The article is interesting, but doesn't really convince me that lossy compression schemes are a danger to hearing. According to the article, MP3 compression and similar formats drop out the "calibration sounds" that the concious mind doesn't hear directly after a loud noise. This is supposed to throw off the neural preprocessing circuitry of the ear, and possibly damage hearing. It seems to assume, however, that the audience of the sound is solely hearing data from the audio stream.
If the quiet calibration noises from music are lost, what about the whir of fans in the room or the squeaking of your chair? Only with the thickest of headphones are these sounds drowned out completely. Even then, the distortion in the headphones themselves probably adds slight reverb after the loudest noises. There is never going to be the complete silence briefly after a loud noise to throw off the calibration.
DO I know what I am talking about? Not really. Does this guy, though? Probably not.
--Jason T
People need to know that Open Source is just as vulnerable to viruses and worms as proprietory software is... The hackers target the most widespread software, which is more often than not Windowware. Apache is one of the most widespread Linux programs, and its infection is a sign of things to come as more people leave Windows.
Fully electronic systems do not provide any way that the voter can truly verify that the ballot cast corresponds to that being recorded, transmitted, or tabulated.
This may be true, but what about current systems? What happens to your card after you punch it? Voters have no way of knowing if the card they punch is the one that ends up being counted...it all comes down to trust. I would rather trust a nonpartisan peice of open-source software than a group of human beings.
No electronic voting system has been certified to even the lowest level of the U.S. government or international computer security standards (such as the ISO Common Criteria or its predecessor, TCSEC/ITSEC), nor has any been required to comply with such. Hence, no current electronic voting system has been verified as secure.
True, this is needed. However, I am sure even current systems are more secure than punch cards. A standard A=1 B=2 cypher is more secure than a punch card.
There are no required standards for voting displays, so computer ballots can be constructed to be as confusing (or more) than the butterfly used in Florida, giving advantage to some candidates over others.
She brings up the point that Florida ballots were confusing. Exactly! We ALREADY have this problem with our current methods.
Electronic balloting and tabulation makes the tasks performed by poll workers, challengers, and election officials purely procedural, and removes any opportunity to perform bipartisan checks. Any computerized election process is thus entrusted to the small group of individuals who program, construct and maintain the machines.
An open source voting solution would be checked by everyone who had a mind to do it, and if it was non-partisan, than the actual voting procedure would be non-partisan. I would rather trust a computer to carry out a potentially emotional procedure than some human beings.
Although convicted felons and foreign citizens are prohibited from voting in U.S. elections (in many states), there are no such laws regarding voting system manufacturers, programmers and administrative personnel. Felons and foreigners can (and do!) work at and even own some of the voting machine companies providing equipment to U.S. municipalities.
Whoa...scary. That gets me thinking. What about the companies that make the punch cards? There could be FOREIGNERS printing those cards!
Encryption provides no assurance of privacy or accuracy of ballots cast. Cryptographic systems, even strong ones, can be cracked or hacked, thus leaving the ballot contents along with the identity of the voter open to perusal. One of the nation's top cryptographers, Bruce Schneier, has recently expressed his concerns on this matter, and has recommended that no computer voting system be adopted unless it also provides a physical paper ballot perused by the voter and used for recount and verification.
Internet voting (whether at polling places or off-site) provides avenues of system attack to the entire planet. If the major software manufacturer in the USA could not protect their own company from an Internet attack, one must understand that voting systems (created by this firm or others) will be no better (and probably worse) in terms of vulnerability.
Off-site Internet voting creates unresolvable problems with authentication, leading to possible loss of voter privacy, vote-selling, and coersion. Furthermore, this form of voting does not provide equal access for convenient balloting by all citizens, especially the poor, those in rural areas not well served by Internet service providers, the elderly, and certain disabled populations. For these reasons, off-site Internet voting systems should not be used for any government election.
Ok, it seems she is grouping electronic systems with internet-based systems. On her site, she says she is opposed to both. I admit I would doubt security of an internet-based approach, but ALL electronic solutions? Todays cryptographic algorithms are very, very secure. Just ask all the distributed computing efforts designed to break them. Once again, compare a modern cryptographic algorithm with a punch card in a locked box. Which is more secure to you? Also, an election only lasts a couple months. Afterwards, votes don't really mean much. People aren't going to crank their supercomputers for 5 years to find out if Mr. Gogfroggls Jones voted for Bush in the next Presidential Election.
Umm yeah, so mac users can switch to linux. What I meant (when I posted as anonymous coward because I was too lazy to login) was that the majority of people who are switching operating systems are going to be Windows-to-linux users, because the majority of people right now are running Windows. You can't go Windows-to-Mac using the same hardware like you can with Linux. (As of right now...anyone remember that story on here a few days ago about the x86 port of OSX?
Linux is a lot easier to switch to. You can go back to windows if you think it sucks, with no hardware changing involved.
Whenever I am asked for an email address from an non-reputable site, I simply give a fake one such as wigglebroggle@frogtoggle.com. My friends do the same thing, except they always do randomaddress@hotmail.com. I know a lot of people who do that. Hotmail must be swamped with invalid emails... Also, I bet some of the "fake" addresses turn out to be real and some poor people start getting spam they don't deserve. "Accidently" type the wrong address...ha!
