People are facing a political situation in which global trade has become their enemy. They're not economists. Businessmen aren't economists, either: global labor markets and global trade are good for business, regardless of whether they're good economics.
Global trade, in an economic sense, is a multi-layered beast of unexpected outcomes and outcomes that unexpectedly don't matter. Economics is like that: common sense doesn't work here. Common sense says pulling the lever to the right moves things to the right, but we have a complicated mechanism by which the thing on the other side moves upwards and backwards in an oscillating corkscrew pattern.
I ran a bunch of math against Chinese manufacture of pants and what happens if we make them in the USA and ban Chinese imports entirely. A few important things happen.
Firstly. the import cost of a 40-foot shipping container is under $1,300. With 20,000 pairs of pants, it's like 6.5 cents per pair. The cost of those pants when they land at the American port is $6.12. Using a Chinese labor cost of $3.20/hr, we find a minimum-wage at the factory would require Americans to work at least 1 2/3 as long to afford the pants (regardless of the consumer's wage). With an $18/hr wage plus 18% benefits plus 6.4% payroll taxes, the American worker must work three times as long to purchase pants.
In other words: poverty. Americans become poorer, because they must work longer to afford the same goods. Those above numbers assume goods manufactured to the same quality; to manufacture to a higher standard, the American factories must expend a greater cost, thus pants cost even more. Apples-to-apples: let's stick to "same quality".
The total number of workers required to make all imported pants at 40 hours per work week is 178,000. That's 0.11% of all workers, so we do not suddenly have an enriched consumer base due to "money staying here". To illustrate: accounting for the bottom 90% as the ones who buy these cheap Chinese imports, 99.89% of these purchases would be diminished by 60% at minimum-wage factory wages. Thus you can create 71,200 jobs this way.
60% of the trucking, stocking, and retail needed to move these pants domestically goes away due to fewer units moved. If people buy the same number of pants, they can't buy other things with the pants-money, so those things don't get made or sold instead, losing those jobs.
At minimum wage, you might be looking at 58,000 jobs lost, or 10,000-15,000 jobs created in net; however I used low costs for benefits and payroll taxes, so the net creation could be lower. Anything above minimum wage, of course, means you lose more jobs and you create fewer jobs—we hit net-loss before we even reach $10/hr.
So bringing jobs back from China makes us poorer and loses jobs.... right?
Enter Malthusian growth.
Malthus said a bunch of things that turned out to not work. He said population grows in abundance... of food. Later, he admitted he should have accounted for all economic factors that could impact prosperity. Essentially, he argued population grows exponentially, while food production grows linearly, thus we hit food scarcity and stop.
He's right: it's not just food, and he was a short-sighted fool for being so myopic.
When we have a scarcity of employment (high unemployment), people stay in college longer and retire earlier (if they get laid off at 68 and planned to retire at 70, they don't go job-hunting). Conversely, when we have low unemployment, students exit college early to take jobs, and more folks retire at age 72 or 75 instead of 62 1/2. We adjust the tap of immigrant labor--not just administratively, but by the simple fact that job availability is a matter of consumer purchasing, and the lack of demand economy creates a lower demand for workers in general.
So whether you create or lose jobs in the process, you end up right back where you started in 2-3 years--maybe in 6-12 months.
That's what got me: How can you claim your phones are the highest-quality, most-durable devices and also claim that offering a warranty longer than the warranty period of lower-quality devices would be burdensome? Not lifetime, of course--although phones tend to last forever, and just end up slow because the new phone is faster.
In project management, SMEs are a constant source of critical information. Project managers make decisions about scope, about schedule, about the work to be done, about risks, and so forth by asking people who know how to execute the project what it's going to entail. We put that information into the context of planning, scheduling, budgeting, and executing, and let the engineers figure out how to build whatever we're building.
This is why.
