Christian Creationism has no place in the classroom (save for perhaps a religion class).
Intelligent Design != Creationism (even though some Creationists have co-opted the term, attempting to cloak promotion of Creationism in pseudoscience).
Intelligent Design certainly has a place in the classroom.
But not the biology or science classrooms. I'd hope that we've evolved, no pun intended, to the point that we can agree that this might belong in, say, a philosophy classroom. To say that it wholesale "doesn't belong in the classroom" is, I think, a disservice to honest discussions about our existence, further complicated by Creationists who want to do away with the theory and science of evolution completely.
While I fully acknowledge that there are Creationists out there who quite literally believe the Bible's version of the creation of the Earth and our species, and indeed the universe, reject evolution out-of-hand, and ignorantly stand steadfastly against science, there is an actual place for philosophical debate about why we're here.
"Intelligent design", not in a form that has been co-opted by anti-evolution Creationists and people who think pi should be equal to exactly 3, has a place in this debate.
Does it have a place in a biology class? No.
Does it have a place in a philosophy class? Absolutely.
I rather liked this sequence from Star Trek: The Next Generation, in which Patrick Stewart elegantly sums up my, and likely many others', thoughts on this matter.
DATA: I have a question, sir. What is death?
PICARD: Oh, is that all?
You've picked probably the most difficult of all questions, Data.
[There is the beginning of a twinkle in Picard's eyes again. It is the sort of question that his mind loves.]
Some explain it by inventing gods wearing their own form...and argue that the purpose of the entire universe is to maintain themselves in their present form in an Earth-like garden which will give them pleasure through all eternity. And at the other extreme, assuming that is an "extreme," are those who prefer the idea of our blinking into nothingness with all our experiences, hopes and dreams only an illusion.
DATA: Which do you believe?
PICARD: Considering the marvelous complexity of our universe, its clockwork perfection, its balances of this against that... matter, energy, gravitation, time, dimension, pattern, I believe our existence must mean more than a meaningless illusion. I prefer to believe that my and your existence goes beyond Euclidian and other "practical" measuring systems... and that, in ways we cannot yet fathom, our existence is part of a reality beyond what we understand now as reality.
It's unfortunate that rabid anti-science Creationists have bastardized this debate, so that we can't really have a frank discussion about the science and theory of evolution on a backdrop of philosophical questions about how and why we're here.
In my 7th grade biology class, I'll never forget a kid raising his hand during the section on evolution and asking, "What about the Bible?" After a pause, the teacher replied, quite simply, "Well, some might say the Bible tells what God did, and science explains how he did it." Whether or not you agree fundamentally with religion in any form, it was a concise, non-confrontational answer to an honest question.
I do find it interesting the links that the submitter chose. For instance, a link of a center attempting to discredit Darwinian evolution was picked for "Intelligent Design" (in an obvious attempt to elicit a certain reaction), while the Wikipedia link was picked for Creationism. Why not pick the Wikipedia link for Intelligent Design, too, which describes in a pretty unbiased fashion what it generally is? Intelligent Design might not be science, but it certainly has a place in philosophy. And further, Intelligent Design and Creationism are NOT the same thing. That some Creationists have co-opted the term is unfortunate, but still doesn't make Creationism equal to Intelligent Design.
And is it any surprise that an agent of the Catholic Church condemns evolution? I mean, come on, people...is this really news? Why don't we have a front page slashdot story about what the Muslim Brotherhood believes?
Intelligent Design, at its most basic level, asks that with all the beauty, wonder, and astounding perfection that make up the physical world around us, and indeed the science itself which proves it to be more and more elegant as time goes on, might there possibly be a force that surpasses our understanding that has allowed for, or caused, its, and our, creation? Is this provable? Nope. Is it
From: Kim Christensen (kichrist) [mailto:kichrist@cisco.com%5D Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2005 11:58 AM Subject: CISCO - CCO Passwords
Dear Cisco Partner,
I'd like to bring your attention to an issue thatmay cause minor inconvenience for customers and partners.
You may experience issues with yourlogin to www.cisco.com
You will be required to reset your password, please send an email to cco-locksmith@cisco.com from the same email address that is associated with your CCO userid. Within a few minutes you should receive a new working password back to that same email address.
Please note that when you send an email to cco-locksmith@cisco.com - the only requirement is that the email is sent from the same email address associated with your userid to receive the return email with the new password. Once this is received you should be able to reset your password to one of your own choosing.
It ispossible that you are not impacted by this issue but I wanted to ensure you are aware of this in the event you have a problem logging into CCO today.
Also, the "major flaws" could only be referring to two things:
- flaws that have already been long fixed (six months before Black Hat), that Lynn, in his opinion, didn't believe Cisco identified as "critical enough" to its customers, but nonetheless, as I already said, are fixed; or
- general IOS flaws that will only materialize for architectural reasons in the next major iteration of Cisco's routers that Lynn felt it was important enough to have a frank discussion about, but are not yet shipping.
In other words, Cisco's technical response was such that the vulnerabilities in shipping products are already fixed, and the vulnerability Lynn claims is a real killer allegedly exists in products that aren't even shipping yet and won't be for some time; it flies in the face of logic to believe that Cisco would ignore such vulnerabilities in yet-to-ship products, once identified. Yes, Cisco didn't believe it at first, but it sent engineering staff, and were proven wrong. One can only assume the engineer Cisco sent for the very purpose of confirming this general issue in turn confirmed to Cisco that the problem was indeed real.
Furthermore, it's likely that Lynn broke no law (save possible civil violations of contract and/or trade secret provisions), so any FBI investigation, if not over already, is moot. Ironically, several members of the government, including possibly Air Force OSI and/or NSA congratulated Lynn after his talk at Black Hat, even giving him a challenge coin for his work. Don't worry: Lynn's work isn't lost on those who value security, but don't presume that there is a huge conspiracy just because someone was willing to quit his job to reveal the secrets of a sometime-competitor. A little more of the Cisco/ISS background in this issue - including what I would consider fairly questionably motivated references by ISS about this flaw being Cisco's "Witty" - is provided in the earlier Wired interview.
I do not see the NLRB ruling as breaking any new ground. I will concede that NLRB inaction on this issue could be construed as giving more latitude to employers in this arena. However, isn't it reasonable, and indeed logical, to presume that the any anti-fraternization provision is designed as such precisely because such activity frequently does affect work performance? And if the NLRB mandated that a work performance clause be specifically added, if the employer is the ultimate authority on the work performance standard, how is this really any different?
Further, while the previous court decisions and precedent weren't identical, I don't see any fundamentally new feature with regard to an employer's requirements of their employees, as long as a protected status (i.e., protected class, Section 7, etc.) is not being violated. Employers are generally fairly free to terminate most types of employees for any or no reason, so I fail to see how an anti-fratnerization provision has any bearing on the issue in that context.
