Unique things that neither gold nor fiat/government money can do: move money globally, instantly in a permissionless way. Hold an asset unseizably and unfreezably.
Good will of mathematicians? Err math:) 2+2 = 4 regardless of the mood of mathematicians or their views on your spending choices.
Try your claim with metals: Gold is simply a near zero-value metal ingot which a subset of people have agreed has value. Nothing less, nothing more.
After 8.5 years the stories about imminent death of bitcoin gets kind of old - that was the reason people started collecting bitcoin obituaries.
Trading strategy: buy and hodl and have a long term investment horizon.
Lots of opportunity to average down as low as $200 during the intervening period.
Point is if people see a value to permissionless, unseizable global digital gold. From the $16 billion market cap it seems that they do. Feel free not to buy any.
I agree. If I had any moderation points I would mod it 5 insightful.
This is precisely the problem: copyright & patents.
Copyrights are in effect a government subsidy for monopolies.
So some people argue actually enforcing monopoly law alone would be enough, and this certainly seems like something that should be illegal under anti-monopoly laws, if anything should.
If you send hashcash on your mail, then at least for people using spamassassin 2.7 (and soon to be released 3.0) your chances of being subject to false positive pretty much disappear.
(Think I read spamassassin is used on about 130M inboxes)
See hashcash for instructions on hooking hashcash up to various MUAs and MFAs.
(Hashcash does not cost money, it costs the senders CPU time to create a Proof of Work stamp which looks like this:
I'm the inventor of hashcash. Here are some comments on the article's
comments on hashcash, I think the author missed some aspects around how
mailing lists work with hashcash, and the economic model. Most of this
stuff is covered in the hashcash
FAQ
* Mailing lists. [...] if there is a way for legitimate
mailing lists to bypass the challenge, then spammers can equally bypass the
challenge.
Hashcash is generated for the mailing-list address.
The recipient would add the mailing-list to their list of addresses they
accept mail as, and a spammer can not send to the list without
including hashcash. So the limitation for mailing-lists is that the spammer
can send mail to many people (the list subscribers) for the cost of one
stamp; if he sends directly he has to send one stamp for each recipient.
* Robot armies [of 0wned machines].
Clearly someone wit
lots of owned systems can send lots of mail; but still less mail than
they could without hashcash.
* Legal robot armies. [...] Large
spam groups can afford purchasing hundreds of systems for distributing an
computational cost.
They can do this (and doesn't matter with
it's legal or not btw, they'll do it anyway), but it will cost them more per
mail which will cost them, so they will send less mails and be economically
incentivized to target their mails by buying demographic data etc. (eg. so
you would be less likely to receive spams in languages you can't read, or on
topics you are not interested in).
Another aspect is that legitimate
users do not send mails to lots of new recipients; most email exchanges are
conversations over a period of time with sends and receives. Some of the
hashcash based systems use hashcash only for introductions, and exempt
recipients from hashcash after that based on crypto tokens (or just
whitelists) (eg CAMRAM, TMDA do this).
The
argument here is that hashcash can be set to higher cost as it is only borne
once per new recipient for normal users.
the PIT things have been proposed under other names in numerous other proposals. PKI is complex in and of itself, so I don't see how taking two hard problems (spam and PKI) and combining them is going to help solve the spam problem.
As others have observed the CA is effectively a black list moderator. Spammers can set up their own CAs.
And it discriminates against anonymity and privacy. It is not in the users interests to non-repudiably sign each email just to combat spam.
Hashcash combined with content based filters like spamassassin makes more sense in that at least it attacks the problem: by making the sender pay (in CPU time) on a scale that costs normal senders effectively nothing (they already have spare CPU) but increases the costs of sending spam.
The filtering software would then just not filter your email if it had a hashcash token attached. This means users have an incentive to install hashcash plugins in their mailers to avoid their mail getting lost in filtering false positives.
hashcash is at: http://www.cypherspace.org/hashcash/
Adam
why Microsoft think Palladium couldn't be used to protect software copyright (as the subject of Lucky Green's patent)
are there plans to move SCP functions into processor? any relation to Intel Lagrange TCPA enabled processor
isn't it quite weak as someone could send different information to the SCP and processor, thereby being able to forge remote attestation
without having to tamper with the SCP; and hence being able to run different TOR, observe trusted agents etc.
at the bottom of the talk invite it says
"Palladium" is not designed to provide defenses against hardware-based attacks that originate from someone in control of the local machine.
but in this case how does it meet the claimed BORA prevention. Is it BORA prevention _presuming_ the local user is not interested to reconfigure
his own hardware?
Given the above quote (no defense against simple local hw attack) Will palladium really make any significant difference to DRM enforcement rates? Wouldn't the subset of the file sharing community who produce DVD rips still produce Pd DRM rips if the only protection is the assumption that the user won't make simple hardware modifications.