"I know a lot about planes" is a hell of a lot different than "I've got a pilot, an engineer, and a maintenance pit crewman on the call. What the hell happened?" One of these will get you a competent resolution to whatever problem with which you're currently faced.
I have no idea. The industry standard is steering wheel touch detection--which is why we keep hearing about people defeating Volvo or Benz systems by taping soda cans to the wheel.
They're saying that Tesla told users a thing has limitations, users didn't listen, and Tesla should have anticipated this and gone through more-rigorous efforts to stop users from ignoring the warnings. They're also suggesting they didn't perform due diligence because an alternative approach would have been better and, like you, I'm confused about where this alternative approach is considered standard or even leading practice in the industry at this time. It's unheard of to me thus-far, which may be an artifact of it being an uncommon topic in the uncommon topic of autonomous vehicles (we don't really discuss autonomous vehicles in detail day in and day out; we mention them now and then with fair frequency).
Tesla likes to disclaim responsibility because the user was misusing the system. That's status quo, and common. Tesla also usually takes action when something happens--even when it's not their fault, strictly-speaking (user hits a 70-pound chunk of iron in the road at 100mph, puncturing battery? Armor the battery against heavy projectile assault)--but it's in their favor to say, "Hey, this wasn't our fault, you fucked up; since you people are obviously going to keep fucking up like this, we'll see what we can do to protect you from your own stupidity." In nice, friendly words, maybe, but that's the message: not their fault, but their responsibility.
I assume the engineers are all excited about this new tech, and somehow aren't predicting the consequences of people's natural tendency to circumvent obstacles. Maybe they're overestimating people and simply not putting in anti-circumvention tech that will ultimately be circumvented anyway, instead of scaling how many people will circumvent any given countermeasure and how likely crashes are in each scenario. Maybe they just don't give a damn. Who knows? I could see this being a surprise to Tesla as much as anyone else--I'd bet money they didn't put anything out there to cause death and destruction on purpose in the first pass.
So like how I worked out a social insurance plan by basically burning the world on paper, rebuilding it, and then finding a way to do it in real life without burning the world on the way there? Social insurances are filled with sacred cows nobody will even suggest touching, much less remove in a thought experiment and then re-create later in that experiment.
The argument is that you can perform to exception, not to standard.
Salvinorin A if we go with this shit, please. Toxicity is unknown because extreme overdoses have so far shown 0 toxicity; injuries from the drug have never happened (unlike MDMA, which will frigging destroy your 5HT system); and, honestly, it runs for about 5-15 minutes and then burns out of your system, versus 15-20 hours on LSD.
Let's be reasonable: Kappa-Opioid Receptor Agonists are well-known as anti-addictives (YES!) and "insight drugs" or whatever; but you don't need a 16-hour high every frigging day. Go on your little spirit walk and then go to bed.
Oh, that's not hard. It's about a trillion dollars cheaper than the current system to get the foundational benefit out; once you add back OASDI and such, it's still a hell of a lot cheaper.
Take the 2016 model, for example. Taxes taken by FICA (OASDI) total $810.20 billion; Federal individual income taxes are $1,546.10 billion; and business income taxes are $299.60 billion. Out of that $2,655.90 billion of total income-based taxes, we spend $1,346.20 at the Federal level on retirement, disability, food security services, unemployment, and housing assistance.
Excluding many poverty-reducing services from the model entirely (see "Restructuring Target"), that's $1,279.70 of spending to restructure. As a percentage of income taxes, it's 48.18%; and then to have WIC (entirely childcare and pregnant women support), TANF (childcare, basic aid, and administrative costs only), and HUD still operate, you need an extra $28.69 billion or about 0.2% income taxes.
So flush all the FICA tax to income--the 6.2% on payrolls comes out of paychecks instead--and then cut 48% out of the combined tax brackets (this slightly-reduces the deficit) and out of the corporate tax rate (35%). Add 0.2% to that to capture the services mentioned above, and also drop in a 15% separate Universal Security funding tax on all income (corporate and individual).
