Slashdot Mirror


IBM Crypto Up For Grabs?

An Anonymous Coward writes: "BBC Newsnight have tonight shown an article about a groups of hackers who are about to release details of the vulnerability of the IBM Cryptographical processors. ( Details here.) The BBC article can be watched online here. Alan Cox makes a starring role ;)" windowlicker adds some detail: "Mike Bond and Richard Clayton, from Cambridge University, have cracked IBM's 4758 crytoprocessor running the 'Common Cryptographic Architecture' (CCA). You can do the same with $1000-worth of hardware and the info from here. Many banks use this system for protecting PINs." The video file requires Real software; here's the BBC's article online for those of us without.

230 comments

  1. somebody hacked the mainframe? by my+brain+hurts · · Score: 0

    Did someone hack IBM's mainframe?

    What kind of *.axe did they use?

  2. Hacker divas suck. by perdida · · Score: 2, Insightful

    If you're gonna release some shit for purely knowledge reasons, then why are you advertising your intention to release it before releasing it?

    Knowledge is knowledge. If you want to propagate effective computer security, don't badger and pressure corporations to cow to your wishes with publicity stunts like this one.

    Instead, just release the hole, and let the damage be done. The damage itself will be far more instructive to the company. It will also be a better influence on computer security as a whole -- damaging releases will, perhaps, induce large corporations to practice better preventative security.

    1. Re:Hacker divas suck. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

      You got the wrong end of the stick. They have already released the information. They told IBM about it a year ago.

    2. Re:Hacker divas suck. by TeraCo · · Score: 1
      Instead, just release the hole, and let the damage be done. The damage itself will be far more instructive to the company. It will also be a better influence on computer security as a whole -- damaging releases will, perhaps, induce large corporations to practice better preventative security.

      It's also criminally negligent behavior, you idiot. Do you really want them being held responsible for banks and other high security installations being 'hacked'?

      Or maybe you just don't want your money to be secure..

      --
      Not Meta-modding due to apathy.
    3. Re:Hacker divas suck. by demaria · · Score: 3, Interesting

      And screw all the people who are using the systems or products in question.

      I'm all for full disclosure, but blind siding is not ethical.

    4. Re:Hacker divas suck. by SquierStrat · · Score: 1

      No, criminal negligence is know there is a problem, and not fixing it!

      --
      Derek Greene
    5. Re:Hacker divas suck. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      IBM was informed of the crack in April and did FA about it.

      windowlicker

    6. Re:Hacker divas suck. by TeraCo · · Score: 1
      Ah, but how many of these banks know there is a problem? Should the first thing they know about it be some 'hax0r' posting the results to the internet where anyone [criminals, terrorists, etc] can get access to them?

      Or should it be presented to the banks first, to give them a chance to upgrade?

      --
      Not Meta-modding due to apathy.
    7. Re:Hacker divas suck. by SquierStrat · · Score: 3, Informative

      See, this is the problem...no upgrade. IBM was notified about the problem a year ago, with no fix. In reality a firmware update should do it (I believe the card is capable of it...) but they've done nothing. They didn't say the banks didn't know they just didnt say they did. Also you have to have physical access to the machine with the chip in it to do it. That's alot of banks to notify also!

      --
      Derek Greene
    8. Re:Hacker divas suck. by TeraCo · · Score: 1
      Hmm.. If IBM knew about it and didn't say anything that is irresponsible.. however, mindlessly the exploit to the public is just as bad.

      I think the middle ground they selected to follow [ie: informing the media that there was a problem and letting them hype it up] raised just as much public interest as releasing the details would do, while not providing exploitable information for John Q Public.

      --
      Not Meta-modding due to apathy.
    9. Re:Hacker divas suck. by SquierStrat · · Score: 1

      Not true IMHO. By releasing it to the public, it forces IBM and the banks to fix the problem, or (hopefully) face public scrutiny and possibly a loss of customers. Hyping it up and not relasing the information will simply entice some hacker to repeat the crack him/herself. No one will no they did it until they bribe some bank manager to help him still the money...Not releasing the information is far more dangerous than releasing it. By releasing it, you know what is out ther eand what you have to protect against. Either way, it's a difficult crack to pull off, simply for access reasons...

      --
      Derek Greene
    10. Re:Hacker divas suck. by dawg · · Score: 1

      Uh, Mike Bond published this stuff in a paper back in May. BBC were the ones playing up the fact that they were putting it on the internet tonight.

    11. Re:Hacker divas suck. by TeraCo · · Score: 1
      Oh come on, you think IBM is not going to fix the problem now that everyone knows about it?

      Customers will be on the phones asking banks what is happening. Therefore banks will be on the phone asking IBM what is happening. And all of this is happening while the information is not generally available. [Plus you have good will from the banks, the companies and the public].

      Could you honestly go on TV and say: Well, today I released the information on how to break the encryption that banks use. I hope they fix it before y'all lose your money.

      --
      Not Meta-modding due to apathy.
    12. Re:Hacker divas suck. by SquierStrat · · Score: 1

      No, quite the opposite, I think they WILL fix it now that it is in the open. That was my point, they didn't need to while no one else knew.

      --
      Derek Greene
    13. Re:Hacker divas suck. by xmedar · · Score: 3, Interesting

      If you saw the program you'd know that it was cracked by someone at a lab Microsoft set up with Cambridge University, this is the same Microsoft that calls on security experts to "end information anarchy" and stop releasing sample code that exploits security holes in Windows and other operating systems. AKA MS Hypocracy 3.51

      --
      Any sufficiently advanced man is indistinguishable from God
    14. Re:Hacker divas suck. by TeraCo · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Yes, but there are two different levels of 'open'. The argument was that they should have provided detailed information on how to exploit it. I said 'no, that ideal is criminally negligent'. There is a difference between saying publically 'there is a problem with your system X' and saying 'there is a problem with your system X, and we have just put the details of how to exploit it on the internet'.

      --
      Not Meta-modding due to apathy.
    15. Re:Hacker divas suck. by SquierStrat · · Score: 2, Insightful

      If they had not told IBM about it ahead of time, I'd agree, it's negligent. But a year is plenty of time for IBM engineers (sad fact now that I think about it...i might be an intern at IBM this time next year...sorry off topic) to fix the problem. If they choose not to fix it (and I doubt that they were not warned that the informationw ould be released) they are the ones being negligent. Now, if IBM recieved no warning, I'd agree with you, it's negligent to say hey guess what! But, then again, more than just banks use this hardware....Alan Cox state "This is really military grade hardware...." I'm sure many large corp.'s use it, and the best way to let them know instead of just trying to call downa customer list is to say hey this exists, protect yourself. Also, it's a fairly easily blocked attacked until a fix is released. Which will hopefully be quick, as I just got a new Visa! ;-)

      --
      Derek Greene
    16. Re:Hacker divas suck. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

      Yeah... and all the researchers in the lab were using Linux and Solaris.

    17. Re:Hacker divas suck. by sql*kitten · · Score: 2

      Knowledge is knowledge. If you want to propagate effective computer security, don't badger and pressure corporations to cow to your wishes with publicity stunts like this one.

      Actually, the knowledge of hardware DES cracking is already pretty old.

    18. Re:Hacker divas suck. by RichardClayton · · Score: 1

      The "publishing at midnight" aspect of this story was really just a media artefact. We'd intended to make the web pages available and then point people at them. However, the BBC got wind of the story and then asked that we didn't have the pages available until the show went out (they didn't want to be scooped) ... one might note the inconvenience of publishing web pages in the middle of the night when the owner of the filespace is in a foreign city with no net access. Much thanks are due to sysadmins for ensuring people could read the full info and not just the part of it that can be fitted into a mainstream news program.

    19. Re:Hacker divas suck. by another+slaphead · · Score: 1

      Having looked at the details of the exploit, I cannot see any grounds for complaint about its release or about the level of detail. There's enough to stimulate action but not to actually increase the risk.

      IBM knew for a while and apparently assumed its customers would provide adequate additional physical security to prevent a crooked bank official using the clearly defined flaw. Wrong assumption, IMHO. The Altera FPGA chip and evaluation board, and the methodolgy are advanced stuff but not rocket science. There must be at least one disaffected or crooked official in a position to do an exploit.

      As has also been pointed out, closing the loophole is not a big deal in coding terms. I guess IBM was more concerned about the cost of software re-certification (new code for crypto boxes happens infrequently and involves a LOT of testing) and the cost of loading it piecemeal into all the affected machines.

      Sloppy thinking, bad decision, worrying result.

  3. Crypto by joshyboy · · Score: 1

    I wonder how far professional crypto freaks will go? I mean it's cool, it's forcing banks to keep up with security, but I wonder how long it'll be (if ever) before we hit a point where it's just too damned expensive to crack security?

    1. Re:Crypto by naskovz · · Score: 1

      I think that real life will never get to that
      point. Infinitely secure systems have infinitely
      high cost. So every time a product is developed
      for mass production/sale (ie reasonable cost
      per item) the implementor will have to cut
      corners. I am not implying that IBM and
      others, deliberately produce faulty products.
      It is just that they try to bring to market
      the next best thing to perfect. And that is
      always imperfection... which is inherently not
      crack proof. my $0.02
      Z

  4. The Great Game! by euroderf · · Score: 1, Insightful
    Cryptography/Countercryptography, it is all a neodarwinian game, an arms race, a cold war, call it what you will the key fact is that the decryptors are never very far behind the encryptors, the nature of technology is that the ability to encrypt blesses one with an equivalent ability to decrypt, the knowledge and techniques that improve encryption also improve decryption.


    The problem is the competitive nature of modern business. Despite what the hackers and libertarians may say, the home user has no real need of encryption - encryption is the technology of big government and big business. The home user does not need it for his emails to Aunt Beth and porn downloading, but Big Government and Megacorp(TM) most certainly do, for their official secrets and industrial espionage.


    The development of encryption is rather like the development of weapons - it is at it's fastest in a cuthroat society of vicious competition.


    If we really want secure communication, we must not treat the symptoms by encrypting, but rather effect a radical cure - we must render all motivations for evesdropping redundant.


    How?


    Simple. Just attack the basis of competitive society by encouraging greater global cooperation (some sort of 5th International?), smashing big business, nationalise the worst, most competitive industries leaving only the big, lumbering and safe monopolies to do their thing. This way, we reduce the competitive nature of modern society and consequently the technological encryption/decryption competitive paradigm.


    It would be tough, but is eminently possible. We just need the will to power!

    1. Re:The Great Game! by John+Miles · · Score: 2

      Cool. It looks like parents are letting their kids watch Fight Club before they know how to read.

      --
      Dahlmann tightly grips the knife, which he may have no idea how to use, and steps out into the plain.
    2. Re:The Great Game! by sparkz · · Score: 1

      How's the weather on your planet?

      --
      Author, Shell Scripting : Expert Re
    3. Re:The Great Game! by borgboy · · Score: 1

      Cryptography/Countercryptography, it is all a neodarwinian game, an arms race, a cold war, call it what you will the key fact is that the decryptors are never very far behind the encryptors, the nature of technology is that the ability to encrypt blesses one with an equivalent ability to decrypt, the knowledge and techniques that improve encryption also improve decryption.

      Ok, sure. I can agree with that.

      The problem is the competitive nature of modern business. Despite what the hackers and libertarians may say, the home user has no real need of encryption - encryption is the technology of big government and big business. The home user does not need it for his emails to Aunt Beth and porn downloading, but Big Government and Megacorp(TM) most certainly do, for their official secrets and industrial espionage.


      Hmmmm. Nope.

      The development of encryption is rather like the development of weapons - it is at it's fastest in a cuthroat society of vicious competition.


