I'm not talking about information that is provably incorrect, like whether the Earth is flat. I'm talking about philosophical and ideological differences on whether, e.g., promoting the development of democracies in the Mideast - for myriad reasons - is or isn't a good idea, and what the arguments are for each.
Some editorial discussion is also an issue of severely misplaced priorities. A greater disservice is done to the population being served by a particular media outlet when they disproportionately represent threats from, e.g., our own government, versus radical Panislamic terrorists or longer term from China.
There are many supposedly intelligent and well-educated individuals who literally and fervently believe that the Bush administration is the single greatest threat to the American people that has existed in the history of the nation, and any other current or historical external threat is either manufactured or pales in comparison to the present "internal" threat. Further, any media outlet that does not represent the situation in this fashion is therefore not reporting the "truth".
Then again, a disappointingly - and increasingly - large number of these people also genuinely believe that 9/11 was executed (or at the very least "allowed to happen") by the United States government as an excuse to warmonger in the Mideast, so I suppose I should not find this surprising. I do, however, find it extremely disheartening.
It's almost not so much what the media is reporting; it seems a great deal of people have already chosen their ideological "side", as it were, in many of these debates, and will simply seek out "news" that supports their point of view, and discount any other source that doesn't.
Sorry to disappoint you, but I'm a slashdot subscriber. See that little * by my name? That means I get to see the article early.
Those are my thoughts, typed by me, after the story got posted to the home page for subscribers, but before it got published to the public (which is usually about 10-15 minutes).
Oh, and by all means, "really, check my homepage". I'm, like, totally hiding my identity! I don't even include my real name, web page, and contact information right in my slashdot profile and at the top of every post.
Also, you seem to have totally misunderstood the point of what you quoted. Utterly. Which isn't surprising, given that you think that anyone who has any kind of affiliation with any part of government must be a propaganda mouthpiece. Brilliant. The point, in case you're too ignorant to grasp it, is the part you forgot to quote, which is falling "to the common fallacy of 'recentism', believing that a recent event must necessarily be the worst such case of an event in the history of mankind". The part you quoted was nothing more than a simple observation of the truth, namely, that "the internet can simply deluge us with an increasingly unprecedented level of information about any person or group which may pique our interest, allowing a wide range of ever more specific issues and minutia to be amplified to levels never witnessed in the past."
Does is scare you when someone states the obvious, and points out a giant flaw that is related to it? Apparently so!
Of course, if I was really paranoid, I'd wonder how long you had that typed up so you try to sidetrack the discussion with some first post flamebait about what is and is not a proper for a slashdot post.
How long in advance I had it typed up? I'd say about, oh, five minutes or so?
You know, since I'm a subscriber and all. See that little * by my username?
(I always get a kick out of it whenever I'm in the first few posts of a story due to the fact that I'm a subscriber, and someone insinuates that the comment was completely canned and prepared, just waiting for the right time to be posted to slashdot. Sorry to disappoint, but I write my comments after I see the story. If you want to see the stories a bit early, you, too, can become a subscriber.)
And, oh, I'm sure my post will certainly stifle the discussion to follow!
I just wanted to take a moment to thank the slashdot community, in advance, for what I am certain will be yet another discussion that will be the picture of decorum and civility. If there is anything I have learned about slashdot over the years, it is its ability to conduct a mature discussion about any topic, devoid of paranoia, rage, or ignorance.
In fact, I believe it would be fair to say that it was slashdot that single-handedly relegated the old connotation of "tinfoil hat" to the dustbin, leaving instead something that could only be termed fashionable, if unique, headwear in its wake. I know of no other web site that could have accomplished this return to such a balance and due consideration of all sides of an issue in its discourse.
Only on slashdot can such a discussion be guaranteed to be free of cynicism that dominates other venues of debate. Here, opposing viewpoints will be examined and considered, and not snuffed out. Nor will the community elevate viewpoints which only serve to reinforce their preconceived notions; indeed, slashdot, especially its comments, is the place to come for an evenly weighted consideration of any issue, especially issues of a political nature.
Neither will commenters fall to the common fallacy of "recentism", believing that a recent event must necessarily be the worst such case of an event in the history of mankind; instead recognizing that the internet can simply deluge us with an increasingly unprecedented level of information about any person or group which may pique our interest, allowing a wide range of ever more specific issues and minutia to be amplified to levels never witnessed in the past.
Moreover, I can tell by the (current) article title - "Politics: Carl Rove Resigning Aug 31" - that this discussion will have the highest regard for accuracy not only in content, but in spelling and grammar, as regular slashdot visitors will no doubt recognize to be the status quo. This level of accuracy can only be achieved by the tireless work of slashdot's editors, who carefully review each submission to the site.
So, bravo, slashdot - not only for what you have accomplished for political discussion in the past, but for the discussion you are about to have. It is exactly this kind of level-headed discussion that keeps people coming back for evenly balanced news and careful interpretation on nearly any topic.
And no, it's not "something that needs to be brought up" (I can hear it now) whenever someone talks about AT&T.
If anything, AT&T wouldn't want to remind people of this. (No, wait...let me guess: they do want you to know, because AT&T is part of the corporate/government machinery that wants to get the "sheeple" "used to" being monitored, right? Give me a break.)
The only thing "subtle" here - or not so subtle, actually - is someone taking an opportunity to again bring up the AT&T/NSA issue again in a completely and utterly unrelated context.
It's a detailed billing system that has to exist to, you know, bill for data usage, being used on handsets with unlimited data plans, quite ridiculously, when not needed.
This will remain unlimited, period, and it's not introductory. The only way devices like this make sense is with unlimited data, and they have had unlimited data plans for similar handsets and devices for years. Competition with carriers that offer unlimited, high speed wireless data (Sprint, Verizon) is only increasing.
They've had this detailed billing system in place forever, and - newsflash - there are millions of AT&T/Cingular handsets out there that do NOT have unlimited data, and get billed for it. They may "want" to charge you for every download, but the clear trend has been toward flat rate, and bandwidth - even wireless bandwidth - is only getting cheaper.
This is flat rate and unlimited, and that's not changing. The fact that AT&T still shows you the detailed billing is an example of stupidity and an exercise in redundancy, not part of any "softening-up" process, or proof of anything.
I literally can't believe the parent got modded up.
The "angle" is recognizing that some "bloggers" can also be legitimate "journalists". RTFA.
And treating bloggers, where appropriate, as journalists funnels official interaction with them through the normal channels for interacting with media, with its associated organization, controls, and so on.
I think it's funny that you open with "I bet in the long run it will be a bad thing" and "the government does do anything out of the good for the people", and you're the only post modded up so far in this article.
The distinction can only benefit the blogger. If a blogger does not want to be considered a journalist, he or she can simply reject press credentials they may otherwise be entitled to, make FOIA requests as a citizen instead of a journalist, etc. Imagining that greater restrictions will or even could somehow be placed upon people who post things to a web page vs. not - which is all it really is - is a great imagination indeed.
The point about specifically including blogs when talking about leaks of classified information should be obvious.
Even if you believe Jobs' DRM statement was a PR stunt, it is the single biggest shot across the bow of DRM from anyone anywhere near a person of Steve Jobs stature in the online media distribution industry. In this case, from someone who is the CEO of the company which is the third largest music retailer in the US, the largest online music retailer, the manufacturer of the most popular portable music player by far, the CEO of a major movie company, and a boardmember of one of the largest movie and media companies in Hollywood.