Look, I'm not saying that employers should unfairly, arbitrarily, and vindictively fire people at random. But employers can and must be able to terminate employees essentially at will. There is no inherent right to work, regardless of how important employment might tangentially be to our actual rights.
I should also note that the uniform provisions section of the ruling makes very specific reference relating to whether or not a uniform may be worn when in an off-duty capacity for ANY activity, NOT just for solicitation.
The judge orginally stated:
"I find the provision to be sufficiently clear on its face to advise employees that they should not engage in unofficial business while in uniform. This implies that such activities are permissible provided they are not in uniform [...]"
...which was overturned by the NLRB as being too vague. I find it to be exceedingly clear, but regardless, the NLRB wants to make it clear that Section 7 activities are allowed...which is what this is all about right?
Right?
I mean, you're not actually saying that employers can't damned well set any guidelines they please for employment (as long as it does not violate a protected class or status), are you? Because they can. This whole submission - the original article, the labor site that was linked to - all talks about this being chilling to the formation of labor unions. Not who you can have a beer with after work. Because, see, you have a right to form a union, which has not been impinged, and in fact, has been dutifully upheld. Such behavior is not grounds for termination.
You also have a right to start fucking one of your coworkers. Or having a beer after work. Or playing poker. Or all of the above. But if your employer, for whatever reason, chooses to prohibit such activity, and they find out about it, and enforce it, this was, is, and will continue to be, allowable. To say nothing of the fact that being an at-will employee allows for termination for pretty much ANY reason. That's the problem with labor advocates: they erroneously believe that you have a right to work, or a right to continue to work at a particular job.
I'm sorry, but in the context of the submission - i.e., that there was a new ruling - it must. Because the only new order in the ruling deals with in-uniform provisions (which were overturned), while the submission claims that a new ruling prohibits off-duty fraternization. Since there is only one new order in the ruling, that's what the submitter must be talking about.
Another poster kept telling me the ruling had nothing to do with "in-uniform" provisions. I could not understand why that would be the case, as it was central to the ruling, and the only thing that was actually overturned (i.e., where the NLRB took affirmative, definable action). The in-uniform provisions included ALL off-duty activity, including solicitation and all other interaction with clients.
I did err when I said that the ruling had to do with in-uniform, off-duty fraternization. It actually has to do with ALL in-uniform, off-duty activity (though it is admittedly irrelevant, and separate from the other, specific fraternization issue in the ruling, for which no new action at all was taken, and since the submitter was posting as if this were a new issue or decision, he must be talking about the only issue that actually is new in the ruling. Right? Otherwise the submission makes no sense. Because the off-duty fraternization issue is not new: previous court decisions and NLRB rulings already allowed such employer provisions, and termination when such provisions are violated (providing Section 7 is not violated)).
My honest impression of your posts this entire time was that you were asserting the ruling had nothing to do with in-uniform issues, when that was almost exclusively the focus of the resultant order in the ruling. I could not understand how you could possibly continue to state that uniform provisions were not at issue, when that was section (1)(a) of the order.
If it is your concern that I stated that the original ruling regarded "fraternization while in Guardsmark uniform" as opposed to "solicitation in Guardsmark uniform", while ignoring the anti-fratnerization (without regard to uniform) provisions, then I really don't know what to say. You seem to be concerned that because the post was moderated up, people would read it and think that the ruling really only dealt with a uniform issue. However, that is the case. The actual order of the ruling, i.e,, the part of the ruling that took new action, did deal with the uniform issue. That is the part of the ruling order that caused Guardsmark to be require to post a notice that it was found to be in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, and explicitly inform employees that they are allowed to assemble and discuss and form unions, or not.
The fraternization (non-uniform) issue is a separate one, for which no action was taken and previous precedence was cited. If it is your opinion that this constitutes a NEW action, i.e., one that new slashdot readers should be concerned about, that is not the case. This ruling did not cause anti-fraternization provisions to become allowable. Previous NLRB and court decisions had already done that. If you think it is wrong, fine; that is certainly your right. But the slashdot submission makes it sound like a new decision was made regarding anti-fratnerization provisions by employers. That is untrue. A new decision has been made regarding in uniform provisions, including fraternization, solicitation, and any off-duty activity while in uniform. I.e., it is technically accurate to say that the only new decision to arise from this ruling is regarding off-duty, in-uniform activities.
If you want to believe I'm trolling, go ahead. I'm more than open about who I am; I'm not anonymous, and anyone is free to contact me directly via any number of means, all of which can be seen via my user page or by personal web page.
If you want to accuse me of having an agenda, I would say I have an agenda only as much as you yourself might, or the person who submitted the article might. Anyone who reads the ruling, as you yourself have, can see clearly that the decision is not designed to infringe on workers' Section 7 rights, which SPECIFICALLY deals with assembly, meeting, and other union activities. The net result is that Guardsmark has to make explicit statements to that effect.
While I am politically conservative, I am not a fundamentalist or evangelical religious advocate, and am not anti-abortion or anti-gay marriage. I did not vote for Bush (And no, I didn't vote for some off the wall right wing candidate or the libertarian candidate either. And yes, I did vote.) Your invocation of "working man" and "fair wage" tug at the heartstrings, but they don't address what a company might be able to do to maintain its existence in the United States when it might be an order of magnitude cheaper to produce the same product (or service) overseas. Implicit in all of this is my belief that employers, as I said before, must be able to terminate employees for all reasons except those universally thought to be protected reasons, e.g., protected classes, protected labor activity, and so on.
If your assertion that the NLRB's inaction on the anti-fratnerization issue - even as it repeatedly and pointedly states that Section 7 protections are critical - is really an underhanded tactic to allow employers easier tools to dismiss employees that may be attempting to form unions, I simply reject that premise. My initial response to this issue was no more sensationalist in terms of attempts to grab attention than the submission.
I'm going to add to the chorus of my own posts (which, to others who may be seeing my user page, are, yes, duplicated numerous times now):
This has everything to do with Section 7 of the NLRA! Employers are absolutely allowed to have anti-fratnerization rules as long as they do not infringe on workers' Section 7 rights, period. The NLRB took no new action, made no affirmative decision, with regard to anti-fratnerization rules save for to agree with the preexisting decision of a judge. The only substantive action taken by the ruling was in regard to the in-uniform provisions, and remedial actions for the employee handbook and general mechanisms for actively informing employees of changes. There were NO CHANGES made with respect to anything dealing with anti-fratnernization rules, which the ruling notes are already allowable by precedent! In other words, this ruling CHANGES NOTHING, which runs counter to the assertion of the submission.
Whether or not you agree with this is another story, but it is a prevailing condition at best, and definitely NOT a result of this ruling. Has the NLRB changed or reversed a previous position or precedent in this regard, I'd agree with you. But it didn't.
