Until "Stacy Spikes" [who?] can convince advertisers that there's premium value in ads force-fed to a population that gets increasingly good at pretending to pay attention to them while doing something else altogether [yes, dear...]
You've certainly lined up a long row of straw men, friend, and perhaps you'll feel vindicated since I'm not going to specifically address them all. But underlying most or all of your points is the notion that I said or somehow implied that the media has meaningful input into the investigation and/or remediation of this situation. Of course it doesn't. But what it most certainly does have input into is how the public responds pending (and perhaps even despite the results of) the investigation/remediation, as directly evidenced by many irrational posts in this very discussion, along with mods who bubbled up those posts. Articles like this one that are based on bad information, leaps of logic, and devoid of anything resembling critical thinking simply fan the flames of an ever-more-eager mob mentality. That's irresponsible at best.
Finally, you have identified the real source of the problem - the media! Seriously, we need to eliminate the media because y'all smart folks manage to show us how they are responsible for any and all problems.
No, we need to take the media with the same grain of salt this crowd is perfectly content to take them with in any other tech-heavy situation: a group of generally ill-informed people who through some combination of ignorance, incompetence, and recklessness write articles primarily designed to inflame a group of readers who on balance are even more ill-informed of the actual issues.
This is the first time I've heard that the third pilot simply walked through a checklist. Have a cite for that? It seems like Boeing would want that checklist plastered on the front page of every newspaper.
When the only input to a system that can override the pilot is an AoA sensor, I would consider it mandatory to have an indicator, say, some kind of light, to let me know when that sensor isn't working properly
A light that tells you the readings of the two AoA sensors disagree doesn't tell you whether the AoA sensor that acts as an input to MCAS is the correct or the incorrect one. So at best it's a way for the pilot to narrow down what the problem might be. But the pilots need to be trained on that troubleshooting path, and if they can be trained to check MCAS when the difference light comes on, they can just as readily be trained to check MCAS when the plane repeatedly and unexpectedly noses down all on its own.
As I've said before, in my view the real issues here were (1) designing MCAS to only monitor one of the two available AoA sensors, and (2) not training pilots on how MCAS works and how to deactivate it if it starts going haywire. Particularly without the latter, the two features discussed in this article are unlikely to have changed the outcome.
Why doesn't the city just require everyone to put a GPS on their cars to ensure they are parked in permitted locations?
It would be hard for this to be a less apt analogy. Car owners are incentivized not to park those cars in the middle of the street or the middle of the sidewalk because they, the owner, will be ticketed and/or will have to pay to retrieve the car from impound, and in the meantime won't be able to get where they want to go. Someone who just spent a buck riding a company's scooter around on the sidewalk that they're never going to need again (if for no other reason than there are hundreds of others around if that one goes away) could give a fuck less. They know the company isn't going to be able to come back on them, because "someone else must have moved it after my ride was over!" and a score of variants.
Typical clickbait headline. Nothing is being reported during the trip, and the minimal information being reported doesn't include any personally identifiable information so there's no opportunity for misuse of the data down the road. I don't see the issue -- the city certainly has an interest in knowing where these things are being littered about when they're not in use. FTFA:
"Route information is provided to the city after the trip has completed and within 24 hours and it doesn't include the name, age, gender, address of the user," the agency said in a statement. "LADOT is asking companies to provide the start trip and end trip of every vehicle as trips start and as trips end to make sure scooters are being parked legally and within the terms of the permit."
Even without a magical "significant/insignificant" threshold, researchers will still evaluate, judge, and compare levels of significance. The pressure will just shift to come up with results that are "MORE significant" rather than "LESS significant," and thus p-hacking will continue by those that were willing to cross that line in the first place.
The root cause is going to remain until peer reviewers force researchers to commit to how they're going to evaluate their measurements before they take those measurements. But the likely outcome would be either a lot less research would get published at all or published research would start to lose some of the imprimatur it now enjoys, including that of the peer reviewers. So that's unlikely to happen.
$6.4 Million per life in Sweden. Might not be worth it. In the USA though it would be $2.3 Million per life saved. It might be worth it there.
What sort of stone-cold calculus does it take to reach the conclusion that saving the life of an arbitrary human might be worth $2.3 million but not $6.4?
Unless you know of a source that specifically says that, Occam would suggest they either didn't properly test the AoA sensor or didn't do anything to it at all.