      So, the common folk have no right to protect themselves or their communication? Just the bigwigs of CorporateSociety and those in high places of power within the governments of the world? Huh-uh. Government exists to serve us, and neither would the Corporations of the world exist without consumers to fleece.

      --
      meh.
    4. Re:The Great Game! by ilaT · · Score: 1
      Encryption is used to protect ones privacy.

      In order to make it impossible to break ones privacy, you propose to just drop privacy ourself?

      Another possibility to reduce the motivation for evesdropping would be to encrypt everything. Let the individuals decide which one they like :)

    5. Re:The Great Game! by Codifex+Maximus · · Score: 2

      Hmm.. I don't know. Sounds to me like you want to remove the very mechanism that drives innovation?

      Competition breeds better products and more goodies for the consumer.

      --
      Codifex Maximus ~ In search of... a shorter sig.
    6. Re:The Great Game! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Hmmm...interesting post to see mere days after the big "Troll HOWTO" blitz that was recently seen in the GameCube article.

    7. Re:The Great Game! by 1010011010 · · Score: 2

      Yeah! It worked for the Soviets! And Mao! Let's go!

      Ri-yot! Ri-yot! Ri-yot!

      reduce the competitive nature of modern society and consequently the technological encryption/decryption competitive paradigm

      Not to mention the free society paradigm, the able to feed oneself paradigm, and the use-the-forebrain paradigm. Rubbish!

      --
      Napster-to-go says "Fill and refill your compatible MP3 player", which is a lie. It's not MP3. It's WMA with DRM.
    8. Re:The Great Game! by logicnazi · · Score: 1

      You know it might have been more convincing if the potential victims of this LACK of cryptography were not private individuals like you and me trying to prevent others from stealing their money.

      --

      If you liked this thought maybe you would find my blog nice too:

    9. Re:The Great Game! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      hey codifex, I'm a *customer*, not a consumer.
      Down with abusive corporations that exploit normal people.
      Revolutionary Greetings, Jason

  5. Lessons to be learned: by alewando · · Score: 4, Insightful
    1. Hardware encryption will always be more difficult than software-based encryption to patch when vulnerabilities arise. There are advantages that can offset this when deciding whether or not to go with hardware, but contingency plans must be put in place for yanking the hardware back when a vulnerability is discovered.
    2. Homogeneity in network environments is nearly always bad. This particular vulnerability wouldn't be nearly as critical if it weren't for the fact that all banks who use these cryptoprocessors either use the same ones or use ones that are similar enough that vulnerabilities like these can be used on more than one "different" type. It's much harder to crack one and then crack another and another than it is to crack one and have therefore cracked them all.
    At least I have high hopes that this vulnerability will be patched forthwith -- not only does IBM have a better track record than certain other corporations, banks have both the money and the clout to demand and receive.
    1. Re:Lessons to be learned: by Crazy+Diamond · · Score: 1

      1. Hardware is more expensive to produce and fix and as a result has better testing methods. The fact that you can bug fix software implies bugs can just patched if they show up after inadequate testing. What software package is tested as thoroughly as a typical hardware design is.

      2. Related to time of testing. If you get one processor that is 99.99% tested or 10 processors that are 80% tested, which would you rather have? Either the bug is very, very hard to find and it gives you access to all doors or there are a number of implementations all of which are easy to crack.

    2. Re:Lessons to be learned: by dj28 · · Score: 1

      Your lesson number 1 falls right into the hands of IBM. Guess what happens when a 'vulnerability' is found in the hardware? They sell the company a new 'solution' at a higher cost and profit margin than a software solution would provide. IBM makes more money this way. They aren't going to be held responsible for the exploit (example: Microsoft and IIS). They'll just sell a fix to the company for a nice little profit.

    3. Re:Lessons to be learned: by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      not only does IBM have a better track record than certain other corporations


      Where do you get this from? I've always found IBM slow to respond, and this article just helps confirms that.

    4. Re:Lessons to be learned: by swillden · · Score: 5, Interesting

      Hardware encryption will always be more difficult than software-based encryption to patch when vulnerabilities arise.

      Actually this is incorrect. The 4758 is eminently software-patchable because it's a software device inside a secure hardware module. In fact the most difficult and complex part of the 4758 design is the support for secure upgrades of critical software components in a hostile environment. It uses a combination of carefully designed boot stages coupled with hardware interlocks (they call it a "ratchet") that gradually increase the complexity and decrease the access of the software that can be loaded. Thus they start with a miniature boot PROM whose code can be thoroughly proven (in the mathematical sense) to be correct, but whose only purpose is to be able to load the next stage after validating the signature on it. After that second stage is loaded, the "ratchet" is moved and the region of memory that has been loaded is now unwritable. It's very cool stuff, you can read about it in the design whitepaper.

      Homogeneity in network environments is nearly always bad. This particular vulnerability wouldn't be nearly as critical if it weren't for the fact that all banks who use these cryptoprocessors either use the same ones or use ones that are similar enough that vulnerabilities like these can be used on more than one "different" type.

      I agree in principle, but in practice (1) 4758s are still fairly rare in the banking environment and (2) the reason that the 4758 was an interesting device to attack is because the CCA API is far *more* secure than the APIs provided by comparable devices from other vendors. The authors of the crack paper even mention that they've cracked other devices this way. The 4758 was interesting because it's the best of them.

      Note, BTW, that I work for IBM and I know the guys who created the 4758, so I have some obvious biases. I also know my way around the boards :) The real weakness uncovered was not in the 4758, but in a thoughtless patch to the 20+ year old CCA API. The "patch" was the addition of 3DES. CCA is the only (AFAIK) formally-designed API for symmetric key management, and it's really well done. When it was created, though, 3DES was unnecessary. It's now obvious that a little more thinking needed to be done when it was "extended" to support 3DES.

      This weakness is very easy to close. I don't know what fix they'll choose to implement, but there's a really obvious and simple one: Don't allow a replicate key part (3DES key with identical halves) to be combined with a non-replicate key part to create a non-replicate whole that is an export key.

      What I am certain of, though, is that the entire "patched" CCA API is going to be going back to IBM's cryptographers for formal modeling, so that the integrity of the structure can tweaked until the structure can once again be proven to be mathematically correct. This won't happen again; IBM takes security very seriously and has the people that know how to do it.

      While I'm on the subject, Linux freaks will be interested to know that the next-generation OS for the 4758 is... Linux! Well, a stripped-down, thoroughly validated version of Linux, anyway. Dunno if the source will be published or not, but I think so. Linux is already running on the boards, but getting the validated version will take some time.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    5. Re:Lessons to be learned: by JDizzy · · Score: 1

      Dunno if the source will be published or not, but I think so.

      Please read the GNU license... for the answer to your question. If IBM wanted to keep it secret... use a bsd derived kernel instead.

      --
      It isn't a lie if you belive it.
    6. Re:Lessons to be learned: by Old+Wolf · · Score: 2

      Banks around here (New Zealand) use 3DES for PIN encryption (which is a bit of a joke because most PINs are only 4 digits). They also use 3DES (with the same master key) for message checksumming.

      Banks make a big hullabaloo about security, more to scare people off than for real security.

    7. Re:Lessons to be learned: by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Interesting
      Mod this parent up, he knows exactly what he's talking about

      This group has some misconceptions about the FIPS 140 process. First, they rightly point out that the level 4 cert on the IBM 4758 does not cover the CCA software, and then they go on to talk about how a bug in this (admittedly, non-evaluated software) shows the weakness of FIPS 140-1.

      Hmm... Well, interesting, but wrong. First, as they point out, the CCA software is not covered by the FIPS cert. Once you install the CCA software on the 4758, the 4758 is no longer a FIPS 140-1 module, level 4 or otherwise. The FIPS cert only applies to the module as it was evaluated. As this post's parent points out, the 4758 allows arbitrary code to be uploaded into the module. This means that as soon as you load unevaluated (ie: non-FIPS 140-1 evaluated) code into the module, it looses its FIPS 140-1 level 4 status.

      So, what is evaluated? Examining the NIST FIPS 140 validated modules list you'll see there are several pertinent certificates that apply to the IBM 4758 card. First, there is the level 4 certification of the 4758 and the boot code (Miniboot layers 0 and 1) (certificates # 35 and 116). Next you see the FIPS 140-1 level 3 certificates involving the 4758 with its onboard OS (CP/Q++) at layer 2 (certificates #122, 122). Note that as soon as you add the OS the certification drops to at most level 3. And that's without any application code at all; no CCA, no other libraries, and no applications.

      You'll also note, that the CCA is not evaluated under any of these certificates. If you think that this is an oversight on IBM's part, I have a lovely patch of land to sell you.

      Now, just to put all this 4758 bashing into perspective: The IBM 4758 is an amazingly secure cryptographic module. It is by far the most well designed and implemented cryptographic module I have ever worked with, and that says a hell of a lot. Sure, there may be more secure modules out there, but not in the civilian market. The 4758 is, to put it plainly, The Shit. The reason this module is such an interesting target is that it defines the state of the art of cryptographic modules. To put it another way, virtually every other cryptographic module (software or hardware) is less secure than the IBM 4758.

      When someone demonstrates a possible attack against an IBM 4758, you shouldn't just say to yourself "Oh, this doesn't matter, I don't own/use/deal with one of these". Because the IBM 4758 is the commercial state of the art, the work factor associated with breaking every other cryptographic module out there is less. So, if it only takes an a few days compromise the 4758, it is a fairly good bet that it takes less time than that to compromise any other commercial cryptographic module.

      Ain't it grand?

    8. Re:Lessons to be learned: by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Please read the GNU license. The source doesn't have to published, just made available to the owners of the binaries - ie. the owners of the boards.

    9. Re:Lessons to be learned: by innocent_white_lamb · · Score: 1

      What software package is tested as thoroughly as a typical hardware design is.

      In theory, sure! But in practice, how many boards have you received that are just polluted! with jumper wires and such. "Oops, we discovered that this didn't work after the mainboard went into production, so we just jumped j2 to j5 and it should be fine now."

      Of course, they don't actually tell you this in so many words, unless you ask I suppose, but really - the presence of jumper wires and obvious last-minute trace runs on all sorts of boards is self-explanatory.

      I wish that hardware was as well-tested as you say it is, but in the real world it obviously isn't. Sadly.

      --
      If you're a zombie and you know it, bite your friend!
    10. Re:Lessons to be learned: by Crazy+Diamond · · Score: 1

      By hardware I'm more thinking of an IC. But a PC board is a good enough example too. What is the cost of shipping a CD with a software patch compared with the cost of adding a jumper to every board in the field and to every board in the assembly line. What's the last motherboard you've seen that had a jumper obviously added after the board was designed? Better yet, when have you had a motherboard recalled so that they could add a jumper between two traces. Now when was the last time you flashed your BIOS?

    11. Re:Lessons to be learned: by sql*kitten · · Score: 2

      It's very cool stuff, you can read about it in the design whitepaper

      The correct URL for the white paper is here.

    12. Re:Lessons to be learned: by swillden · · Score: 2

      Please read the GNU license... for the answer to your question. If IBM wanted to keep it secret... use a bsd derived kernel instead.

      Duh. I was thinking about security implications of publishing or not publishing, without even considering the license. Yes, obviously the source will have to be given to the purchasers of the boards, who can then do what they like with it, so clearly the source will be published.

      BTW, the whole "open source is secure" notion has valid arguments both for and against. In environments where the system cannot be updated in the field (smart card operating systems, for example), secret systems are clearly more secure. In environments where the system can be patched immediately, openness is clearly more secure. In spaces in between, which covers most of the real world, the security situation is, well, in between.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    13. Re:Lessons to be learned: by Ami+Ganguli · · Score: 2

      But there can be restrictions placed on re-publishing the source. So IBM cannot make anybody sign an NDA or other agreement to keep it secret. One of the thousands of people who receive the code from IBM will publish it openly.