I'm sorry, but you can't just ignore the fact that Words Mean Things. You can't assume that just because a company makes a statement that it is pure 100% PR and nothing more, and that an individual, even a CEO, can't have his own beliefs and convictions that are exclusive of the corporation's desire to many money. Besides, if DRM-free is really the way to grow the market and make the most money, then doesn't coming out against DRM do that as well?
I have no doubt that Jobs is being pragmatic, but I also believe he understands - because it is articulated in crystal clear fashion in the statement - that DRM is crippling the online music industry, will never work, and will always be able to be defeated. I also believe he thinks that removing DRM will mean that Apple may end up with a smaller slice of a much bigger market, still meaning growth in absolute terms for iTunes.
And, my cynical friend, Apple has NEVER needed DRM to keep people on iTunes and iPod. The ease of use for normal people is what keeps people on iTunes and the iPod. I find it humorous that you're talking about computer jukeboxes and a commodity like a portable music player as something that shouldn't strive to be the best on the market, and outdo its competition. It's also laughable, if not somewhat sad, that after Apple made its statement AND became the first online music store of any consequence whatsoever to sell mainstream music from a major label - you know, music that a lot of people actually want - that you still choose to believe that Apple "really doesn't want to get rid of DRM".
The mind boggles, almost as much as at this statement and the associated analysis from Daring Fireball:
So Universal is going to sell DRM-free music through Amazon, Wal-Mart, RealNetworks, and others, but not through iTunes. Why?
But the music will not be offered D.R.M.-free through Apple's iTunes, the leading music service. The use of copy protection software has become a major bone of contention in the digital music business, where iTunes accounts for the vast majority of download sales. The record labels generally have required that retailers place electronic locks to limit copying of music files.
But Apple's proprietary D.R.M. does not work with most rivals' devices or software -- meaning that music sold by competing services cannot play on Apple's popular iPod. Some record executives say they believe that the stalemate has capped the growth of digital music sales, which the industry is relying on more heavily as sales of plastic CDs slide.
Um, Universal won't sell DRM-free music through iTunes because they don't like Apple's DRM? WTF? Am I even supposed to pretend this makes sense?
Also, various EU nations targeting Apple for DRM on iTunes and iPod are barking completely up the wrong tree. It's the labels that require DRM in every sense of the situation, not Apple. No matter what you think Apple "really" wants. And "interoperable" or "open" DRM? Give me a fucking break. The only "interoperable" DRM is no DRM at all. Even if everything on iTunes was DRM free, many, many customers would have no problem at all staying with the iTunes/iPod paradigm. Because, for the most part, it just works. Other more tech-savvy customers would be free to get other players and use them with music from iTunes. Apple is under no obligation whatever, nor should it be, to make iTunes interoperate as slickly and easily as it does with the iPod an
[...] somehow they are sure that this is safe. The interesting bit is that since these samples came from ancient ice, it seems that the world will naturally be filled with these guys soon.
...filed, of course, under "gonna-need-more-antibiotics".
Except the article says:
This is nothing to worry about, say experts, because the process has been going on for billions of years and the bugs are unlikely to cause human disease.
[...]
Paul Falkowski of Rutgers University, who led the study, [...] does not believe this is cause for concern because marine bacteria and viruses are typically far less harmful to human health than, for instance, those found on land.
Russell Vreeland of the Ancient Biomaterials Institute at West Chester University in Pennsylvania, US, agrees. "This has been happening probably for a long, long time. Ice freezes and melts, rocks sink and are eroded. Microbes have been involved with this process for almost 4 billion years," says Vreeland, who has resuscitated 250-million year-old bacteria found in salt crystals. "Earth acts as a gene bank for microbes."
So, what's "new" here is that a researcher has actually intentionally taken frozen microbes from the oldest known ice and successfully resuscitated them in a laboratory setting. The Earth has been doing this on its own for billions of years.
I'm sure this comments will be filled with the likes of:
- By ignoring the undeniable truth that global warming is due to human behavior, we are toying with balances we can't possibly understand, and now may even be releasing ancient microbes into the environment whose dangers we don't yet know!
- Even if the Earth has been doing this on its own, we are unnaturally accelerating it; therefore, the potential release of these microbes must be bad!
- This may be a natural process, but humans may not have existed on Earth the last time this occurred, therefore we can't predict the possible harm to humanity!
...all tied in, of course, to the fact that we should be working on ways to "stop" climate change, predicated on the belief that any negative climate change is due exclusively to human activity beyond any shadow of scientific doubt, and that no climate change can ever be a net positive, especially when caused by human activity, when there are in truth far more factors involved, even if human activity is a large one. (Note: I am not saying global warming is "positive" or that human activity isn't a component; I am saying that it is inaccurate to cloak anything in self-serving absolutes.)
The interesting intersection here is that such a transition may occur while humans are present on Earth. This is not necessarily a "good" or a "bad" thing...it just is. Humans have learned to manipulate and adapt to their environment for millennia, both on long and short term bases. Artificial change cannot intrinsically be defined as better or worse than natural change. Some of this change may have a negative impact on human existence on Earth; some may not.
This does not mean that we should be raping the environment or ignoring any danger. But the single-mindedness of climate change activists is somewhat disturbing. They view climate change in a vacuum, separated from all other concerns, and that is simply a foolish and counterproductive position to take.
Ever wonder why there are so many global warming deniers? It's because of the attitude taken by fanatic, self-righteous global warming alarmists. We'd be a lot better served by real discussions - which are, unfortunately, far too complex for most people on either side of the "political" global warming debate to understand - than one alarmist global warming story after another.
The issues - social, economic, scientific, and so on - surrounding "climate change" deserve a far better treatment, even in slashdot comments, than berating Chevy Suburbans, Big Oil, and fat, lazy, greedy Americans.
If you believe it will be used to arbitrarily execute search of and seizure of property from US citizens on US soil without a warrant, then you are reading things into the law that simply aren't there. I've already read the language, and I, and thankfully, the majority of Congress, agrees with it. Storage in this context is understood to apply to transient storage. If I believed the FISA wording change would be used as you believe it will be, I would be against it to. However, again, that is not the purpose of this update.
The update is purely to allow foreign intelligence gathering when BOTH endpoints are outside of the United States, even if information travels through US equipment. In any home or residential context, unless a person is operating networking or routing equipment out of their home, they are by the conventional definition understood to be a party of the communication, not a conduit. Therefore, a warrant would be required.
This legislation is targeted at major commercial ISPs, network operators, and telecommunications companies. It cannot be applied in the manner you imagine without a warrant. I know you're construing it that way, and illustrating a "slippery slope" argument. However, that is not the purpose or function of the law in the context of electronic surveillance on US soil when at least one endpoint is on US soil. The exchange student example is an endpoint in the context of electronic communications. The commercial networking operator is not.
The law does not allow for the search or seizure of property or equipment of US residents on US soil, only of communications that are actively traveling via US communications equipment between parties outside of the United States. Not a personal computer of a US citizen on US soil who might have lived with an exchange student that might have a copy of an email communications on a computer. By definition, that traffic contains a person within the United States, and is excluded. This covers telecommunications equipment, and is not construed to mean personal laptops or telephones of US citizens in any legal sense, because an endpoint of the communication in that context is within the United States.
That is neither the intent nor wording of the law. So no, I don't believe that the law, either in letter or spirit, allows any of the slippery slope you describe.
So yes, I am okay with it, as-is. If this really did effectively do away with the Fourth Amendment - or, for that matter, if any of the other updates of laws to keep up with the times did away with the Constitution as much as people imagine they do - then I doubt a Democratic Congress would be voting for their implementation.
