1. Do some research about how much money plaintiffs actually get for workplace discrimination. It is virtually never millions, and typically only in the tens of thousands if punitive damages are available -- and the point of those are not to compensate people as you seem to think, but to serve (among other things) as a deterrent.
2. Workplace discrimination is a civil, not criminal matter. Nobody is going to get a criminal record or have their "lives ruined" in these suits.
3. You seem to think there is no space between being "protected like a flower" and "anything goes." But of course this is stupid. An example of one such intermediate position is to allow a little casual ribbing, but not so much harassment that it makes for a hostile work environment. And, for the record, men can also file workplace discrimination claims, though these are clearly less common. This probably is partially because most workplaces are male-dominated and, thus, can generate a greater pervasive feeling of gender-biased hostility towards women than men, partially because men are simply more likely to make "remarks" towards women than the other way around, and yes, maybe in part because women are more likely to perceive an environment as hostile than men.
Oh, and here's another fun fact: did you know that the U.S. currently gets away with paying negative interest on its short-term sovereign debt? If countries are paying us to borrow take their money...why shouldn't we, exactly?
Yet again: you're preaching to the choir. (I happen to be a constitutional lawyer...so I'm kinda up on what the courts think.) I was never claiming that the Second Amendment protects the "right" to buy whatever sort of weapon you want. The comment I was responding to was asking why we haven't banned bullets, and I'm pretty sure THAT would be a 2nd Amendment violation in the eyes of just about any U.S. court. And besides, the 2nd Amendment influences public debate about gun control far beyond it's technical legal scope -- our Constitution has more than just legal effects.
Again: you're preaching to the choir. I think today's prevailing interpretation os the Second Amendment is goofy. But it is what it is, and correct or not it serves to explain the difference between bullets and buckyballs.
Well, remember that the interest rates are set at auction, and in the absence of any specific evidence to this effect I don't see how you can claim that we "demand" low interest rates.
So the better analogy is this: I lend John $100,000. He loses his job and starts drinking, hits hard times and comes to me looking for a $5,000 loan. I offer him one at, say, 5% interest. At this point, John is good to go; nobody needs to step in to rescue John. But, nonetheless, you show up and offer to lend him the money at 2.5% interest. Why the hell would you do that if you didn't think John could repay? You wouldn't, of course.
Compare this to a simpler explanation: while our deficit is very large, it is relatively easy for us to pay down if we make it a priority. There are a bunch of specific proposals floating around out there, any one of which would bring us back into the black. We could, for example, repeal Bush's tax cuts. Or, we could privatize social security. Or we could cut defense spending to something less than 16x anyone else's. Either one of those (among many others) would do the trick in pretty much one fell swoop. So the problem isn't that we are in so deep we can't get out -- very far from it. The problem is simply that our leaders can't agree on the right way to do it.
Of course, that might be because many of us think that now isn't the time to prioritize paying down the dept at all. We should come up with a plan to do it, of course, but in the immediate term we should take advantage of the fact that we are able to borrow at much lower rates than most other countries and plow it all into infrastructure investment. That way when the global economy rebounds we're ready to lead for another 50 years (and, yes, pay down the debt) because we've been investing while everyone else has been in austerity mode. Unfortunately, the political climate today means we have to let this golden (and obvious) opportunity pass us by.
Well, I'm with you. but there's an obvious explanation: like it or not (I sure don't) guns and ammunition are protected by the second amendment and (for some reason) have a special place in American culture.
No, actually. They could always have sued for negligence (if, in fact, there was negligence). Banning the things will therefore permit fewer lawsuits, not more.
What, according to this theory, accounts for the fact that everyone in the world, including China, continue to buy newly issued U.S. debt at historically low interest rates?
This is interesting, and thanks for the information. Though having read it, it seems pretty clear that this guidance document doesn't set out legal requirements -- it's only informational. (Some guidance docs can indeed be legally binding, but I don't think this one is.) [IAAL -- but, of course, I'm not YOUR lawyer so don't treat this as legal advice. I am also not admitted to the bar in your state. Etc.]
Interesting. But it matters which banks comprise that 4%. (Though the most relevant number for us is 6%, I would thin, since that is the percentage that allows you to opt in to a two-factor system.) Bank of America is one of them -- they offer an optional second factor in the form of an RSA SiteKey fob. Other major banks do the same. Remember that you also have the choice to not use online banking. So, yes, given that backdrop, I;d say it is definitely fair to say that you "chose" to use whatever system it is that your bank has you using.
