What...is the airspeed velocity of an unladen chicken?
What do you mean, a Perdue or an irradiated chicken?
What.... I don't know..AAAGGHHH KABOOOOMMMM!!!
It's just like what Richard Clarke said in the 9/11 hearings on Wednesday.
It's not a question of morality at all. It's a question of politics."
I believe this statement sums up most, if not all of the problems the feds introduce.
Re:I worked for the navy at the pentagon.
on
IT at the CIA
·
· Score: 1
Agreed, the new way of doing things take far more out of the sailors hands. Pre-ISNS left something to be desired. Now, you can just call someone. Being an IT1 I'm sure you know who I used to work for. The biggest problems were a serious lack of training, which I hope has gotten better since my time, and deviating from the guidelines. As you well know, the ISNS package is designed to run one specific way... when it gets messed with who knows what can happen. Everybody crashes their Exchange box and they never have a backup. Breathing life back into an Exchange box over INMARSAT 5000 miles away at 4am local just got old for me.
I saw things taking a positive turn when I last plugged in and for that I'm thankful. I just hope they continue to offer the training for the IT's. A lot of then can do it, and a lot of them don't want to. You just have to count of the younger crowd to join and take charge. I've seen IT's, FC's, GSE's, and even PN's take charge and run a shipboard system, that's what makes the Navy great.
I agree, SIRNET isn't half-ass, its a decent system with a good foundation. The problem, as always, is the user. The half-ass systems I would find weren't piped into the SIPR system... they were usually NIPR class systems w/ class info on them. Most of the time they were smart enough to unplug them from the outside world, but not always. The big drive that pushed the "smaller" ships to create their own networks was the larger platform standards that were being created without concern for the other parties in the battle groups being able to keep up. The Navy saw the need to bring organized systems into the fleet but didn't think ahead to the interoperability issues that arose from multi-platform connectivity. We went from grease pencils and plot boards to posting datam on shared web pages via SIPR for instant data sharing. Now that's the way it should be done. IRC chat was another wonderful tool that arose from it that allowed the sharing of information via non-radio means. I'm sure it has only gotten better.
Re:I worked for the navy at the pentagon.
on
IT at the CIA
·
· Score: 2, Interesting
I didn't work at the Pentagon but I was the lead IT on a ship and also an engineer (post-eaos) for the the NIPR/SIPR shipboard ISNS provider.
The CIA isn't the only government agency that is behind the times. Lets talk about intelligence handling with the Navy. It wasn't until 4 years ago that an official standard, project if you will, was implemented on a broad scale to handle the class/unclass infosys traffic. Now I'm not saying that it didn't exist, because it did exist, but what I am hitting on here is that the Navy, in this example, didn't provide a clear cut method for shipboard units to maintain data via a computer network. Now, the standards existed, but on a broad scale it was left up to specific commands to implement a computer system within the regulations for INFOSEC without outside assistance. So lets get into how it was done, pre-ISNS days.
Seaman Smuckitelle is tasked with providing a half-ass computer network on the ship. Since during that time the DS's were still in existance it wasn't a hard task but the real fun came when everyone started messing around with it. The only "allowed" system shipboard was unclass due to the obvious INFOSEC requirements of a class network and the serious lack of personal that could accomplish such a task unassisted. Now, DS2 Smuck creates this network and connects all the major spaces together, this is UNCLASS mind you. Now, as you can probably tell what ended up on that unclass network, yep... classified material. In a matter of a week you have chief's writing CASREPS on it (a classified message). Then, someone has a bright idea. From a distant corner of the Wardroom comes a voice that says, lets put all of our message traffic on it through the exchange server. There was much celebrating from the wardroom that night and thus the unclass, insecure, half-ass, non-INFOSEC compliant network now magically becomes a secret network.
This isn't to scare anyone, its just to further extend the point of being "behind the times". In the case of the CIA we should hope that the outdated IT problem is due to hardware and lack of funding. In the case of the Navy it was due to a lack of training and organized leadership. The foresight of a tight, well designed INFOSYS infrastructure wasn't clear until well past its need. Once it was clear, they tried to do something about it. Now as of 2 years ago, when I last touched it, the times were changing... but there was still alot to be learned. Example being when the Navy decided to formalize their shipboard INFOSYS structure they downsized the DS rating (the only rating in the Navy that specialized in Data Systems specifically) and crossed all of the new IT responsibility to the RM's, or Radiomen. Now, who do you think could handle this task better, a Data Systems specialist trained in the use, support, and troubleshooting of computer systems (despite the obvious age of these system), or a RM who's only purpose in life was to push paper and transmit radio traffic? Well, I'll tell you this... any advance the Navy made by bringing a standard cross-ship platform for INFOSYS into the works was further slowed by allowing inexperienced people take charge of it. My exact point is made very clear in the above post where a Chief, a leader mind you, hooked an unclass and a class network together on the same system. Why might you ask? Well the real fact is clear, people as a whole are very concerned about Information Security, the single induhvidual (yes Dilbert) doesn't think before they act. Could it be innocent, yes but the information that is classified is made such for a reason and the gross mishandling of that information leads to serious problems. Do I believe that SIPR is secure, sure in theory, but the people behind it are not.
Its the government, they never choose wisely until its too late and then they always find a way to muck it up in the long run. You know how many times I went onboard a ship to fix a downed Exchange server and they hadn't backed up in 2 months....