I am not talking about a "request" of the operators of that equipment, I am talking about the government forcing a US citizen to provide access to their records and communication networks without a warrant.
This is getting into semantics now. Yes, I think the operators of the equipment should be compelled to respond to this request without a warrant. If you want to call that "forcing", fine.
Also, the legislation proposed does not constrain the access to "where the passage of the information through US equipment is incidental." Would it be presumptuous of me to presume you don't support the legislation as written?
Yes, it would be. The passage of the communication through US equipment is incidental. The legislation does not have to contain that word for that to be the case. The traffic's passage through the US is, by nature, incidental to its content and the parties to the communication. That's why I support its capture without a warrant.
I am also curious if you see any fourth amendment problems with the search and seizure of US citizens and their assets in this legislation? Not with the targets of the surveillance, but in the forced compliance of US citizens implementing the governments surveillance.
I do think that potential problems could be asserted. But I also would imagine that most equipment such communication could even travel through would be large multinational network operators with a good understanding of how legislation such as this may apply to them. I also don't think that foreign intelligence targets should be afforded additional protections or hindrances to their monitoring simply because traffic passes through the US. It is already the case that persons can legally be compelled to comply with government requests, and that such requests are not necessarily always in the form of a warrant.
My question was not about pen registers, it was about the distinction between the government collecting intelligence of non US citizens outside the USA, and the government forcing a US citizen to provide access to their records and communication networks without a warrant.
So, to be clear, you're referring to collection activities relating to monitoring communication between parties outside the United States that happens to be traveling via US equipment? My apologies; I thought you were bringing the domestic logging issue into the discussion.
Returning to my original question, should the government have the power to compel access to the communication networks and records of a US company or US citizen without a warrant?
In the course of collection activities relating to foreign signals intelligence where the passage of the information through US equipment is incidental, and the request is made to the operators of that equipment carrying the traffic in support of this activity, yes.
They did say that. All the AG has to do is lie and say it was someone else who was targeted. And, hey, we already know he can lie.
Then he can lie and ignore the law under any circumstances, no matter what the law says.
Before it was, at least, perjury, although entirely uncheckable, and now it's not even that. Yay progress.
Ugh. So your concern is that they'll lie and ignore the law, but that now this update to the law allows them the escape of being able to say they thought they were targeting someone outside the US? Well, if they realize they are targeting someone within the US, a warrant is required, as it always has been.
Don't get me wrong: I can understand the argument you're making, but foreign intelligence simply does not require a warrant, and I do not believe it should even if it incidentally travels through equipment on US soil. There is no way to solve this problem except to require that all traffic that is a legitimate target of foreign intelligence which incidentally travels through US equipment would require a warrant.
I will repeat: This is about as useful as laws against murder would be if anyone could just assert they thought it was self-defense and the case gets thrown out of court, with no checks on whether or not a reasonable person would have thought that.
No, wait, it's less useful than that, because it wouldn't even see a court. It's like you could just yell 'self-defense' to the arresting officers and they'd have to let you go.
The law is clear on the application. The only reason the wording says "reasonably believed to be outside the United States" is because "reasonable" is a fairly well-established legal standard, and, technologically, it can't be guaranteed under all circumstances that subjects "reasonably believed to be outside the United States" actually are.
You're imagining a scenario where that suddenly means they could theoretically say that any traffic falls under this guideline, but that's simply not the case. There has to be a reasonable belief that the subjects are outside the United States. Not just a random assertion. The perjury standard still applies. If your concern is that there are no checks and balances, there never were any warrant-level requirements on foreign intelligence operations, and shouldn't be.
Or maybe he'll just 'forget' why he authorized that tap, although he'll be sure he had some sort of legal reason. And, no, he won't turn over any documents or let anyone testify, because that's executive privilege. If someone impedes the investigation into any abuse, he'll just refuse to arrest them for contempt of Congress, and if he is forced to arrest them anyway, Bush will just commute their sentence. Do you think any sort of abuse of this is going to lead to any sort of punishment or even admission of wrongdoing?
All of these arguments are applicable under any wording of the law.
And, as I said, if you believe that persons in the administration will just ignore the law, do whatever they want, and that even if they are caught, Bush will just commute or pardon, then what does the wording of the law even matter? I imagine the response will be something along the lines that this just makes it even easier for them to shred the Constitution.
No, this is exactly what I said it was: an update to a law to monitor communications that should NEVER require a warrant to monitor, period.
It would be one thing to trust a government that actually behaved in a trustworthy behavior, that is actually concerned with at least appearing to do the right thing, but trustworthy behavior and how the current administration has behaved towards warrentless-wiretapping are about as far as humanly possible. Don't forget Bush got out there and lied for three years about the existence of his programs, and then the AG has repeatedly mislead and misdirected investigations into it. We still don't know the full extent of everything that's been done under 'this program', or 'all these i
Why wasn't the law specifically worded to permit warrantless surveillance only when the interception point is outside of the borders of the US? This would serve to reduce warrantless spying on Americans, and it would coincide with your stated aim.
It is. And that's exactly what "my" am is, as is the aim of the update to FISA.
It allows for monitoring of phone calls, e-mails and other communications involving foreign nationals reasonably believed to be outside the United States.
The word "reasonable" has legal precedent and meaning.
So, is your stated aim a lie, or is the law only accidentally designed to allow warrantless surveillance upon US citizens, in their homes, communicating with other US citizens in their own homes? You haven't got a leg to stand on, either way.
Both of those statements are incorrect.
The aim is to allow for monitoring of phone calls, e-mails and other communications involving foreign nationals reasonably believed to be outside the United States, which have never required a warrant, and should not require a warrant on the basis of the incidental path that a particular message took to get to its destination.
Since the law is specifically worded to concern foreign intelligence (which intrinsically and specifically means non-domestic intelligence collection) and foreign nationals outside the United States, it appears there is a disconnect between the update to FISA and your understanding of it. If you believe that the "reasonably believed" wording is to allow for wiggle room so that the government can spy on anyone, you're completely wrong, as "reasonable" is a standard that courts apply routinely; i.e., it would have to be pretty darned apparent that the subject of the monitoring is almost certainly outside of the United States, and that there wouldn't be any reason to believe they are anywhere else. It's not just a matter of someone declaring that someone is outside the United States even when they're really not and then monitoring them. But since you can't guarantee that, the wording allows for reasonable leeway.
Should the government have the power to compel access to the communication networks and records of a US company or US citizen without a warrant?
To be clear - and I know you know this, but I want to make it clear for others who may not understand - that's not what this addresses. This addresses the monitoring of the entirety of content of communication between parties outside of the United States. This has always been legal and does not require a warrant, never has, and never should.
But to answer your question: if you are speaking of information about records that define only start and end points of a communication, but NOT the content of the communication (e.g., telephone numbers dialed or calls received), such records constitute a "pen register", which does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, and which therefore does not require a warrant (Smith v. Maryland, 442 US 735 (1979)). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, often cited as the most liberal appeals court, found that IP addresses visited and to/from addresses on emails (but again, not the content of the communication) constitutes a pen register and therefore does not require a warrant (US v. Forrester (2007)).
On this basis, no, I do not believe that such monitoring legally requires a warrant.
Monitoring of foreign communications has never required a warrant, nor should it. This simply reflects the current technological state of affairs with respect to foreign signals intelligence.