It's not entirely on point anymore, but I'd also point out that that FFIEC guidance is not likely to be legally binding. With agency guidance documents it's sometimes hard to tell, but in this case it seems pretty clear that it is only informational. (IAAL -- though, of course, this isn't legal advice and I'm not your lawyer. I'm just some guy on/.)
Cited in the executive order: 47 U.S.C. 606 . (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2009-title47/pdf/USCODE-2009-title47-chap5-subchapVI-sec606.pdf). Congress passed legislation authorizing the president to do this in 1934.
The funny thing is that, while I agree, the authorizing legislation (47 U.S.C. 606) actually DOES give the president power to seize communications equipment (with compensation). So much of the commentary on/. is wrong in both respects: it does not actually try to seize equipment, but if it did it would clearly be authorized by statute. (And, going a step farter, it is clearly not a violation of the takings clause since the law provides compensation.)
You're right, but the legislation you're looking for is 47 U.S.C. 606 . (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2009-title47/pdf/USCODE-2009-title47-chap5-subchapVI-sec606.pdf) It's cited in the executive order.
You forgot to read the actual executive order to discover that there is no part that empowers them "to seize civilian facilities." It just lists private gear as one category of communications equipment that the government might use. Would you rather the government not use available, privately owned gear?
Right, except as others have noted, it doesn't authorize seizure of private property. It just lists them as a category of communications equipment that the government might use to disseminate information in an emergency.
This is mostly incorrect. Executive orders only allow the executive to exercise powers conferred upon it by some other source, such as directly by the constitution (such as in some situations involving national defense and commanding the military) or by laws passed by the legislature. Typically they allow the president to order federal agencies (which are [generally] part of the executive branch) to alter the manner in which they carry out the laws congress has asked them to execute. Congress may give the executive more or less freedom to choose how the law will be applied, but it must always be within the meaning of the language congress passed.
If you read the executive order in question here (I know, I know...), you will see that it at least claims to have been authorized by a number of laws, but particularly The Communications Act of 1934.
This means that not only can executive orders be overturned by the courts, they can also be effectively overturned by the legislature by altering the authorizing legislation, or they can be "overturned" by future presidents who can simply supersede them with new, incompatible executive orders.
I missed the obvious: are you sure there is no bank that provides these things? Most of them? Have you Googled it? I just did, and I found quite a few options. But I take it that, for some reason, you have chosen not to use one of those banks or services. That's the sense in which you are using your bank's security regime voluntarily. You never had to do business on those terms in the first place if you didn't like them. In fact, the law is designed to help you in just the way you have in mind: it provides some limit on the "whatever you agreed to" default. If the security regime offered by your bank is not commercially reasonable, it doesn't matter whether or not you agreed to use it. The problem, again, is just that you want more than what courts have found to be "commercially reasonable" and anf for some reason have not chosen to find a bank that meets your needs better. What am I missing?
Interesting, but I can't quite tell what you're proposing. I agree with you in wanting banks to use better security measures. This seems to go to the definition of "commercially reasonable." And, as I said, there may be a problem with judges' understanding of the costs and benefits of the technologies involved that could work to ensure that this definition lags.
But this seems like a different question from the one I was primarily answering: who is liable for a breached account if the banks DID employ commercially reasonable security measures. To answer that question, you'd have to say something about the problem of infinite liability for banks in cases like the one when my grandmother loses her password negligently.
What law is it that requires banks to use RSA keys? I've googled and come up with nothing applicable. If you can show it to me, that would be great so I can sue my bank into compliance. (Seriously.) I suggest you do the same!
Mmm...I think it's pretty obvious. I always read "RTFA" as hostile. I've got no problem with you or your comment, but thought you might be interested in another data point on the off chance that you actually do care about not coming off as rude. Cheers.
Well, it's clear that someone owes them X dollars, the question is whom. In cases where the bank's security measures aren't to blame (the typical case will be when the user picked a weak password, or allowed his password to be stolen somehow, or lost it to keylogging software they installed along with a desktop weather widget) why place the loss on the bank? All they did was implement the security measures that they and their customer agreed upon. It was the customer's fault (by hypothesis) that their account was compromised. The alternative would give customers no incentive to keep their passwords secure and would expose banks to essentially infinite uncontrollable liability.
