"Application Programming" is today done in things like Excel spreadsheets. You don't need to write a COBOL app* to keep track of interest payments and such. I'd argue that computers are more accessible than ever, and thanks to Google routine coding often becomes this exercise in searching for already-solved problems and applying the solutions to your similar problem.
Roughly 0.00005% (about 10 in 19 million) of all flights (where part of the flight lands in the US) are at risk of bombing annually.
Are you arguing that they can keep their security procedures static because the results are good enough? I'd argue that you need to keep changing along with the threats.
Using the presence of a working device in addition to an x-ray scanner, as well as manual and residue inspection as warranted. And for all I know, dogs.
Not allowing discharged batteries is just too large in false positives
It's hard for me to make that judgement without knowing what the threat is.
Right - shoes and liquids surely had their batteries discharged.
Most shoes and liquids don't have batteries.
Not a falsifiable statement.
So what? We are both discussing this without any real data in front of us.
If you have an argument why dogs are or are not feasible - put it on the table.
Of course they are feasible - they are using them right now. If you mean are they feasible for this particular threat... well, I don't even know what this alleged threat is and neither do you.
they don't have to make their rules and procedures convenient enough for most passengers
It certainly is not convenient, I'll give you that! Air travel is no fun at all.
Ability to avoid puddles is not technical knowledge. Also, a smart person, if any, behind the scenes would have waterproofed things.
I don't want to quibble about how stupid the puddle stepper was or how good the bombmaker was so much as to point out that it represents a complication that increased security forced upon their plan. Their plan failed where a simpler plan may not have.
A smart person, if any, behind the scenes would have made it automatic.
It cannot be made automatic because the apparatus would arouse suspicion. At that point, you are better off trying to smuggle the finished product.
I do realize that dogs would have prevented most such incidents
They might, but: - do you have enough trained dogs right now for sensible coverage? - do you have enough dog handlers right now for sensible coverage? - how much more does it cost to train a dog and hire a handler vs. tell people to charge their phone?
1. You expressed doubts about dogs being able to detect some explosives. You don't show how discharged battery can detect any explosives. Clearly dogs are superior as explosive detector.
They aren't using a discharged battery to detect explosives.
So clearly the cases being discussed are where X-rays are not effective e.g. explosive inside battery like built component.
I know nearly nothing about security, but even I know that security is best applied in layers. You will never get 100% coverage from any single technology, even if such a magical thing existed. You have to adapt your security to changing threats. I have no inside knowledge as to what caused the TSA to take this step. It's possible that it is just stupid, but in the past (shoes, liquids, etc) there has been some legitimate threat.
3. My point is that we are only discussing dogs as an alternative for empty battery scheme. If dogs can be deceived in a situation where empty battery scheme is not applicable, dogs are superior still by at least being applicable, needing effort to deceive.
I have no idea what it would take to put dogs at every checkpoint, but I imagine it is expensive, time consuming to train them, and prone to failure: terrorist waits around until the dog has to poop, etc. I have no idea. Presumably they would use dogs if it was feasible - they already use them for cargo. Remember that they have to make their rules and procedures simple enough for complete dolts to follow (both the agents and the passengers). There is not a lot of room for nuance or judgement.
You persist in mistakenly assuming the martyr must be the same person as the one who builds the contraption.
Then we are talking past one another. They are almost certainly different people. I agree with you.
I am saying that the bomb carrier can no longer just be a useful idiot. They need to have some level of technical knowledge or they are liable to, say, step in a puddle. Or they have to mix various ingredients together (unsuccessfully, as in the underwear bomb). The operation becomes more complex, and by definition more prone to failure.
Also the odds of the people building a bomb into an iPhone not being able to also make the phone look and act like an iPhone for some short amount of time is tiny.
Here I disagree. The last couple of bombings went awry because the bomber did something minor wrong. The more little bumps you throw at their plan, the more likely the conspiracy is to fail.
You'd get to shut down an entire airport and kill the hundred people in line.
Terrorists seem to be just as irrational about their targets as we are about our fears. I'm not the one who singled out bombing airplanes as this weird, master goal. I can think of many, many ways to cause much more economic and human damage than to take down a single airplane. But that's not what gets people in a tizzy.
To think otherwise is willful ignorance.
And I think it is naive to leave the rules at some base level and expect that routes won't be found around them. If your goal is to thwart bombings on airplanes, then you need layers of security combined with changing, flexible tactics.
I can only speculate on this newest regulation - we don't yet know their rationale. If I had to guess, it might be that grams matter. A laptop that has been gutted and filled with explosive is a lot more dangerous than one where they had to make it at least partially operable. It's also more difficult to produce, which makes the whole conspiracy harder to pull off.
2. Xray machines are NOT applicable in the situations being discussed.
Why not? You put your electronics through the x-ray machine, do you not?