That gives you $2,183 billion moving around. The top tax bracket is now 35.8%; business tax rate is 33.20%; and, in 2016, each adult receives $8,751/year or $729.25/month disbursed as $364.63 twice each month. The net-effect, with the new tax rates minus the benefit, is a reduction in income taxes retained at every level; at the lowest end, the benefit exceeds the tax burden.
The 6.2% FICA tax on payrolls has been removed here. To pay the full benefit--without raising the retirement age, cutting disability eligibility, or reducing cost-of-living adjustments--we need to put a 5.15% FICA tax back on payrolls and pay the difference between this new Universal benefit and the original Retirement, Survivors, and Disability Insurance pensions. So if you get $1,200/month in retirement today, then instead every adult receives $729.25, while you receive an additional $470.75 as your Social Security retirement, netting the same $1,200. By taking 5.30%, we tip the balance some, giving the Trust better cash flow.
The Universal benefit has grown by 8% since 2013 in the model, whereas retirement has grown by 5.10% and OASDI benefits reaching those on the program in total has grown by 6.72%. That means this benefit overtakes OASDI eventually, and so that 5.30% can come down; as well, the OASDI tax funds the Trust and ensures its solvency (as of 2016, Social Security claimed the Trust would be insolvent by 2034).
The new Universal benefit can't become insolvent unless the United States suffers an unrecoverable total economic collapse: the adjusted payout follows the take per adult each year, and that only goes down when the country is economically damaged. This funding structure also survives the 2008 Great Recession as a new recession model, without compromising its ability to sustain low-income households. It also increases proportionally to productivity: it's essentially a chunk of GDP-per-capita, an economic dividend of a sort.
So at this point, you have most Federal welfare services still operating. The means-test for many services faces higher-income, better-means households, and so the benefits required and the associated costs are lower. This constant payment replaces Federal unemployment insurance (and probably SNAP--I want to investigate that further before actually submitting a draft bill, should I get elected, but that requires CBO access and you kind of have to be a Congressman to get that), while the State uninsurance programs continue to take their tax and pay their own benefits. I've targeted childcare
My major plan is to build our social insurances on top of a universal social security. This improves the financial position of all households, most-importantly the lowest-income households. When you do the computation for necessary aid, you're starting from a higher annual income, so the amount of necessary aid is smaller.
Can these apps provide deal tracking and budgeting from cash for lower-income households without EBT services?
The correct answer is to use UAF or U2F. The U2F keys all have UAF capability.
You walk into a bank, present your ID (driver's license, etc.), and they can see it's you. Online, you tell them what car you had in 1999, where you lived 6 years ago, and which bank holds a current loan. One of these is stronger than the other.
So what you do, you walk into a bank, present your ID, and then you take a brand-new, personally-owned, $20 security key to their terminal. You plug it in or wave it at the NFC, and it sends separate keys to Equifax, TransUnion, etc. Done. You now have an established trust with the credit reporting agency.
When you open a new credit account, the bank checks the CRA for your history. If you have a hold on your credit, the CRA tells them no loans. Same deal: when the bank talks to the CRA, the CRA sends a challenge; you use your security key to digitally sign the response, proving your physical possession of the correct key, thus your identity. Generally this is RSA or elliptical curve; and the devices are non-cloneable.
Lost your key? Call your bank and tell them. They'll put your trusts on hold with the CRA. You show up with ID and your key to re-establish trust. In the mean time, it's impossible to open a new loan account.
People can't hack the CRA or the bank and steal your identity to open new loans in your name if there's no shared secret to steal. You have the only secret; you can prove you have that secret; and you can prove it without revealing the secret. An adversary can only steal the secret by stealing a physical device; and they use secure hardware that resists physical and logical attack, so cloning is destructive at best, and destructive attacks tend to completely-fail on these devices.
