outside of the United States traveling through the United States should be fair game. There have traditionally been restrictions on intercepting traffic within the United States, because the implication was that it would be used to monitor US citizens. However, with the advent of the Internet and advanced telecommunications systems, the reality is that some traffic that is exclusively foreign is suddenly off-limits because it happens to be routed through the United States. That is, quite simply, ridiculous. The extension of this argument is that any foreign intelligence surveillance of non-US Persons outside of the United States should also be able to be use equipment physically located within the United States for monitoring when possible.
If not, from where do US citizens draw their superior qualities that put them above the rest of the world in regard to basic respect for the individual?
US Persons have greater rights and protections under the Constitution than do non-US Persons. As such, the monitoring of US Persons is carefully controlled, and requires court oversight in the form of judicial review and sworn court orders or warrants to execute. Foreign intelligence outside of the United States is subject to no similar legal restrictions or judicial oversight. It is an intelligence function of a sovereign nation; one that is performed by all nations in one form or another.
Yes, it is the unfortunate reality that militaries and military intelligence are necessities. As long as the need for them exists, there will be instances where there is also a need to violate the human rights of someone, somewhere. That doesn't mean we need to take the arrogant approach and treat every non-US citizen as a second class human. When US citizens are surveilled, there is a formal process that must first take place to ensure (or at least help ensure) that it is an appropriate action. Personally, I don't see any reason why the same shouldn't take place for a non-US citizen but even if it doesn't, intelligence gathering should still be conducted in a respectful manner. Go after the targets of interest or relevance to national security, but why monitor and collect the personal information of everyone just because it passes through a router that just happens to be in the US?
Now we really get to the meat of the argument. There is indeed a distinction between US Persons and everyone else. This doesn't mean that US citizens or residents are "better" than anyone else. What it means is that we have decided to afford protections, rights, and liberties to individuals who live in our system of government, those who come to visit, learn, or work here legally, and t
It's fine to play devil's advocate, but can you really argue there is no compelling national security reason to not have easily navigable and searchable street level photography of military installations, even ones which are quasi-open/public, online?
You acknowledge that secrecy and classification systems have a purpose, but then go on to say that "every scandal" in the last "7 years" (interesting choice of timeframe; poilitical much?) have used secrecy arguments as an excuse. You then seem to make the logical leap that any use of secrecy in the last 7 years has been to cover up corruption (and this has never happened at any other time in US history...?).
Consider this: gathering foreign intelligence outside of the United States on non-US Persons has ALWAYS been allowable without any form of court oversight or warrants. As it should be. Now, there are two issues:
1. Some exclusively foreign traffic between foreign individuals can now travel through equipment located physically in the United States. Why should that be off limits? Indeed, if telecommunications operators are willing to assist, we should absolutely leverage the fact that we have direct access to the traffic.
2. Capturing communications of a foreign individual outside of the US -- even if the other end of the conversation ended on US soil or was a US Person -- is also always allowable without court oversight or warrants (however, the identity and conversation content of the US Person may be masked for legal reasons). Again, since warrants protect individuals, why shouldn't telecommunications operators be allowed to voluntary assist in the interception of such traffic via much, much easier means?
Foreign intelligence is a necessity, even for free nations. It always has been. Any denial of this is the denial of reality. The Constitution only applies to US citizens or persons with a legal status within the United States. It does NOT apply to foreign persons outside of the US; any argument that it does flies in the face of the very notion of nation-states, borders, and international relationships. This is precisely why the surveillance of such persons does not require a warrant. In the past, there was no earthly reason to conduct any such surveillance within the United States. Now there is.
I'm not saying taking such surveillance of non-US Persons within the United States' physical borders isn't rife with controversy, much of it valid. But can you see how it's possible for this to not be so clear cut when you just throw out the blanket statement that it's "illegal"? Can you actually envision a scenario in which the Intelligence Community is trying to aggressively leverage all of the foreign SIGINT capability it possibly can given the circumstances? I know that certain folks can only see this as an obvious plot to destroy the Constitution, strip away civil liberties, and create a police state. However, where I live -- aka, the real world -- this was simply an aggressive attempt to make a lot of foreign intelligence collection, especially when one of the endpoints is in the US, a lot more practical. That doesn't mean it's not controversial.
And Walter Reed...I try watching the "exposés" on Walter Reed, and you know what? Kill me for saying this, but water damage on some ceiling tiles and peeling paint? Is that really affecting the level of care? This is what people are up in arms about? Granted, there are a wide variety of other problems with military medical care and facilities, but they're not classified.
This isn't to say that secrecy has never been used to cover up for corruption or illegal behavior. But you're making some sweeping statements and coming to conclusions that aren't warranted. There is a compelling national security interest to not have easy-to-use street level photography of US military installations available globally. Basic principles of operational security and defense in depth would easily validate that. Does that mean some