Since the parent is highly moderated and will be seen, I'll respond here, duplicating one of my other responses:
The ORDER of this ruling, which is the only substantive piece of the ruling, relates to in-uniform provisions. The NLRB took NO ACTION with regard to the fraternization decision, already made by a judge, noting simply that such provisions are not prohibited and that precedence exists for employers to maintain anti-fratnernization laws. In other words, the only positive, definable action taken by the NLRB was with regard to in-uniform rules, as can be seen in the order, and simply held the status quo, albeit with comment, with regard to allowed anti-fraternization rules.
In other words, a labor website picked this up, twisted it to mean something that it didn't by taking it WAYYYY overboard, then someone posted it to slashdot, no doubt awaiting the inevitable accusations of a conservative Republican corporatist conspiracy. The fact of the matter is that employers can maintain regulations, and can indeed terminate you if you do not adhere to them, period. The NLRB made NO AFFIRMATIVE DECISION in that regard, simply commenting that it jived with previous precedent (with a dissenting member), and did not reverse a judge's preexisting ruling. Section 7 provisions must be protected, and if you and others want to interpret this as an affront to Section 7, fine, but frankly, I'm in the philosophical camp that employers must be able to release employees for any reason (excluding reasons prohibited by e.g., protected classes, and so on), so we'll likely not agree here. Being employed at a particular place, or indeed being employed at all, is not a right.
No. Taking no action is not an affirmative action in this context.
The affirmative actions are what are listed in the section(s) of the ruling labeled "ORDER", period. If you don't want to believe that, fine. The bottom line is that anti-fratnerization rules were already allowable and remain allowable. There was already precedent before this complaint If you have a problem with that, that's fine, but there is nothing NEW - i'm not sure how to say this any clearer - with regard to employer anti-fraternization provisions.
To reiterate: if you want to be all up in arms that employers can have such rules, fine, but it wasn't this ruling that allowed it. And since the slashdot submission is talking about THIS RULING, it would seem to be somewhat relevant. Of course, if you want to derail the issue and accuse me of propaganda or some ideology (if you know what mine is, I'd love to hear it!), then go for it.
I'm getting tired of correcting people, but I feel I must so some mods don't go crazy.
The ORDER, i.e., the affirmative part of the ruling that actually does something and takes new action, revolves around the in-uniform issue (and remedial issues dealing with the employee handbook in this context). The fraternization issue was discussed in the ruling only because it was part of the original case that had already been decided by a judge. Such fraternization provisions are allowed, as long as they do not violate the NLRA or infringe upon workers' Section 7 rights. In other words, the provision was already legal, there was preexisting precedent, and no new action was taken. The NEW interpretive action taken regarded in-uniform activity only.
But if people want to get all up in arms that the NLRB incidentally mentioned in passing that something that was already legal and has legal precedent remains legal (that is, that employers are allowed to have and enforce anti-fratnerization rules as long as they do not infringe, specifically, on workers' Section 7 NLRA rights), then knock yourselves out.
As I have pointed out to several others now, the ORDER of the ruling only relates to in-uniform issues. That the ruling discusses the fraternization issue, in the form of noting that it does not violate the Act in its current form and taking to action on the judge's preexisting ruling, is incidental. In other words, the ruling in question (which is itself already over a year old - WTF?) takes NO NEW ACTION on the issue of worker fraternization rules, which are already legal and for which there is already precedent, as long as they do not infringe upon workers' Section 7 rights.
As I said in my second response to you, but I'll also post here so people will see it, the order of the ruling only concerned in-uniform issues and remedial action.
The "ruling" didn't "make it legal" for employers to fire you for having rules regarding off-duty fraternization. It already WAS legal - and a judge had already ruled in the Guardsmark case as such - and remains as such. No new orders were issued in that regard.
So I'm not admitting I'm wrong at all, because I'm not:
The submission trumpets like this is a "new" "ruling" that opens the floodgates for employers to start randomly prohibiting any contact whatever by employees after hours. However,
- This ruling itself was already over a year old, so I'm not sure why this is even rearing its head; - The order of the ruling deals with in-uniform issues and merely makes comment on the fraternization issue as being allowable; - Frankly, as long as it doesn't prohibit, infringe, or chill Section 7 rights, employers are absolutely allowed to prohibit interpersonal interaction/dating/etc. between employees. And, if an employer chooses to do that for whatever reason, you don't have to work there.
FYI, I already answered your question in another post (see my responses to you).
The ORDER of this ruling, which is the only substantive piece of the ruling, relates to in-uniform provisions. The NLRB took NO ACTION with regard to the fraternization decision, already made by a judge, noting simply that such provisions are not prohibited and that precedence exists for employers to maintain anti-fratnernization laws. In other words, the only positive, definable action taken by the NLRB was with regard to in-uniform rules, as can be seen in the order, and simply held the status quo, albeit with comment, with regard to allowed anti-fraternization rules.
In other words, a labor website picked this up, twisted it to mean something that it didn't by taking it WAYYYY overboard, then someone posted it to slashdot, no doubt awaiting the inevitable accusations of a conservative Republican corporatist conspiracy. The fact of the matter, spun, is that employers can maintain regulations, and can indeed terminate you if you do not adhere to them, period. The NLRB made NO AFFIRMATIVE DECISION in that regard, simply commenting that it jived with previous precedent, and did not reverse a judge's preexisting ruling. Section 7 provisions must be protected, and if you and others want to interpret this as an affront to Section 7, fine, but frankly, I'm in the philosophical camp that employers must be able to release employees for any reason (excluding reasons prohibited by e.g., protected classes, and so on), so we'll likely not agree here. Being employed at a particular place, or indeed being employed at all, is not a right.
You're not wrong, but that's not the order of the ruling. In the context of fraternization, the ruling discussed an already-made decision by a judge, which the NLRB did not reverse and for which it did not issue relevant orders.
The ORDER of the ruling relates exclusively to the in-uniform provisions and the employee handbook, and remedial action.
The SECTION of the ruling's discussion about fraternization, without regard to the separate uniform issue, simply reaffirmed the judge's existing decision and concluded that the ruling was not in violation of the NLRA, and further noted that the employer's fraternization provision would not reasonably be interpreted to limit or infringe upon Section 7 Activity, and that indeed, Section 7 activity is protected, as it is mentioned exceedingly numerous times elsewhere in the ruling, and in that section.
we do not believe that the Respondent's rule would reasonably tend to chill protected employee activity. The Respondent's proscrip-tion against fraternization appears alongside proscrip-tions on "dat[ing,] or becom[ing] overly friendly with the client's employees or with co-employees." That being so, we believe that employees would reasonably under-stand the rule to prohibit only personal entanglements, rather than activity protected by the Act. In our view, it would be an unreasonable stretch for an employee to infer that speaking to others about terms and conditions of employment is a "fraternization" that is condemned by the rule.