Yes, it is obvious in hindsight that they should have taken the plane for a test flight afterwards to verify that things were working correctly, but if you did that for every failure, it would add up pretty quickly
See my original comment. At least in the U.S., the airlines err on the side of the caution to the point that planes with passengers sit around for hours while indisputably minor and non-hazardous issues get repaired. Maybe that's why the U.S. hasn't had any issues with this plane.
I had put together the below response before I realized that you may have misunderstood my post to say that better reporting/servicing of this incident on the Lyon Air flight would have prevented the recent Ethiopian Airlines crash. I'm saying that better reporting/servicing of this incident on the Lyon Air flight would have prevented the Lyon Air crash. In any event, and for what it's worth:
Also, the failure was reported, and servicing was performed after that failure.
As I said, inadequately. I'm comfortable that had the pilots properly reported the failure mode and maintenance had properly addressed the underlying problem, the plane wouldn't have failed in exactly the same way the next day. From TFA:
However, the pilots on the harrowing Oct. 28 flight from Bali to Jakarta didn’t mention key issues with the flight after they landed, according to the report.
Their request for maintenance didn’t mention they had been getting a stall warning since about 400 feet after takeoff as a result of the faulty angle-of-attack sensor. It was still giving false readings the next morning on the flight that crashed, according to flight data.
At that point, nobody knew that there was a design flaw in that system, and the problem had been mitigated before it became actively dangerous
"Airplane won't stop severely overriding my trim settings" should have grounded that airplane until someone figured out why. That's a great way to get dead really fast, as the crew the next day proved.
and the problem had been mitigated before it became actively dangerous
Because of some random pilot along for the ride who just happened to know how to curb the problem. The actual pilots didn't know, and clearly neither did the pilots the next day.
Based on what I've heard so far it strikes me as a marginal design (at best), coupled with inadequate training on how to work with that marginal design to stay safe.
But this now adds a third layer: inadequate reporting by the pilots and/or resolution by the airline of a known severe problem, which allowed the plane to continue in service and experience the second failure. That's particularly over the top for those of us who routinely sit on the tarmac for hours while the airline tries to scrape up a technician to come in and change something as minor as an exit sign lightbulb.
The study is being misrepresented in the media to focus on eggs, even though it looked at total cholesterol not eggs.
No, it looked at both additional cholesterol and additional eggs, independently:
Findings Among 29615 adults pooled from 6 prospective cohort studies in the United States with a median follow-up of 17.5 years, each additional 300 mg of dietary cholesterol consumed per day was significantly associated with higher risk of incident CVD (adjusted hazard ratio [HR], 1.17; adjusted absolute risk difference [ARD], 3.24%) and all-cause mortality (adjusted HR, 1.18; adjusted ARD, 4.43%), and each additional half an egg consumed per day was significantly associated with higher risk of incident CVD (adjusted HR, 1.06; adjusted ARD, 1.11%) and all-cause mortality (adjusted HR, 1.08; adjusted ARD, 1.93%).
It's fairly muddled in the article, and the summary here isn't much clearer. The last sentence in the summary is consistent with the below excerpt from the study, which is clear that the researchers were measuring independent risks from (1) an additional 300 mg of cholesterol per week from any source, and (2) an additional 3-4 eggs per week.
Findings Among 29615 adults pooled from 6 prospective cohort studies in the United States with a median follow-up of 17.5 years, each additional 300 mg of dietary cholesterol consumed per day was significantly associated with higher risk of incident CVD (adjusted hazard ratio [HR], 1.17; adjusted absolute risk difference [ARD], 3.24%) and all-cause mortality (adjusted HR, 1.18; adjusted ARD, 4.43%), and each additional half an egg consumed per day was significantly associated with higher risk of incident CVD (adjusted HR, 1.06; adjusted ARD, 1.11%) and all-cause mortality (adjusted HR, 1.08; adjusted ARD, 1.93%).
It's popcorn-worthy to watch the usual "IF YOU WERE DUMB ENOUGH TO PUBLISH THE BITS, I CAN FREELY USE THOSE BITS HOWEVER I WANT" crowd get all up in arms about a corporation they don't like doing some competitive data scraping.
Mod me down all you want -- it will remain hilarious.
With 2 sensors how does the software know which is right when they disagree ?
At least one possibility is laid out in TFA -- measure both sensors against a known point of reference when the plane is taxiing and therefore has an angle of attack of basically zero.
