This group has some misconceptions about the FIPS 140 process. First, they rightly point out that the level 4 cert on the IBM 4758 does not cover the CCA software, and then they go on to talk about how a bug in this (admittedly, non-evaluated software) shows the weakness of FIPS 140-1.
What we were trying to say was that the FIPS process has a weakness in the real world - in that the statements it makes ("This is a really secure piece of hardware") are of limited practical use technically (because this type of hardware is meant to encapsulate a software product) and are of limited practical use to would be purchasers (because the salepeople stress the certification and fail to point out that this is only one part of the picture).
Don't lose sight of the point that the CCA software is shipped for free to 4758 users; it's not as if it's a completely separate thing.
Now, just to put all this 4758 bashing into perspective: The IBM 4758 is an amazingly secure cryptographic module.
I totally agree. But remember that "security" is a property of systems and is not an entirely useful adjective to apply to components.
The "publishing at midnight" aspect of this story was really just a media artefact.
We'd intended to make the web pages available and then point people at them. However, the BBC got wind of the story and then asked that we didn't have the pages available until the show went out (they didn't want to be scooped)...
one might note the inconvenience of publishing web pages in the middle of the night when the owner of the filespace is in a foreign city with no net access. Much thanks are due to sysadmins for ensuring people could read the full info and not just the part of it that can be fitted into a mainstream news program.
Slashdot Mirror
This group has some misconceptions about the FIPS 140 process. First, they rightly point out that the level 4 cert on the IBM 4758 does not cover the CCA software, and then they go on to talk about how a bug in this (admittedly, non-evaluated software) shows the weakness of FIPS 140-1.
What we were trying to say was that the FIPS process has a weakness in the real world - in that the statements it makes ("This is a really secure piece of hardware") are of limited practical use technically (because this type of hardware is meant to encapsulate a software product) and are of limited practical use to would be purchasers (because the salepeople stress the certification and fail to point out that this is only one part of the picture).
Don't lose sight of the point that the CCA software is shipped for free to 4758 users; it's not as if it's a completely separate thing.
Now, just to put all this 4758 bashing into perspective: The IBM 4758 is an amazingly secure cryptographic module.
I totally agree. But remember that "security" is a property of systems and is not an entirely useful adjective to apply to components.
The "publishing at midnight" aspect of this story was really just a media artefact. We'd intended to make the web pages available and then point people at them. However, the BBC got wind of the story and then asked that we didn't have the pages available until the show went out (they didn't want to be scooped) ...
one might note the inconvenience of publishing web pages in the middle of the night when the owner of the filespace is in a foreign city with no net access. Much thanks are due to sysadmins for ensuring people could read the full info and not just the part of it that can be fitted into a mainstream news program.