That's the solution. It's the cheapest, most-effective, simplest option available today.
Hmm, seems you're right. They have a lot of statements about OpenPGP, but apparently it's a separate applet on the key; the Yubikey implements a suite of OpenPGP-standard algorithms for U2F, which seems to be an implementation detail. Thanks for making me take a second look!
WEP was deprecated because RC4 was theoretically-unsafe at one time (it's currently speculated some state agencies might actually have a full break), largely because a bad implementation can make RC4 breakable. ECDSA isn't weak so much as it's unsafe compared to what's currently known about 25519. Some of us like the low-effort, high-paranoia route; there are conspiracy theorists who all want to take the high-effort, high-paranoia route, but that's impractical.
I've seen those kinds of places get hacked. It just happens almost-never. "Almost" means you still failed to stop it; it's an improvement, but it's not enough.
I would not install an explosive into the base of my skull and then place the trigger to detonate it on your network. Maybe it's nigh-on-unhackable, but it's not impossible. Your security means nothing to the attacker who walks right in the front door. In your case, maybe it takes someone who can actually understand your security--give me time to sit around and be a good boy and I'll get to know the details of your countermeasures--but it can be done. Your work is forever-unfinished.
We give Equifax and TransUnion the trigger to create accounts in our name. The banks ask them about credit, and use them to validate our identities. Why would you do that? They shouldn't possess any secret information allowing an attacker to impersonate you.
It won't stop businesses from being hacked and losing your information. The OP wants security standards so that your secret information is nice and safe--well that's not happening. Your secrets are going to leak, and there's nothing you can do about it; you can only make it happen less-often.
We need a system which doesn't rely on secrets known by more than one party. The party to whom we are proving ourselves needs to not know secrets. I should not have to identify by a shared secret; the secret is mine, and I can prove I know it without letting you know it.
That's because U2F is a one-way authentication standard. It authenticates you to the service.
U2F is a wrapper around OpenPGP in one direction. It could have easily been a wrapper around OpenPGP in its entire, but it's not.
Yubi's more expensive/featureful devices add a built-in OpenPGP Smartcard [wikipedia.org] -- which is an entirely different standard.
They don't provide an open standard to implement OpenPGP to these devices through the browser, across generic carriers (USB, NFC, BTLE, etc.), and so forth. They don't say, "When you build a device to do this, build it to talk this way".
U2F and UAF have caught on pretty well across several services. They've got browser integration in Chrome. We didn't get integration in e-mail clients, phone SMS apps, and the like to encrypt and thus make secret your conversations in a nice, user-friendly manner--which would have happened if it were in the standard.
That irritates me. The damned things are capable, the protocol specification is capable, and they didn't take advantage of the opportunity.
How do you initially verify someone is who they say they are to assign them a hardware device?
You don't. They assign a credential to identify themselves. If someone else assigns it to them, then you've already lost control.
Who holds the database of keys to know that public key X ties to individual X?
The entity with which the trust is established--that is, Equifax has their own, TransUnion has their own, and so forth. A trust is a very personal relationship between two single entities, such as a CRA and an individual; Equifax shouldn't trust your identity just because TransUnion says so.
Who generates the secret key? How is it loaded onto the device?
It's generated on the device itself.
I walk into a bank. I have a Maryland-issued ID card. It's multi-layer polycarbonate with a laser-etched multi-image, and currently pretty difficult to duplicate without multi-million dollar equipment. That's a bit different than filling out an online form, punching in my Social Security number, and having a loan opened--which is how I open all of my loans; I don't physically present at a bank to get credit.
When I walk into a bank, I bring my own key. I present my hard ID--physical forms of identification, State-issued, passports, the like. The bank has now identified me. Then I wave my key over the NFC terminal, push the button that blinks on it, and it generates a new key pair and sends the public key down to Equifax and TransUnion as my new trust relationship with them.