As I said in another response on this issue, and am repeating for the sake of expeditiousness here:
The entire ruling is laden with concern about not prohibiting protected Section 7 activity under the Act.
The NLRB ruling, which was affirming a decision that had already been made by a judge, is that an employer is perfectly with its rights to restrict off-duty personal fraternization between employees and clients and/or coworkers. This has already been established in multiple previous decisions, and is nothing even remotely new. Even the Guardsmark decision is over a year old.
Sorry, but this does not chill Section 7 rights, and in fact reaffirms, several times, Section 7 rights at multiple points throughout the ruling, including in the final Order.
I've already addressed that section of the ruling as well. It's very clear:
we do not believe that the Respondent's rule would reasonably tend to chill protected employee activity. The Respondent's proscrip-tion against fraternization appears alongside proscrip-tions on "dat[ing,] or becom[ing] overly friendly with the client's employees or with co-employees." That being so, we believe that employees would reasonably under-stand the rule to prohibit only personal entanglements, rather than activity protected by the Act. In our view, it would be an unreasonable stretch for an employee to infer that speaking to others about terms and conditions of employment is a "fraternization" that is condemned by the rule.
The entire ruling is laden with concern about not prohibiting protected Section 7 activity under the Act.
The NLRB ruling, which was affirming a decision that had already been made by a judge, is that an employer is perfectly with its rights to restrict off-duty personal fraternization between employees and clients and/or coworkers. This has already been established in multiple previous decisions, and is nothing even remotely new. Even the Guardsmark decision is over a year old.
Sorry, but this does not chill Section 7 rights, and in fact reaffirms, several times, Section 7 rights at multiple points throughout the ruling, including in the final Order.
we do not believe that the Respondent's rule would reasonably tend to chill protected employee activity. The Respondent's proscrip-tion against fraternization appears alongside proscrip-tions on "dat[ing,] or becom[ing] overly friendly with the client's employees or with co-employees." That being so, we believe that employees would reasonably understand the rule to prohibit only personal entanglements, rather than activity protected by the Act. In our view, it would be an unreasonable stretch for an employee to infer that speaking to others about terms and conditions of employment is a "fraternization" that is condemned by the rule.
Otherwise, I reserve the right to date, have sex with, go out with, hang out with, etc, with any of my co-workers when we are off the clock.
Not if it's affecting your work performance, and your employer knows it or reasonably believes that to be the case, you don't.
Or, rather, yes: you do have the "right" to do that. Who said you didn't?
The difference is that your employer doesn't have to keep you employed anymore, either, if the performance of your work suffers because of it. Being employed at a particular company, or any company, is not a right.
First of all, this ruling is over a year old, so I'm quite at a loss of why it's being trotted out now, if only for drama.
Second, it's pretty clear:
Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we do not believe that the Respondent's rule would reasonably tend to chill protected employee activity. The Respondent's proscrip-tion against fraternization appears alongside proscrip-tions on "dat[ing,] or becom[ing] overly friendly with the client's employees or with co-employees." That being so, we believe that employees would reasonably under-stand the rule to prohibit only personal entanglements, rather than activity protected by the Act. In our view, it would be an unreasonable stretch for an employee to infer that speaking to others about terms and conditions of employment is a "fraternization" that is condemned by the rule.
It is well established that employees have the right under Section 7 to engage in union solicitation on the employer's premises during nonwork time, unless the employer can demonstrate the need to limit the exercise of that right in order to maintain production or discipline. Republic Aviation Corporation v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945), citing Peyton Packing Co., 49 NLRB 828, 843-844 (1943), enfd. 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 323 U.S. 730 (1944).
There is a longstanding principle that is well-understood and acknowledged by the NLRB that employers MAY NOT interfere with employee's rights under section 7 of the Act.
However, if you're doing something - anything - that is significantly interfering with your, or others', workplace productivity, then you may be terminated.
How or why does this possibly come as a surprise? Further, if you're an at-will employee, you (generally) can be terminated at any time without cause.
The entire text of the over-year-old fraternization section of the ruling is below. Keep in mind that the NLRB was reviewing a decision that a judge already made determining that the rules, as applied, did not violate the act.
B. The Fraternization Rule The judge also concluded that the Respondent did not violate the Act by maintaining a work rule that directs employees not to "fraternize on duty or off duty, date[,] or become overly friendly with the client's employees or with co-employees." The judge reasoned that such a rule "does not on its face, or by reasonable implication, pre-clude activities protected by the Act." The General Counsel excepts, arguing that employees reasonably would understand the rule to prohibit activity protected by Section 7. We find no merit to this exception. The Respondent's rule is somewhat similar to a work rule we reviewed in Lafayette Park Hotel, supra, and found lawful. There, the employer's rule mandated that "[e]mployees are not allowed to fraternize with hotel guests anywhere on hotel property." 326 NLRB at 825. We concluded that the rule was lawful because employees would not reasonably read "this rule as prohibiting protected employee com-munications . . . about terms and conditions of employ-ment." Id. at 827. Although the Respondent's rule is not identical to the one in Lafayette Park Hotel, we find that any differences between the rules are not material and do not warrant a different outcome here. Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we do not believe that the Respondent's rule would reasonably tend to chill protected employee activity. The Respondent's proscrip-tion against fraternization appears alongside proscrip-tions on "dat[ing,] or becom[ing] overly friendly with the client's employees or with co-employees." That being so, we believe that employees would reasonably under-stand the rule to prohibit only personal entanglements, rather than activity protected by the Act. In our view, it would be an unreasonable stretch for an employee to infer that speaking to others about terms and conditions of employment is a "fraternization" that is condemned by the rule. As in Lutheran Heritage Village, our dissenting co
Yeah, it is interesting (since you're the one politicizing it) that the Clinton appointee thought it was just fine for Guardsmark employees to date and/or get "overly friendly with" clients and co-workers while in their work uniform.
Since, you know, that was the crux of the entire ruling: not that employees couldn't fraternize on their own time, but that employees couldn't do whatever the fuck they wanted while still in their Guardsmark uniform, implying that they are official representatives of Guardsmark.
Of course, since President Clinton himself had no problem with that sort of thing, I imagine it is "interesting".
Now can you explain how an employers has ANY right whatsoever to tell us what to do when we are off the clock?
Sure.
When you're still in your employer's uniform, especially that of a security company wishing to maintain its reputation as a professional organization, you shouldn't be going on dates with your clients.
Because this ruling was very specific and in a single case, and only applied to dating or fraternization off-duty with clients or coworkers while in their work uniforms.
Slashdot Mirror
Actually, I'd take issue with this.
Christian Creationism has no place in the classroom (save for perhaps a religion class).
Intelligent Design != Creationism (even though some Creationists have co-opted the term, attempting to cloak promotion of Creationism in pseudoscience).
Intelligent Design certainly has a place in the classroom.