If you believe that foreign signals intelligence should be burdened with warrant requirements because it incidentally travels through the United States, then we're in disagreement.
This is an update to a law so that intelligence agencies can reasonably execute their longstanding foreign intelligence roles within the law. If you believe that someone is secretly going to be arbitrarily declaring everyone "foreigners outside of the United States" even when they're not - in other words, completely ignoring and running afoul of the wording or spirit of any law - then they could be doing that anyway, regardless of what any law says.
There is absolutely nothing wrong with intelligence monitoring of foreign communications. Because modern technology means that some of these communications may travel through US communications equipment does not suddenly mean that they should be saddled with warrant process requirements and everything else that implies. It is simply not practical, and it flies in the face of the very purpose and methods of foreign intelligence collection.
This unnecessarily saddles foreign intelligence gathering, which has never required a warrant for good reason, with warrant requirements.
Again, see this article for a brief overview of the issues.
Monitoring this kind of traffic should not require a warrant process of any kind, period. It flies in the face of the method and purpose of foreign signals intelligence. It's that simple. You can refuse to understand that if you wish.
How is that a problem? It would seem to me that it would be easier to tap that way.
Uh, it is, but when that happens, it requires a warrant.
Monitoring of communication between two parties outside the United States does not require a warrant, and never will. But because of today's technology, sometimes that traffic can flow through the United States.
Which suddenly means it is subject to the warrant requirements.
Which it shouldn't be.
And... ? FISA allows up to 72 hours AFTER the event to get a warrant. Even in your scenario, there doesn't seem to be a problem.
Yes. There is.
The monitoring of such communications has never required a warrant, but now increasingly does require one, crippling foreign signals intelligence with warrant requirements because FISA didn't foresee the realities of modern communications.
Again, FISA allows up to 72 hours AFTER the even to get a warrant.
I'm going to have to trust our Founding Fathers on this one.
Fascism begins when the efficiency of the Government becomes more important than the Rights of the People.
Requiring the FISA process, even retroactively, on all foreign signals intelligence collection completely cripples that capability.
This has nothing to do with the founding fathers or fascism. It has to do with updating a law to reflect today's reality. And by "today's reality" I don't mean "post-9/11"; I mean the fact that more foreign communication that never had warrant requirements suddenly does because of the way traffic is routed. Crippling our intelligence capability because of what amounts to a technological technicality is foolish.
What about the violating the laws of the countries where these wiretaps are made? Or does the US always request the required warrants from the local courts before they go about their business? As a citizen under the star circled banner, I'm not crazy about the idea of being monitored by your loonie government only because unwarranted wiretaps happen legal in your country.
First, unwarranted wiretaps do NOT "happen legal in [our] country". That's the whole point of updating the FISA law: monitoring the content of communications between parties within the United States DOES require a warrant. Monitoring of foreign communications does not, and never will.
This is about the monitoring of FOREIGN communications (which may incidentally physically travel through the United States) not needing a warrant. And no, the US, nor any other country, does not comply with other nations' laws when it does intelligence gathering. That's the purpose of foreign intelligence, and all nations will always do it. Nations spy on their friends, enemies, neighbors, and anything else they can get their hands on, and this will never change.
This is utter BS, intended to distract from the actual argument. The effect of this new wiretapping law is to permit warrantless surveillance of United States citizens in their homes. This is why we object to it.
No. This does not permit this at all, in any way, shape, or form.
You are mistaken as to what this law does, and why.
You want a law clarifying that foreign surveillance, performed overseas, doesn't require warrants when the communication happens to be routed through the US? Then pass that law, not the one you are supporting to which we object.That you conflate the two indicates willful blindness or the purest ignorance this world knows.
Wrong. It's very clear what this law does.
It allows monitoring of communication between parties outside the United States by US intelligence services, even if the traffic is passing through the United States, without a warrant.
If you believe warrantless surveillance performed upon the citizens of a state by that state's police force are not an extremely dangerous tool used to consolidate power in the hands of the government, then you clearly haven't got even an inkling of what history is.
Except this isn't for surveillance of "the citizens". It's for surveillance of persons outside the United States. The law and wording are clear, and if you choose to jump to conclusions that can't even reasonably be drawn from its clearly stated purpose and intent, that's your problem.
The technological situation is exactly the problem, yes.
We need to be able to monitor foreign communications, without a warrant, including those that may be incidentally traveling through the United States.
This is a problem that will never be solved, because, with today's technology, it may not be apparent where the ends of a conversation are.
The two issues you note are inextricably intertwined. The only practical way to intercept the kind of communication the NSA is looking for is to do exactly what they're doing. That's the technological reality.
So we can choose to monitor none of this communication, or make good faith efforts to cherry-pick only foreign communications when it can be reasonably asserted as such. I choose the latter, no matter which party controls the White House or Congress.
When they say any communication of any kind between any two people, including US citizens, can be actively and substantively monitored and targeted, then I'll raise the alarm. Until then, this is an update to an old law to reflect the practical technological capabilities at hand.
If it has "gone on for decades", then what is the problem NOW?
Why and How has the existing system suddenly failed?
This system failed because more and more foreign communication is traveling through equipment physically within the United States.
Under the current law, monitoring of such communication, which never required (and shouldn't require) a warrant, suddenly requires a warrant, because of the incidental fact that some of the traffic travels through the US.
The fallacy is that you apparently, by your statements, are asserting foreign SIGINT doesn't work, because if we have that capability, we should have been able to "win" the war on drugs.
You have said that twice now. It is fallacious to draw that conclusion. That's the fallacy. No lies; sorry to disappoint.
And claiming that you don't know your history is an easy claim to make if you think foreign signals intelligence hasn't worked.
Lastly, we're not even talking about drugs, and you chose to bring it up. Newsflash: it's not a binary game. You don't have to completely eradicate something to successfully fight against it. This is completely separate from either of our opinions on drugs.
If warrants are no longer necessary to wiretap, where exactly is the check to see if the people being wiretapped are foreign nationals? The whole point of a warrant is to make sure that a requested invasive measure is being applied properly.
Now you say:
I didn't say anything about "all foreign signals intelligence". The issue here is monitoring communications by individuals inside the United States.
No, it's not, at all.
It's about monitoring communications by individuals outside the United States, where the traffic may incidentally flow through communications or networking equipment inside the United States.
Under the current law, that requires a warrant. Even if all parties to the communication are foreign nationals outside of the United States. That's ridiculous, and is something that the current law never could have foreseen. Monitoring such communication does not require a warrant, and this fixes the issue where the communication may incidentally travel through equipment physically within the US.
There should be some sort of process before you go recording phone calls from a particular address. If that address is the Chinese embassy, it shouldn't be that hard to make the case. If it's some random suburb in the midwest, I'd like to think that there's some process to ensure that the person is actually foreign, and doesn't just have dark skin and a beard.
The problem here is that you assume the warrant is the only acceptable "check". That's the thing that is crippling foreign intelligence gathering that falls into this category now. The "check" happens within the intelligence community itself. If both parties are reasonably believed to be outside of the United States, but the traffic is traveling through equipment in the United States, no warrant is required. If it's not clear (i.e., not "reasonable" to believe), or if the parties are inside the United States, a warrant is required.
If your next response is along the lines of, "Well, how can we trust them to do the right thing?" I'd ask, even with a warrant, how can you trust them to do the right thing? I mean, really. And then, how can you trust the FISA court? Maybe we should have another court to check to see if FISA is really doing what you want. The answer is that there is Congressional oversight of the intelligence services. Some, myself included, don't think it's enough, but that, in addition to the processes built into the foreign SIGINT collection, is where the "check" lies.