I think custom spam sending software would not be significantly slowed down by tar-pits. Consider: the spam engine just keeps the connections open until they connect, then drops off the mail directly or via a mail hub or open relay as before.
What does it cost the spammer -- I think just more open connections. But there aren't any limits on the number of open connections. The spammer has to adapt his tools, but once he's done that the through put of spams/second over a given link speed is the same as before.
Hashcash forces the spammer to buy (or steal) lots of CPU cycles, even though a few CPU cycles is essentially free for normal mail users, for a spammer who wants to send millions of mails this could be a significant expense.
The point about introducing inefficiency is to introduce a cost for the sender.
It's like junk faxes: in countries with free local calls, junk faxes are a much bigger problem than they are where local calls cost the caller.
Similarly for being called on cell phones with by marketers. In some countries calling a cell phone is free for the recipient and all costs are on the caller.
So while it is true that hashcash would use some CPU on the client, the amount of CPU used would be small enough to not present a noticeable problem for the sender who sends some sane number of mails per day.
The problem as I see it is deployment, as the first message in the thread "Slow acceptance if ever" puts it. ie If I use a hashcash filter on my received mail then I may lose mail if senders don't follow whatever steps are necessary for them to get their mail to me.
This is what the camram list is about -- making it reasonable for senders to send mail to people using hashcash filters, when sender has no client. For example there is a proposal to require hashcash only on the first mail, subsequent mails would be exempted. There is a simple web page with a java implementation of hashcash.
(The are proposals to deal separately with mailing lists where the recipients wants to receive the mail, and the list has to send lots of mail).
Another approach to reduce the deployment problems is to do it in two phases. In phase 1 hashcash filtering is advisory only (bounce messages on mail having no hashcash if any would just encourage sender to participate but not reject mail; filtering would improve priority of mail, not delete mail without postage); in phase 2 if phase 1 was succesful enough the filters could start bouncing mail without postage.
Will any of these approaches reach sufficient deployment to be useful? I don't know. That's what the camram group are working on.
There are also other applications of hashcash (other than email spam) in combatting DoS which have been succesfully deployed (see the paper).
there is some library and command line tool source available at:
http://www.cypherspace.org/hashcash/source/
also there is a windows gui version and a java applet version which is kind of "clientless" for people with java browers. (The camram group are using the java version for senders who don't have a hashcash client).
http://www.cypherspace.org/hashcash/
- better scalability for freenet. - file trading systems resistant to the people RIAA and MPAA are paying to jam kazaa et al - anonymous file trading (like freenet or stronger) - anonymous ecash
To the people who think lobbying is a fruitfull use of your time: name one law that increased 'Net freedoms and personal liberty in the last 5 years in the US. The best you can hope to do is burn lots of time and money to slow them down an insignificant amount.
Slashdot Mirror
Unique things that neither gold nor fiat/government money can do: move money globally, instantly in a permissionless way. Hold an asset unseizably and unfreezably.
bitcoin had lower volatility than GBP for much of 2016.
Good will of mathematicians? Err math :) 2+2 = 4 regardless of the mood of mathematicians or their views on your spending choices.
Try your claim with metals: Gold is simply a near zero-value metal ingot which a subset of people have agreed has value. Nothing less, nothing more.
After 8.5 years the stories about imminent death of bitcoin gets kind of old - that was the reason people started collecting bitcoin obituaries. Trading strategy: buy and hodl and have a long term investment horizon. Lots of opportunity to average down as low as $200 during the intervening period. Point is if people see a value to permissionless, unseizable global digital gold. From the $16 billion market cap it seems that they do. Feel free not to buy any.
Global political attacks on cash (India http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worl..., Pakistan http://www.financialexpress.co..., Venezuela https://www.theguardian.com/wo..., Euro http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/busi...) and gold (India gold ownership limits http://www.indianjobs4u.com/go...) and Euro currency (Italian bank bailout worries http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/busi...), US (geopolitical uncertainty from Trump, interest rate hikes http://abcnews.go.com/Business...), brexit (UK in or out of Europe http://www.express.co.uk/news/...) are all bullish for Bitcoin into 2017.
Refer you to https://99bitcoins.com/bitcoin...
I agree. If I had any moderation points I would mod it 5 insightful. This is precisely the problem: copyright & patents. Copyrights are in effect a government subsidy for monopolies. So some people argue actually enforcing monopoly law alone would be enough, and this certainly seems like something that should be illegal under anti-monopoly laws, if anything should.
This is a duplicate of posted 4 days ago The referred article is a verbatim copy of the previous article.
* Mailing lists. [...] if there is a way for legitimate mailing lists to bypass the challenge, then spammers can equally bypass the challenge.