This is a much smaller attack surface than "I know what car I drove in 1999, where my parents lived (I lived with them), and roughly how much income I had." It's a smaller attack surface than a stolen credit card number or driver's license number. Only the person in physical possession of the hardware device can authenticate as me without physically presenting real (read: stronger than verbal attestation via pop quiz) forms of identification face-to-face.
Millions of hackers can't all simultaneously have access to my trust relationship; only one, and it's a physical object.
Ah yes, easy denial of service. Hello, Shit Ass Bank? This is bluefoxlucid, I've lost my key. I have a new one, and I'm coming down next week to prove it. Until then, please freeze everything. Kthx.
I can verbally-attest that I've lost my card over the phone to my bank. They can quiz me on something like my driver's ID or a soft credit check if they want--you know, the things that, if you answer them today, will get you a $50,000 loan in my name. Today, to close someone's credit card account, you call their bank with their last name, address, and birth date.
As well, it's not as big a deal as you make it out. Hard credit checks are used to open accounts; I don't need hard credit checks to work at all unless I'm applying for a loan at that given moment--which is essentially what a hardware-driven trust does.
You keep relying on that "secure hardware token". There is no such thing. "Secure hardware tokens" are simply computers that run a deterministic algorithm based on a secret key and time.
Actually, Universal Authentication Framework and Universal Second-Factor use OpenPGP to sign a challenge message originating from the provider--that is: TransUnion or Equifax send a packet (JSON crap) to your bank, who forward it to your device, which then signs it with an RSA or elliptical curve private key and sends it back. Then TransUnion or Equifax verify that the content is what they expect, and verify your signature based on your established trust.
What happens when someone steals your device? What happens when someone X-Rays your device or dumps it in liquid nitrogen or otherwise takes a really close look to extract your key or Oprah's key or Bill Gates's key?
No regulation would stop this. Computers are enormous and complex; either Equifax writes in-house software or hires out for someone to write their software; and credit reporting agencies are dealing with a unique business situation requiring some kind of unique front-end to their clients. Even Windows, Linux, Oracle, Adobe, and Chrome have security bugs.
Regulation can't prevent them from putting forth all due diligence and still failing. Equifax was founded in 1899 and has been the front-line CRA for decades; they got the tech first, they got the Internet services first, they got the Web sites first, and now they got hacked first. It's been a long time coming and they've gotten hacked once. You can't stop that.
You want security against identity theft? Here it is: hardware identification. U2F devices--I hate them, rant in a minute--can identify a user without relinquishing a key. You want to know I'm who I say I am? Then I register with Equifax, I give them an identifying key, I authorize your credit check with my key. You can't hack that. It's unhackable, or else somebody has figured out how to break encryption that should not be breakable yet--in which case nothing is safe.
I would not be above passing legislation specifying that a person's credit history cannot be impacted by non-challenge-response, user-presence-based authentication in line with modern standards. That is: you have to have something that can be handled entirely in the open and still not allow impersonation, such as RSA or Ed25519 challenge-response exchange with a secure hardware device. These devices cost all of $20 at the lowest end.
If the banks want to go ahead and verify your ID by other means, that's fine; and when you have presented your case in dispute and filed for small bankruptcy, we bail you out of only those unauthenticated accounts, and don't mark it on your credit history, at all. They can validate your identity later and confirm those accounts only with your informed consent.
Lost your key? Call your bank; all banks are required to file a Lost Key hold for anyone with a credit account with them, which freezes all your credit. You have to show up to a bank, present valid ID (e.g. a real Driver's ID), and then prove you still have your key or provide a new key to re-establish a trust relationship between you and the CRA. No verbal verification; you physically come here and show me your ID, or you're full of shit and have a print-out of stolen Social Security numbers at your desk.