Of course, if it really was the bank's fault then, yes, the customer should be able to recover directly from the bank and the bank should be the one left to track down the thief if they want their money back. It's this distinction that the law tries to capture (see UCC Art 4A Sec. 202, http://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/4A/4A-202.html), and I think it generally does a good job (except, of course, for the inevitable problem of keeping courts up to speed on what counts as "commercially reasonable" -- but that's the beauty of our adversarial system: we can usually count on the parties' lawyers to keep the judges more-or-less educated).
To start, I think you're somehow missing the fact that I am a big big supporter of the separation of church and state. I just don't think that the historical argument for it is very compelling. And I think the historical argument is beside the point anyway. I don't advance any of the conflicting arguments you suggest I advance.
And, again, there is no serious debate among constitutional scholars about what the establishment clause meant when it was written: it meant only that the federal government could not create a national church to replace state churches. Basically it was a federalism provision that ensured that states remained free to choose their own local official churches. Again: I am on your side. It would be more convenient for us if this were not true. But it is. So no, not all the evidence points to the consensus you suggest among the framers. The evidence actually is that the practice was widespread at the time the constitution was drafted and the framers did not understand the constitution to do anything to stop it. It may be that Jefferson would have preferred a more total separation, but even if we knew that to be true (I believe that it is, but the evidence is not unequivocal), it wouldn't decide anything because you also need to think about what the other authors (remember: there were very many) and, even worse, the ratifiers thought it meant.
But, all this notwithstanding, there are plenty of arguments we can make about why, even if the founders didn't enshrine the total separation we are committed to today, they should have. Articulating those arguments will be much more productive and get us farther than bickering over how often Thomas Jefferson went to church.
Slashdot Mirror
Three things:
1. Do some research about how much money plaintiffs actually get for workplace discrimination. It is virtually never millions, and typically only in the tens of thousands if punitive damages are available -- and the point of those are not to compensate people as you seem to think, but to serve (among other things) as a deterrent.
2. Workplace discrimination is a civil, not criminal matter. Nobody is going to get a criminal record or have their "lives ruined" in these suits.
3. You seem to think there is no space between being "protected like a flower" and "anything goes." But of course this is stupid. An example of one such intermediate position is to allow a little casual ribbing, but not so much harassment that it makes for a hostile work environment. And, for the record, men can also file workplace discrimination claims, though these are clearly less common. This probably is partially because most workplaces are male-dominated and, thus, can generate a greater pervasive feeling of gender-biased hostility towards women than men, partially because men are simply more likely to make "remarks" towards women than the other way around, and yes, maybe in part because women are more likely to perceive an environment as hostile than men.
Oh, and here's another fun fact: did you know that the U.S. currently gets away with paying negative interest on its short-term sovereign debt? If countries are paying us to borrow take their money...why shouldn't we, exactly?
Yet again: you're preaching to the choir. (I happen to be a constitutional lawyer...so I'm kinda up on what the courts think.) I was never claiming that the Second Amendment protects the "right" to buy whatever sort of weapon you want. The comment I was responding to was asking why we haven't banned bullets, and I'm pretty sure THAT would be a 2nd Amendment violation in the eyes of just about any U.S. court. And besides, the 2nd Amendment influences public debate about gun control far beyond it's technical legal scope -- our Constitution has more than just legal effects.
Again: you're preaching to the choir. I think today's prevailing interpretation os the Second Amendment is goofy. But it is what it is, and correct or not it serves to explain the difference between bullets and buckyballs.
Well, remember that the interest rates are set at auction, and in the absence of any specific evidence to this effect I don't see how you can claim that we "demand" low interest rates.
So the better analogy is this: I lend John $100,000. He loses his job and starts drinking, hits hard times and comes to me looking for a $5,000 loan. I offer him one at, say, 5% interest. At this point, John is good to go; nobody needs to step in to rescue John. But, nonetheless, you show up and offer to lend him the money at 2.5% interest. Why the hell would you do that if you didn't think John could repay? You wouldn't, of course.