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Try getting used to DTG (Day Time Group) tagging in military messages. DDTTTTZ(Month)YY
What...is the airspeed velocity of an unladen chicken? What do you mean, a Perdue or an irradiated chicken? What.... I don't know..AAAGGHHH KABOOOOMMMM!!!
It's just like what Richard Clarke said in the 9/11 hearings on Wednesday. It's not a question of morality at all. It's a question of politics." I believe this statement sums up most, if not all of the problems the feds introduce.
Agreed, the new way of doing things take far more out of the sailors hands. Pre-ISNS left something to be desired. Now, you can just call someone. Being an IT1 I'm sure you know who I used to work for. The biggest problems were a serious lack of training, which I hope has gotten better since my time, and deviating from the guidelines. As you well know, the ISNS package is designed to run one specific way... when it gets messed with who knows what can happen. Everybody crashes their Exchange box and they never have a backup. Breathing life back into an Exchange box over INMARSAT 5000 miles away at 4am local just got old for me.
I saw things taking a positive turn when I last plugged in and for that I'm thankful. I just hope they continue to offer the training for the IT's. A lot of then can do it, and a lot of them don't want to. You just have to count of the younger crowd to join and take charge. I've seen IT's, FC's, GSE's, and even PN's take charge and run a shipboard system, that's what makes the Navy great.
I agree, SIRNET isn't half-ass, its a decent system with a good foundation. The problem, as always, is the user. The half-ass systems I would find weren't piped into the SIPR system... they were usually NIPR class systems w/ class info on them. Most of the time they were smart enough to unplug them from the outside world, but not always. The big drive that pushed the "smaller" ships to create their own networks was the larger platform standards that were being created without concern for the other parties in the battle groups being able to keep up. The Navy saw the need to bring organized systems into the fleet but didn't think ahead to the interoperability issues that arose from multi-platform connectivity. We went from grease pencils and plot boards to posting datam on shared web pages via SIPR for instant data sharing. Now that's the way it should be done. IRC chat was another wonderful tool that arose from it that allowed the sharing of information via non-radio means. I'm sure it has only gotten better.
I didn't work at the Pentagon but I was the lead IT on a ship and also an engineer (post-eaos) for the the NIPR/SIPR shipboard ISNS provider.
The CIA isn't the only government agency that is behind the times. Lets talk about intelligence handling with the Navy. It wasn't until 4 years ago that an official standard, project if you will, was implemented on a broad scale to handle the class/unclass infosys traffic. Now I'm not saying that it didn't exist, because it did exist, but what I am hitting on here is that the Navy, in this example, didn't provide a clear cut method for shipboard units to maintain data via a computer network. Now, the standards existed, but on a broad scale it was left up to specific commands to implement a computer system within the regulations for INFOSEC without outside assistance. So lets get into how it was done, pre-ISNS days.
Seaman Smuckitelle is tasked with providing a half-ass computer network on the ship. Since during that time the DS's were still in existance it wasn't a hard task but the real fun came when everyone started messing around with it. The only "allowed" system shipboard was unclass due to the obvious INFOSEC requirements of a class network and the serious lack of personal that could accomplish such a task unassisted. Now, DS2 Smuck creates this network and connects all the major spaces together, this is UNCLASS mind you. Now, as you can probably tell what ended up on that unclass network, yep... classified material. In a matter of a week you have chief's writing CASREPS on it (a classified message). Then, someone has a bright idea. From a distant corner of the Wardroom comes a voice that says, lets put all of our message traffic on it through the exchange server. There was much celebrating from the wardroom that night and thus the unclass, insecure, half-ass, non-INFOSEC compliant network now magically becomes a secret network.
This isn't to scare anyone, its just to further extend the point of being "behind the times". In the case of the CIA we should hope that the outdated IT problem is due to hardware and lack of funding. In the case of the Navy it was due to a lack of training and organized leadership. The foresight of a tight, well designed INFOSYS infrastructure wasn't clear until well past its need. Once it was clear, they tried to do something about it. Now as of 2 years ago, when I last touched it, the times were changing... but there was still alot to be learned. Example being when the Navy decided to formalize their shipboard INFOSYS structure they downsized the DS rating (the only rating in the Navy that specialized in Data Systems specifically) and crossed all of the new IT responsibility to the RM's, or Radiomen. Now, who do you think could handle this task better, a Data Systems specialist trained in the use, support, and troubleshooting of computer systems (despite the obvious age of these system), or a RM who's only purpose in life was to push paper and transmit radio traffic? Well, I'll tell you this... any advance the Navy made by bringing a standard cross-ship platform for INFOSYS into the works was further slowed by allowing inexperienced people take charge of it. My exact point is made very clear in the above post where a Chief, a leader mind you, hooked an unclass and a class network together on the same system. Why might you ask? Well the real fact is clear, people as a whole are very concerned about Information Security, the single induhvidual (yes Dilbert) doesn't think before they act. Could it be innocent, yes but the information that is classified is made such for a reason and the gross mishandling of that information leads to serious problems. Do I believe that SIPR is secure, sure in theory, but the people behind it are not.
Its the government, they never choose wisely until its too late and then they always find a way to muck it up in the long run. You know how many times I went onboard a ship to fix a downed Exchange server and they hadn't backed up in 2 months....