It's extremely disconcerting that (1) they had two sensor inputs available but apparently chose to use only one; and (2) they apparently chose not to calibrate or otherwise validate the sensors before making use of them in a given operational cycle .
You gave them something of value (your data, and the opportunity to grab your eyeballs). And they gave you the expectation that they would store your data for you.
The term you should be looking at is not "payment" but "consideration".
Putting aside whether the examples you give would actually be deemed adequate consideration, the term you should be looking for is "freedom of contract." The MySpace terms and conditions are crystal clear that (1) their liability is limited to the amount actually paid, and (2) specifically disavow any additional liability for "destruction of the MySpace services":
NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING TO THE CONTRARY CONTAINED HEREIN, MYSPACE’S LIABILITY TO YOU FOR ANY CAUSE WHATSOEVER AND REGARDLESS OF THE FORM OF THE ACTION, WILL AT ALL TIMES BE LIMITED TO THE AMOUNT PAID, IF ANY, BY YOU TO MYSPACE FOR THE MYSPACE SERVICES DURING THE TERM OF MEMBERSHIP. THE FOREGOING LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY WILL APPLY EVEN IF ANY OF THE FOREGOING EVENTS OR CIRCUMSTANCES WERE FORESEEABLE AND EVEN IF MYSPACE WAS ADVISED OF OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH LOSSES OR DAMAGES, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER YOU BRING AN ACTION BASED IN CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING WHETHER CAUSED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, BY NEGLIGENCE, ACTS OF GOD, TELECOMMUNICATIONS FAILURE, OR DESTRUCTION OF THE MYSPACE SERVICES).
I'm sure some lawyer somewhere is trying to figure out how to file a class action suit.
Probably not any of them that have a passing understanding of contract law. No reasonable person reading the MySpace T&Cs could come away with the notion that MySpace was taking on the legal obligation to perpetually backup and insure a user's data.
Slashdot Mirror
and then you can start thinking about how to code it.
Until "Stacy Spikes" [who?] can convince advertisers that there's premium value in ads force-fed to a population that gets increasingly good at pretending to pay attention to them while doing something else altogether [yes, dear...]
Even the summary says that the 200x improvement is the learning cycle. The actual execution speed is less than 2x faster.
You've certainly lined up a long row of straw men, friend, and perhaps you'll feel vindicated since I'm not going to specifically address them all. But underlying most or all of your points is the notion that I said or somehow implied that the media has meaningful input into the investigation and/or remediation of this situation. Of course it doesn't. But what it most certainly does have input into is how the public responds pending (and perhaps even despite the results of) the investigation/remediation, as directly evidenced by many irrational posts in this very discussion, along with mods who bubbled up those posts. Articles like this one that are based on bad information, leaps of logic, and devoid of anything resembling critical thinking simply fan the flames of an ever-more-eager mob mentality. That's irresponsible at best.
Finally, you have identified the real source of the problem - the media! Seriously, we need to eliminate the media because y'all smart folks manage to show us how they are responsible for any and all problems.
No, we need to take the media with the same grain of salt this crowd is perfectly content to take them with in any other tech-heavy situation: a group of generally ill-informed people who through some combination of ignorance, incompetence, and recklessness write articles primarily designed to inflame a group of readers who on balance are even more ill-informed of the actual issues.
This is the first time I've heard that the third pilot simply walked through a checklist. Have a cite for that? It seems like Boeing would want that checklist plastered on the front page of every newspaper.
When the only input to a system that can override the pilot is an AoA sensor, I would consider it mandatory to have an indicator, say, some kind of light, to let me know when that sensor isn't working properly
A light that tells you the readings of the two AoA sensors disagree doesn't tell you whether the AoA sensor that acts as an input to MCAS is the correct or the incorrect one. So at best it's a way for the pilot to narrow down what the problem might be. But the pilots need to be trained on that troubleshooting path, and if they can be trained to check MCAS when the difference light comes on, they can just as readily be trained to check MCAS when the plane repeatedly and unexpectedly noses down all on its own.
As I've said before, in my view the real issues here were (1) designing MCAS to only monitor one of the two available AoA sensors, and (2) not training pilots on how MCAS works and how to deactivate it if it starts going haywire. Particularly without the latter, the two features discussed in this article are unlikely to have changed the outcome.
Why doesn't the city just require everyone to put a GPS on their cars to ensure they are parked in permitted locations?