      --
      It is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail. - Abraham Maslow
    14. Re:Lessons to be learned: by JDizzy · · Score: 1

      In environments where the system cannot be updated in the field (smart card operating systems, for example), secret systems are clearly more secure. In environments where the system can be patched immediately, openness is clearly more secure. In spaces in between, which covers most of the real world, the security situation is, well, in between.

      It has been argued that security via obsurity is not really secure at all... just secret. Yet clearly obscurity is secure.... however... its biggest weakness is the obscurity.

      Duh. I was thinking about.......

      Yeah... I think IBM should use linux kernel for the board... why not... except the license will take the product hostage, yet at the same time protect IBM. A double edge sword.

      Going back to the Obscurity aspect... I would argue that all systems should be treated as though they are insecure... and already broken... it tends to make security better. Forinstance, beaming a new key to a communications satalite, or two analog cell phones (radios) trading keys over the air-waves... These systems undergo the best scrutiny..... the enemy

      Yet, that is not the issue at hand.... what he have here is buggy software kit. THe IBM board is still secure, and to my understanding the software is the only part that needs to be re-evaluated. I wonder if it would be possible to add Blowfish to the kit? YOu say you knwo the guys that work on this.... have they said anything about using non-DES (aka non-IBM and the goverment with their backdoors) type of ciphers??

      BTW- I wanter if smart cards have a FIPS rating?

      --
      It isn't a lie if you belive it.
    15. Re:Lessons to be learned: by swillden · · Score: 3, Informative

      It has been argued that security via obsurity is not really secure at all... just secret. Yet clearly obscurity is secure.... however... its biggest weakness is the obscurity.

      Security by obscurity is security, until the veil of obscurity is lifted. There is no question whatsoever that the absolute best in security is achieved by building something that would be completely secure if published, and then keeping it a complete secret. Obscurity creates an enormous extra work factor for would-be attackers.

      Openness actually weakens the security of systems that cannot be modified, however, because it removes the work factor created by security, but the systems cannot benefit from the quick defect corrections provided by openness. Maybe for sufficiently simple non-modifiable systems the best approach is still openness, with substantial public analysis and discourse before any systems are fielded.

      These systems undergo the best scrutiny..... the enemy

      No, I disagree. The enemy does not provide the best scrutiny, for one simple reason: the enemy won't tell you if your system is broken.

      I wonder if it would be possible to add Blowfish to the kit? YOu say you knwo the guys that work on this.... have they said anything about using non-DES (aka non-IBM and the goverment with their backdoors) type of ciphers??

      It would be trivial to add additional ciphers like Blowfish. The purchaser of a 4758 can buy a developer's kit and do it himself, even.

      However, I would not recommend Blowfish for high-security applications. It's too young. Although slow, 3DES is actually the best cipher we have right now. DES has withstood almost 30 years of intensive cryptanalysis by the best academic cryptographers in the world. Not only has it not been broken, it hasn't even showed the tiniest hint of a hairline fracture. Sure, the keys are too small these days, but 3DES fixes that up nicely, and its properties are very well understood.

      If you need a more modern, faster block cipher, I would actually recommend AES or the AES candidates, not Blowfish. Twofish is Bruce Scheier's successor to Blowfish and although it is a couple years newer than Blowfish it has almost certainly had more intense scrutiny thanks to its status as an AES finalist.

      Finally, every professional cryptographer I know put that old spectre of NSA backdoors in DES to bed years ago. It is almost inconcievable that the NSA 30 years ago was so far ahead of the current state of public cryptanalytic art that something as significant as a back door could still escape notice. Also, the NSA didn't *need* a back door. They forced a small key size, and they have more computers than anyone.

      It is vaguely possible that 3DES is crackable now by the NSA using a meet-in-the-middle attack, which is computationally feasible but requires truly phenomenal storage requirements. If you're trying to keep secrets from governments, though, good luck, because cipher strength is the least of your worries.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    16. Re:Lessons to be learned: by swillden · · Score: 2

      it removes the work factor created by security I meant "the work factor created by obscurity", of course.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    17. Re:Lessons to be learned: by swillden · · Score: 2

      BTW- I wanter if smart cards have a FIPS rating?

      I'm not aware of any that are formally certified under FIPS 140-1, but they would be level 3 at best. All known smart cards are vulnerable to clever but expensive hardware attacks, and always will be as long as they're externally powered. Boards like the 4758 have their own power supply and can actively monitor their environment for break-in attempts. Good smart card designers focus on making the cheap attacks impossible, and good smart card system designers focus on making sure that the value of breaking a card is less than the cost.

      That's the hardware. Smart card software is also generally not certified, though there are a few exceptions. I'm aware of work that is going on to produce an EAL level 6 or level 7 certified smart card operating system, but I don't know if I'm allowed to say which company is doing it or what exactly is being done. ObMSBash: It's obviously *not* Microsoft, though ;-). Their brief foray into the world of smart card OSes produced the least secure I've ever seen.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    18. Re:Lessons to be learned: by JDizzy · · Score: 1

      Thanks for responding... I enjoy our talks... to bad we have to use slashdot as a medium......

      BTW - my level of crypto knowledge could be considered novice... I only read the Applied Crypto book by Bruce, and I use Blowfish on my website. I know, I'm a lame nobody... but I love pumping your for info... thanks =)

      I have a passing interest in keeping others out of my affairs, and if I could afford this IBM board... I'd use it on my server instead of using a software based cyrpto system.. like the mcrypt libs I use now. I sure wish this type of tech were marketed to the small fry, like myself.... if IBM were smart... they could capitalize on this press coverage to their advantage.

      --
      It isn't a lie if you belive it.
    19. Re:Lessons to be learned: by swillden · · Score: 3, Informative

      Thanks for responding... I enjoy our talks... to bad we have to use slashdot as a medium......

      Welcome. You can judge from the ludicrously large number of posts I've made to threads under this article just how much I like talking about this stuff :) And my e-mail address should be on the header of all my posts.

      I only read the Applied Crypto book by Bruce

      Not a bad place to start, although it's a bad place to end. As Schneier says in his intro to "Secrets and Lies", "Applied Cryptography" has cause more bad cryptography to be implemented than any other book. It's a good book, but people read it and then think they're qualified to build stuff. I highly recommend the self-study course in block cipher cryptanalysis he has on his web site. Not that I've completed it, but just working through a little bit of it really gives you some insights, both into the world of crypto and into your own lack of knowledge of the same.

      I sure wish this type of tech were marketed to the small fry, like myself.... if IBM were smart... they could capitalize on this press coverage to their advantage.

      The boards are cheap relative to their class, but not cheap by consumer standards. Most of the competition is (or was, at least, they're being forced to lower their prices) in the $25-$50K range, per device. The 4758 is $2K-$3K, depending on whether you get the level 3 or level 4 version. Based on the complexity of manufacturing the level 4 boards, I doubt they'd be much under a grand even if volumes were huge. I can see that the level 3 boards could get down to consumer price levels (say, $200), though, if volumes were large enough. Note that I'm a software guy, so these are wild guesses.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    20. Re:Lessons to be learned: by RichardClayton · · Score: 1

      This group has some misconceptions about the FIPS 140 process. First, they rightly point out that the level 4 cert on the IBM 4758 does not cover the CCA software, and then they go on to talk about how a bug in this (admittedly, non-evaluated software) shows the weakness of FIPS 140-1.

      What we were trying to say was that the FIPS process has a weakness in the real world - in that the statements it makes ("This is a really secure piece of hardware") are of limited practical use technically (because this type of hardware is meant to encapsulate a software product) and are of limited practical use to would be purchasers (because the salepeople stress the certification and fail to point out that this is only one part of the picture).

      Don't lose sight of the point that the CCA software is shipped for free to 4758 users; it's not as if it's a completely separate thing.

      Now, just to put all this 4758 bashing into perspective: The IBM 4758 is an amazingly secure cryptographic module.

      I totally agree. But remember that "security" is a property of systems and is not an entirely useful adjective to apply to components.

    21. Re:Lessons to be learned: by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      This is not true: "The real weakness uncovered was not in the 4758, but in a thoughtless patch to the 20+ year old CCA API. The "patch" was the addition of 3DES." The very first IBM CCA products, in 1989, used Triple-DES AND ONLY TRIPLE-DES for key management. The fundamental type for all key-encrypting keys was the double-length T-DES key. By default, the two halves of the TDES key are different, but in order to allow interchange with legacy systems, CCA has always permitted the "Replicated" TDES key in which the two halves are equal - which gives you the same result as a single-length key with that value. The only TDES addition to CCA over the years was the addition of TDES data keys, for encrypting data. This is different from the key encrypting keys, used in key management. The TDES data keys are not involved in the Bond paper.

    22. Re:Lessons to be learned: by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Remember that the 4758 is targeted toward commercial enterprises, like banks. Customers like these have no use for Blowfish, or any other algorithm that is not a part of the standards they use for their operations, and for interchange with other parties. If Blowfish (or any other algorithm) becomes important to these users, then it would be a candidate - but until then, as another appender mentioned, it's possible to get a toolkit to add whatever you want to the 4758 code, producing a secure, custom version you can distribute to your own customers.

    23. Re:Lessons to be learned: by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      In this case, the perceived vulnerability is in software (CCA) that runs inside the piece of hardware (4758). As mentioned by others, IBM gives the CCA software away for free - you can just download it from their web site, if you have a 4758 card. The same is true for patches that have been provided over the years - free. Also, the same is true of the PKCS#11 API software for the 4758, which you can use instead of CCA if it is more in line with your needs. All the card software and updates, and related host software, is free.

    24. Re:Lessons to be learned: by JDizzy · · Score: 1

      Actually I'm thinking of way to justify the cash expence in purchasing one of these boards. I'm wondering how much faster this would increase the speed of my application as opposed to software based crypto? If I were to grab one of these boards... I wouldn't neccesarily want to use the Data Encipher Standard, but rather experiment with a new crypto system.

      My only basis for mentioning Blowfish is because that is what I use in my application currently. This seems to be reasonably fast, but several folks have said that the cipher is not old enough for their taste.

      --
      It isn't a lie if you belive it.
    25. Re:Lessons to be learned: by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      What we were trying to say was that the FIPS process has a weakness in the real world - in that the statements it makes ("This is a really secure piece of hardware") are of limited practical use technically (because this type of hardware is meant to encapsulate a software product) and are of limited practical use to would be purchasers (because the salepeople stress the certification and fail to point out that this is only one part of the picture).

      I think that what you term a weakness is actually a strength for many customers of this and related devices.

      I would imagine that there are many customer and potential customers out there who are perhaps software/solutions providors, and don't necessarily build their own hardware/platforms. Yet, I would argue that they deserve some level of security assurance as well. So, I would think that if someone could supply them a platform that can make certain claims (e.g., FIPS 140-1 overall level 4 validated - under whatever conditions were specified for that evaluation), you would provide that assurance that these software/solutions providers, and even their customers, require. If the software/solutions people decide have their application(s) evaluated (always a good idea), their job is made easier because they can build upon the evaluation of the platform (and the OS). If they choose not to have their application(s) evaluated -- for whatever reason -- they still have some level of assurance in at least the underlying components of "their" solution (which may be enough for some of their customers).

      So, who is at fault for not having CCA evaluated? Well, first of all, it appears that CCA has indeed undergone some form of security evaluation (ZKA from what I remember). And like most evaluations, I suppose that this one covered specific "configurations" of CCA. Is your vulnerability valid in those configurations? Perhaps you should look into it. Also, sharing some of the "fault", is (IMHO), the banks if they do not require formal, third-party security evaluations of the solutions they purchase.