The only "solution" would be to require all such monitoring of communication have an associated warrant, because, by the logic you are using, that's the only way to "check" if the monitoring is allowable. But that's ridiculous. See the problem, here? And no, it's not simple, efficient, or even useful to saddle all foreign SIGINT with warrant requirements.
Slashdot Mirror
I'm not talking about information that is provably incorrect, like whether the Earth is flat. I'm talking about philosophical and ideological differences on whether, e.g., promoting the development of democracies in the Mideast - for myriad reasons - is or isn't a good idea, and what the arguments are for each.
Some editorial discussion is also an issue of severely misplaced priorities. A greater disservice is done to the population being served by a particular media outlet when they disproportionately represent threats from, e.g., our own government, versus radical Panislamic terrorists or longer term from China.
There are many supposedly intelligent and well-educated individuals who literally and fervently believe that the Bush administration is the single greatest threat to the American people that has existed in the history of the nation, and any other current or historical external threat is either manufactured or pales in comparison to the present "internal" threat. Further, any media outlet that does not represent the situation in this fashion is therefore not reporting the "truth".
Then again, a disappointingly - and increasingly - large number of these people also genuinely believe that 9/11 was executed (or at the very least "allowed to happen") by the United States government as an excuse to warmonger in the Mideast, so I suppose I should not find this surprising. I do, however, find it extremely disheartening.
It's almost not so much what the media is reporting; it seems a great deal of people have already chosen their ideological "side", as it were, in many of these debates, and will simply seek out "news" that supports their point of view, and discount any other source that doesn't.
Sorry to disappoint you, but I'm a slashdot subscriber. See that little * by my name? That means I get to see the article early.
Those are my thoughts, typed by me, after the story got posted to the home page for subscribers, but before it got published to the public (which is usually about 10-15 minutes).
Oh, and by all means, "really, check my homepage". I'm, like, totally hiding my identity! I don't even include my real name, web page, and contact information right in my slashdot profile and at the top of every post.
Also, you seem to have totally misunderstood the point of what you quoted. Utterly. Which isn't surprising, given that you think that anyone who has any kind of affiliation with any part of government must be a propaganda mouthpiece. Brilliant. The point, in case you're too ignorant to grasp it, is the part you forgot to quote, which is falling "to the common fallacy of 'recentism', believing that a recent event must necessarily be the worst such case of an event in the history of mankind". The part you quoted was nothing more than a simple observation of the truth, namely, that "the internet can simply deluge us with an increasingly unprecedented level of information about any person or group which may pique our interest, allowing a wide range of ever more specific issues and minutia to be amplified to levels never witnessed in the past."
Does is scare you when someone states the obvious, and points out a giant flaw that is related to it? Apparently so!
Of course, if I was really paranoid, I'd wonder how long you had that typed up so you try to sidetrack the discussion with some first post flamebait about what is and is not a proper for a slashdot post.
How long in advance I had it typed up? I'd say about, oh, five minutes or so?
You know, since I'm a subscriber and all. See that little * by my username?
(I always get a kick out of it whenever I'm in the first few posts of a story due to the fact that I'm a subscriber, and someone insinuates that the comment was completely canned and prepared, just waiting for the right time to be posted to slashdot. Sorry to disappoint, but I write my comments after I see the story. If you want to see the stories a bit early, you, too, can become a subscriber.)
And, oh, I'm sure my post will certainly stifle the discussion to follow!
I just wanted to take a moment to thank the slashdot community, in advance, for what I am certain will be yet another discussion that will be the picture of decorum and civility. If there is anything I have learned about slashdot over the years, it is its ability to conduct a mature discussion about any topic, devoid of paranoia, rage, or ignorance.
In fact, I believe it would be fair to say that it was slashdot that single-handedly relegated the old connotation of "tinfoil hat" to the dustbin, leaving instead something that could only be termed fashionable, if unique, headwear in its wake. I know of no other web site that could have accomplished this return to such a balance and due consideration of all sides of an issue in its discourse.
Only on slashdot can such a discussion be guaranteed to be free of cynicism that dominates other venues of debate. Here, opposing viewpoints will be examined and considered, and not snuffed out. Nor will the community elevate viewpoints which only serve to reinforce their preconceived notions; indeed, slashdot, especially its comments, is the place to come for an evenly weighted consideration of any issue, especially issues of a political nature.
Neither will commenters fall to the common fallacy of "recentism", believing that a recent event must necessarily be the worst such case of an event in the history of mankind; instead recognizing that the internet can simply deluge us with an increasingly unprecedented level of information about any person or group which may pique our interest, allowing a wide range of ever more specific issues and minutia to be amplified to levels never witnessed in the past.
Moreover, I can tell by the (current) article title - "Politics: Carl Rove Resigning Aug 31" - that this discussion will have the highest regard for accuracy not only in content, but in spelling and grammar, as regular slashdot visitors will no doubt recognize to be the status quo. This level of accuracy can only be achieved by the tireless work of slashdot's editors, who carefully review each submission to the site.
So, bravo, slashdot - not only for what you have accomplished for political discussion in the past, but for the discussion you are about to have. It is exactly this kind of level-headed discussion that keeps people coming back for evenly balanced news and careful interpretation on nearly any topic.
Bravo, indeed!
This isn't a subtle way of saying anything.
And no, it's not "something that needs to be brought up" (I can hear it now) whenever someone talks about AT&T.
If anything, AT&T wouldn't want to remind people of this. (No, wait...let me guess: they do want you to know, because AT&T is part of the corporate/government machinery that wants to get the "sheeple" "used to" being monitored, right? Give me a break.)
The only thing "subtle" here - or not so subtle, actually - is someone taking an opportunity to again bring up the AT&T/NSA issue again in a completely and utterly unrelated context.
It's a detailed billing system that has to exist to, you know, bill for data usage, being used on handsets with unlimited data plans, quite ridiculously, when not needed.
They're not "preparing" anyone for anything.
This will remain unlimited, period, and it's not introductory. The only way devices like this make sense is with unlimited data, and they have had unlimited data plans for similar handsets and devices for years. Competition with carriers that offer unlimited, high speed wireless data (Sprint, Verizon) is only increasing.
They've had this detailed billing system in place forever, and - newsflash - there are millions of AT&T/Cingular handsets out there that do NOT have unlimited data, and get billed for it. They may "want" to charge you for every download, but the clear trend has been toward flat rate, and bandwidth - even wireless bandwidth - is only getting cheaper.
This is flat rate and unlimited, and that's not changing. The fact that AT&T still shows you the detailed billing is an example of stupidity and an exercise in redundancy, not part of any "softening-up" process, or proof of anything.
I literally can't believe the parent got modded up.
How did this get modded up?
There is no "angle".
The "angle" is recognizing that some "bloggers" can also be legitimate "journalists". RTFA.
And treating bloggers, where appropriate, as journalists funnels official interaction with them through the normal channels for interacting with media, with its associated organization, controls, and so on.
I think it's funny that you open with "I bet in the long run it will be a bad thing" and "the government does do anything out of the good for the people", and you're the only post modded up so far in this article.
The distinction can only benefit the blogger. If a blogger does not want to be considered a journalist, he or she can simply reject press credentials they may otherwise be entitled to, make FOIA requests as a citizen instead of a journalist, etc. Imagining that greater restrictions will or even could somehow be placed upon people who post things to a web page vs. not - which is all it really is - is a great imagination indeed.
