Deploying ASP.NET apps has always been a real pain in the neck. Sure, in theory it's as easy as xcopy, but once your apps start growing and your configuration grows it rapidly becomes a bigger thing to maintain. It takes a lot of time, there's lots of stuffing around, it's very fiddly and generally a PITA.
Why aren't you using a build and deployment system? We use Team City and Octopus Deploy to deploy ASP.Net websites, and once its set up (5 minutes for TC, a few minutes for OD) deployment is a zero friction issue - it just works.
You obviously didn't read the article - its Docker for Windows, the main management system for this is Docker, its just using the existing HyperV virtualisation system rather than expending effort porting Dockers virtualisation subsystem to Windows. Portability doesn't really matter here, because of the way Docker works (sharing kernels, virtual filesystems etc) - so you will rather run a Unix container on a Unix host, and a Windows container on a Windows host. The benefit here is that you can manage both using the same system - how Docker accomplishes what it does on each platform is an implementation detail you don't need to know about, its just Docker to you.
No, it really does not - are you a pilot at all? Because it doesn't sound like one.
Runways for large civil aircraft are 3000+ meters of reasonably flat concrete or tarmac without any obstructions. The only place you may find something like that is in a flat desert, a long river or the sea, because everywhere else either isn't 3000+ meters of flat whatever, or it has obstacles. And its rare that you have a handy flat desert around when you need one.
With a river you still have to watch out for obstacles such as other river users, and you have absolutely no idea what lurks just under the surface - just because it looks flat on the surface doesnt mean theres a huge rock just under the surface which will rip the belly out of your aircraft the moment you touch down. What about that lightweight river boat that the radar is proving difficult to make out against the scatter off the water?
Yes, this is in actuality Docker for Windows, as this line from the article says:
Both Windows Server Containers and Hyper-V Containers can be controlled through the Docker engine, allowing administrators to manage both Docker and Microsoft containers in the same environment.
You try refusing to appear in front of Congressional, Senate or Parliamentary Committee once they have required your attendance. Those invitations are akin to subpoenas, so yes they were forced to appear and answer questions.
This is what happens when you have two sets of rules to follow - the "law", which is laid out in black and white as to what is allowed and what is not allowed, and is backed by the courts and amended by acts of government. And then there is the "spirit of the law", which is fluffy, ethereal and changes depending on who you talk to, when you talk to them and what their agenda is.
As Ms. Carnegie points out, if you want stuff taxed in your jurisdiction, change the law so that happens - dont wave the "spirit" of the law around as if it has any meaning other than a method of blackmail.
Yeah, the market will sort that out. Meanwhile that companies subscriber base has no service - so if they all immediately switch to a different provider, how long do you think that will take? Here in the UK it takes 2 weeks minimum to get an activation date on an ADSL line - but what if you don't have a telephone line installed, what if you only have the old companies cable line or whatever?
What do you think is going to happen then? The subscriber base merrily playing along and saying "yup, they deserved it, glad I'm not receiving any service because the company I use broke the rules, glad I'm going to be without internet for days or weeks because thats how long it takes to switch the line, glad I have to go through all that bother"?
No, those people are going to be screaming at the top of their voices, and they will be screaming at the government.
Suspending the corporate charter may work, but it would be a horrifically messy way of doing things - the company would immediately suspend all operations, including service delivery to all its customers for the duration. How well would that go down, a million or so people (no idea of subscriber rates here) suddenly without internet and phone service.
The government would then have to react to that, but how? Un-suspend the corporate charter? Enact some emergency legislation allowing them to take over the running of the services? What? And if they do take over the running of the services, how do you compel all the workers to do their work?
Thats a nice utopia you have there, pity it will never, ever come to fruition because humans just don't work like that.
Artists can sell directly to their fans today - they just have to not sign those lucrative contracts that they sign. So why are they signing those lucrative contracts?
Sorry, I will clarify - the readings didn't make any sense when combined with the stall warning parameters, as the airspeed was below the minimum bound.
You misunderstand the discussion - its not about identifying runways, its identifying alternatives to runways in emergency situations. You know, amongst all the clutter that you dont want to hit.