But not the biology or science classrooms. I'd hope that we've evolved, no pun intended, to the point that we can agree that this might belong in, say, a philosophy classroom. To say that it wholesale "doesn't belong in the classroom" is, I think, a disservice to honest discussions about our existence, further complicated by Creationists who want to do away with the theory and science of evolution completely.
While I fully acknowledge that there are Creationists out there who quite literally believe the Bible's version of the creation of the Earth and our species, and indeed the universe, reject evolution out-of-hand, and ignorantly stand steadfastly against science, there is an actual place for philosophical debate about why we're here.
"Intelligent design", not in a form that has been co-opted by anti-evolution Creationists and people who think pi should be equal to exactly 3, has a place in this debate.
Does it have a place in a biology class? No.
Does it have a place in a philosophy class? Absolutely.
I rather liked this sequence from Star Trek: The Next Generation, in which Patrick Stewart elegantly sums up my, and likely many others', thoughts on this matter.
DATA: I have a question, sir. What is death?
PICARD: Oh, is that all?
You've picked probably the most difficult of all questions, Data.
[There is the beginning of a twinkle in Picard's eyes again. It is the sort of question that his mind loves.]
Some explain it by inventing gods wearing their own form...and argue that the purpose of the entire universe is to maintain themselves in their present form in an Earth-like garden which will give them pleasure through all eternity. And at the other extreme, assuming that is an "extreme," are those who prefer the idea of our blinking into nothingness with all our experiences, hopes and dreams only an illusion.
DATA: Which do you believe?
PICARD: Considering the marvelous complexity of our universe, its clockwork perfection, its balances of this against that... matter, energy, gravitation, time, dimension, pattern, I believe our existence must mean more than a meaningless illusion. I prefer to believe that my and your existence goes beyond Euclidian and other "practical" measuring systems... and that, in ways we cannot yet fathom, our existence is part of a reality beyond what we understand now as reality.
It's unfortunate that rabid anti-science Creationists have bastardized this debate, so that we can't really have a frank discussion about the science and theory of evolution on a backdrop of philosophical questions about how and why we're here.
In my 7th grade biology class, I'll never forget a kid raising his hand during the section on evolution and asking, "What about the Bible?" After a pause, the teacher replied, quite simply, "Well, some might say the Bible tells what God did, and science explains how he did it." Whether or not you agree fundamentally with religion in any form, it was a concise, non-confrontational answer to an honest question.
I do find it interesting the links that the submitter chose. For instance, a link of a center attempting to discredit Darwinian evolution was picked for "Intelligent Design" (in an obvious attempt to elicit a certain reaction), while the Wikipedia link was picked for Creationism. Why not pick the Wikipedia link for Intelligent Design, too, which describes in a pretty unbiased fashion what it generally is? Intelligent Design might not be science, but it certainly has a place in philosophy. And further, Intelligent Design and Creationism are NOT the same thing. That some Creationists have co-opted the term is unfortunate, but still doesn't make Creationism equal to Intelligent Design.
And is it any surprise that an agent of the Catholic Church condemns evolution? I mean, come on, people...is this really news? Why don't we have a front page slashdot story about what the Muslim Brotherhood believes?
Intelligent Design, at its most basic level, asks that with all the beauty, wonder, and astounding perfection that make up the physical world around us, and indeed the science itself which proves it to be more and more elegant as time goes on, might there possibly be a force that surpasses our understanding that has allowed for, or caused, its, and our, creation? Is this provable? Nope. Is it
From: Kim Christensen (kichrist) [mailto:kichrist@cisco.com%5D
Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2005 11:58 AM
Subject: CISCO - CCO Passwords
Dear Cisco Partner,
I'd like to bring your attention to an issue thatmay cause minor inconvenience for customers and partners.
You may experience issues with yourlogin to www.cisco.com
You will be required to reset your password, please send an email to cco-locksmith@cisco.com from the same email address that is associated with your CCO userid. Within a few minutes you should receive a new working password back to that same email address.
Please note that when you send an email to cco-locksmith@cisco.com - the only requirement is that the email is sent from the same email address associated with your userid to receive the return email with the new password. Once this is received you should be able to reset your password to one of your own choosing.
It ispossible that you are not impacted by this issue but I wanted to ensure you are aware of this in the event you have a problem logging into CCO today.
Your Cisco Channel Team
And Mike Lynn already settled with Cisco, but I suppose it's par for the course to get in one more jab.
Also, the "major flaws" could only be referring to two things:
- flaws that have already been long fixed (six months before Black Hat), that Lynn, in his opinion, didn't believe Cisco identified as "critical enough" to its customers, but nonetheless, as I already said, are fixed; or
- general IOS flaws that will only materialize for architectural reasons in the next major iteration of Cisco's routers that Lynn felt it was important enough to have a frank discussion about, but are not yet shipping.
In other words, Cisco's technical response was such that the vulnerabilities in shipping products are already fixed, and the vulnerability Lynn claims is a real killer allegedly exists in products that aren't even shipping yet and won't be for some time; it flies in the face of logic to believe that Cisco would ignore such vulnerabilities in yet-to-ship products, once identified. Yes, Cisco didn't believe it at first, but it sent engineering staff, and were proven wrong. One can only assume the engineer Cisco sent for the very purpose of confirming this general issue in turn confirmed to Cisco that the problem was indeed real.
Furthermore, it's likely that Lynn broke no law (save possible civil violations of contract and/or trade secret provisions), so any FBI investigation, if not over already, is moot. Ironically, several members of the government, including possibly Air Force OSI and/or NSA congratulated Lynn after his talk at Black Hat, even giving him a challenge coin for his work. Don't worry: Lynn's work isn't lost on those who value security, but don't presume that there is a huge conspiracy just because someone was willing to quit his job to reveal the secrets of a sometime-competitor. A little more of the Cisco/ISS background in this issue - including what I would consider fairly questionably motivated references by ISS about this flaw being Cisco's "Witty" - is provided in the earlier Wired interview.
I think this is a matter of interpretation.
I do not see the NLRB ruling as breaking any new ground. I will concede that NLRB inaction on this issue could be construed as giving more latitude to employers in this arena. However, isn't it reasonable, and indeed logical, to presume that the any anti-fraternization provision is designed as such precisely because such activity frequently does affect work performance? And if the NLRB mandated that a work performance clause be specifically added, if the employer is the ultimate authority on the work performance standard, how is this really any different?
Further, while the previous court decisions and precedent weren't identical, I don't see any fundamentally new feature with regard to an employer's requirements of their employees, as long as a protected status (i.e., protected class, Section 7, etc.) is not being violated. Employers are generally fairly free to terminate most types of employees for any or no reason, so I fail to see how an anti-fratnerization provision has any bearing on the issue in that context.