It would be hard for this to be a less apt analogy. Car owners are incentivized not to park those cars in the middle of the street or the middle of the sidewalk because they, the owner, will be ticketed and/or will have to pay to retrieve the car from impound, and in the meantime won't be able to get where they want to go. Someone who just spent a buck riding a company's scooter around on the sidewalk that they're never going to need again (if for no other reason than there are hundreds of others around if that one goes away) could give a fuck less. They know the company isn't going to be able to come back on them, because "someone else must have moved it after my ride was over!" and a score of variants.
Typical clickbait headline. Nothing is being reported during the trip, and the minimal information being reported doesn't include any personally identifiable information so there's no opportunity for misuse of the data down the road. I don't see the issue -- the city certainly has an interest in knowing where these things are being littered about when they're not in use. FTFA:
"Route information is provided to the city after the trip has completed and within 24 hours and it doesn't include the name, age, gender, address of the user," the agency said in a statement. "LADOT is asking companies to provide the start trip and end trip of every vehicle as trips start and as trips end to make sure scooters are being parked legally and within the terms of the permit."
Even without a magical "significant/insignificant" threshold, researchers will still evaluate, judge, and compare levels of significance. The pressure will just shift to come up with results that are "MORE significant" rather than "LESS significant," and thus p-hacking will continue by those that were willing to cross that line in the first place.
The root cause is going to remain until peer reviewers force researchers to commit to how they're going to evaluate their measurements before they take those measurements. But the likely outcome would be either a lot less research would get published at all or published research would start to lose some of the imprimatur it now enjoys, including that of the peer reviewers. So that's unlikely to happen.
We're talking about the USA.
Actually, OP was talking about Sweden.
Just imagine the possibilities:
$6.4 Million per life in Sweden. Might not be worth it. In the USA though it would be $2.3 Million per life saved. It might be worth it there.
What sort of stone-cold calculus does it take to reach the conclusion that saving the life of an arbitrary human might be worth $2.3 million but not $6.4?
if the repair resulted in correct readings
Unless you know of a source that specifically says that, Occam would suggest they either didn't properly test the AoA sensor or didn't do anything to it at all.
Yes, it is obvious in hindsight that they should have taken the plane for a test flight afterwards to verify that things were working correctly, but if you did that for every failure, it would add up pretty quickly
See my original comment. At least in the U.S., the airlines err on the side of the caution to the point that planes with passengers sit around for hours while indisputably minor and non-hazardous issues get repaired. Maybe that's why the U.S. hasn't had any issues with this plane.
I had put together the below response before I realized that you may have misunderstood my post to say that better reporting/servicing of this incident on the Lyon Air flight would have prevented the recent Ethiopian Airlines crash. I'm saying that better reporting/servicing of this incident on the Lyon Air flight would have prevented the Lyon Air crash. In any event, and for what it's worth:
Also, the failure was reported, and servicing was performed after that failure.
As I said, inadequately. I'm comfortable that had the pilots properly reported the failure mode and maintenance had properly addressed the underlying problem, the plane wouldn't have failed in exactly the same way the next day. From TFA:
However, the pilots on the harrowing Oct. 28 flight from Bali to Jakarta didn’t mention key issues with the flight after they landed, according to the report.
Their request for maintenance didn’t mention they had been getting a stall warning since about 400 feet after takeoff as a result of the faulty angle-of-attack sensor. It was still giving false readings the next morning on the flight that crashed, according to flight data.
At that point, nobody knew that there was a design flaw in that system, and the problem had been mitigated before it became actively dangerous
"Airplane won't stop severely overriding my trim settings" should have grounded that airplane until someone figured out why. That's a great way to get dead really fast, as the crew the next day proved.
and the problem had been mitigated before it became actively dangerous
Because of some random pilot along for the ride who just happened to know how to curb the problem. The actual pilots didn't know, and clearly neither did the pilots the next day.
Based on what I've heard so far it strikes me as a marginal design (at best), coupled with inadequate training on how to work with that marginal design to stay safe.
But this now adds a third layer: inadequate reporting by the pilots and/or resolution by the airline of a known severe problem, which allowed the plane to continue in service and experience the second failure. That's particularly over the top for those of us who routinely sit on the tarmac for hours while the airline tries to scrape up a technician to come in and change something as minor as an exit sign lightbulb.