I did read other sources. I talk to people who read other sources. Enough to know Airbus hides info from pilots -- critical info such as pitch trim, throttles that don't move as autothrottle adjusts power, and provides no tactile feedback to the stick
So you just admitted that you don't know anything - Boeing aircraft "hide" just as much information, throttles move as a single entity and yet are controlled through auto-throttle as independent entities (this has been linked as a contributory factor in more than one air crash - see the Kegworth air crash report), tactile feedback is a computer amalgamation rather than actuality etc etc.
Airbus isn't a seat-of-the-pants airplane, you almost have to think like a passenger, not a pilot.
Ouch, so you definitely don't know anything about Airbus aircraft then.
Oh well -- that's the conclusion I reached over the years of this accident being known, as well as other Airbus incidents involving their computers.
And all that does is make you come across as another anti-Airbus critic rather than someone actually informed of the topic at hand.
On AF 447 BEA blamed training, cockpit ergonomics and incorrect procedure. They didn't even mention the role FEP had. It seems the French authorities like to shield Airbus from responsibility and scrutiny.
See, anti-Airbus bullshit. The FEP had no role in the situation, the crew should have recovered from the stall without issue. Infact, they should never have got into the stall in the first place, they should have enacted stall avoidance procedures as soon as the autopilot disconnected. But they didn't, their training completely broke down and the entire situation went to pot.
The Airbus flight controls don't' talk to each other. The left seater can't tell what the right seater was doing. One of them pulled the stick back all the way and kept it there. I read somewhere, forgot where, that the other pilot did the opposite at the same time. Sorry, no citation for that one. Go look for it yourself.
Don't need to look, I've seen that crap spouted elsewhere. Have you *ever* sat in an Airbus cockpit? If not, then its easy to just accept the bullshit that neither pilot knows what the other is doing - with both pilots sat in their seat, its trivial to glance at the others side stick and see what position its in. Nothing is blocking it.
Oh, and if one pilot is doing one thing and the other pilot is doing something else, thats a complete breakdown of CRM in the cockpit - the pilot flying has command authority, the other pilot should not be touching the stick. And in any case, the sticks have priority buttons which require pressing before the stick does anything - so its impossible for both sticks to be engaged at the same time, both pilots can be dancing the macaraina on their own stick and it wouldn't matter, only the one with command priority would have any effect.
The crew was confused and even panicked for many minutes. They were passengers in an airplane that was perhaps too smart for it's own good.
And they shouldn't have been - you know how long the actual airspeed mismatch situation occured for during the entire final phase of AF447s flight? The airspeed mismatch which was caused by the iced up pitot tube, and caused the autopilot to disconnect? Less than 3% of the total event time. The rest of it was the crew panicking and not carrying out their basic stall avoidance protection. Immediately when they received the airspeed mismatch warning, they should have angled the nose up slightly and applied a set amount of throttle. They did neither. And that is what killed them, not the aircraft.
1. Did they not see the altimeter unwinding?
They did. They ignored it.
2. Did they not see the artificial horizon showing more blue
I wasn't talking about double spending attacks, I was more talking about a single mining entity having a greater power over setting the target and difficulty numbers because they essentially have a greater vote in setting it.
The problem is, having the APU further down the list is done for a reason, and Sullenberger essentially rolled the dice by doing what he did.
Plus starting the APU can take a considerable drain on the existing power budget, which can cause knock on effects. Again, its another one of those decisions to be weighed up at the time.
Ahh, Wikipedia articles. One minor step up from UTTER AND COMPLETE BULLSHIT.
Try reading the accident reports on both of your chosen examples - they differ wildly from the Wikipedia articles conclusions.
In the case of AF296, the aircraft performed exactly as it should have - if the aircraft had allowed the commanded elevator action, the aircraft would have stalled and come down before the tree line. The issue with AF296 is that the pilot was being a fucking twat, had descended to below the height of local obstacles, and dropped the engines back to idle - the engines responded to the commanded thrust increase within the engine manufacturers specs, which is to say that it takes several seconds to spool up from idle to the setting the pilot input. By which time the aircraft was in the trees.
The pilot should not have been flying at that altitude with the engines at idle, they should have been at a high thrust level and he should have been controlling his speed using spoilers, flaps and other aerodynamic devices - if he had done that, he would have had instant power available when he needed it. The bloke was a twat.
If the same manoeuvre had been attempted in a Boeing 737, with the same vectors and the same thrust inputs, the aircraft would still be in the trees.