Look, I'm not saying that employers should unfairly, arbitrarily, and vindictively fire people at random. But employers can and must be able to terminate employees essentially at will. There is no inherent right to work, regardless of how important employment might tangentially be to our actual rights.
The judge orginally stated:
"I find the provision to be sufficiently clear on its face to advise employees that they should not engage in unofficial business while in uniform. This implies that such activities are permissible provided they are not in uniform [...]"
...which was overturned by the NLRB as being too vague. I find it to be exceedingly clear, but regardless, the NLRB wants to make it clear that Section 7 activities are allowed...which is what this is all about right?
Right?
I mean, you're not actually saying that employers can't damned well set any guidelines they please for employment (as long as it does not violate a protected class or status), are you? Because they can. This whole submission - the original article, the labor site that was linked to - all talks about this being chilling to the formation of labor unions. Not who you can have a beer with after work. Because, see, you have a right to form a union, which has not been impinged, and in fact, has been dutifully upheld. Such behavior is not grounds for termination.
You also have a right to start fucking one of your coworkers. Or having a beer after work. Or playing poker. Or all of the above. But if your employer, for whatever reason, chooses to prohibit such activity, and they find out about it, and enforce it, this was, is, and will continue to be, allowable. To say nothing of the fact that being an at-will employee allows for termination for pretty much ANY reason. That's the problem with labor advocates: they erroneously believe that you have a right to work, or a right to continue to work at a particular job.
You don't.
I'm sorry, but in the context of the submission - i.e., that there was a new ruling - it must. Because the only new order in the ruling deals with in-uniform provisions (which were overturned), while the submission claims that a new ruling prohibits off-duty fraternization. Since there is only one new order in the ruling, that's what the submitter must be talking about.
Absurd?
Only as absurd as the submission. Further explanation here.
If you, or anyone else, would like to discuss this further, please feel free to contact me via email.
Another poster kept telling me the ruling had nothing to do with "in-uniform" provisions. I could not understand why that would be the case, as it was central to the ruling, and the only thing that was actually overturned (i.e., where the NLRB took affirmative, definable action). The in-uniform provisions included ALL off-duty activity, including solicitation and all other interaction with clients.
I did err when I said that the ruling had to do with in-uniform, off-duty fraternization. It actually has to do with ALL in-uniform, off-duty activity (though it is admittedly irrelevant, and separate from the other, specific fraternization issue in the ruling, for which no new action at all was taken, and since the submitter was posting as if this were a new issue or decision, he must be talking about the only issue that actually is new in the ruling. Right? Otherwise the submission makes no sense. Because the off-duty fraternization issue is not new: previous court decisions and NLRB rulings already allowed such employer provisions, and termination when such provisions are violated (providing Section 7 is not violated)).
My honest impression of your posts this entire time was that you were asserting the ruling had nothing to do with in-uniform issues, when that was almost exclusively the focus of the resultant order in the ruling. I could not understand how you could possibly continue to state that uniform provisions were not at issue, when that was section (1)(a) of the order.
If it is your concern that I stated that the original ruling regarded "fraternization while in Guardsmark uniform" as opposed to "solicitation in Guardsmark uniform", while ignoring the anti-fratnerization (without regard to uniform) provisions, then I really don't know what to say. You seem to be concerned that because the post was moderated up, people would read it and think that the ruling really only dealt with a uniform issue. However, that is the case. The actual order of the ruling, i.e,, the part of the ruling that took new action, did deal with the uniform issue. That is the part of the ruling order that caused Guardsmark to be require to post a notice that it was found to be in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, and explicitly inform employees that they are allowed to assemble and discuss and form unions, or not.
The fraternization (non-uniform) issue is a separate one, for which no action was taken and previous precedence was cited. If it is your opinion that this constitutes a NEW action, i.e., one that new slashdot readers should be concerned about, that is not the case. This ruling did not cause anti-fraternization provisions to become allowable. Previous NLRB and court decisions had already done that. If you think it is wrong, fine; that is certainly your right. But the slashdot submission makes it sound like a new decision was made regarding anti-fratnerization provisions by employers. That is untrue. A new decision has been made regarding in uniform provisions, including fraternization, solicitation, and any off-duty activity while in uniform. I.e., it is technically accurate to say that the only new decision to arise from this ruling is regarding off-duty, in-uniform activities.
If you want to believe I'm trolling, go ahead. I'm more than open about who I am; I'm not anonymous, and anyone is free to contact me directly via any number of means, all of which can be seen via my user page or by personal web page.
If you want to accuse me of having an agenda, I would say I have an agenda only as much as you yourself might, or the person who submitted the article might. Anyone who reads the ruling, as you yourself have, can see clearly that the decision is not designed to infringe on workers' Section 7 rights, which SPECIFICALLY deals with assembly, meeting, and other union activities. The net result is that Guardsmark has to make explicit statements to that effect.
While I am politically conservative, I am not a fundamentalist or evangelical religious advocate, and am not anti-abortion or anti-gay marriage. I did not vote for Bush (And no, I didn't vote for some off the wall right wing candidate or the libertarian candidate either. And yes, I did vote.) Your invocation of "working man" and "fair wage" tug at the heartstrings, but they don't address what a company might be able to do to maintain its existence in the United States when it might be an order of magnitude cheaper to produce the same product (or service) overseas. Implicit in all of this is my belief that employers, as I said before, must be able to terminate employees for all reasons except those universally thought to be protected reasons, e.g., protected classes, protected labor activity, and so on.
If your assertion that the NLRB's inaction on the anti-fratnerization issue - even as it repeatedly and pointedly states that Section 7 protections are critical - is really an underhanded tactic to allow employers easier tools to dismiss employees that may be attempting to form unions, I simply reject that premise. My initial response to this issue was no more sensationalist in terms of attempts to grab attention than the submission.
I'm going to add to the chorus of my own posts (which, to others who may be seeing my user page, are, yes, duplicated numerous times now):
This has everything to do with Section 7 of the NLRA! Employers are absolutely allowed to have anti-fratnerization rules as long as they do not infringe on workers' Section 7 rights, period. The NLRB took no new action, made no affirmative decision, with regard to anti-fratnerization rules save for to agree with the preexisting decision of a judge. The only substantive action taken by the ruling was in regard to the in-uniform provisions, and remedial actions for the employee handbook and general mechanisms for actively informing employees of changes. There were NO CHANGES made with respect to anything dealing with anti-fratnernization rules, which the ruling notes are already allowable by precedent! In other words, this ruling CHANGES NOTHING, which runs counter to the assertion of the submission.
Whether or not you agree with this is another story, but it is a prevailing condition at best, and definitely NOT a result of this ruling. Has the NLRB changed or reversed a previous position or precedent in this regard, I'd agree with you. But it didn't.