The states or the SSA could supply similar attestation, with those smart chips (they're actually miniature computers, in full) embedded into multi-layer polycarbonate Driver's IDs and Social Security cards functioning as U2F devices with a trust relationship to the Government agency. These cards are tamper-proof: your photograph is laser-etched into a mult-image across multiple polycarbonate layers. You're not going to clone someone's Driver's ID with a non-readable private key inside, not without stealing the original Driver's ID. If your state supplies this, you can easily attest to your bank that you are in fact holding a real Driver's ID, and they can verify who you are, and you can use your own personal security key device to set up a trust relationship to the CRA and not to the bank (again: the CRA is authenticating you; it's working on your behalf, not on the behalf of the bank).
As for why I hate U2F devices? Yubico built them right. They use secure hardware--specialized, physically-unhackable without some serious high-end equipment, and potentially impossible to get into without destroying it unless you can remove ceramic in atomic layers--and they accept a challenge, then issue a response. You have a parent key, which the device uses to create child keys, and then sends the certificate (public key) to whoever wants it. No exposure of the identity credential: you can only identify t
If I physically steal your phone, an unlocked bootloader lets me replace your firmware with a custom, insecure firmware that bypasses your lock screen and everything.
If you lock your bootloader, I can use an exploit to hack into your phone and take control.
If you upgrade your phone's official OS image, I can load an earlier version of the OS image and then hack into it anyway.
This anti-rollback mechanism stops that last one. Remember: A brick costs $0.89 at Home Depot. I can probably get most people's phones out of their possessions. Prostitutes have been able to pull it off while getting paid by the person they're robbing.
Maybe because nobody lied to them about not being able to install custom ROMs?
The frigging summary is like, "It will prevent you from installing custom firmware by checking the roll-back index of official, signed firmware and refusing to boot official, signed firmware with a lower roll-back index". That doesn't say it will do anything special for unofficial firmware.
IoT is getting a lot of bad publicity for being an enormous security nightmare. It needs a standard. Not another standard so we have 14 standards; it needs a standard that people follow. As for regulations... Congress should stop at accountability for reasonable security measures; legislating technology creates inflexibility.
I've left mine stillborn, though. I wanted IoT devices to have a near-process set-up (i.e. you have to put the devices together, tell them they're setting up, and they open a window to communicate with one device) to exchange keys between an IoT hub and either an IoT device or client. Yes, I said either: your IoT device does not talk to clients because I don't want it managing its own security.
The whole purpose is to have the IoT device access-controlled by the IoT hub, listening to no other connections. Today, you plug an IoT device in and you can hit Telnet, a Web server, the like. The devices find each other, network together, and talk to a service in the cloud. I don't want them accepting any connections; instead, you connect to the hub, and it proxies the connection.
The IoT hub would use the small negotiation window (activated by a hardware button) to establish a credential--it and the client exchange public keys either internally-generated, from U2F (a Yubikey), or some other mechanism. They trust each other by the identity of that key. When a device--your phone, computer (U2F), etc.--connects to the IoT hub outside the negotiation window, the IoT hub checks for certificate validity. That means the only code run on outside, unauthenticated connections is the kernel's network stack, the Web server's connection handling, and the TLS library's certificate validation. If you don't have a first-factor U2F trust established with anything, then it flatly rejects any U2F authentication; otherwise it also runs through some U2F code, and validates the certificate through the same TLS library code.
Until you're authenticated in that way--which is user-transparent--the attack surface is tiny. It's possible to have a miniature Web server handle these new connections and then sendmsg() them to nginx, handing off a completed TCP connection with a fully-authenticated client TLS certificate; you'd have to write the module to transfer the relevant connection state information (session key, etc.) to nginx, but POSIX does allow you to give an established TCP connection to another process.
Now your devices are secure.