The theory that Airbus messed with the FDR and CVR is also rubbish, and has been proven in the past to be rubbish - there was a period of "missing data", but that was caused by the tape being folded over, and when folded back again to how it was the data all matches up. A lot of the rumours about data tampering came about from a grainy photo taken of the crash scene, which showed the FDR with a completely different stripe on it than there was in the official photo of the recovered FDR - hence it not being the same FDR. But the original negatives of this photo have never been released for confirmation, and other photos of the same scene show the correct stripe on the FDR.
Remember that the pilot involved in AF296 spent time in prison and has lost every court case he brought against Air France, Airbus, the French aviation regulatory body and everyone else - he is also the main proponent of tampering theories etc by Airbus.
Take it from me - don't assume that Wikipedia articles are unbiased and fair. If you follow the aviation articles long enough, you see some very "interesting" edits and roll backs going on - entire sections backed up by aviation regulatory board citations go "missing", and negative hearsay gets put in its place. These edits only really seem to affect the Airbus pages...
You are talking about billions of sites across the globe - and sites would be dependent on weather, local conditions, change of use etc etc etc. What if on that fateful day, one of the Hudson's ferries happening to be in the way but there wasn't enough power available to allow the use of the forward radar? What if the field pre-chosen had suddenly turned into a camp site? Or had a combine harvester and a fuel bowser parked in the middle of it. What if the Hudson was iced over?
As for the APU, the issue is that it simply was way down on the checklist - and a lot of things on that checklist can't be done in parallel etc Just because a computer has a speed advantage, doesn't mean it can use it. It was a concious decision from the PIC to fire up the APU out of checklist order. You don't find concious decisions coming from computers.
I thought there was a big outcry recently that one mining pool managed to get above 50% of the total computational effort, and therefore was in a position to control bitcoin due to the intricacies of the system?
What sensor suite would that be? Even military systems find it inordinately difficult to discriminate between ground targets amongst ground clutter, and thats with human guidance.
Currently an aircraft cannot find and airport and land without external input, be it GPS, ILS or other such systems - and thats to a well defined landing point. A computer would have to identify a safe location to ditch, make decisions based on available data and extrapolated data, and then actually perform the ditching.
Another point to make about the Hudson ditching was that it was only successful because the pilot specifically skipped a load of stuff in the checklist and told the co-pilot to fire up the APU, because he knew there wasn't going to be enough electrical power from the engines and RAT to give him full command authority - he would lose things like flaps and spoilers, meaning his options would be much more limited. If he hadn't done that, chances are he wouldn't have made it even to the Hudson.
The stall warning was cut off because the readings being fed to it made no sense (they dropped below absolute minimums - the reasoning being that the pilots having sat through 5 minutes of warnings and not changing their approach to flying the aircraft, it won't suddenly fix itself as the horizontal speed drops to zero) - it wasnt cut off because of any automation systems, it was cut off because the readings didnt make any sense.
But it takes more than an avid Boeing fan to actually read the AF447 report.
The decision tree to get to the idea of putting the aircraft down onto anything other than a runway with a CAT I, II or III landing system is beyond automation. Without ILS, the computers on board the aircraft had no idea what the ground infront of them looks like, other than "its there".
You assume a level of technical capability and desire that typically exists only in TV or film.
Even when the IRA switched to mobile phones as their method of detonation, they never added a deadmans switch - hell, they never used more than one detonation method in most of their bombs, meaning that when the timer circuit failed the bomb had no chance of going off, resulting in more than a few finds over the years. And this was a heavily financed, technically competent group - hell, they were firing delayed action mortars onto Heathrow airports runways from remote controlled cars!
The first set of London Underground bombers used themselves as the timer circuit, but they went to the effort of actually having switches etc - the second set, the set that failed, again used themselves as timer circuits, but this time they had nothing but bare wires and a battery each. They also cocked up the explosive mix thankfully, so it never went off.
Mobile phone detonators have become a big thing in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, but even then you don't see a secondary system - they just add technical complexity, and in turn that adds more ways to prematurely detonate, which the bomb makers want to avoid at all cost.
Or because not everyone has to share the same opinion, so its obvious people are not going to necessarily share the opinion that network neutrality is a great thing? Shocking I know, but there you have it.
A hell of a lot of one time pad encrypted messages have been broken due to pad misuse in the past - take a look at the Venona Project, where the Soviets reused pads for different communication types, and thus western analysts were able to break a non-trivial amount of them.