Since the parent is highly moderated and will be seen, I'll respond here, duplicating one of my other responses:
The ORDER of this ruling, which is the only substantive piece of the ruling, relates to in-uniform provisions. The NLRB took NO ACTION with regard to the fraternization decision, already made by a judge, noting simply that such provisions are not prohibited and that precedence exists for employers to maintain anti-fratnernization laws. In other words, the only positive, definable action taken by the NLRB was with regard to in-uniform rules, as can be seen in the order, and simply held the status quo, albeit with comment, with regard to allowed anti-fraternization rules.
In other words, a labor website picked this up, twisted it to mean something that it didn't by taking it WAYYYY overboard, then someone posted it to slashdot, no doubt awaiting the inevitable accusations of a conservative Republican corporatist conspiracy. The fact of the matter is that employers can maintain regulations, and can indeed terminate you if you do not adhere to them, period. The NLRB made NO AFFIRMATIVE DECISION in that regard, simply commenting that it jived with previous precedent (with a dissenting member), and did not reverse a judge's preexisting ruling. Section 7 provisions must be protected, and if you and others want to interpret this as an affront to Section 7, fine, but frankly, I'm in the philosophical camp that employers must be able to release employees for any reason (excluding reasons prohibited by e.g., protected classes, and so on), so we'll likely not agree here. Being employed at a particular place, or indeed being employed at all, is not a right.
No. Taking no action is not an affirmative action in this context.
The affirmative actions are what are listed in the section(s) of the ruling labeled "ORDER", period. If you don't want to believe that, fine. The bottom line is that anti-fratnerization rules were already allowable and remain allowable. There was already precedent before this complaint If you have a problem with that, that's fine, but there is nothing NEW - i'm not sure how to say this any clearer - with regard to employer anti-fraternization provisions.
To reiterate: if you want to be all up in arms that employers can have such rules, fine, but it wasn't this ruling that allowed it. And since the slashdot submission is talking about THIS RULING, it would seem to be somewhat relevant. Of course, if you want to derail the issue and accuse me of propaganda or some ideology (if you know what mine is, I'd love to hear it!), then go for it.
I'm getting tired of correcting people, but I feel I must so some mods don't go crazy.
The ORDER, i.e., the affirmative part of the ruling that actually does something and takes new action, revolves around the in-uniform issue (and remedial issues dealing with the employee handbook in this context). The fraternization issue was discussed in the ruling only because it was part of the original case that had already been decided by a judge. Such fraternization provisions are allowed, as long as they do not violate the NLRA or infringe upon workers' Section 7 rights. In other words, the provision was already legal, there was preexisting precedent, and no new action was taken. The NEW interpretive action taken regarded in-uniform activity only.
But if people want to get all up in arms that the NLRB incidentally mentioned in passing that something that was already legal and has legal precedent remains legal (that is, that employers are allowed to have and enforce anti-fratnerization rules as long as they do not infringe, specifically, on workers' Section 7 NLRA rights), then knock yourselves out.
No, I am not wrong.
As I have pointed out to several others now, the ORDER of the ruling only relates to in-uniform issues. That the ruling discusses the fraternization issue, in the form of noting that it does not violate the Act in its current form and taking to action on the judge's preexisting ruling, is incidental. In other words, the ruling in question (which is itself already over a year old - WTF?) takes NO NEW ACTION on the issue of worker fraternization rules, which are already legal and for which there is already precedent, as long as they do not infringe upon workers' Section 7 rights.
As I said in my second response to you, but I'll also post here so people will see it, the order of the ruling only concerned in-uniform issues and remedial action.
The "ruling" didn't "make it legal" for employers to fire you for having rules regarding off-duty fraternization. It already WAS legal - and a judge had already ruled in the Guardsmark case as such - and remains as such. No new orders were issued in that regard.
So I'm not admitting I'm wrong at all, because I'm not:
The submission trumpets like this is a "new" "ruling" that opens the floodgates for employers to start randomly prohibiting any contact whatever by employees after hours. However,
- This ruling itself was already over a year old, so I'm not sure why this is even rearing its head;
- The order of the ruling deals with in-uniform issues and merely makes comment on the fraternization issue as being allowable;
- Frankly, as long as it doesn't prohibit, infringe, or chill Section 7 rights, employers are absolutely allowed to prohibit interpersonal interaction/dating/etc. between employees. And, if an employer chooses to do that for whatever reason, you don't have to work there.
I'm not being dense.
FYI, I already answered your question in another post (see my responses to you).
The ORDER of this ruling, which is the only substantive piece of the ruling, relates to in-uniform provisions. The NLRB took NO ACTION with regard to the fraternization decision, already made by a judge, noting simply that such provisions are not prohibited and that precedence exists for employers to maintain anti-fratnernization laws. In other words, the only positive, definable action taken by the NLRB was with regard to in-uniform rules, as can be seen in the order, and simply held the status quo, albeit with comment, with regard to allowed anti-fraternization rules.
In other words, a labor website picked this up, twisted it to mean something that it didn't by taking it WAYYYY overboard, then someone posted it to slashdot, no doubt awaiting the inevitable accusations of a conservative Republican corporatist conspiracy. The fact of the matter, spun, is that employers can maintain regulations, and can indeed terminate you if you do not adhere to them, period. The NLRB made NO AFFIRMATIVE DECISION in that regard, simply commenting that it jived with previous precedent, and did not reverse a judge's preexisting ruling. Section 7 provisions must be protected, and if you and others want to interpret this as an affront to Section 7, fine, but frankly, I'm in the philosophical camp that employers must be able to release employees for any reason (excluding reasons prohibited by e.g., protected classes, and so on), so we'll likely not agree here. Being employed at a particular place, or indeed being employed at all, is not a right.
You're not wrong, but that's not the order of the ruling. In the context of fraternization, the ruling discussed an already-made decision by a judge, which the NLRB did not reverse and for which it did not issue relevant orders.
The ORDER of the ruling relates exclusively to the in-uniform provisions and the employee handbook, and remedial action.
The SECTION of the ruling's discussion about fraternization, without regard to the separate uniform issue, simply reaffirmed the judge's existing decision and concluded that the ruling was not in violation of the NLRA, and further noted that the employer's fraternization provision would not reasonably be interpreted to limit or infringe upon Section 7 Activity, and that indeed, Section 7 activity is protected, as it is mentioned exceedingly numerous times elsewhere in the ruling, and in that section.
I've already responded to this several times now.
The decision was already made by a judge, and I'll refer you here for the quite straightforward response to the issue.
There is a large amount of precedent for this, as long as employee's Section 7 rights are protected.
Yes, and in response to that, the NLRB said:
we do not believe that the Respondent's rule would reasonably tend to chill protected employee activity. The Respondent's proscrip-tion against fraternization appears alongside proscrip-tions on "dat[ing,] or becom[ing] overly friendly with the client's employees or with co-employees." That being so, we believe that employees would reasonably under-stand the rule to prohibit only personal entanglements, rather than activity protected by the Act. In our view, it would be an unreasonable stretch for an employee to infer that speaking to others about terms and conditions of employment is a "fraternization" that is condemned by the rule.