      BTW, I don't believe that CCA is technically "shipped for free to 4758 users". It is one of the applications that is available for free on IBM's web site, and I imagine that there are other applications that can be purchased (either separately or as a packaged deal) that will run on the 4758. And I beileve it (CCA) is indeed a seperate thing -- unless the API "requires" the use of a 4758 (does it?). From my understanding, CCA has been around a lot longer than the 4758 -- so what did it run on? A "separate thing"? Cheers

  6. I question the point of advertising your hack.... by moniker_21 · · Score: 1

    but wouldn't it be funny if IBM contacted them and offered to purchase the info on the vulnerability, thus keeping it a secret? I've oft wondered if anything like this has every occurred. Software blackmail anyone?

    --
    I posted to /. and all I got was this stupid sig
  7. RealVideo Coverage by guru_steve · · Score: 5, Informative

    I'm watching the video right now, and its taken a bit of time to find out where this segment is on the bbc news.

    So, for those of you who don't feel like jumping around the video for this segment, it starts at about 22 minutes in the broadcast.

    1. Re:RealVideo Coverage by darnellmc · · Score: 1

      Thanks, I was about 2 minutes into the thing and had about 20 to go.

    2. Re:RealVideo Coverage by guru_steve · · Score: 1

      No problem.

      If it was a local file, seeking wouldn't be bad, but even on my DSL connection, it takes ~ 6-10 seconds to buffer every time you jump around the file. Very, very annoying.

      Thank goodness i already had RealVideo installed. (ugh.)

    3. Re:RealVideo Coverage by tom.allender · · Score: 1
      it starts at about 22 minutes in the broadcast

      ... and Alan Cox at about 30 minutes.

    4. Re:RealVideo Coverage by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Sorry to be pedantic but it's not BBC News, this programme follows the main BBC News and offers more comment and insight into the facts of today's news.

    5. Re:RealVideo Coverage by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      and Alan Cox at about 30 minutes


      Thanks, now I know when I can turn it off. If I was really in the mood to watch fat commies spew nonsense I'll pull out my old Dean Martin Roasts the USSR Premiers videotape.

  8. No by sulli · · Score: 2

    That's where the money is!

    --

    sulli
    RTFJ.
  9. Insiders by Embedded+Geek · · Score: 5, Interesting
    I'm glad they pointed out that most thefts are perpetrated by insiders (at banks or other companies) due to the other (physical) security measures. I can only hope that other media outlets don't drop the ball on this and start shouting "hackers can steal your cash" on the 6PM news.

    Then again... I guess you'd only need to be an insider at the phone company (or whatever company might be leasing a cable to a phone company) to exploit ATM transfers. You wouldn't need to be a bank employee (who undergo background checks, etc).

    --

    "Prepare for the worst - hope for the best."

    1. Re:Insiders by maladroit · · Score: 2, Interesting
      It seems like it would be tough for even an insider to exploit this. Supposing the would-be thief has managed to (a) tap into the (leased) line (b) separate out the transaction data being sent from the ATM and (c) decrypt it, then they have a set of card numbers and pins. Now what ? I don't think you can get any money without the physical ATM card.


      Maybe the debit cards or other transactions they mention are more vulnerable ...

    2. Re:Insiders by Telastyn · · Score: 1

      This is much easier than you'd think. You probably would only have to be an IT staffer for a company in the same building as a bank. (preferably an old bank where the telephone room was an afterthought). A simple shoulder surf of a DSL guy and I had access to the building phone closet. The bank's leased lines ran there, as well as our own DSL (which I had to rewire, hence the shoulder surfing). I even voulenteered to finish off the punch downs (handy punch down tool in hand) and the tech let me.

      I was 19 at the time, in generic t-shirt and jeans sort of attire, not exactly 'professional' looking. As far as thievery goes it's probably easier to generate a check card number (they should be within a certain range, and credit card generation is public knowledge).

    3. Re:Insiders by FredGray · · Score: 1
      I don't think you can get any money without the physical ATM card.

      A magnetic stripe recorder can be had for a few hundred dollars, so it's not too hard to create a replica of the "physical ATM card."

    4. Re:Insiders by Yobgod+Ababua · · Score: 1

      Now what ?

      More dangerous than decrypting any individual transaction would be decrypting the keys used to encode the transactions (which is what the article says they've done).

      So, you make up your own set of transactions tranferring funds from one place to another, perhaps using the credit card and account numbers you collected along the way, encrypt them with the discovered keys, and send them off to be processed.

    5. Re:Insiders by maladroit · · Score: 1

      And then the thief can get his picture taken when using that replica ... even if they manage to stay off camera, the risk is enormous for the few hundred bucks they can get before hitting the daily withdrawal limit.
      As someone else has pointed out, the more likely way to use this would be transfer money into an account they can abscond with, but simulating those transactions is yet another hurdle to overcome. The risk seems relatively low ...

    6. Re:Insiders by swillden · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Then again... I guess you'd only need to be an insider at the phone company (or whatever company might be leasing a cable to a phone company) to exploit ATM transfers.

      Nope, read the article. Performing the attack requires that the insider have permission to use the Combine_Key_Parts function of the board. That means, essentially, that you have to have an "account" on the board with a username and password, and that your account has to have those permissions. Generally, only a very small number of people will have accounts, and only two or three at will have this permission.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    7. Re:Insiders by innocent_white_lamb · · Score: 1

      It seems like it would be tough for even an insider to exploit this.

      That depends.

      A buddy of mine (sort of) is the "computer guy" at a small credit union. (Read "sort of a bank.")

      I, and a lot of other folks, have their bank accounts at that credit union. I suspect that my "buddy" would have relatively easy access to the encryption doodad that they have there, simply by workng late one night. Heck, there are maybe 20 employees at this credit union, at the most....

      --
      If you're a zombie and you know it, bite your friend!
    8. Re:Insiders by Tuonenkielo · · Score: 1

      And then the thief can get his picture taken when using that replica ... even if they manage to stay off camera, the risk is enormous for the few hundred bucks they can get before hitting the daily withdrawal limit.
      Question? Why would the hackers use the copied cards themselves? Wouldn't it be easier to just sell the copied cards in bulk to organized crime, who then exploit the cards? At least that is teh understanding I have about what happens to most stolen cards, they get shipped around and used some odd places. And no photo of the hacker from ATM anywhere while a several crooks run around using cloned credit cards for other shams and illegal activities...

    9. Re:Insiders by arkanes · · Score: 1

      At a mall I was at in Georgia, the atm was plugged via modem into the wall - you could see the wire coming out of the (probably very sold) ATM case and going into the wall. It would have been simple to hunker down there and tap in. Weren't even any cameras there - the ATMS cameras were pointed forward to get people using the ATM.

    10. Re:Insiders by gorilla · · Score: 3, Interesting

      If you have the card number and the pin, then you can write your own card with that number on it, put it into any machine, and enter the pin.

  10. When will they learn... by bytes256 · · Score: 1, Offtopic

    Crypto is like the law...it's made to be broken!

    --

    Slashdot, the site where everything's made up and the points don't matter
  11. ut-oh by DanThe1Man · · Score: 1
    "Until IBM fix the CCA software to prevent our attack, banks are vulnerable to a dishonest branch manager whose teenager has $995 and a few hours to spend in duplicating our work."


    Oh man, I can see it now


    Banker's son: "Hey dad, I need a new computer. I hear Alteras are pretty good...."

  12. ATM's are more prone to stone age methods by number+one+duck · · Score: 4, Informative

    I'm not too worried about this. An electronic fraud is something that can be reasonably gotten out of, its the *banks* fault if their system eats your money. (Admittedly, I haven't read the small print of my own bank, but hey, its not the article, anyway).

    The big problem I have with my bank, however, is the location and layout of their ATM machines to begin with:

    1) ATM's are built into the wall, rather than in any kind of nook. The line generally forms directly behind the user. (This isn't so much of a problem for e.g. drive through atms, as the bulk of the car is obscuring view of the transaction).

    2) The buttons on the keypad are almost two inches across! I know they have to make them 'easy to use', and big happy buttons are important for that, I imagine... but having to move my entire hand around to enter the code makes it trivial to watch someone's movements...as opposed to normal sized buttons where what is being pushed is generally obscured by your hand itself.

    3) This is a general problem. Cards are *inserted* rather than *swiped*, which makes it almost trivial for people to rig the machines to prevent the card from being returned. A card swipe, where the card never leaves my hand, would be infinitely preferred to leaving my bank card at the mercy of any hoodlum with a bottle of soap and a pair of pliers.

    4) Apparently the ATM card I recieved is more than I asked for... it is also a credit card AND a debit card AND who knows what all else... if they acquire it they can run me down even if I don't have any money left in the account proper.

    1. Re:ATM's are more prone to stone age methods by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

      Sounds like your bank is pretty bad. Try getting a new one. but in response:

      3) It's not that easy to screw around with an ATM without getting caught. Otherwise you would see a lor more criminals stealing cash directly from within the machine.

      4) Don't get a debit card if you don't want one. In the US a debit card is usually also on the Maestro/Mastercard networks, while ATM cards are on only (e.g.) Cirrus and NYCE. See the logos on the back. Also a debit card will have a hologram and usually a network logo on the front.

    2. Re:ATM's are more prone to stone age methods by dirty · · Score: 1

      As for number four read your bank's fine print. I know with my bank if the card is stolen i'm responsible for the first $50 of any ATM transaction (requiring the PIN), and $0 of any credit card transaction on the card. So provided I report the card stolen the most I'm out is $50 and that's if the person manages to guess my PIN in three tries (the ATM eats the card after that).

      Besides, if you don't want a "check card" just tell your bank, I'm certain they would be more than happy to issue you a standard ATM card.

      --

      -matt
    3. Re:ATM's are more prone to stone age methods by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Wow. What an obnoxious site. Even Popup Killer doesn't get rid of all that shit you spew at people.

      Why don't porn webmasters realize that because they're running a business like anyone else, pissing off the clientele isn't going to make them any money in the end?

    4. Re:ATM's are more prone to stone age methods by Lish · · Score: 0, Offtopic

      Referring to item 3:

      I am actually disappointed that many ATMs are swipe-based now rather than insert-based. One safety feature of an ATM card is that if you report it stolen, your bank can put a block on it such that if it is inserted into an ATM the machine will eat it. It will also do the same if someone attempts to brute-force your PIN and guesses wrong too many times. This is a big plus IMHO.

      --
      "This message is composed of 100% recycled electrons."
    5. Re:ATM's are more prone to stone age methods by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Because of 3 and 4, I had a very bad incident
      happen. The machine ate my card, or so I
      thought, but I can only assume it later spit
      it out. Anyway, because of 4 the joker who
      came along after me took it and emptied out
      my account... in 2 hours. (i was a poor
      college student at the time thank goodness.)

      The bank -eventually- (30 days later or so)
      reimbursed me but it was quite a pain for me
      and I'm glad my parents were there to help
      me out. My account was cleaned out the day
      before rent was due.

      Now, I no longer have 4 on my card.

    6. Re:ATM's are more prone to stone age methods by Sloppy · · Score: 1

      The buttons on the keypad are almost two inches across! I know they have to make them 'easy to use', and big happy buttons are important for that, I imagine...

      I don't like this either.

      This problem could be solved by just having two keypads -- a big one and a small one (maybe even with the small one recessed a bit) -- and let the user type on whichever one he wants to. Then people who need the big keys would still be able to use the machines, and everyone else could have a little more privacy.

      --
      As copyright owner of this comment, I authorize everyone to defeat any technological measure which limits access to it.
    7. Re:ATM's are more prone to stone age methods by 1010011010 · · Score: 1, Offtopic

      My favorite thing about ATMs is the braille all over the console and the buttons, with a CRT giving the instructions. It's a hoot!