Compare this to a simpler explanation: while our deficit is very large, it is relatively easy for us to pay down if we make it a priority. There are a bunch of specific proposals floating around out there, any one of which would bring us back into the black. We could, for example, repeal Bush's tax cuts. Or, we could privatize social security. Or we could cut defense spending to something less than 16x anyone else's. Either one of those (among many others) would do the trick in pretty much one fell swoop. So the problem isn't that we are in so deep we can't get out -- very far from it. The problem is simply that our leaders can't agree on the right way to do it.
Of course, that might be because many of us think that now isn't the time to prioritize paying down the dept at all. We should come up with a plan to do it, of course, but in the immediate term we should take advantage of the fact that we are able to borrow at much lower rates than most other countries and plow it all into infrastructure investment. That way when the global economy rebounds we're ready to lead for another 50 years (and, yes, pay down the debt) because we've been investing while everyone else has been in austerity mode. Unfortunately, the political climate today means we have to let this golden (and obvious) opportunity pass us by.
Well, I'm with you. but there's an obvious explanation: like it or not (I sure don't) guns and ammunition are protected by the second amendment and (for some reason) have a special place in American culture.
No, actually. They could always have sued for negligence (if, in fact, there was negligence). Banning the things will therefore permit fewer lawsuits, not more.
What, according to this theory, accounts for the fact that everyone in the world, including China, continue to buy newly issued U.S. debt at historically low interest rates?
This is interesting, and thanks for the information. Though having read it, it seems pretty clear that this guidance document doesn't set out legal requirements -- it's only informational. (Some guidance docs can indeed be legally binding, but I don't think this one is.) [IAAL -- but, of course, I'm not YOUR lawyer so don't treat this as legal advice. I am also not admitted to the bar in your state. Etc.]
Interesting. But it matters which banks comprise that 4%. (Though the most relevant number for us is 6%, I would thin, since that is the percentage that allows you to opt in to a two-factor system.) Bank of America is one of them -- they offer an optional second factor in the form of an RSA SiteKey fob. Other major banks do the same. Remember that you also have the choice to not use online banking. So, yes, given that backdrop, I;d say it is definitely fair to say that you "chose" to use whatever system it is that your bank has you using.
It's not entirely on point anymore, but I'd also point out that that FFIEC guidance is not likely to be legally binding. With agency guidance documents it's sometimes hard to tell, but in this case it seems pretty clear that it is only informational. (IAAL -- though, of course, this isn't legal advice and I'm not your lawyer. I'm just some guy on /.)
Forgot my link to the authorizing legislation:
47 U.S.C. 606
PDF: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2009-title47/pdf/USCODE-2009-title47-chap5-subchapVI-sec606.pdf
HTML: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2009-title47/html/USCODE-2009-title47-chap5-subchapVI-sec606.htm
Cited in the executive order: 47 U.S.C. 606 . (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2009-title47/pdf/USCODE-2009-title47-chap5-subchapVI-sec606.pdf). Congress passed legislation authorizing the president to do this in 1934.
The funny thing is that, while I agree, the authorizing legislation (47 U.S.C. 606) actually DOES give the president power to seize communications equipment (with compensation). So much of the commentary on /. is wrong in both respects: it does not actually try to seize equipment, but if it did it would clearly be authorized by statute. (And, going a step farter, it is clearly not a violation of the takings clause since the law provides compensation.)
You're right, but the legislation you're looking for is 47 U.S.C. 606 . (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2009-title47/pdf/USCODE-2009-title47-chap5-subchapVI-sec606.pdf) It's cited in the executive order.
You forgot to read the actual executive order to discover that there is no part that empowers them "to seize civilian facilities." It just lists private gear as one category of communications equipment that the government might use. Would you rather the government not use available, privately owned gear?
Right, except as others have noted, it doesn't authorize seizure of private property. It just lists them as a category of communications equipment that the government might use to disseminate information in an emergency.
This is mostly incorrect. Executive orders only allow the executive to exercise powers conferred upon it by some other source, such as directly by the constitution (such as in some situations involving national defense and commanding the military) or by laws passed by the legislature. Typically they allow the president to order federal agencies (which are [generally] part of the executive branch) to alter the manner in which they carry out the laws congress has asked them to execute. Congress may give the executive more or less freedom to choose how the law will be applied, but it must always be within the meaning of the language congress passed.