As I said in another response on this issue, and am repeating for the sake of expeditiousness here:
The entire ruling is laden with concern about not prohibiting protected Section 7 activity under the Act.
The NLRB ruling, which was affirming a decision that had already been made by a judge, is that an employer is perfectly with its rights to restrict off-duty personal fraternization between employees and clients and/or coworkers. This has already been established in multiple previous decisions, and is nothing even remotely new. Even the Guardsmark decision is over a year old.
Sorry, but this does not chill Section 7 rights, and in fact reaffirms, several times, Section 7 rights at multiple points throughout the ruling, including in the final Order.
I've already addressed that section of the ruling as well. It's very clear:
we do not believe that the Respondent's rule would reasonably tend to chill protected employee activity. The Respondent's proscrip-tion against fraternization appears alongside proscrip-tions on "dat[ing,] or becom[ing] overly friendly with the client's employees or with co-employees." That being so, we believe that employees would reasonably under-stand the rule to prohibit only personal entanglements, rather than activity protected by the Act. In our view, it would be an unreasonable stretch for an employee to infer that speaking to others about terms and conditions of employment is a "fraternization" that is condemned by the rule.
The entire ruling is laden with concern about not prohibiting protected Section 7 activity under the Act.
The NLRB ruling, which was affirming a decision that had already been made by a judge, is that an employer is perfectly with its rights to restrict off-duty personal fraternization between employees and clients and/or coworkers. This has already been established in multiple previous decisions, and is nothing even remotely new. Even the Guardsmark decision is over a year old.
Sorry, but this does not chill Section 7 rights, and in fact reaffirms, several times, Section 7 rights at multiple points throughout the ruling, including in the final Order.
No, actually, you're still wrong.
As I discussed here:
we do not believe that the Respondent's rule would reasonably tend to chill protected employee activity. The Respondent's proscrip-tion against fraternization appears alongside proscrip-tions on "dat[ing,] or becom[ing] overly friendly with the client's employees or with co-employees." That being so, we believe that employees would reasonably understand the rule to prohibit only personal entanglements, rather than activity protected by the Act. In our view, it would be an unreasonable stretch for an employee to infer that speaking to others about terms and conditions of employment is a "fraternization" that is condemned by the rule.
Otherwise, I reserve the right to date, have sex with, go out with, hang out with, etc, with any of my co-workers when we are off the clock.
Not if it's affecting your work performance, and your employer knows it or reasonably believes that to be the case, you don't.
Or, rather, yes: you do have the "right" to do that. Who said you didn't?
The difference is that your employer doesn't have to keep you employed anymore, either, if the performance of your work suffers because of it. Being employed at a particular company, or any company, is not a right.
No, I have not misrepresented it.
First of all, this ruling is over a year old, so I'm quite at a loss of why it's being trotted out now, if only for drama.
Second, it's pretty clear:
Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we do not believe that the Respondent's rule would reasonably tend to chill protected employee activity. The Respondent's proscrip-tion against fraternization appears alongside proscrip-tions on "dat[ing,] or becom[ing] overly friendly with the client's employees or with co-employees." That being so, we believe that employees would reasonably under-stand the rule to prohibit only personal entanglements, rather than activity protected by the Act. In our view, it would be an unreasonable stretch for an employee to infer that speaking to others about terms and conditions of employment is a "fraternization" that is condemned by the rule.
It is well established that employees have the right under Section 7 to engage in union solicitation on the employer's premises during nonwork time, unless the employer can demonstrate the need to limit the exercise of that right in order to maintain production or discipline. Republic Aviation Corporation v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945), citing Peyton Packing Co., 49 NLRB 828, 843-844 (1943), enfd. 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 323 U.S. 730 (1944).
There is a longstanding principle that is well-understood and acknowledged by the NLRB that employers MAY NOT interfere with employee's rights under section 7 of the Act.
However, if you're doing something - anything - that is significantly interfering with your, or others', workplace productivity, then you may be terminated.
How or why does this possibly come as a surprise? Further, if you're an at-will employee, you (generally) can be terminated at any time without cause.
The entire text of the over-year-old fraternization section of the ruling is below. Keep in mind that the NLRB was reviewing a decision that a judge already made determining that the rules, as applied, did not violate the act.
B. The Fraternization Rule
The judge also concluded that the Respondent did not violate the Act by maintaining a work rule that directs employees not to "fraternize on duty or off duty, date[,] or become overly friendly with the client's employees or with co-employees." The judge reasoned that such a rule "does not on its face, or by reasonable implication, pre-clude activities protected by the Act." The General Counsel excepts, arguing that employees reasonably would understand the rule to prohibit activity protected by Section 7.
We find no merit to this exception. The Respondent's rule is somewhat similar to a work rule we reviewed in Lafayette Park Hotel, supra, and found lawful. There, the employer's rule mandated that "[e]mployees are not allowed to fraternize with hotel guests anywhere on hotel property." 326 NLRB at 825. We concluded that the rule was lawful because employees would not reasonably read "this rule as prohibiting protected employee com-munications . . . about terms and conditions of employ-ment." Id. at 827. Although the Respondent's rule is not identical to the one in Lafayette Park Hotel, we find that any differences between the rules are not material and do not warrant a different outcome here.
Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we do not believe that the Respondent's rule would reasonably tend to chill protected employee activity. The Respondent's proscrip-tion against fraternization appears alongside proscrip-tions on "dat[ing,] or becom[ing] overly friendly with the client's employees or with co-employees." That being so, we believe that employees would reasonably under-stand the rule to prohibit only personal entanglements, rather than activity protected by the Act. In our view, it would be an unreasonable stretch for an employee to infer that speaking to others about terms and conditions of employment is a "fraternization" that is condemned by the rule. As in Lutheran Heritage Village, our dissenting co
Yeah, it is interesting (since you're the one politicizing it) that the Clinton appointee thought it was just fine for Guardsmark employees to date and/or get "overly friendly with" clients and co-workers while in their work uniform.
Since, you know, that was the crux of the entire ruling: not that employees couldn't fraternize on their own time, but that employees couldn't do whatever the fuck they wanted while still in their Guardsmark uniform, implying that they are official representatives of Guardsmark.
Of course, since President Clinton himself had no problem with that sort of thing, I imagine it is "interesting".
Now can you explain how an employers has ANY right whatsoever to tell us what to do when we are off the clock?
Sure.
When you're still in your employer's uniform, especially that of a security company wishing to maintain its reputation as a professional organization, you shouldn't be going on dates with your clients.
That help?
Because this ruling was very specific and in a single case, and only applied to dating or fraternization off-duty with clients or coworkers while in their work uniforms.