      --
      Napster-to-go says "Fill and refill your compatible MP3 player", which is a lie. It's not MP3. It's WMA with DRM.
    8. Re:ATM's are more prone to stone age methods by 3263827 · · Score: 2

      In a previous life, I worked as a teller at a bank. Not only are most tellers underpaid, they are continually dumped on by rude customers. Anyways, for giggles, some tellers would go to the cabinet/closet where our ATM was housed, and when someone put a card in, they'd pull it into the reject bin. They'd do this when the bank was closed, so the luser would have to come into the branch the following morning to get the card back. Pretty funny to watch peoples faces on the camera when they realize their card isn't going to pop back out...

    9. Re:ATM's are more prone to stone age methods by Jaeden · · Score: 1

      How about:

      1) Card stolen & reported stolen.
      2) Thief tries to use card to withdraw money:
      3) Thief swipes card.
      4) ATM recognises stolen card.
      5) ATM: "Error reading card. Please swipe again."
      6) Thief swipes again.
      7) ATM erases card.

    10. Re:ATM's are more prone to stone age methods by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Especially on the drive-up ATMs, even more when they're in the middle of a parking lot.

    11. Re:ATM's are more prone to stone age methods by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That would most likely require re-engineering the reader to include write capabilities. Also, you could toast someone else's card if they walked away and the next person swiped...

      "I was standing in line at the ATM, and the dude in front of me got mad, said his card was bad, and left. I swiped my card and the @#$*! machine erased my card."

    12. Re:ATM's are more prone to stone age methods by dragons_flight · · Score: 2

      Blind people might want to use ATMs too. Suppose a blind person needs to get some cash, he or she can get someone else to read the screen instructions, but can punch in the PIN directly, without having to give it out to anyone else. Of course being certain the other person isn't watching your fingers might be a trick, but in theory a blind person should be able to conduct his transaction without revealing his PIN to anyone.

    13. Re:ATM's are more prone to stone age methods by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      A pair of pliers and a bottle of soap? Reminds me of Christie and Sabrina last night. "Don't just stare at it, Sabrina -- eat it." What a riot.

      -Patrick Bateman, Esq.

    14. Re:ATM's are more prone to stone age methods by Secret+Coward · · Score: 1

      A simple solution to this, is to recognize that a card belongs to a blind person, and to have standard procedures for working with the machine.

    15. Re:ATM's are more prone to stone age methods by skajohan · · Score: 1
      The solution is, of course, to have a button to press that makes the ATM also read what's being displayed.

      The ATMs in Sweden have this functionality. It's quite fun to press the button and hang around to watch the next person that comes to use the machine. At the press of the button, the ATM says "Please insert your card". It then sits quietly until a card is inserted and it's time to say "Please enter your pin code". The voice is very loud and most people are quite startled =)

    16. Re:ATM's are more prone to stone age methods by gorilla · · Score: 2

      Many modern ATMs are coming equiped with an audio output socket, which allows the blind person to plug in a headset and have the screen instructions read to her by the ATM directly. Here is a link to a bank which has this in some of their ATMs. NCR has said that all future ATMs they produce will be audio enabled by default. I hope that other ATM manufacturers will follow.

  13. Mountain out of a molehill by Papa+Legba · · Score: 1, Insightful

    Ok granted they have hacked the hardware with a neato device that they built but.... Is it really practical as a hack, I was struck by the length of time it took to acomplish this hack in real time. Looks like three days total of the device attached to the machine. This is a VERY long time to try and hack something that is in a secure position. Also you have to get inside the bank undetected (either as an insider or as some sort of infiltrator) place the device out of sight (don't forget to hide the connections).

    Frankly if you have gone that far why not just rob the vault? The money is right their. Ultimatly with this stealth run of encryption you have a bunch of PIN numbers.... Ok great but you don't have any of the cards or the card info that is needed even. Even if you some how extract the contents of the cards magnetic strip you still have to manufacture a card, then you have my pin number. Great now you can withdraw the total sum of my bank account which is ... about $20 right now. That's a lot of work in a high risk way to garner a very small amount of reward.

    This is really not all that different than me saying I can crack a PCs bios password if I can get access to the physical machine and have a screwdriver. the amount of effort that precedes the hack negates the hacks effectiveness.

    I applaud their inginuity, and I hope IBM buys the idea off of them as a handy tool to recover lost data, but if I was IBM I would not be in any big hurry to change all of this hardware.

    --
    Papa Legba come and open the gate
    1. Re:Mountain out of a molehill by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Uh - you missed something. They only need physical access for 20 minutes. The remaining analysis can happen 'off line'.

    2. Re:Mountain out of a molehill by Quikah · · Score: 2

      You only neeed access to the ATM for 20 minutes to download the keys. You then spend a couple days decrypting the keys offline.

      I don't know about the rest of you but I have more than $20 in my bank account.

      --
      Q.
    3. Re:Mountain out of a molehill by ilaT · · Score: 1
      If you steal the right keys (and i assume you do once you made it to this high security device), you don't have go get any more cards or something.

      With these keys you could forge inter-bank or bank-atm traffic at will! Just choose some account and transfer as much money as you need.

      Well, you shouldn't use an account that can be traced back to you... ;)

    4. Re:Mountain out of a molehill by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I offer you my account for just this application. ;)

  14. Question... by srvivn21 · · Score: 5, Interesting

    So they article says that this is really only exploitable by "insiders". At first I felt safe. "Well, at least my money is Federally protected". Then I got to thinking about it. How would I prove that I wasn't the one who used my PIN at an ATM (or several) to clear out my account? Anyone have an answer that can put my mind at ease?
    (Not like I'm going to take all my money from the bank, and stuff it in a jar. Just idle thoughts of threat)

    1. Re:Question... by Papa+Legba · · Score: 1

      All atms have cameras on them to record the physical person who removed the cash. If they show a withdrawl at 1pm and their is no one standing in front of the machine at that time then I would think yuo have a case. And if they do use a physical card to do it with a physicall person pushing the buttons, it won't be you standing their taking the money out...

      --
      Papa Legba come and open the gate
    2. Re:Question... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      they have camera's at each station. I'm sure if you could prove you wasn't at the ATM at the time the money was taken out, that would also make a good case for getting your money back. Embezzlement has been around for a while now. It's not something new with ATM's and the internet.

    3. Re:Question... by srvivn21 · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Two problems with that.

      1)Not all of the ATM's in my home city have cameras.

      2)I also live in a cold climate. There would be nothing odd with someone being bundled up with a ski mask on making use of an ATM...

    4. Re:Question... by psavo · · Score: 2, Funny

      2)I also live in a cold climate. There would be nothing odd with someone being bundled up with a ski mask on making use of an ATM...

      I used to live in poor country, there was nothing odd with someone being bundled up with a ski mask on making use of an ATM...

      --
      fucktard is a tenderhearted description
    5. Re:Question... by sachmet · · Score: 2, Informative

      Because most banks that I am aware of have a $300 limit on account withdrawls; also, with enough witnesses willing to provide affidavits, you can prove you were not in the location you said you were in at the time the withdrawl took place. The withdrawl limit is to prevent a person from physically accosting you from ATM to ATM trying to take all your money.

    6. Re:Question... by dazed-n-confused · · Score: 3, Interesting

      How would I prove that I wasn't the one who used my PIN at an ATM (or several) to clear out my account? Anyone have an answer that can put my mind at ease?

      In a word, no. Here in the UK, there was an unpleasant case some years back when the banks tried to do just that -- covering up security flaws in their ATM machines and prosecuting the man who had suffered from their errors when he protested about unauthorised withdrawals from his account.

      There's a selection of relevant papers on Ross Anderson's website: read up on the subject here. "Why Cryptosystems Fail" is probably the most immediately rewarding, given your concerns.

    7. Re:Question... by walt-sjc · · Score: 1

      The limit depends on the account type. You can get accounts with a much higher limit. Same applies to the daily "purchase" limit wich is separate, and usually higher than the cash limit.

    8. Re:Question... by mpe · · Score: 2

      Here in the UK, there was an unpleasant case some years back when the banks tried to do just that -- covering up security flaws in their ATM machines and prosecuting the man who had suffered from their errors when he protested about unauthorised withdrawals from his account.

      It actually turns out internal fraud by bank employees is a common cause here. This need not involve any hacking. Simply something as simple as ordering additional cards attached to an account can do it. Since statements generally don't indicate which card is used or even how many cards are attached to the account.

    9. Re:Question... by mpe · · Score: 2

      All atms have cameras on them to record the physical person who removed the cash. If they show a withdrawl at 1pm and their is no one standing in front of the machine at that time then I would think yuo have a case.

      All the bank then has to do is say "well the cardholder must have lent their card to someone else".

    10. Re:Question... by armb · · Score: 2

      > you can prove you were not in the location you said you were in at the time the withdrawal

      That doesn't help if the banks response is "then you must have given your PIN to someone else - our system is perfect so the money must have been withdrawn by someone with your PIN".
      _You_ know they are lying, but how do you prove it?

      Back to this attack, there are details at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/descrack/ and http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mkb23/research.html

      --
      rant
    11. Re:Question... by arkanes · · Score: 1

      Yeah, but then the burden goes back to the bank.

    12. Re:Question... by sachmet · · Score: 1

      If I have the sole copy of my card, or I can prove where all copies of my card were, then I solve the issue of proving that I was not at the ATM at the time rather nicely. After all, you are supposed to need both the physical card and the PIN to withdrawl cash.

    13. Re:Question... by gorilla · · Score: 2

      The banks can do the opposite. All ATMs are fittable with a camera, and can be programmed to take a picture of the person making the withdrawal. When this is produced, almost certainly it's someone known to the cardholder, if not the cardholder themselves.

    14. Re:Question... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Because most ATM transactions are video taped.

    15. Re:Question... by rthille · · Score: 1

      My ex wife had her account cleaned out. She didn't save the receipt, which for that particular ATM printed the whole number, and someone watched her type her PIN code (via a long lens). She wasn't liable.

      --
      Awesome furniture, accessories and cabinetry in Santa Rosa, CA: http://humanity-home.com/
    16. Re:Question... by Cato · · Score: 2

      This is exactly what has happened in the UK with 'phantom withdrawals' - one poor guy was on holiday with his bank card in a drawer at home (no-one else with access to house) when one withdrawal happened, and he was *still* accused of defrauding the bank.

      The most important feature of any bank is the small print in their contract with you - check to see whether they assume that a fraud is nothing to do with you, and must prove that you committed it. For far too long, at least in the UK, banks assumed their customers guilty until proven innocent...

    17. Re:Question... by armb · · Score: 2

      > The banks can do the opposite. All ATMs are fittable with a camera,

      Only relevent if the cash was actually taken out of an ATM. If the bank are trying to cover up a fraudulent transaction by an insider, which was the context under discussion, there will be no photo. But since not all ATMs actually have cameras taking pictures of every transaction, the banks failure to produce a photo doesn't help you prove the withdrawal didn't happen.

      --
      rant
    18. Re:Question... by armb · · Score: 2

      > I can prove where all copies of my card were

      Which is fine if you are in the habit of frequently asking witnesses to note that you have your ATM cards with you just in case someone is creating a fraudulent transactions supposedly using it at the time. Most people aren't.
      (Or the fake transaction clashing with a real transaction somewhere else, which requires luck and the person creating the fake transaction not being able to see the real ones).

      --
      rant
  15. Just another case of security by obscurity? by imrdkl · · Score: 2
    Like ssh-agent, this chip seems to be secure keyholder. It is a little unnerving that an hardware implementation could be so easily broken, but I also suspect that, unlike ssh-agent, this was not ever an open-source implementation. :-)

    The news (I liked Real links) claims that development took 20 years, and that normal banking procedures would prevent this type of attack. But Alan Cox, of course, strongly suggests that publishing the algorithm behind the chip would have helped to avoid this calamity.