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What are the prospects for me, who will be getting a masters in computer engineering in five years?
The article is interesting, but doesn't really convince me that lossy compression schemes are a danger to hearing. According to the article, MP3 compression and similar formats drop out the "calibration sounds" that the concious mind doesn't hear directly after a loud noise. This is supposed to throw off the neural preprocessing circuitry of the ear, and possibly damage hearing. It seems to assume, however, that the audience of the sound is solely hearing data from the audio stream.
If the quiet calibration noises from music are lost, what about the whir of fans in the room or the squeaking of your chair? Only with the thickest of headphones are these sounds drowned out completely. Even then, the distortion in the headphones themselves probably adds slight reverb after the loudest noises. There is never going to be the complete silence briefly after a loud noise to throw off the calibration. DO I know what I am talking about? Not really. Does this guy, though? Probably not. --Jason T
People need to know that Open Source is just as vulnerable to viruses and worms as proprietory software is... The hackers target the most widespread software, which is more often than not Windowware. Apache is one of the most widespread Linux programs, and its infection is a sign of things to come as more people leave Windows.
Fully electronic systems do not provide any way that the voter can truly verify that the ballot cast corresponds to that being recorded, transmitted, or tabulated.
This may be true, but what about current systems? What happens to your card after you punch it? Voters have no way of knowing if the card they punch is the one that ends up being counted...it all comes down to trust. I would rather trust a nonpartisan peice of open-source software than a group of human beings.
No electronic voting system has been certified to even the lowest level of the U.S. government or international computer security standards (such as the ISO Common Criteria or its predecessor, TCSEC/ITSEC), nor has any been required to comply with such. Hence, no current electronic voting system has been verified as secure.
True, this is needed. However, I am sure even current systems are more secure than punch cards. A standard A=1 B=2 cypher is more secure than a punch card.
There are no required standards for voting displays, so computer ballots can be constructed to be as confusing (or more) than the butterfly used in Florida, giving advantage to some candidates over others.
She brings up the point that Florida ballots were confusing. Exactly! We ALREADY have this problem with our current methods.
Electronic balloting and tabulation makes the tasks performed by poll workers, challengers, and election officials purely procedural, and removes any opportunity to perform bipartisan checks. Any computerized election process is thus entrusted to the small group of individuals who program, construct and maintain the machines.
An open source voting solution would be checked by everyone who had a mind to do it, and if it was non-partisan, than the actual voting procedure would be non-partisan. I would rather trust a computer to carry out a potentially emotional procedure than some human beings.
Although convicted felons and foreign citizens are prohibited from voting in U.S. elections (in many states), there are no such laws regarding voting system manufacturers, programmers and administrative personnel. Felons and foreigners can (and do!) work at and even own some of the voting machine companies providing equipment to U.S. municipalities.
Whoa...scary. That gets me thinking. What about the companies that make the punch cards? There could be FOREIGNERS printing those cards!
Encryption provides no assurance of privacy or accuracy of ballots cast. Cryptographic systems, even strong ones, can be cracked or hacked, thus leaving the ballot contents along with the identity of the voter open to perusal. One of the nation's top cryptographers, Bruce Schneier, has recently expressed his concerns on this matter, and has recommended that no computer voting system be adopted unless it also provides a physical paper ballot perused by the voter and used for recount and verification. Internet voting (whether at polling places or off-site) provides avenues of system attack to the entire planet. If the major software manufacturer in the USA could not protect their own company from an Internet attack, one must understand that voting systems (created by this firm or others) will be no better (and probably worse) in terms of vulnerability. Off-site Internet voting creates unresolvable problems with authentication, leading to possible loss of voter privacy, vote-selling, and coersion. Furthermore, this form of voting does not provide equal access for convenient balloting by all citizens, especially the poor, those in rural areas not well served by Internet service providers, the elderly, and certain disabled populations. For these reasons, off-site Internet voting systems should not be used for any government election.
Ok, it seems she is grouping electronic systems with internet-based systems. On her site, she says she is opposed to both. I admit I would doubt security of an internet-based approach, but ALL electronic solutions? Todays cryptographic algorithms are very, very secure. Just ask all the distributed computing efforts designed to break them. Once again, compare a modern cryptographic algorithm with a punch card in a locked box. Which is more secure to you? Also, an election only lasts a couple months. Afterwards, votes don't really mean much. People aren't going to crank their supercomputers for 5 years to find out if Mr. Gogfroggls Jones voted for Bush in the next Presidential Election.
Umm yeah, so mac users can switch to linux. What I meant (when I posted as anonymous coward because I was too lazy to login) was that the majority of people who are switching operating systems are going to be Windows-to-linux users, because the majority of people right now are running Windows. You can't go Windows-to-Mac using the same hardware like you can with Linux. (As of right now...anyone remember that story on here a few days ago about the x86 port of OSX? Linux is a lot easier to switch to. You can go back to windows if you think it sucks, with no hardware changing involved.
Whenever I am asked for an email address from an non-reputable site, I simply give a fake one such as wigglebroggle@frogtoggle.com. My friends do the same thing, except they always do randomaddress@hotmail.com. I know a lot of people who do that. Hotmail must be swamped with invalid emails... Also, I bet some of the "fake" addresses turn out to be real and some poor people start getting spam they don't deserve. "Accidently" type the wrong address...ha!