3. I bet the drugs having no battery gave them up.
I'm not sure what your point is. Mine was that dogs are fine as a layer of security, but my limited experience (my friends might have just gotten lucky) shows that their nose is easily overwhelmed. I mean, it was a flight from Amsterdam... EVERYTHING on the plane probably had drug residue on it. Apparently dogs may be able to sniff out PETN, so they certainly may (and do I believe) have a place in the security of aircraft. That doesn't mean that it is sufficient to rely on them exclusively.
People managers can get all kinds of people to work for them, and keep them informed about the operations in varying degrees.
It is still harder to find a "martyr" personality who can also carry out a complex operation than it is to find a martyr who simply has to carry a suitcase. Is that not true?
No, it does. The smart people didn't want to get on the plane and kill themselves, so they hand it off to people like Richard Reid. I don't know if Reid was "stupid", but apparently it did not occur to him that he should keep the shoes dry. Nor did he excuse himself to the restroom where he could light his shoe at leisure. I have a feeling that the guy who build the shoe bomb would have known those things and been successful. When the operation itself becomes more complicated than "here, hold this bag", the capability of the operatives becomes very important.
1. Dogs. When in doubt, ask a dog. If you can fool a dog, you can light up the screen.
Are you sure dogs can sniff out PETN? In any case, I'd rather run my stuff through an x-ray machine than have dogs sniffing around me. I even have friends who put drugs inside a cake of deodorant and got past the drug dogs (not something I'd endorse).
Well, you have to admit that it is now harder to blow a plane out of the sky than it used to be. I think some level of security is in fact responsible for keeping planes from falling out of the sky. They used to. It's just technically quite challenging now.
From what I can tell all of the bombing plots in the 2000s were avoided by either misfires or security measures in place since the mid 90s.
Yes, we've all been very lucky that these knuckleheads did things like step in puddles - the TSA did not find them. But the fact is that every TSA regulation was born of some previous security lapse. It used to be that you could simply check a bomb onto a flight that you weren't even going to ride on. They tightened that up, so now you have to find a person willing to "martyr" themselves - which all by itself makes a huge difference. As they make the challenge of blowing up or hijacking an airplane harder and harder, they seriously shrink the pool of people willing and capable of carrying out the act.
Also 50g of PETN in a shoe bomb would have been ineffective even if it had detonated.
This source seems to think differently. In either event, explosives aren't something you really want passengers to have, and multiple passengers could have multiple shoes. Are you seriously suggesting that they not screen shoes now?
So you would be content to have security ignore the shoe bomb possibility? This seems irrational, given that only a bit of luck (he got the fuse wet) thwarted Reid's attack. It is not exactly a stretch to imagine people trying the shoe angle over and over again until it worked.
But maybe they detered the great Shoe Bomb Epidemic of 2010? Who knows.
You laugh, but the shoe bomb could have gone either way. One wonders what might have happened if the guy had lit the thing in a restroom instead of trying to light it in full view of the other passengers. The underwear bomber is a similar fellow. What do you expect the TSA to do in response to these guys? They have to change their methods.
So putting "non-existent" as a criteria means that you will always fail.
That is exactly my point. Security does not have to be perfect to be valuable.
And you will never know if the money being spent is not being wasted because there incidents are so rare already.
There are many places where traditional methods of statistical research will fail. This is one of them. Instead we have to learn from our experience. For instance: some incompetent people were recruited to light bombs in their shoes - now shoes go through the x-ray machine. People found a way to mix the explosives behind security - now we can't have substantial amounts of liquids. People hijacked airliners with box cutters - now we have reinforced doors and pocket knife restrictions.
Now I'll concede that it is entirely possible that this latest regulation is based upon some scenario in some bureaucrat's mind. It is also possible that, like the liquids regulation, it is done for a perfectly good reason. Only time will tell.
So many systems on a plane are dependent on electronics... I'm not sure a camera and TV would be the hardest part to make reliable. Worst case you could give them some battery powered goggles or something.
But not non-existent, as history has shown. Take away the security and you don't even need "smart" or "poised". Any doofus who can hold a bag will do. Keep security static and you don't need smart people - just enough attempts from dullards until they chance upon a workaround, the way penicillin eventually adapts to an antibiotic.
I was just stopped because I forgot to take my suntan lotion out of my kid's diaper bag. They offered to let me go back and check it if I wanted. I declined:)
Slashdot Mirror
Do you honestly think we can improve on a rate of 6-9's?
No, not particularly. I think that people will learn to exploit the weaknesses, though - and that is why I feel that constant change is necessary.
"Application Programming" is today done in things like Excel spreadsheets. You don't need to write a COBOL app* to keep track of interest payments and such. I'd argue that computers are more accessible than ever, and thanks to Google routine coding often becomes this exercise in searching for already-solved problems and applying the solutions to your similar problem.