  16. typical by brer_rabbit · · Score: 1

    as is typical, the mechanism was broken not because of the crypto algorithm but because of the implementation.

  17. Pretty focussed branch manager... by WasterDave · · Score: 4, Funny

    "banks are vulnerable to a dishonest branch manager whose teenager has $995 and a few hours to spend in duplicating our work."

    If you have a teenager who can hack FPGA's sufficiently well to brute force into a cash machine, you're really not going to have any problems making money in years to come. Either that or your problems are just beginning.

    Dave

    --
    I write a blog now, you should be afraid.
  18. Linux RealPlayer and BBC's Real stream nada by dazdaz · · Score: 0


    This does'nt work so no point clicking on it.
    The BBC are becoming slacker nowadays.

    http://news.bbc.co.uk/olmedia/cta/progs/newsnigh t/ latest.ram

    dazdaz

  19. Old news: SOSP 18 by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    They announced this at SOSP 18, 2 weeks ago. Perhaps being sequestered in alpine Canada made the information take a while to disseminate.

  20. Old news by CrazyJim0 · · Score: 1

    The kid from Terminator 2 did that with a hacked atari computer.

  21. Well, it's a worry but... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

    I type my pin into my cordless phone,
    to check my balance regularly.
    So anyone could tap my phone,
    or just use an AM radio.
    But chances are it will never happen to me...

    1. Re:Well, it's a worry but... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Well if you were a swanky UK'ian you'd be using a digital DECT phone which is encrypted, and operating on the European 1.8ghz ISM band this means it will co-exist with your 802.11b 2.4ghz network perfectly.

    2. Re:Well, it's a worry but... by RGW · · Score: 1

      There are European guidelines, a bank is never allowed to ask for a PIN over the phone.

  22. i hope they don't want to come to the us.... by taco1991 · · Score: 0, Troll

    or they could face the evil hand of the DMCA like Dmitry Sklyarov did. I wonder what would happen if the crackers had come from america, or if ibm will try to take those guys to court to protect their encryption.

    on the other hand, it's already hit the net so it's a pratically public domain now ;)

    t.

    --
    "Corrupting our youth one mind at a time"
    1. Re:i hope they don't want to come to the us.... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      'Troll'? This guy makes a valid point, this is exactly what happend to Sklyarov but in this case the stakes are much higher, e-book v. banking security, hrm, I really would reconsider a sabbatical in the US if I were part of the research team.

  23. Re:Buy a couple of those and... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    you couldn't hack your area code

  24. Re:bad slashdot by Alan+Cox · · Score: 2

    Well its their heads under the DMCA 8)

  25. Re:bad slashdot by SquierStrat · · Score: 1

    No, especially when you need physical access to the machine with the card to do it. What is immoral is spending a year lolly gagging around about it and not fixing it..IBM that is.

    --
    Derek Greene
  26. Re:Buy a couple of those and... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    That reminds me of my highschool login system that accepted wildcards. Huh.

  27. Only a matter of time by CmdrTroll · · Score: 4, Insightful
    My brother used to work as a contractor for Cirrus. He said that the PIN encryption was a private joke amongst all of the engineers there. The suits all believed that cryptographic mumbo-jumbo and really expensive chips sold by "connected" salespeople at IBM would protect the banks' assets. But, he said, the problems with the PIN were nearly impossible to solve. Consider:
    • The PIN is four decimal digits = 10,000 combinations ~= somewhere between 13 and 14 bits of security. It is entirely feasible for a quick P4 to encrypt every single PIN within an hour, with time left over to play Unreal Tournament.
    • There is no trusted path between the user's memory and the bank. Fake ATMs have been installed in shopping malls, collecting PINs and ATM cards from unsuspecting victims. Do you *really trust* every single PIN keypad at every shady gas station, grocery store, and Wal-Mart, not to have logging devices installed? Replay attacks are not rocket science.
    • Embedding DES keys inside a chip will inevitably lead to compromise. One needs to look no farther than the DirecTV access cards (particularly the H and F cards) to see the amount of damage that a few determined hobbyists can do. Imagine if there are billions of dollars at stake rather than just a little free TV.

    Regardless, this is not a widespread problem. It is a weak system and it was always a weak system. But it's not worth thieves' time to steal PINs yet (for the most part anyway) just because PINless credit card fraud is still so easy.

    -CT

    1. Re:Only a matter of time by WasterDave · · Score: 5, Insightful

      10,000 combinations ~= somewhere between 13 and 14 bits of security. It is entirely feasible for a quick P4 to encrypt every single PIN within an hour, with time left over to play Unreal Tournament.

      But if you read their page about how PIN works it becomes aparrent that you still need the derivation key, which is the hard bit to get.

      Fake ATMs have been installed in shopping malls, collecting PINs and ATM cards from unsuspecting victims

      LOL! Someone did a whole bunch of these in the UK a couple of years ago. Looked and smelled like an ATM, but took the PIN then complained that the card was borked, or something. Easy EASY kill.

      because PINless credit card fraud is still so easy.

      Exactly. 1e6+1 easier ways of stealing money than opening an ATM with an oxy-acetylene, spending two days cracking it with an FPGA and using all that to hack the banks comms. Easier to just look over some lamers shoulder then pick their pocket. Not that I would know. Not at all.

      Dave

      --
      I write a blog now, you should be afraid.
    2. Re:Only a matter of time by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Ah, but you forget the fuckwits who can't remember their own phone number.

      All encryption can and will be broken.
      I just wish they would give you more than
      four digits on a PIN to work with.

    3. Re:Only a matter of time by Black+Acid · · Score: 5, Informative
      The PIN is four decimal digits = 10,000 combinations ~= somewhere between 13 and 14 bits of security.

      For those interested, you can find how many bits a key with x values is using logarithms:



      bits = log(x) / log(2), or

      bits = d / log(2)

      Where d is the number of decimal digits the key is. Therefore, a 4-digit PIN has 4/log(2) or precisely 13.287712379549449391481277717958 bits of cryptographic strength. Not much compared even to weak encryption such as 64-bit DES, or the 56-bit des-ii cracked by d.net.

    4. Re:Only a matter of time by Glytch · · Score: 2

      Do you *really trust* every single PIN keypad at every shady gas station, grocery store, and Wal-Mart, not to have logging devices installed?

      I work at a Walmart. Don't give me ideas. :)

    5. Re:Only a matter of time by Birdie-PL · · Score: 1

      There is no trusted path between the user's memory and the bank. Fake ATMs have been installed in shopping malls, collecting PINs and ATM cards from unsuspecting victims. Do you *really trust* every single PIN keypad at every shady gas station, grocery store, and Wal-Mart, not to have logging devices installed? Replay attacks are not rocket science.

      And also one can install minature cameras on real ATMs to take pictures when you type your PIN. It already has been done - a few months ago in Poland. The thing got quite a lot of attention, as an ATM of one of the biggest banks were 'hacked' this way. And this wasn't done by insiders - just a couple of smart 'kids' hooked on electronics.

      Don't know of any link in English if you want the full story, though.

      --
      e-mail: karol at tls-technologies.com
      www: http://www.tls-technologies.com
      sig: not found
    6. Re:Only a matter of time by mpe · · Score: 2

      Exactly. 1e6+1 easier ways of stealing money than opening an ATM with an oxy-acetylene, spending two days cracking it with an FPGA and using all that to hack the banks comms.

      If you are going to crack one open far easier to simply pinch a machine just after it has been filled...

    7. Re:Only a matter of time by gorilla · · Score: 3, Informative

      You're assuming that all 10,000 combinations are valid. Most systems exclude 'first guess' combinations such as 0000,1234, etc. This reduces the number to 9000 and some.

    8. Re:Only a matter of time by dfn_deux · · Score: 1

      Just to Clarify, your point about DSS hacking. The Cryptographic "Secret" has never (at least not publicly) been hacked out of the reciever. And all the current hacks still rely on the secret in combination with the F,H,HU card asic to decrypt the signal. There have been no steps taken toward hacking the secret out past the theoretical.

      OTH: the cryptography built into these devices is based on the FFS (Fage, Fiat, Shamir (SP?)) algorythm which is only a stone's throw away from DES, which has been shown to be crackable by determined groups(EFF).

      P.S. Now that I'm thoroughly off the original subject, I'd be interested to here any chypherpunks take on the best way to attack the cryptography on DSS reciever in such a way to reveal both the primary and redundant backup secrets and allow the the ASIC in the smart card to be removed from the equation. That'd be a real prize, anybody could make a satelite reciever that'd work for 100% of the DSS stream all the time and could be invunerable to ECMs(electronic counter measures) because there is no feasable way for DSS to change the encryption keys(the secrets are not in writeable space in the reciever) without exchanging EVERY DSS BOX EVER SOLD for a new "IMPROVED" reciever.

      --
      -*The above statement is printed entirely on recycled electrons*-
    9. Re:Only a matter of time by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      DirecTV cards are not FIPS 140 Level 4 certified. That's why you can break into their hardware. Nobody - including people who are supposed to know about every attack that exists - has been able to penetrate the physical security of the 4758 card and extract any secret information.

    10. Re:Only a matter of time by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Why is the number of bits in the PIN relevant here? The PIN is not used as an encryption key. If you encrypt a PIN with a double-length (112-bit) DES key, then that key is the item whose strength you have to break - not the PIN itself.

  28. From the FAQ on their site by lexxlutha · · Score: 1

    After breaking the encryption on bank accounts.

    Where can I go to book tickets to Bermuda?

    Go to http://www.bermuda-online.org/airlines.htm

    Funny stuff.

    --
    It's a fool that looks for logic in the chambers of the human heart.
  29. Is your parent a bank manger? by Quizme2000 · · Score: 4, Funny

    Until IBM fix the CCA software to prevent our attack, banks are vulnerable to a dishonest branch manager whose teenager has $995 and a few hours to spend in duplicating our work.

    I like the tech about hacking the processor, very clever. The rest is better read as bad fiction. Chalk this one up under the anarchist cookbook. Sure you may be able too, but you'll get thrown into jail or blow off a limb.

    --
    "Get them before they get....
  30. Not relevant on both counts... by Moooo+Cow · · Score: 2, Informative

    At least, not relevant for this particular story.

    1) The hackers themselves say "Until IBM fix the CCA software to prevent our attack...". According to the experts here, the fix is a software patch, not a hardware change-out.

    2) This particular vulnerability only needs access to any single IBM 4758 running IBM's ATM. It does not depend on a whole set of them working together. In fact, given that you only need one, increased heterogeneity would increase the overall chance that a given network/organization has one exploitable system somewhere (although it does indeed decrease the overall chance that ALL your elements are exploitable).

    --
    Slashdot is entertaining like pro wrestling is entertaining
  31. Encryption by king-manic · · Score: 0, Offtopic

    If the US ever gets a working DNA computer, no encryption will will be safe. It's interesting, the DNA comuter would literally be a million monkeys. eventually they'll recreate shakespear, and with a dna computer, it will break all encription by massive parrelelism and brute force.

    --
    "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy."
    1. Re:Encryption by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      And by throwing feces. heh.

    2. Re:Encryption by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Maybe they should invest in public education first and help people like you.

  32. 33mkeys/sec ? Slow! by b0rken · · Score: 1
    The EFF DES machine was breaking DES quite quickly even without special information about the key--three years ago. 56 hours. Since you can speed it up by adding transistors or cranking speed, I bet an implementation today could reach 10 hours. If you have something that can tell you half the bits in the key, setup time would begin to dominate over solve time.

    So, yeah, it sucks that these people found a weakness that lets them guess key bits, but DES should have been tossed years ago. At least for 3DES, which doubles the effective key size. But isn't the AES standard finalized now?