The point about specifically including blogs when talking about leaks of classified information should be obvious.
I'm sorry, but you can't just ignore the fact that Words Mean Things. You can't assume that just because a company makes a statement that it is pure 100% PR and nothing more, and that an individual, even a CEO, can't have his own beliefs and convictions that are exclusive of the corporation's desire to many money. Besides, if DRM-free is really the way to grow the market and make the most money, then doesn't coming out against DRM do that as well?
I have no doubt that Jobs is being pragmatic, but I also believe he understands - because it is articulated in crystal clear fashion in the statement - that DRM is crippling the online music industry, will never work, and will always be able to be defeated. I also believe he thinks that removing DRM will mean that Apple may end up with a smaller slice of a much bigger market, still meaning growth in absolute terms for iTunes.
And, my cynical friend, Apple has NEVER needed DRM to keep people on iTunes and iPod. The ease of use for normal people is what keeps people on iTunes and the iPod. I find it humorous that you're talking about computer jukeboxes and a commodity like a portable music player as something that shouldn't strive to be the best on the market, and outdo its competition. It's also laughable, if not somewhat sad, that after Apple made its statement AND became the first online music store of any consequence whatsoever to sell mainstream music from a major label - you know, music that a lot of people actually want - that you still choose to believe that Apple "really doesn't want to get rid of DRM".
The mind boggles, almost as much as at this statement and the associated analysis from Daring Fireball:
Also, various EU nations targeting Apple for DRM on iTunes and iPod are barking completely up the wrong tree. It's the labels that require DRM in every sense of the situation, not Apple. No matter what you think Apple "really" wants. And "interoperable" or "open" DRM? Give me a fucking break. The only "interoperable" DRM is no DRM at all. Even if everything on iTunes was DRM free, many, many customers would have no problem at all staying with the iTunes/iPod paradigm. Because, for the most part, it just works. Other more tech-savvy customers would be free to get other players and use them with music from iTunes. Apple is under no obligation whatever, nor should it be, to make iTunes interoperate as slickly and easily as it does with the iPod an
The summary ominously notes:
[...] somehow they are sure that this is safe. The interesting bit is that since these samples came from ancient ice, it seems that the world will naturally be filled with these guys soon.
...filed, of course, under "gonna-need-more-antibiotics".
Except the article says:
This is nothing to worry about, say experts, because the process has been going on for billions of years and the bugs are unlikely to cause human disease.
[...]
Paul Falkowski of Rutgers University, who led the study, [...] does not believe this is cause for concern because marine bacteria and viruses are typically far less harmful to human health than, for instance, those found on land.
Russell Vreeland of the Ancient Biomaterials Institute at West Chester University in Pennsylvania, US, agrees. "This has been happening probably for a long, long time. Ice freezes and melts, rocks sink and are eroded. Microbes have been involved with this process for almost 4 billion years," says Vreeland, who has resuscitated 250-million year-old bacteria found in salt crystals. "Earth acts as a gene bank for microbes."
So, what's "new" here is that a researcher has actually intentionally taken frozen microbes from the oldest known ice and successfully resuscitated them in a laboratory setting. The Earth has been doing this on its own for billions of years.
I'm sure this comments will be filled with the likes of:
- By ignoring the undeniable truth that global warming is due to human behavior, we are toying with balances we can't possibly understand, and now may even be releasing ancient microbes into the environment whose dangers we don't yet know!
- Even if the Earth has been doing this on its own, we are unnaturally accelerating it; therefore, the potential release of these microbes must be bad!
- This may be a natural process, but humans may not have existed on Earth the last time this occurred, therefore we can't predict the possible harm to humanity!
...all tied in, of course, to the fact that we should be working on ways to "stop" climate change, predicated on the belief that any negative climate change is due exclusively to human activity beyond any shadow of scientific doubt, and that no climate change can ever be a net positive, especially when caused by human activity, when there are in truth far more factors involved, even if human activity is a large one. (Note: I am not saying global warming is "positive" or that human activity isn't a component; I am saying that it is inaccurate to cloak anything in self-serving absolutes.)
The interesting intersection here is that such a transition may occur while humans are present on Earth. This is not necessarily a "good" or a "bad" thing...it just is. Humans have learned to manipulate and adapt to their environment for millennia, both on long and short term bases. Artificial change cannot intrinsically be defined as better or worse than natural change. Some of this change may have a negative impact on human existence on Earth; some may not.
This does not mean that we should be raping the environment or ignoring any danger. But the single-mindedness of climate change activists is somewhat disturbing. They view climate change in a vacuum, separated from all other concerns, and that is simply a foolish and counterproductive position to take.
Ever wonder why there are so many global warming deniers? It's because of the attitude taken by fanatic, self-righteous global warming alarmists. We'd be a lot better served by real discussions - which are, unfortunately, far too complex for most people on either side of the "political" global warming debate to understand - than one alarmist global warming story after another.
The issues - social, economic, scientific, and so on - surrounding "climate change" deserve a far better treatment, even in slashdot comments, than berating Chevy Suburbans, Big Oil, and fat, lazy, greedy Americans.
If you believe it will be used to arbitrarily execute search of and seizure of property from US citizens on US soil without a warrant, then you are reading things into the law that simply aren't there. I've already read the language, and I, and thankfully, the majority of Congress, agrees with it. Storage in this context is understood to apply to transient storage. If I believed the FISA wording change would be used as you believe it will be, I would be against it to. However, again, that is not the purpose of this update.
The update is purely to allow foreign intelligence gathering when BOTH endpoints are outside of the United States, even if information travels through US equipment. In any home or residential context, unless a person is operating networking or routing equipment out of their home, they are by the conventional definition understood to be a party of the communication, not a conduit. Therefore, a warrant would be required.
This legislation is targeted at major commercial ISPs, network operators, and telecommunications companies. It cannot be applied in the manner you imagine without a warrant. I know you're construing it that way, and illustrating a "slippery slope" argument. However, that is not the purpose or function of the law in the context of electronic surveillance on US soil when at least one endpoint is on US soil. The exchange student example is an endpoint in the context of electronic communications. The commercial networking operator is not.
The law does not allow for the search or seizure of property or equipment of US residents on US soil, only of communications that are actively traveling via US communications equipment between parties outside of the United States. Not a personal computer of a US citizen on US soil who might have lived with an exchange student that might have a copy of an email communications on a computer. By definition, that traffic contains a person within the United States, and is excluded. This covers telecommunications equipment, and is not construed to mean personal laptops or telephones of US citizens in any legal sense, because an endpoint of the communication in that context is within the United States.
That is neither the intent nor wording of the law. So no, I don't believe that the law, either in letter or spirit, allows any of the slippery slope you describe.
So yes, I am okay with it, as-is. If this really did effectively do away with the Fourth Amendment - or, for that matter, if any of the other updates of laws to keep up with the times did away with the Constitution as much as people imagine they do - then I doubt a Democratic Congress would be voting for their implementation.
I am not talking about a "request" of the operators of that equipment, I am talking about the government forcing a US citizen to provide access to their records and communication networks without a warrant.
This is getting into semantics now. Yes, I think the operators of the equipment should be compelled to respond to this request without a warrant. If you want to call that "forcing", fine.
Also, the legislation proposed does not constrain the access to "where the passage of the information through US equipment is incidental." Would it be presumptuous of me to presume you don't support the legislation as written?