If you read the executive order in question here (I know, I know...), you will see that it at least claims to have been authorized by a number of laws, but particularly The Communications Act of 1934.
This means that not only can executive orders be overturned by the courts, they can also be effectively overturned by the legislature by altering the authorizing legislation, or they can be "overturned" by future presidents who can simply supersede them with new, incompatible executive orders.
This is basically true of all executive orders. They augment the executive's implementation of laws passed by the legislature.
I missed the obvious: are you sure there is no bank that provides these things? Most of them? Have you Googled it? I just did, and I found quite a few options. But I take it that, for some reason, you have chosen not to use one of those banks or services. That's the sense in which you are using your bank's security regime voluntarily. You never had to do business on those terms in the first place if you didn't like them. In fact, the law is designed to help you in just the way you have in mind: it provides some limit on the "whatever you agreed to" default. If the security regime offered by your bank is not commercially reasonable, it doesn't matter whether or not you agreed to use it. The problem, again, is just that you want more than what courts have found to be "commercially reasonable" and anf for some reason have not chosen to find a bank that meets your needs better. What am I missing?
Do you have a newsletter?
Interesting, but I can't quite tell what you're proposing. I agree with you in wanting banks to use better security measures. This seems to go to the definition of "commercially reasonable." And, as I said, there may be a problem with judges' understanding of the costs and benefits of the technologies involved that could work to ensure that this definition lags.
But this seems like a different question from the one I was primarily answering: who is liable for a breached account if the banks DID employ commercially reasonable security measures. To answer that question, you'd have to say something about the problem of infinite liability for banks in cases like the one when my grandmother loses her password negligently.
What law is it that requires banks to use RSA keys? I've googled and come up with nothing applicable. If you can show it to me, that would be great so I can sue my bank into compliance. (Seriously.) I suggest you do the same!
This assumes that false positives are costless. They aren't. Think: attorney's fees.
Mmm...I think it's pretty obvious. I always read "RTFA" as hostile. I've got no problem with you or your comment, but thought you might be interested in another data point on the off chance that you actually do care about not coming off as rude. Cheers.
Well, it's clear that someone owes them X dollars, the question is whom. In cases where the bank's security measures aren't to blame (the typical case will be when the user picked a weak password, or allowed his password to be stolen somehow, or lost it to keylogging software they installed along with a desktop weather widget) why place the loss on the bank? All they did was implement the security measures that they and their customer agreed upon. It was the customer's fault (by hypothesis) that their account was compromised. The alternative would give customers no incentive to keep their passwords secure and would expose banks to essentially infinite uncontrollable liability.
Of course, if it really was the bank's fault then, yes, the customer should be able to recover directly from the bank and the bank should be the one left to track down the thief if they want their money back. It's this distinction that the law tries to capture (see UCC Art 4A Sec. 202, http://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/4A/4A-202.html), and I think it generally does a good job (except, of course, for the inevitable problem of keeping courts up to speed on what counts as "commercially reasonable" -- but that's the beauty of our adversarial system: we can usually count on the parties' lawyers to keep the judges more-or-less educated).
To start, I think you're somehow missing the fact that I am a big big supporter of the separation of church and state. I just don't think that the historical argument for it is very compelling. And I think the historical argument is beside the point anyway. I don't advance any of the conflicting arguments you suggest I advance.
And, again, there is no serious debate among constitutional scholars about what the establishment clause meant when it was written: it meant only that the federal government could not create a national church to replace state churches. Basically it was a federalism provision that ensured that states remained free to choose their own local official churches. Again: I am on your side. It would be more convenient for us if this were not true. But it is. So no, not all the evidence points to the consensus you suggest among the framers. The evidence actually is that the practice was widespread at the time the constitution was drafted and the framers did not understand the constitution to do anything to stop it. It may be that Jefferson would have preferred a more total separation, but even if we knew that to be true (I believe that it is, but the evidence is not unequivocal), it wouldn't decide anything because you also need to think about what the other authors (remember: there were very many) and, even worse, the ratifiers thought it meant.
But, all this notwithstanding, there are plenty of arguments we can make about why, even if the founders didn't enshrine the total separation we are committed to today, they should have. Articulating those arguments will be much more productive and get us farther than bickering over how often Thomas Jefferson went to church.