The other part is to run services inside Docker containers. NestCam should be able to run its service on an IoT server, which connects to the IoT hub. The IoT hub can allow communication between NestCam and the NestCam local service. That can communicate with a storage back-end (FreeNAS, SMB, FTP, whatever). Further, when you pair your phone (e.g. via Bluetooth) to the IoT hub and authenticate the Nest app, the Nest app would be able to retrieve the IoT Hub's IPv6 address, thus becoming capable of accessing your Nest cameras from anywhere in the world--through a TLS-authenticated, encrypted connection, directly to your house, passing through the IoT Hub, using only the local service on your IoT Server.
You don't even need a certificate authority. You physically walked up to a device in your house, pushed a button, paired with it over Bluetooth, and carried out a key exchange. You have a direct trust.
Sadly, I don't have the patience or depth of knowledge to produce a full specification or reference implementation.
Slashdot Mirror
People are facing a political situation in which global trade has become their enemy. They're not economists. Businessmen aren't economists, either: global labor markets and global trade are good for business, regardless of whether they're good economics.
Global trade, in an economic sense, is a multi-layered beast of unexpected outcomes and outcomes that unexpectedly don't matter. Economics is like that: common sense doesn't work here. Common sense says pulling the lever to the right moves things to the right, but we have a complicated mechanism by which the thing on the other side moves upwards and backwards in an oscillating corkscrew pattern.
I ran a bunch of math against Chinese manufacture of pants and what happens if we make them in the USA and ban Chinese imports entirely. A few important things happen.
Firstly. the import cost of a 40-foot shipping container is under $1,300. With 20,000 pairs of pants, it's like 6.5 cents per pair. The cost of those pants when they land at the American port is $6.12. Using a Chinese labor cost of $3.20/hr, we find a minimum-wage at the factory would require Americans to work at least 1 2/3 as long to afford the pants (regardless of the consumer's wage). With an $18/hr wage plus 18% benefits plus 6.4% payroll taxes, the American worker must work three times as long to purchase pants.
In other words: poverty. Americans become poorer, because they must work longer to afford the same goods. Those above numbers assume goods manufactured to the same quality; to manufacture to a higher standard, the American factories must expend a greater cost, thus pants cost even more. Apples-to-apples: let's stick to "same quality".
The total number of workers required to make all imported pants at 40 hours per work week is 178,000. That's 0.11% of all workers, so we do not suddenly have an enriched consumer base due to "money staying here". To illustrate: accounting for the bottom 90% as the ones who buy these cheap Chinese imports, 99.89% of these purchases would be diminished by 60% at minimum-wage factory wages. Thus you can create 71,200 jobs this way.
60% of the trucking, stocking, and retail needed to move these pants domestically goes away due to fewer units moved. If people buy the same number of pants, they can't buy other things with the pants-money, so those things don't get made or sold instead, losing those jobs.
At minimum wage, you might be looking at 58,000 jobs lost, or 10,000-15,000 jobs created in net; however I used low costs for benefits and payroll taxes, so the net creation could be lower. Anything above minimum wage, of course, means you lose more jobs and you create fewer jobs—we hit net-loss before we even reach $10/hr.
So bringing jobs back from China makes us poorer and loses jobs. ... right?
Enter Malthusian growth.
Malthus said a bunch of things that turned out to not work. He said population grows in abundance... of food. Later, he admitted he should have accounted for all economic factors that could impact prosperity. Essentially, he argued population grows exponentially, while food production grows linearly, thus we hit food scarcity and stop.
He's right: it's not just food, and he was a short-sighted fool for being so myopic.
When we have a scarcity of employment (high unemployment), people stay in college longer and retire earlier (if they get laid off at 68 and planned to retire at 70, they don't go job-hunting). Conversely, when we have low unemployment, students exit college early to take jobs, and more folks retire at age 72 or 75 instead of 62 1/2. We adjust the tap of immigrant labor--not just administratively, but by the simple fact that job availability is a matter of consumer purchasing, and the lack of demand economy creates a lower demand for workers in general.
So whether you create or lose jobs in the process, you end up right back where you started in 2-3 years--maybe in 6-12 months.