Yes, it would be. The passage of the communication through US equipment is incidental. The legislation does not have to contain that word for that to be the case. The traffic's passage through the US is, by nature, incidental to its content and the parties to the communication. That's why I support its capture without a warrant.
I am also curious if you see any fourth amendment problems with the search and seizure of US citizens and their assets in this legislation? Not with the targets of the surveillance, but in the forced compliance of US citizens implementing the governments surveillance.
I do think that potential problems could be asserted. But I also would imagine that most equipment such communication could even travel through would be large multinational network operators with a good understanding of how legislation such as this may apply to them. I also don't think that foreign intelligence targets should be afforded additional protections or hindrances to their monitoring simply because traffic passes through the US. It is already the case that persons can legally be compelled to comply with government requests, and that such requests are not necessarily always in the form of a warrant.
My question was not about pen registers, it was about the distinction between the government collecting intelligence of non US citizens outside the USA, and the government forcing a US citizen to provide access to their records and communication networks without a warrant.
So, to be clear, you're referring to collection activities relating to monitoring communication between parties outside the United States that happens to be traveling via US equipment? My apologies; I thought you were bringing the domestic logging issue into the discussion.
Returning to my original question, should the government have the power to compel access to the communication networks and records of a US company or US citizen without a warrant?
In the course of collection activities relating to foreign signals intelligence where the passage of the information through US equipment is incidental, and the request is made to the operators of that equipment carrying the traffic in support of this activity, yes.
They did say that. All the AG has to do is lie and say it was someone else who was targeted. And, hey, we already know he can lie.
Then he can lie and ignore the law under any circumstances, no matter what the law says.
Before it was, at least, perjury, although entirely uncheckable, and now it's not even that. Yay progress.
Ugh. So your concern is that they'll lie and ignore the law, but that now this update to the law allows them the escape of being able to say they thought they were targeting someone outside the US? Well, if they realize they are targeting someone within the US, a warrant is required, as it always has been.
Don't get me wrong: I can understand the argument you're making, but foreign intelligence simply does not require a warrant, and I do not believe it should even if it incidentally travels through equipment on US soil. There is no way to solve this problem except to require that all traffic that is a legitimate target of foreign intelligence which incidentally travels through US equipment would require a warrant.
I will repeat: This is about as useful as laws against murder would be if anyone could just assert they thought it was self-defense and the case gets thrown out of court, with no checks on whether or not a reasonable person would have thought that.
No, wait, it's less useful than that, because it wouldn't even see a court. It's like you could just yell 'self-defense' to the arresting officers and they'd have to let you go.
The law is clear on the application. The only reason the wording says "reasonably believed to be outside the United States" is because "reasonable" is a fairly well-established legal standard, and, technologically, it can't be guaranteed under all circumstances that subjects "reasonably believed to be outside the United States" actually are.
You're imagining a scenario where that suddenly means they could theoretically say that any traffic falls under this guideline, but that's simply not the case. There has to be a reasonable belief that the subjects are outside the United States. Not just a random assertion. The perjury standard still applies. If your concern is that there are no checks and balances, there never were any warrant-level requirements on foreign intelligence operations, and shouldn't be.
Or maybe he'll just 'forget' why he authorized that tap, although he'll be sure he had some sort of legal reason. And, no, he won't turn over any documents or let anyone testify, because that's executive privilege. If someone impedes the investigation into any abuse, he'll just refuse to arrest them for contempt of Congress, and if he is forced to arrest them anyway, Bush will just commute their sentence. Do you think any sort of abuse of this is going to lead to any sort of punishment or even admission of wrongdoing?
All of these arguments are applicable under any wording of the law.
And, as I said, if you believe that persons in the administration will just ignore the law, do whatever they want, and that even if they are caught, Bush will just commute or pardon, then what does the wording of the law even matter? I imagine the response will be something along the lines that this just makes it even easier for them to shred the Constitution.
No, this is exactly what I said it was: an update to a law to monitor communications that should NEVER require a warrant to monitor, period.
It would be one thing to trust a government that actually behaved in a trustworthy behavior, that is actually concerned with at least appearing to do the right thing, but trustworthy behavior and how the current administration has behaved towards warrentless-wiretapping are about as far as humanly possible. Don't forget Bush got out there and lied for three years about the existence of his programs, and then the AG has repeatedly mislead and misdirected investigations into it. We still don't know the full extent of everything that's been done under 'this program', or 'all these i
Why wasn't the law specifically worded to permit warrantless surveillance only when the interception point is outside of the borders of the US? This would serve to reduce warrantless spying on Americans, and it would coincide with your stated aim.
It is. And that's exactly what "my" am is, as is the aim of the update to FISA.
It allows for monitoring of phone calls, e-mails and other communications involving foreign nationals reasonably believed to be outside the United States.
The word "reasonable" has legal precedent and meaning.
So, is your stated aim a lie, or is the law only accidentally designed to allow warrantless surveillance upon US citizens, in their homes, communicating with other US citizens in their own homes? You haven't got a leg to stand on, either way.
Both of those statements are incorrect.
The aim is to allow for monitoring of phone calls, e-mails and other communications involving foreign nationals reasonably believed to be outside the United States, which have never required a warrant, and should not require a warrant on the basis of the incidental path that a particular message took to get to its destination.
Since the law is specifically worded to concern foreign intelligence (which intrinsically and specifically means non-domestic intelligence collection) and foreign nationals outside the United States, it appears there is a disconnect between the update to FISA and your understanding of it. If you believe that the "reasonably believed" wording is to allow for wiggle room so that the government can spy on anyone, you're completely wrong, as "reasonable" is a standard that courts apply routinely; i.e., it would have to be pretty darned apparent that the subject of the monitoring is almost certainly outside of the United States, and that there wouldn't be any reason to believe they are anywhere else. It's not just a matter of someone declaring that someone is outside the United States even when they're really not and then monitoring them. But since you can't guarantee that, the wording allows for reasonable leeway.
Should the government have the power to compel access to the communication networks and records of a US company or US citizen without a warrant?
To be clear - and I know you know this, but I want to make it clear for others who may not understand - that's not what this addresses. This addresses the monitoring of the entirety of content of communication between parties outside of the United States. This has always been legal and does not require a warrant, never has, and never should.
But to answer your question: if you are speaking of information about records that define only start and end points of a communication, but NOT the content of the communication (e.g., telephone numbers dialed or calls received), such records constitute a "pen register", which does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, and which therefore does not require a warrant (Smith v. Maryland, 442 US 735 (1979)). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, often cited as the most liberal appeals court, found that IP addresses visited and to/from addresses on emails (but again, not the content of the communication) constitutes a pen register and therefore does not require a warrant (US v. Forrester (2007)).
On this basis, no, I do not believe that such monitoring legally requires a warrant.
Monitoring of foreign communications has never required a warrant, nor should it. This simply reflects the current technological state of affairs with respect to foreign signals intelligence.
If you believe that foreign signals intelligence should be burdened with warrant requirements because it incidentally travels through the United States, then we're in disagreement.
This is an update to a law so that intelligence agencies can reasonably execute their longstanding foreign intelligence roles within the law. If you believe that someone is secretly going to be arbitrarily declaring everyone "foreigners outside of the United States" even when they're not - in other words, completely ignoring and running afoul of the wording or spirit of any law - then they could be doing that anyway, regardless of what any law says.
There is absolutely nothing wrong with intelligence monitoring of foreign communications. Because modern technology means that some of these communications may travel through US communications equipment does not suddenly mean that they should be saddled with warrant process requirements and everything else that implies. It is simply not practical, and it flies in the face of the very purpose and methods of foreign intelligence collection.