Hashcash is generated for the mailing-list address. The recipient would add the mailing-list to their list of addresses they accept mail as, and a spammer can not send to the list without including hashcash. So the limitation for mailing-lists is that the spammer can send mail to many people (the list subscribers) for the cost of one stamp; if he sends directly he has to send one stamp for each recipient.
* Robot armies [of 0wned machines].
Clearly someone wit lots of owned systems can send lots of mail; but still less mail than they could without hashcash.
* Legal robot armies. [...] Large spam groups can afford purchasing hundreds of systems for distributing an computational cost.
They can do this (and doesn't matter with it's legal or not btw, they'll do it anyway), but it will cost them more per mail which will cost them, so they will send less mails and be economically incentivized to target their mails by buying demographic data etc. (eg. so you would be less likely to receive spams in languages you can't read, or on topics you are not interested in).
Another aspect is that legitimate users do not send mails to lots of new recipients; most email exchanges are conversations over a period of time with sends and receives. Some of the hashcash based systems use hashcash only for introductions, and exempt recipients from hashcash after that based on crypto tokens (or just whitelists) (eg CAMRAM, TMDA do this).
The argument here is that hashcash can be set to higher cost as it is only borne once per new recipient for normal users.
the PIT things have been proposed under other names in numerous other proposals. PKI is complex in and of itself, so I don't see how taking two hard problems (spam and PKI) and combining them is going to help solve the spam problem. As others have observed the CA is effectively a black list moderator. Spammers can set up their own CAs. And it discriminates against anonymity and privacy. It is not in the users interests to non-repudiably sign each email just to combat spam. Hashcash combined with content based filters like spamassassin makes more sense in that at least it attacks the problem: by making the sender pay (in CPU time) on a scale that costs normal senders effectively nothing (they already have spare CPU) but increases the costs of sending spam. The filtering software would then just not filter your email if it had a hashcash token attached. This means users have an incentive to install hashcash plugins in their mailers to avoid their mail getting lost in filtering false positives. hashcash is at: http://www.cypherspace.org/hashcash/ Adam
but in this case how does it meet the claimed BORA prevention. Is it BORA prevention _presuming_ the local user is not interested to reconfigure his own hardware?
What does it cost the spammer -- I think just more open connections. But there aren't any limits on the number of open connections. The spammer has to adapt his tools, but once he's done that the through put of spams/second over a given link speed is the same as before.
Hashcash forces the spammer to buy (or steal) lots of CPU cycles, even though a few CPU cycles is essentially free for normal mail users, for a spammer who wants to send millions of mails this could be a significant expense.
It's like junk faxes: in countries with free local calls, junk faxes are a much bigger problem than they are where local calls cost the caller.
Similarly for being called on cell phones with by marketers. In some countries calling a cell phone is free for the recipient and all costs are on the caller.
So while it is true that hashcash would use some CPU on the client, the amount of CPU used would be small enough to not present a noticeable problem for the sender who sends some sane number of mails per day.
The problem as I see it is deployment, as the first message in the thread "Slow acceptance if ever" puts it. ie If I use a hashcash filter on my received mail then I may lose mail if senders don't follow whatever steps are necessary for them to get their mail to me.
This is what the camram list is about -- making it reasonable for senders to send mail to people using hashcash filters, when sender has no client. For example there is a proposal to require hashcash only on the first mail, subsequent mails would be exempted. There is a simple web page with a java implementation of hashcash.
(The are proposals to deal separately with mailing lists where the recipients wants to receive the mail, and the list has to send lots of mail).
Another approach to reduce the deployment problems is to do it in two phases. In phase 1 hashcash filtering is advisory only (bounce messages on mail having no hashcash if any would just encourage sender to participate but not reject mail; filtering would improve priority of mail, not delete mail without postage); in phase 2 if phase 1 was succesful enough the filters could start bouncing mail without postage.
Will any of these approaches reach sufficient deployment to be useful? I don't know. That's what the camram group are working on.
There are also other applications of hashcash (other than email spam) in combatting DoS which have been succesfully deployed (see the paper).
there is some library and command line tool source available at: http://www.cypherspace.org/hashcash/source/ also there is a windows gui version and a java applet version which is kind of "clientless" for people with java browers. (The camram group are using the java version for senders who don't have a hashcash client). http://www.cypherspace.org/hashcash/
Now you're talking: write code not laws.
- better scalability for freenet.
- file trading systems resistant to the people RIAA and MPAA are paying to jam kazaa et al
- anonymous file trading (like freenet or stronger)
- anonymous ecash
To the people who think lobbying is a fruitfull use of your time: name one law that increased 'Net freedoms and personal liberty in the last 5 years in the US. The best you can hope to do is burn lots of time and money to slow them down an insignificant amount.