    Problem is, banks don't want to replace outdated hardware and networks, as long as their customers don't know they should be scared where their money is going.

    --
    Hate stupid software on freshmeat? Laugh at
  33. Re:33mkeys/sec ? Slow! by man_ls · · Score: 2
    Problem is, banks don't want to replace outdated hardware and networks, as long as their customers don't know they should be scared where their money is going.

    Should their customers really be scared? How likely is it that the technology to do the hardware cracking is easily available? Not too likely, I'd assume.

    For a janitor to even have access to a server room is relatively unlikely, especially in a bank; I can't imagine they would let minimum-wage grunts in the same room as the financial data of their customers. For said janitor to have $1000 of specialized computing hardware is another thing. For him to know how to hook up that hardware to the IBM Encryption Coprocessor is even more difficult. Then he would have to actually go grab the PINs - all he'd have at this point is the DES key which they are encrypted with.

    Sure, one person may exploit it - but seeing as most janitors aren't reading Slashdot, and probably don't even know it, or an IBM cryptocard exists, there is very little to worry about.

    You'd be more likely to win the lotto than to have your money stolen by a janitor who cracked IBM's encryption.
  34. Re:bad slashdot by recursiv · · Score: 1

    No, it's immoral to break into banks.

    --
    I used to bulls-eye womp-rats in my pants
  35. Re:bad slashdot by TeraCo · · Score: 1
    Yes, but how slashdot readers work in banks? Out of that many, how many have a technical ability to do it?

    Sure, it's a small number, but even one is too many.

    --
    Not Meta-modding due to apathy.
  36. Re:bad slashdot by SquierStrat · · Score: 1

    Aye, but it's more than jsut working in a bank! You have to have physical access to the machine which is harder than one might think. Also you must have security access on the machine. Could this be obtained? Yes, but in reality, to do it you would have to be at a point where you had nothing to lose in life, and getting caught wouldn't matter, because chances are, you would be caught.

    --
    Derek Greene
  37. The algorithms are secure by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

    Its the protocol which is faulty (like usual).

  38. Some corrections by hearingaid · · Score: 4, Insightful

    I live in Canada. Some of this may not apply to your jurisdiction.

    My bank uses a PIN which is a minimum of 4 digits long. I believe the maximum is 12. This solves the length problem. I have a 4-digit PIN, but that's mainly because I'm a grad student, and anybody who steals my bank card and gives me money has my thanks. Unfortunately, no luck yet. :)

    We have Interac cops. Interac is the Canadian banking network; the ATMs you see in malls in Canada are usually run by chartered banks, and when they're not, they're run by somebody on the Interac network. These devices get policed, and they have some pretty serious security measures on them.

    There's still the basic vulnerability of the encryption scheme to consider, of course. But the other concerns you bring up can be dealt with.

    --

    my old sig used to be funny, but then slashcode ate it and now it's not funny anymore

    1. Re:Some corrections by alexburke · · Score: 1

      My bank uses a PIN which is a minimum of 4 digits long. I believe the maximum is 12.

      C'mon, at least make it challenging! :)

    2. Re:Some corrections by Nate+Eldredge · · Score: 2, Interesting

      12 digits is still not very much. It's only about 32 bits.

    3. Re:Some corrections by bananapeel17 · · Score: 1
      My bank uses a PIN which is a minimum of 4 digits long. I believe the maximum is 12. This solves the length problem.

      My old bank would let you set a pin that was 4-8 digits long. My pin was 6 digits, but one day I tried just punching in the first 4. It worked - turns out only the first 4 digits were significant. I guess they were using the method described here: How do PIN numbers work.
      --
      Somebody please tell this machine I'm not a machine -
  39. eBay by man_ls · · Score: 1

    Someone was selling a dozen of these on eBay for $127.99/ea. I wonder why......

  40. Is this really a threat???? by pagercam2 · · Score: 1

    I didn't read everything, but as I understand it they are treating this IBM cryto card as a black box, sending it info and saving the results, which is reasonable, but they are using priveledged access to this card to get permission to send keys knowing old keys to get into the system. So this requires an insider who has access to the banks internal systems, those people have much easier ways to steal money, the systems are designed primarily to defeat external hackers, insiders and almost impossible to defeat. So the crack is totally dependent on having access both to the card to feed it data and access to priveldges to the banks computers so the person is already inside thier not really cracking 3DES, thier cracking the key storage mechanisms. While this is one way to steal money from a bank, there are realitively few people with this sort of access and I'd be pretty sure that the bank checks up on those poeple before giving them acces, so this is much more of a cleaver work arround that IBM needs to better design thier systems, they are not cracking 3DES, they are cracking the key storage, the encryption is secure, the key storage isn't. As always if you have access, it isn't hard to get in but without that access this hack is meaningless. I've read a few of these supposed hacks and they always make very unrealistic assumptions about having some level of access the crypto scheme is secure the impelmentation isn't (much like the DVD DeCSS, stuff, the security can't be hacked itself but poor impelementation leaves the doors wide open.

    1. Re:Is this really a threat???? by Mes · · Score: 1

      I think the threat is from a corrupt bank manager with so called mafia ties.. money launderer type. Someone like that might have the resources to attempt to steal millions.

    2. Re:Is this really a threat???? by pagercam2 · · Score: 1

      But thats my point wouldn't the afore mentioned corrupt bank manger have many other easier ways to mess with the banks computers, or even the dead presidents themseleves. Encrption can't ever defend agaist internal attacks, its designed to keep outsiders outside and this hack only helps insiders that probably have more access anyway, this hack requires appropiate access, to insert keys, but a bank manager would have the access directlt to the money why even bother trying to break the encryption. My point was that this hack defeats the user interface not 3DES.

  41. about half way through ram file by SonCorn · · Score: 1

    For those of you who don't want to guess where the cypto stuff starts in the Real Media file it starts between 21 and 22 minutes

    --
    What good is a used up world, and how could it be worth having? --Sting
  42. RealSoftware ReallySucks by 1010011010 · · Score: 1, Offtopic

    What an unholy load of crap. I have never seen suck a bitchy, needy, clingy installer. What the world needs is a RealMedia to MPEG converter.

    --
    Napster-to-go says "Fill and refill your compatible MP3 player", which is a lie. It's not MP3. It's WMA with DRM.
    1. Re:RealSoftware ReallySucks by arkanes · · Score: 1

      Once upon a time there were RealMedia decoders for other players (winamp, in particular) until Real pitched a fit and made them go away. Now you can still play RealMedia files on other players (again, winamp) but you have to have realplayer installed and the only implementations I've seen are buggy. Lets hear it for proprietarty protocols that lock you into using annoying software.
      Oh, and I love the way they make is sound like a huge, fatal error when "You computer is not properly configured to show media files!"

  43. Re:33mkeys/sec ? Slow! by Lally+Singh · · Score: 2

    Yeah, but it's pretty easy for a smart theif to be hired as a janitor.

    --
    Care about electronic freedom? Consider donating to the EFF!
  44. Re:Let me tell you something by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Hey Chachi, if they're so far ahead of their time, why haven't they done anything about this in the several months that they've known about the problem? Thanks, IBM!!

  45. Re:I question the point of advertising your hack.. by Murdock037 · · Score: 1

    "Silence can't be bought, only rented."

    It wouldn't work. Would IBM really trust a bunch of guys that just did this to them, anyways?

    If the hackers were just out to get money from IBM in the first place, it'd probably be considered some form of espionage. Or blackmail. Or whatever you want to call it. Regardless, I'm sure Big Blue can afford the lawyers to kick the hell out of Bond and Clayton if they so choose and if there's any possible legal justification for doing so.

    Anybody know if this is going to turn into a DMCA issue?

  46. Re:bad slashdot by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Yes, but how many slashdot readers work in banks?


    Didn't that survey from earlier this year put the number at around 95%? Oh wait, I thought you said fast food joints.

  47. Yeh, but that cost half a million dollars by autopr0n · · Score: 1

    IIRC, the effcracker cost like $500,000 to build. Granted, that was three years ago, but even you factor a 4x improvement that's still $125,000. It's not that much compared to what you could theoreticaly get, but it puts the bar pretty high for entry.

    And even if you could build the machine, you'd still need to aquire the data to decript (also not easy).

    --
    autopr0n is like, down and stuff.
    1. Re:Yeh, but that cost half a million dollars by maroberts · · Score: 2

      Whilst the EFF Cracker cost $500,000, they recognised that now the research had been done you could build one for about $50K or so. Also FPGA tech has come a long way since then, so I reckon with a little forethought $10-20K may not be an impossible target, which if you can get a few million out of a bank for the effort is a good investment/ return ratio!

      The EFF device was only cracking DES, not 3DES.

      Just after EFF cracker came out I wrote a letter to the UK Daily Mail (National newspaper) about the security of credit card trading on the net.

      Before you reply about it bear in mind:
      a) the letter got edited heavily
      b) this was when Euro browsers only had 40/56 bit encryption, and
      c) yes the photo isn't of my good side! =-0 ]

      --

      Donte Alistair Anderson Roberts - hi son!
      Karma: Chameleon

  48. Scottish Politics? by kaladorn · · Score: 0, Offtopic

    Damn. Now _THERE_ is a reason to watch the vid! Hopefully there are some claymores and bagpipes involved! Maybe throw in a Stone of Scone for a good measure....

    --
    -- Mal: "Well they tell you: never hit a man with a closed fist. But it is, on occasion, hilarious."
  49. DMCA for these Cambridge guys? by TimFreeman · · Score: 1

    So with the DMCA in the US and all, would these two Cambridge PhD students be at risk of being Skylaroved if they visit the US?

    1. Re:DMCA for these Cambridge guys? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Quite so... the stakes are much higher too considering it's banking security verses e-books, one of the guys is in the US on a sabbatical, I'd be watching my back... the land of the free indeed, what was the 1st ammendment for again? How come the English researchers can enjoy their free speech even though these provisions aren't explicitly laid out in British law unlike the US where it's explicity laid out and infringed upon through the DMCA?

  50. I wonder whether this has anything to do with... by Bobzibub · · Score: 1

    "Russian mafia in PIN-code scam"
    http://www.thisismoney.com/19991026/nm8195.html

  51. Re:I question the point of advertising your hack.. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    "Anybody know if this is going to turn into a DMCA issue?"

    It will be a cold day in hell well US law is applicable in British courts :)

  52. try it out by m00nshyn3 · · Score: 1

    if you don't have an insider at a bank or if years of jailtime scare you, there's a few of the 4758 cards on ebay. and there will probably be more posted after this ;) if i wasn't a poor college student i'd pick one up to try this out in the safety of my own room.

  53. UK Academic Freedom & DMCA by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    This research reminds me of passed age where scientists could publish their work freely without fear of rebuke, where academic freedom reigned over commercial interests. Where a publisher cannot be prevented from linking to the research, be it the BBC in this case, shame 2600 isn't afforded such rights.

    But of course, even if these researchers are perfectly legitimate in Britain they could be in trouble they visited the US, even if they didn't come within 1 mile of a computer in the US they could be arrested for the work they did in Britain, which smacks of the France v. Yahoo! case of overbearing jurisdictions.

    I'd suggest that none of the Cambridge researchers take a trip to countries with industry driven copyright acts, and the guy who is on sabbatical in the US should probably be careful too, it's like having the mob on your back right?

    I just hope the UK doesn't get a DMCA.

    1. Re:UK Academic Freedom & DMCA by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The UK has worse than DMCA - it has RIP

  54. Re:bad slashdot by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Nobody is breaking into banks... these guys merely illustrated a flaw, a little like you telling your local bank that leaving the door unlocked a night isn't a particularly good idea, does that make you a robber?