The resolution is one hell of a twist in what otherwise is a solid round trip. Desktop revolution? Pffffft.
The study is being misrepresented in the media to focus on eggs, even though it looked at total cholesterol not eggs.
No, it looked at both additional cholesterol and additional eggs, independently:
Findings Among 29615 adults pooled from 6 prospective cohort studies in the United States with a median follow-up of 17.5 years, each additional 300 mg of dietary cholesterol consumed per day was significantly associated with higher risk of incident CVD (adjusted hazard ratio [HR], 1.17; adjusted absolute risk difference [ARD], 3.24%) and all-cause mortality (adjusted HR, 1.18; adjusted ARD, 4.43%), and each additional half an egg consumed per day was significantly associated with higher risk of incident CVD (adjusted HR, 1.06; adjusted ARD, 1.11%) and all-cause mortality (adjusted HR, 1.08; adjusted ARD, 1.93%).
It's fairly muddled in the article, and the summary here isn't much clearer. The last sentence in the summary is consistent with the below excerpt from the study, which is clear that the researchers were measuring independent risks from (1) an additional 300 mg of cholesterol per week from any source, and (2) an additional 3-4 eggs per week.
Findings Among 29615 adults pooled from 6 prospective cohort studies in the United States with a median follow-up of 17.5 years, each additional 300 mg of dietary cholesterol consumed per day was significantly associated with higher risk of incident CVD (adjusted hazard ratio [HR], 1.17; adjusted absolute risk difference [ARD], 3.24%) and all-cause mortality (adjusted HR, 1.18; adjusted ARD, 4.43%), and each additional half an egg consumed per day was significantly associated with higher risk of incident CVD (adjusted HR, 1.06; adjusted ARD, 1.11%) and all-cause mortality (adjusted HR, 1.08; adjusted ARD, 1.93%).
It's popcorn-worthy to watch the usual "IF YOU WERE DUMB ENOUGH TO PUBLISH THE BITS, I CAN FREELY USE THOSE BITS HOWEVER I WANT" crowd get all up in arms about a corporation they don't like doing some competitive data scraping.
Mod me down all you want -- it will remain hilarious.
'nuff said.
With 2 sensors how does the software know which is right when they disagree ?
At least one possibility is laid out in TFA -- measure both sensors against a known point of reference when the plane is taxiing and therefore has an angle of attack of basically zero.
It's extremely disconcerting that (1) they had two sensor inputs available but apparently chose to use only one; and (2) they apparently chose not to calibrate or otherwise validate the sensors before making use of them in a given operational cycle .
You gave them something of value (your data, and the opportunity to grab your eyeballs).
And they gave you the expectation that they would store your data for you.
The term you should be looking at is not "payment" but "consideration".
Putting aside whether the examples you give would actually be deemed adequate consideration, the term you should be looking for is "freedom of contract." The MySpace terms and conditions are crystal clear that (1) their liability is limited to the amount actually paid , and (2) specifically disavow any additional liability for "destruction of the MySpace services":
NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING TO THE CONTRARY CONTAINED HEREIN, MYSPACE’S LIABILITY TO YOU FOR ANY CAUSE WHATSOEVER AND REGARDLESS OF THE FORM OF THE ACTION, WILL AT ALL TIMES BE LIMITED TO THE AMOUNT PAID, IF ANY, BY YOU TO MYSPACE FOR THE MYSPACE SERVICES DURING THE TERM OF MEMBERSHIP. THE FOREGOING LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY WILL APPLY EVEN IF ANY OF THE FOREGOING EVENTS OR CIRCUMSTANCES WERE FORESEEABLE AND EVEN IF MYSPACE WAS ADVISED OF OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH LOSSES OR DAMAGES, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER YOU BRING AN ACTION BASED IN CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING WHETHER CAUSED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, BY NEGLIGENCE, ACTS OF GOD, TELECOMMUNICATIONS FAILURE, OR DESTRUCTION OF THE MYSPACE SERVICES).
I'm sure some lawyer somewhere is trying to figure out how to file a class action suit.
Probably not any of them that have a passing understanding of contract law. No reasonable person reading the MySpace T&Cs could come away with the notion that MySpace was taking on the legal obligation to perpetually backup and insure a user's data.
That was my point. Read the thread. OP was trying to justify a typical range of 200-300 miles for IC cars.
16 gallon tanks are common. 20mpg is common.
Not in the same car.