* Ahhhh, dear God, "app"? Why did I type that?
Roughly 0.00005% (about 10 in 19 million) of all flights (where part of the flight lands in the US) are at risk of bombing annually.
Are you arguing that they can keep their security procedures static because the results are good enough? I'd argue that you need to keep changing along with the threats.
I will respond with data.
What else are they doing?
Using the presence of a working device in addition to an x-ray scanner, as well as manual and residue inspection as warranted. And for all I know, dogs.
Not allowing discharged batteries is just too large in false positives
It's hard for me to make that judgement without knowing what the threat is.
Right - shoes and liquids surely had their batteries discharged.
Most shoes and liquids don't have batteries.
Not a falsifiable statement.
So what? We are both discussing this without any real data in front of us.
If you have an argument why dogs are or are not feasible - put it on the table.
Of course they are feasible - they are using them right now. If you mean are they feasible for this particular threat... well, I don't even know what this alleged threat is and neither do you.
they don't have to make their rules and procedures convenient enough for most passengers
It certainly is not convenient, I'll give you that! Air travel is no fun at all.
Ability to avoid puddles is not technical knowledge. Also, a smart person, if any, behind the scenes would have waterproofed things.
I don't want to quibble about how stupid the puddle stepper was or how good the bombmaker was so much as to point out that it represents a complication that increased security forced upon their plan. Their plan failed where a simpler plan may not have.
A smart person, if any, behind the scenes would have made it automatic.
It cannot be made automatic because the apparatus would arouse suspicion. At that point, you are better off trying to smuggle the finished product.
I do realize that dogs would have prevented most such incidents
They might, but:
- do you have enough trained dogs right now for sensible coverage?
- do you have enough dog handlers right now for sensible coverage?
- how much more does it cost to train a dog and hire a handler vs. tell people to charge their phone?
1. You expressed doubts about dogs being able to detect some explosives. You don't show how discharged battery can detect any explosives. Clearly dogs are superior as explosive detector.
They aren't using a discharged battery to detect explosives.
So clearly the cases being discussed are where X-rays are not effective e.g. explosive inside battery like built component.
I know nearly nothing about security, but even I know that security is best applied in layers. You will never get 100% coverage from any single technology, even if such a magical thing existed. You have to adapt your security to changing threats. I have no inside knowledge as to what caused the TSA to take this step. It's possible that it is just stupid, but in the past (shoes, liquids, etc) there has been some legitimate threat.
3. My point is that we are only discussing dogs as an alternative for empty battery scheme. If dogs can be deceived in a situation where empty battery scheme is not applicable, dogs are superior still by at least being applicable, needing effort to deceive.
I have no idea what it would take to put dogs at every checkpoint, but I imagine it is expensive, time consuming to train them, and prone to failure: terrorist waits around until the dog has to poop, etc. I have no idea. Presumably they would use dogs if it was feasible - they already use them for cargo. Remember that they have to make their rules and procedures simple enough for complete dolts to follow (both the agents and the passengers). There is not a lot of room for nuance or judgement.
You persist in mistakenly assuming the martyr must be the same person as the one who builds the contraption.
Then we are talking past one another. They are almost certainly different people. I agree with you.
I am saying that the bomb carrier can no longer just be a useful idiot. They need to have some level of technical knowledge or they are liable to, say, step in a puddle. Or they have to mix various ingredients together (unsuccessfully, as in the underwear bomb). The operation becomes more complex, and by definition more prone to failure.
Also the odds of the people building a bomb into an iPhone not being able to also make the phone look and act like an iPhone for some short amount of time is tiny.
Here I disagree. The last couple of bombings went awry because the bomber did something minor wrong. The more little bumps you throw at their plan, the more likely the conspiracy is to fail.
You'd get to shut down an entire airport and kill the hundred people in line.
Terrorists seem to be just as irrational about their targets as we are about our fears. I'm not the one who singled out bombing airplanes as this weird, master goal. I can think of many, many ways to cause much more economic and human damage than to take down a single airplane. But that's not what gets people in a tizzy.
To think otherwise is willful ignorance.
And I think it is naive to leave the rules at some base level and expect that routes won't be found around them. If your goal is to thwart bombings on airplanes, then you need layers of security combined with changing, flexible tactics.
1. Empty battery can't detect ANY explosive.
I can only speculate on this newest regulation - we don't yet know their rationale. If I had to guess, it might be that grams matter. A laptop that has been gutted and filled with explosive is a lot more dangerous than one where they had to make it at least partially operable. It's also more difficult to produce, which makes the whole conspiracy harder to pull off.
2. Xray machines are NOT applicable in the situations being discussed.
Why not? You put your electronics through the x-ray machine, do you not?