  55. Finally! by LinuxHam · · Score: 2

    Maybe now I can get my hands on one of these using my employee discount ;) Imagine a pair of these hacked into supporting VPN endpoints? Or hardware-assisted GnuPG?

    If having physical access to the card is a prereq to cracking it, I'm not too worried about my mother-in-law coming by while I'm at work. Now, the black van down the street that never seems to move.. that's a different story..

    --
    Intelligent Life on Earth
  56. Damn it Q! by Myriad · · Score: 1
    Mr Bond said the weaknesses left banks open to attack by insiders with access to the cryptoprocessors.

    IBM: Damn it Q! Quit making all those damned crazy gadgets for him will ya?

    --
    "They do not preach that their god will rouse them, a little before the Nuts work loose." Kipling, 'The Sons of Martha'
  57. We should all feel safe! by gururise · · Score: 1
    Anyone who attempts to use this method to circumvent the encryption/protection schemes of an ATM machine are in violation of the DMCA.

    Should make us all feel safer!

  58. watch the WHOLE BBC realvideo transmission by pedro · · Score: 1

    It's VERY interesting to see that they scrutinise political scandals even MORE closely than we do, and with ohso much more drama and gravity.
    The Encryption bit was far better done than we would see here on Nightline. It tilted towards paranoia, true, but the underlying principles were given far more voice than we would generally see here in the US.
    Also...
    Hang around for the Afghanistan segment. It's got a bit of bias, but it worked for me. I knew more exiting than when I came in.

    --
    Brak: What's THAT?
    Thundercleese: A light switch.. of TOTAL DEVASTATION!
    1. Re:watch the WHOLE BBC realvideo transmission by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      So I wasn't the only one who was shocked that this was a well thought out, unbiased, technically savvy coverage. Why don't we see more tech news covered so well in the mainstream media?

    2. Re:watch the WHOLE BBC realvideo transmission by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Why don't we see more tech news covered so well in the mainstream media?

      You do... in Britain.

  59. Spam by Lauritz · · Score: 1

    Damn! Now "Get rich quick"-schemes are turning up in slashdot-stories.

  60. Related technical paper by dazed-n-confused · · Score: 4, Informative

    If you want more technical detail, check out the
    paper on API-Level Attacks on Embedded Systems by Mike Bond and Ross Anderson.

    Ross Anderson is the author of "Security Engineering" -- if you're interested in this story but haven't read the book, consider this a strong recommendation. More details inc. sample chapters at his website. Plus other fascinating stuff.

  61. It's a CALEA Backdoor Feature by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    IBM was prohibited from fixing this backdoor put in place by

  62. Re:I question the point of advertising your hack.. by innocent_white_lamb · · Score: 1

    It will be a cold day in hell well US law is applicable in British courts

    Right up until the day that a law equivalent to the DMCA is passed by the UK parliament.

    Given the current state of homogenaeity (for lack of a better word, and did I spell that correctly?) of what might be termed the important laws (WTO, anyone?) I'd not be surprised to see a DMCA equivalent appearing at a parliament near you, where-ever you are...

    Sadly...

    --
    If you're a zombie and you know it, bite your friend!
  63. Re:33mkeys/sec ? Slow! by innocent_white_lamb · · Score: 1

    For a janitor to even have access to a server room is relatively unlikely, especially in a bank;

    You might be surprised, especiallly in a small credit union (or equivalent). Heck, someone has to empy the wastebasket and vacuum the rug, and I really can't visualize the CEO doing it.

    --
    If you're a zombie and you know it, bite your friend!
  64. Most worring aspect by Martin+S. · · Score: 3, Insightful


    The most worring aspect of this is that if this discover had been made by American academics (rather than British) it would have been squashed by the DMCA.

    A nice real world example, that you should be able to exploit, to beat the politicians, to our collective benefit.

  65. Is it time... by timbloid · · Score: 1

    ...to move my money back under my matress?

  66. Jesus Jackie! And it runs Linux too. by opkool · · Score: 3, Informative

    I used to work with some of those cards at my former employee.

    Ther are actualy 2 models, well, there were 2 models when I was there. They are called cryptographic 4758 and 4758-II.

    The first (and older model) wasn't that good at being a fast crypto card. That good for 2001 standards, that's it. Back when they were developed were pretty darn good.

    The newest model was better and more powerfull. It supports more and tougher encryption keys. It offloads any machine of the heavy-cpu-load encryption burden. And it is pretty good piece of technology.

    Their mision is to take over the CPU when dealing with encryption. That is, encrypt stuff before being sent or decrypt stuff received. It can seen not a big deal. But think of e-commerce and/or bank transactions: litearly hundreds of encrypt/decrypt processes.

    The card is (was) a computer-in-a-card. It has a CPU with the power of a 486 (it does not use a 486 cpu). And it costs lotsa money.

    Not so long ago, I heard that IBM was considering dumping the propietary OS of those cards, and use instead embeded secure Linux.

    Now, I want to believe that they have craked the older model. If it is the newer model, well, it is pretty bad. This banks means not being able to trust each other. And I'm serious.

    Nevertheless, to access one of those cards installed in a sensitive system, you must have phisycal access to the card. And this is not easy. It's like a real-life ,a href="http://www.missionimpossible.com/">Missio n Impossible kind-of-thing.

    If there's any problem with it, I'm pretty sure that the crypto team has worked and solved this thing.

    1. Re:Jesus Jackie! And it runs Linux too. by Mes · · Score: 1

      Ah.. I worked on the 4758-II as well in Charlotte. I wrote the external key storage db. Sweet news that theyre moving to embedded linux.

      As far as the cracking the 4758 vs the 4758-II, I dont think it matters. Since they both use the same CCA api, the cards are basically identical.

      Personally Im not worried about hackers stealing my money.. This hack requires lots of physical access to the device and the help of a bank manager with appropriate security access. Also, I believe that during installation of the device, the required DES to 3DES functions can be disabled, as theyre only there for compatability for older hardware and software. Although a corrupt sysadmin could probably reenable them.

      However I can imagine some wider scam with a corrupt manager and his mafia buddies.

  67. We use triple DES by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    This explains a lot about why my employer has migrated to triple DES for our ATM PIN encryption.

    1. Re:We use triple DES by another+slaphead · · Score: 1

      Look at the exploit details - 3DES may not help you that much!

  68. Points 2 and 3 by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The combination of points 2 and 3 make for interesting social engineering exploits.

    Last month there was a report of someone using this to steal money - they put something (the news report was unclear on this) in the slot of the ATM, and wait for someone to insert their card, the card would get stuck..

    At this point, the hoax artist (who was conveniently in line behind the Mark) would go to the Mark and say "hey, this happened to me last week at this machine - you have to re-enter your PIN number, and hit # twice" to get your card back.

    The Mark would then do this (as the con artist watched) - it wouldn't work (of course), and the hoax artist would say "hmm, that's strange, I guess you need to go into the bank and talk to the manager".. the Mark would leave, and the con artist would retreive the card, and withdraw all their money.

  69. Banks already selling 4758s by thewiz · · Score: 1

    Take a look at these E-bay auctions:



    IBM PCI Cryptography Encryption Card 4758

    IBM PCI CRYPTOGRAPHIC COPROCESSOR 4758 002

    Looks like the banking industry already knew about this and are trying to get rid of the problem.

    --
    If "disco" means "I learn" in Latin, does "discothèque" mean "I learn technology"?
    1. Re:Banks already selling 4758s by another+slaphead · · Score: 1

      Wow! Look also at the quantities of 'new' boards said to be available. I wonder if there's a (better) model -3 or some other reason for dumping this quantity. Interestingly, no bids on Ebay yet.

    2. Re:Banks already selling 4758s by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Those 4758 cards are being sold by dot-coms that were caught in the wave of dot-com failures.

  70. Other ways of stealing money by nick_burns · · Score: 1

    I'm more nervous about the bank leaving the vault door open than this.

  71. Re:bad slashdot by Mes · · Score: 1

    The security flaw is with a corrupt bank manager with mafia ties.. someone who has the resources to attempt to steal millions.

    I dont think the lonewolf hacker who sneaks into the back room is really the problem. It would be much easier to palm a few $100's from the cash drawer instead.

  72. And after you've stolen the cash by Mwongozi · · Score: 2

    The last question in the FAQ will help you out.

  73. Legacy devices by death_denied · · Score: 1
    The PCI Cryptographic Coprocessor encapsulates a 486-class processing subsystem [...]

    It serves the banks right to loose stock value and public trust. Who would want their finnancial lives dependent on an array of 486's (probabily SX class since banks don't really do floating point calculations ;-) ). No offense to those of you who have P5 servers running linux-1.2 with an uptime of 6 years but I don't want to my give money to someone who uses archaic devices.

    1. Re:Legacy devices by Nate+Eldredge · · Score: 1

      Okay, first of all this is an embedded device; we're not talking about "arrays of 486's" being used for servers or the like (though see below). Apparently a 486 has adequate computing power for the specific task this device has to do, and it works fine. (The flaw is in the software, not the hardware.) There's no good reason to use a Pentium LXXVII instead; it would be overkill, it would cost more, and since it's newer there's more likely to be strange bugs in the hardware. If you're doing something as important as cryptography, you would much rather have reliability than bogomips.

      You would be surprised at how much of the world is kept running by "archaic" hardware (and the 486 is by no means archaic compared to many other things). It doesn't make sense to randomly fix what isn't broken. It usually makes things break more as you make the change. And it's expensive too. If the banks didn't use "archaic devices", you'd probably be giving a whole lot more of your money to them.

      Personally, I'd much rather have my financial life dependent on an array of 486s running well-tested software than a brand-new MegaServer with the very latest buzzword-compliant financial solution software du jour. The former is known to work well. The latter has no such record, and in the nature of new things, almost certainly contains undiscovered bugs galore. Banks are right to be conservative in their choices of systems.

    2. Re:Legacy devices by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The crypto work on the card is done with high-speed special-purpose hardware. The 486 is simply the controller to play "traffic cop", and it does not do the encryption functions. In an embedded environment with a sealed, tamper-protected module, you have severe restrictions on the amount of heat you can generate. The highest performance processor chips are not candidates. There is also a space problem, meaning that you need single-chip solutions, and not chip sets.

  74. Re:bad slashdot by SquierStrat · · Score: 1

    Oh, I 100% agree! But, even there, the odds of a bank manager having the technical ability to do it, are not good. Not to mention if the act is performed you can almost immediately know who did it. Your suspect list is very minimal at worst.

    --
    Derek Greene
  75. Re:bad slashdot by Cheese+Metal+Rulez!! · · Score: 1

    Are you saying all bank managers are stupid?

    People like you are the reason we refuse future college dropouts like yourself loans, and hold up your McDonalds pay check in processing until your rent check cashes so you get charged for being overdrawn.

  76. Re:bad slashdot by SquierStrat · · Score: 1

    No, I didn't say they were stupid, I said they don't have the technical ability to do the deed...most don't anyhow. I've no trouble getting loans by the way, nor am I a future college drop-out...I'm doing very well in college thank you. Nor do I work at a McDonald. I don't need to pay rent, because hey I can live at home with my folks for free. Nor do I bounce checks, and my credit card is paid off at the end of every month thank you.

    Bank managers are very intelligent people, but being intelligent does not mean one has technical ability. I doubt Einstein could very easily use a computer, being that he'd never seen one and doesn't know how to use it. Read the context before you post something like that and before insulting someone else.

    --
    Derek Greene
  77. Re:bad slashdot by SquierStrat · · Score: 1

    You didn't spell it correctly, and that's my middlename, which I don't use. I see you like to hold a grudge. That's unhealthy you know...
    Why the grudge by the way? If I'm so retarded like you say, why don't you just ignore me? Oh that's because I'm right and you're not and you don't like that. Get a life, please.

    --
    Derek Greene