Slashdot Mirror
Deploying ASP.NET apps has always been a real pain in the neck. Sure, in theory it's as easy as xcopy, but once your apps start growing and your configuration grows it rapidly becomes a bigger thing to maintain. It takes a lot of time, there's lots of stuffing around, it's very fiddly and generally a PITA.
Why aren't you using a build and deployment system? We use Team City and Octopus Deploy to deploy ASP.Net websites, and once its set up (5 minutes for TC, a few minutes for OD) deployment is a zero friction issue - it just works.
You obviously didn't read the article - its Docker for Windows, the main management system for this is Docker, its just using the existing HyperV virtualisation system rather than expending effort porting Dockers virtualisation subsystem to Windows. Portability doesn't really matter here, because of the way Docker works (sharing kernels, virtual filesystems etc) - so you will rather run a Unix container on a Unix host, and a Windows container on a Windows host. The benefit here is that you can manage both using the same system - how Docker accomplishes what it does on each platform is an implementation detail you don't need to know about, its just Docker to you.
No, it really does not - are you a pilot at all? Because it doesn't sound like one.
Runways for large civil aircraft are 3000+ meters of reasonably flat concrete or tarmac without any obstructions. The only place you may find something like that is in a flat desert, a long river or the sea, because everywhere else either isn't 3000+ meters of flat whatever, or it has obstacles. And its rare that you have a handy flat desert around when you need one.
With a river you still have to watch out for obstacles such as other river users, and you have absolutely no idea what lurks just under the surface - just because it looks flat on the surface doesnt mean theres a huge rock just under the surface which will rip the belly out of your aircraft the moment you touch down. What about that lightweight river boat that the radar is proving difficult to make out against the scatter off the water?
Yes, this is in actuality Docker for Windows, as this line from the article says:
You try refusing to appear in front of Congressional, Senate or Parliamentary Committee once they have required your attendance. Those invitations are akin to subpoenas, so yes they were forced to appear and answer questions.
This is what happens when you have two sets of rules to follow - the "law", which is laid out in black and white as to what is allowed and what is not allowed, and is backed by the courts and amended by acts of government. And then there is the "spirit of the law", which is fluffy, ethereal and changes depending on who you talk to, when you talk to them and what their agenda is.
As Ms. Carnegie points out, if you want stuff taxed in your jurisdiction, change the law so that happens - dont wave the "spirit" of the law around as if it has any meaning other than a method of blackmail.
Yeah, the market will sort that out. Meanwhile that companies subscriber base has no service - so if they all immediately switch to a different provider, how long do you think that will take? Here in the UK it takes 2 weeks minimum to get an activation date on an ADSL line - but what if you don't have a telephone line installed, what if you only have the old companies cable line or whatever?
What do you think is going to happen then? The subscriber base merrily playing along and saying "yup, they deserved it, glad I'm not receiving any service because the company I use broke the rules, glad I'm going to be without internet for days or weeks because thats how long it takes to switch the line, glad I have to go through all that bother"?
No, those people are going to be screaming at the top of their voices, and they will be screaming at the government.
And yet the artists still sign them, despite all of this seemingly being "common knowledge". Funny that...
Suspending the corporate charter may work, but it would be a horrifically messy way of doing things - the company would immediately suspend all operations, including service delivery to all its customers for the duration. How well would that go down, a million or so people (no idea of subscriber rates here) suddenly without internet and phone service.
The government would then have to react to that, but how? Un-suspend the corporate charter? Enact some emergency legislation allowing them to take over the running of the services? What? And if they do take over the running of the services, how do you compel all the workers to do their work?
Thats a nice utopia you have there, pity it will never, ever come to fruition because humans just don't work like that.
Artists can sell directly to their fans today - they just have to not sign those lucrative contracts that they sign. So why are they signing those lucrative contracts?
Sorry, I will clarify - the readings didn't make any sense when combined with the stall warning parameters, as the airspeed was below the minimum bound.
You misunderstand the discussion - its not about identifying runways, its identifying alternatives to runways in emergency situations. You know, amongst all the clutter that you dont want to hit.
I did read other sources. I talk to people who read other sources. Enough to know Airbus hides info from pilots -- critical info such as pitch trim, throttles that don't move as autothrottle adjusts power, and provides no tactile feedback to the stick
So you just admitted that you don't know anything - Boeing aircraft "hide" just as much information, throttles move as a single entity and yet are controlled through auto-throttle as independent entities (this has been linked as a contributory factor in more than one air crash - see the Kegworth air crash report), tactile feedback is a computer amalgamation rather than actuality etc etc.