3. I bet the drugs having no battery gave them up.
I'm not sure what your point is. Mine was that dogs are fine as a layer of security, but my limited experience (my friends might have just gotten lucky) shows that their nose is easily overwhelmed. I mean, it was a flight from Amsterdam... EVERYTHING on the plane probably had drug residue on it. Apparently dogs may be able to sniff out PETN, so they certainly may (and do I believe) have a place in the security of aircraft. That doesn't mean that it is sufficient to rely on them exclusively.
People managers can get all kinds of people to work for them, and keep them informed about the operations in varying degrees.
It is still harder to find a "martyr" personality who can also carry out a complex operation than it is to find a martyr who simply has to carry a suitcase. Is that not true?
Shoe screening has never been acceptable, especially because it's ineffective.
Why do you say that? It's probably not 100% effective, but that doesn't make it ineffective as a deterrent. You can't be a martyr by sitting in jail.
Diagram does not get smaller at all.
No, it does. The smart people didn't want to get on the plane and kill themselves, so they hand it off to people like Richard Reid. I don't know if Reid was "stupid", but apparently it did not occur to him that he should keep the shoes dry. Nor did he excuse himself to the restroom where he could light his shoe at leisure. I have a feeling that the guy who build the shoe bomb would have known those things and been successful. When the operation itself becomes more complicated than "here, hold this bag", the capability of the operatives becomes very important.
1. Dogs. When in doubt, ask a dog. If you can fool a dog, you can light up the screen.
Are you sure dogs can sniff out PETN? In any case, I'd rather run my stuff through an x-ray machine than have dogs sniffing around me. I even have friends who put drugs inside a cake of deodorant and got past the drug dogs (not something I'd endorse).
Well, you have to admit that it is now harder to blow a plane out of the sky than it used to be. I think some level of security is in fact responsible for keeping planes from falling out of the sky. They used to. It's just technically quite challenging now.
From what I can tell all of the bombing plots in the 2000s were avoided by either misfires or security measures in place since the mid 90s.
Yes, we've all been very lucky that these knuckleheads did things like step in puddles - the TSA did not find them. But the fact is that every TSA regulation was born of some previous security lapse. It used to be that you could simply check a bomb onto a flight that you weren't even going to ride on. They tightened that up, so now you have to find a person willing to "martyr" themselves - which all by itself makes a huge difference. As they make the challenge of blowing up or hijacking an airplane harder and harder, they seriously shrink the pool of people willing and capable of carrying out the act.
Also 50g of PETN in a shoe bomb would have been ineffective even if it had detonated.
This source seems to think differently. In either event, explosives aren't something you really want passengers to have, and multiple passengers could have multiple shoes. Are you seriously suggesting that they not screen shoes now?
Or a FUTBOL stadium.
Yup, but what is the alternative? I mean, there are alternatives, but each also have disadvantages. What improvement are you proposing?
This is a pretty awesome result if it didn't depend on coincidence.
That's why I don't use penicillin.
So you would be content to have security ignore the shoe bomb possibility? This seems irrational, given that only a bit of luck (he got the fuse wet) thwarted Reid's attack. It is not exactly a stretch to imagine people trying the shoe angle over and over again until it worked.
But maybe they detered the great Shoe Bomb Epidemic of 2010? Who knows.
You laugh, but the shoe bomb could have gone either way. One wonders what might have happened if the guy had lit the thing in a restroom instead of trying to light it in full view of the other passengers. The underwear bomber is a similar fellow. What do you expect the TSA to do in response to these guys? They have to change their methods.
So putting "non-existent" as a criteria means that you will always fail.
That is exactly my point. Security does not have to be perfect to be valuable.
And you will never know if the money being spent is not being wasted because there incidents are so rare already.
There are many places where traditional methods of statistical research will fail. This is one of them. Instead we have to learn from our experience. For instance: some incompetent people were recruited to light bombs in their shoes - now shoes go through the x-ray machine. People found a way to mix the explosives behind security - now we can't have substantial amounts of liquids. People hijacked airliners with box cutters - now we have reinforced doors and pocket knife restrictions.
Now I'll concede that it is entirely possible that this latest regulation is based upon some scenario in some bureaucrat's mind. It is also possible that, like the liquids regulation, it is done for a perfectly good reason. Only time will tell.
So many systems on a plane are dependent on electronics... I'm not sure a camera and TV would be the hardest part to make reliable. Worst case you could give them some battery powered goggles or something.
The risk is already almost non-existent.
But not non-existent, as history has shown. Take away the security and you don't even need "smart" or "poised". Any doofus who can hold a bag will do. Keep security static and you don't need smart people - just enough attempts from dullards until they chance upon a workaround, the way penicillin eventually adapts to an antibiotic.
I was just stopped because I forgot to take my suntan lotion out of my kid's diaper bag. They offered to let me go back and check it if I wanted. I declined :)