The naïveté here is yours.
I'm not ignoring anything.
The 72 hours later bit for FISA is irrelevant.
This unnecessarily saddles foreign intelligence gathering, which has never required a warrant for good reason, with warrant requirements.
Again, see this article for a brief overview of the issues.
Monitoring this kind of traffic should not require a warrant process of any kind, period. It flies in the face of the method and purpose of foreign signals intelligence. It's that simple. You can refuse to understand that if you wish.
How is that a problem? It would seem to me that it would be easier to tap that way.
... ?
Uh, it is, but when that happens, it requires a warrant.
Monitoring of communication between two parties outside the United States does not require a warrant, and never will. But because of today's technology, sometimes that traffic can flow through the United States.
Which suddenly means it is subject to the warrant requirements.
Which it shouldn't be.
And
FISA allows up to 72 hours AFTER the event to get a warrant. Even in your scenario, there doesn't seem to be a problem.
Yes. There is.
The monitoring of such communications has never required a warrant, but now increasingly does require one, crippling foreign signals intelligence with warrant requirements because FISA didn't foresee the realities of modern communications.
Again, FISA allows up to 72 hours AFTER the even to get a warrant.
I'm going to have to trust our Founding Fathers on this one.
Fascism begins when the efficiency of the Government becomes more important than the Rights of the People.
Requiring the FISA process, even retroactively, on all foreign signals intelligence collection completely cripples that capability.
This has nothing to do with the founding fathers or fascism. It has to do with updating a law to reflect today's reality. And by "today's reality" I don't mean "post-9/11"; I mean the fact that more foreign communication that never had warrant requirements suddenly does because of the way traffic is routed. Crippling our intelligence capability because of what amounts to a technological technicality is foolish.
Thankfully Congress agrees.
What about the violating the laws of the countries where these wiretaps are made? Or does the US always request the required warrants from the local courts before they go about their business? As a citizen under the star circled banner, I'm not crazy about the idea of being monitored by your loonie government only because unwarranted wiretaps happen legal in your country.
First, unwarranted wiretaps do NOT "happen legal in [our] country". That's the whole point of updating the FISA law: monitoring the content of communications between parties within the United States DOES require a warrant. Monitoring of foreign communications does not, and never will.
This is about the monitoring of FOREIGN communications (which may incidentally physically travel through the United States) not needing a warrant. And no, the US, nor any other country, does not comply with other nations' laws when it does intelligence gathering. That's the purpose of foreign intelligence, and all nations will always do it. Nations spy on their friends, enemies, neighbors, and anything else they can get their hands on, and this will never change.
This is utter BS, intended to distract from the actual argument. The effect of this new wiretapping law is to permit warrantless surveillance of United States citizens in their homes. This is why we object to it.
No. This does not permit this at all, in any way, shape, or form.
You are mistaken as to what this law does, and why.
You want a law clarifying that foreign surveillance, performed overseas, doesn't require warrants when the communication happens to be routed through the US? Then pass that law, not the one you are supporting to which we object.That you conflate the two indicates willful blindness or the purest ignorance this world knows.
Wrong. It's very clear what this law does.
It allows monitoring of communication between parties outside the United States by US intelligence services, even if the traffic is passing through the United States, without a warrant.
If you believe warrantless surveillance performed upon the citizens of a state by that state's police force are not an extremely dangerous tool used to consolidate power in the hands of the government, then you clearly haven't got even an inkling of what history is.
Except this isn't for surveillance of "the citizens". It's for surveillance of persons outside the United States. The law and wording are clear, and if you choose to jump to conclusions that can't even reasonably be drawn from its clearly stated purpose and intent, that's your problem.
The technological situation is exactly the problem, yes.
We need to be able to monitor foreign communications, without a warrant, including those that may be incidentally traveling through the United States.
This is a problem that will never be solved, because, with today's technology, it may not be apparent where the ends of a conversation are.
The two issues you note are inextricably intertwined. The only practical way to intercept the kind of communication the NSA is looking for is to do exactly what they're doing. That's the technological reality.
So we can choose to monitor none of this communication, or make good faith efforts to cherry-pick only foreign communications when it can be reasonably asserted as such. I choose the latter, no matter which party controls the White House or Congress.
When they say any communication of any kind between any two people, including US citizens, can be actively and substantively monitored and targeted, then I'll raise the alarm. Until then, this is an update to an old law to reflect the practical technological capabilities at hand.
If it has "gone on for decades", then what is the problem NOW?
Why and How has the existing system suddenly failed?
This system failed because more and more foreign communication is traveling through equipment physically within the United States.
Under the current law, monitoring of such communication, which never required (and shouldn't require) a warrant, suddenly requires a warrant, because of the incidental fact that some of the traffic travels through the US.
This fixes that critical problem.
See this article for a brief overview.
The fallacy is that you apparently, by your statements, are asserting foreign SIGINT doesn't work, because if we have that capability, we should have been able to "win" the war on drugs.
You have said that twice now. It is fallacious to draw that conclusion. That's the fallacy. No lies; sorry to disappoint.
And claiming that you don't know your history is an easy claim to make if you think foreign signals intelligence hasn't worked.
Lastly, we're not even talking about drugs, and you chose to bring it up. Newsflash: it's not a binary game. You don't have to completely eradicate something to successfully fight against it. This is completely separate from either of our opinions on drugs.
You said:
If warrants are no longer necessary to wiretap, where exactly is the check to see if the people being wiretapped are foreign nationals? The whole point of a warrant is to make sure that a requested invasive measure is being applied properly.
Now you say:
I didn't say anything about "all foreign signals intelligence". The issue here is monitoring communications by individuals inside the United States.
No, it's not, at all.
It's about monitoring communications by individuals outside the United States, where the traffic may incidentally flow through communications or networking equipment inside the United States.
Under the current law, that requires a warrant. Even if all parties to the communication are foreign nationals outside of the United States. That's ridiculous, and is something that the current law never could have foreseen. Monitoring such communication does not require a warrant, and this fixes the issue where the communication may incidentally travel through equipment physically within the US.
There should be some sort of process before you go recording phone calls from a particular address. If that address is the Chinese embassy, it shouldn't be that hard to make the case. If it's some random suburb in the midwest, I'd like to think that there's some process to ensure that the person is actually foreign, and doesn't just have dark skin and a beard.
The problem here is that you assume the warrant is the only acceptable "check". That's the thing that is crippling foreign intelligence gathering that falls into this category now. The "check" happens within the intelligence community itself. If both parties are reasonably believed to be outside of the United States, but the traffic is traveling through equipment in the United States, no warrant is required. If it's not clear (i.e., not "reasonable" to believe), or if the parties are inside the United States, a warrant is required.
If your next response is along the lines of, "Well, how can we trust them to do the right thing?" I'd ask, even with a warrant, how can you trust them to do the right thing? I mean, really. And then, how can you trust the FISA court? Maybe we should have another court to check to see if FISA is really doing what you want. The answer is that there is Congressional oversight of the intelligence services. Some, myself included, don't think it's enough, but that, in addition to the processes built into the foreign SIGINT collection, is where the "check" lies.
The only "solution" would be to require all such monitoring of communication have an associated warrant, because, by the logic you are using, that's the only way to "check" if the monitoring is allowable. But that's ridiculous. See the problem, here? And no, it's not simple, efficient, or even useful to saddle all foreign SIGINT with warrant requirements.