Airbus isn't a seat-of-the-pants airplane, you almost have to think like a passenger, not a pilot.
Ouch, so you definitely don't know anything about Airbus aircraft then.
Oh well -- that's the conclusion I reached over the years of this accident being known, as well as other Airbus incidents involving their computers.
And all that does is make you come across as another anti-Airbus critic rather than someone actually informed of the topic at hand.
On AF 447 BEA blamed training, cockpit ergonomics and incorrect procedure. They didn't even mention the role FEP had. It seems the French authorities like to shield Airbus from responsibility and scrutiny.
See, anti-Airbus bullshit. The FEP had no role in the situation, the crew should have recovered from the stall without issue. Infact, they should never have got into the stall in the first place, they should have enacted stall avoidance procedures as soon as the autopilot disconnected. But they didn't, their training completely broke down and the entire situation went to pot.
The Airbus flight controls don't' talk to each other. The left seater can't tell what the right seater was doing. One of them pulled the stick back all the way and kept it there. I read somewhere, forgot where, that the other pilot did the opposite at the same time. Sorry, no citation for that one. Go look for it yourself.
Don't need to look, I've seen that crap spouted elsewhere. Have you *ever* sat in an Airbus cockpit? If not, then its easy to just accept the bullshit that neither pilot knows what the other is doing - with both pilots sat in their seat, its trivial to glance at the others side stick and see what position its in. Nothing is blocking it.
Oh, and if one pilot is doing one thing and the other pilot is doing something else, thats a complete breakdown of CRM in the cockpit - the pilot flying has command authority, the other pilot should not be touching the stick. And in any case, the sticks have priority buttons which require pressing before the stick does anything - so its impossible for both sticks to be engaged at the same time, both pilots can be dancing the macaraina on their own stick and it wouldn't matter, only the one with command priority would have any effect.
The crew was confused and even panicked for many minutes. They were passengers in an airplane that was perhaps too smart for it's own good.
And they shouldn't have been - you know how long the actual airspeed mismatch situation occured for during the entire final phase of AF447s flight? The airspeed mismatch which was caused by the iced up pitot tube, and caused the autopilot to disconnect? Less than 3% of the total event time. The rest of it was the crew panicking and not carrying out their basic stall avoidance protection. Immediately when they received the airspeed mismatch warning, they should have angled the nose up slightly and applied a set amount of throttle. They did neither. And that is what killed them, not the aircraft.
1. Did they not see the altimeter unwinding?
They did. They ignored it.
2. Did they not see the artificial horizon showing more blue
I wasn't talking about double spending attacks, I was more talking about a single mining entity having a greater power over setting the target and difficulty numbers because they essentially have a greater vote in setting it.
The problem is, having the APU further down the list is done for a reason, and Sullenberger essentially rolled the dice by doing what he did.
Plus starting the APU can take a considerable drain on the existing power budget, which can cause knock on effects. Again, its another one of those decisions to be weighed up at the time.
Ahh, Wikipedia articles. One minor step up from UTTER AND COMPLETE BULLSHIT.
Try reading the accident reports on both of your chosen examples - they differ wildly from the Wikipedia articles conclusions.
In the case of AF296, the aircraft performed exactly as it should have - if the aircraft had allowed the commanded elevator action, the aircraft would have stalled and come down before the tree line. The issue with AF296 is that the pilot was being a fucking twat, had descended to below the height of local obstacles, and dropped the engines back to idle - the engines responded to the commanded thrust increase within the engine manufacturers specs, which is to say that it takes several seconds to spool up from idle to the setting the pilot input. By which time the aircraft was in the trees.
The pilot should not have been flying at that altitude with the engines at idle, they should have been at a high thrust level and he should have been controlling his speed using spoilers, flaps and other aerodynamic devices - if he had done that, he would have had instant power available when he needed it. The bloke was a twat.
If the same manoeuvre had been attempted in a Boeing 737, with the same vectors and the same thrust inputs, the aircraft would still be in the trees.
The theory that Airbus messed with the FDR and CVR is also rubbish, and has been proven in the past to be rubbish - there was a period of "missing data", but that was caused by the tape being folded over, and when folded back again to how it was the data all matches up. A lot of the rumours about data tampering came about from a grainy photo taken of the crash scene, which showed the FDR with a completely different stripe on it than there was in the official photo of the recovered FDR - hence it not being the same FDR. But the original negatives of this photo have never been released for confirmation, and other photos of the same scene show the correct stripe on the FDR.
Remember that the pilot involved in AF296 spent time in prison and has lost every court case he brought against Air France, Airbus, the French aviation regulatory body and everyone else - he is also the main proponent of tampering theories etc by Airbus.
Take it from me - don't assume that Wikipedia articles are unbiased and fair. If you follow the aviation articles long enough, you see some very "interesting" edits and roll backs going on - entire sections backed up by aviation regulatory board citations go "missing", and negative hearsay gets put in its place. These edits only really seem to affect the Airbus pages...
You are talking about billions of sites across the globe - and sites would be dependent on weather, local conditions, change of use etc etc etc. What if on that fateful day, one of the Hudson's ferries happening to be in the way but there wasn't enough power available to allow the use of the forward radar? What if the field pre-chosen had suddenly turned into a camp site? Or had a combine harvester and a fuel bowser parked in the middle of it. What if the Hudson was iced over?
As for the APU, the issue is that it simply was way down on the checklist - and a lot of things on that checklist can't be done in parallel etc Just because a computer has a speed advantage, doesn't mean it can use it. It was a concious decision from the PIC to fire up the APU out of checklist order. You don't find concious decisions coming from computers.
Nobody control Bitcoin
I thought there was a big outcry recently that one mining pool managed to get above 50% of the total computational effort, and therefore was in a position to control bitcoin due to the intricacies of the system?
What sensor suite would that be? Even military systems find it inordinately difficult to discriminate between ground targets amongst ground clutter, and thats with human guidance.
Currently an aircraft cannot find and airport and land without external input, be it GPS, ILS or other such systems - and thats to a well defined landing point. A computer would have to identify a safe location to ditch, make decisions based on available data and extrapolated data, and then actually perform the ditching.
Another point to make about the Hudson ditching was that it was only successful because the pilot specifically skipped a load of stuff in the checklist and told the co-pilot to fire up the APU, because he knew there wasn't going to be enough electrical power from the engines and RAT to give him full command authority - he would lose things like flaps and spoilers, meaning his options would be much more limited. If he hadn't done that, chances are he wouldn't have made it even to the Hudson.
The stall warning was cut off because the readings being fed to it made no sense (they dropped below absolute minimums - the reasoning being that the pilots having sat through 5 minutes of warnings and not changing their approach to flying the aircraft, it won't suddenly fix itself as the horizontal speed drops to zero) - it wasnt cut off because of any automation systems, it was cut off because the readings didnt make any sense.
But it takes more than an avid Boeing fan to actually read the AF447 report.
The decision tree to get to the idea of putting the aircraft down onto anything other than a runway with a CAT I, II or III landing system is beyond automation. Without ILS, the computers on board the aircraft had no idea what the ground infront of them looks like, other than "its there".
You assume a level of technical capability and desire that typically exists only in TV or film.
Even when the IRA switched to mobile phones as their method of detonation, they never added a deadmans switch - hell, they never used more than one detonation method in most of their bombs, meaning that when the timer circuit failed the bomb had no chance of going off, resulting in more than a few finds over the years. And this was a heavily financed, technically competent group - hell, they were firing delayed action mortars onto Heathrow airports runways from remote controlled cars!
The first set of London Underground bombers used themselves as the timer circuit, but they went to the effort of actually having switches etc - the second set, the set that failed, again used themselves as timer circuits, but this time they had nothing but bare wires and a battery each. They also cocked up the explosive mix thankfully, so it never went off.
Mobile phone detonators have become a big thing in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, but even then you don't see a secondary system - they just add technical complexity, and in turn that adds more ways to prematurely detonate, which the bomb makers want to avoid at all cost.
Or because not everyone has to share the same opinion, so its obvious people are not going to necessarily share the opinion that network neutrality is a great thing? Shocking I know, but there you have it.
A hell of a lot of one time pad encrypted messages have been broken due to pad misuse in the past - take a look at the Venona Project, where the Soviets reused pads for different communication types, and thus western analysts were able to break a non-trivial amount of them.
All UK ISPs are subject to UK law however, and they will get the job of enforcing this through blocking non-conforming websites.