That's what got me: How can you claim your phones are the highest-quality, most-durable devices and also claim that offering a warranty longer than the warranty period of lower-quality devices would be burdensome? Not lifetime, of course--although phones tend to last forever, and just end up slow because the new phone is faster.
In project management, SMEs are a constant source of critical information. Project managers make decisions about scope, about schedule, about the work to be done, about risks, and so forth by asking people who know how to execute the project what it's going to entail. We put that information into the context of planning, scheduling, budgeting, and executing, and let the engineers figure out how to build whatever we're building.
This is why.
"I know a lot about planes" is a hell of a lot different than "I've got a pilot, an engineer, and a maintenance pit crewman on the call. What the hell happened?" One of these will get you a competent resolution to whatever problem with which you're currently faced.
I have no idea. The industry standard is steering wheel touch detection--which is why we keep hearing about people defeating Volvo or Benz systems by taping soda cans to the wheel.
They're saying that Tesla told users a thing has limitations, users didn't listen, and Tesla should have anticipated this and gone through more-rigorous efforts to stop users from ignoring the warnings. They're also suggesting they didn't perform due diligence because an alternative approach would have been better and, like you, I'm confused about where this alternative approach is considered standard or even leading practice in the industry at this time. It's unheard of to me thus-far, which may be an artifact of it being an uncommon topic in the uncommon topic of autonomous vehicles (we don't really discuss autonomous vehicles in detail day in and day out; we mention them now and then with fair frequency).
Tesla likes to disclaim responsibility because the user was misusing the system. That's status quo, and common. Tesla also usually takes action when something happens--even when it's not their fault, strictly-speaking (user hits a 70-pound chunk of iron in the road at 100mph, puncturing battery? Armor the battery against heavy projectile assault)--but it's in their favor to say, "Hey, this wasn't our fault, you fucked up; since you people are obviously going to keep fucking up like this, we'll see what we can do to protect you from your own stupidity." In nice, friendly words, maybe, but that's the message: not their fault, but their responsibility.
I assume the engineers are all excited about this new tech, and somehow aren't predicting the consequences of people's natural tendency to circumvent obstacles. Maybe they're overestimating people and simply not putting in anti-circumvention tech that will ultimately be circumvented anyway, instead of scaling how many people will circumvent any given countermeasure and how likely crashes are in each scenario. Maybe they just don't give a damn. Who knows? I could see this being a surprise to Tesla as much as anyone else--I'd bet money they didn't put anything out there to cause death and destruction on purpose in the first pass.
Blockchain is a buzzword. Blockchain is not useful.
If you want an electronic method that can't be altered after cast and requires the voter's presence to cast, use a UAF, same as I recommended for credit reporting agencies.
So like how I worked out a social insurance plan by basically burning the world on paper, rebuilding it, and then finding a way to do it in real life without burning the world on the way there? Social insurances are filled with sacred cows nobody will even suggest touching, much less remove in a thought experiment and then re-create later in that experiment.
The argument is that you can perform to exception, not to standard.
Salvinorin A if we go with this shit, please. Toxicity is unknown because extreme overdoses have so far shown 0 toxicity; injuries from the drug have never happened (unlike MDMA, which will frigging destroy your 5HT system); and, honestly, it runs for about 5-15 minutes and then burns out of your system, versus 15-20 hours on LSD.
Let's be reasonable: Kappa-Opioid Receptor Agonists are well-known as anti-addictives (YES!) and "insight drugs" or whatever; but you don't need a 16-hour high every frigging day. Go on your little spirit walk and then go to bed.
Oh, that's not hard. It's about a trillion dollars cheaper than the current system to get the foundational benefit out; once you add back OASDI and such, it's still a hell of a lot cheaper.
Take the 2016 model, for example. Taxes taken by FICA (OASDI) total $810.20 billion; Federal individual income taxes are $1,546.10 billion; and business income taxes are $299.60 billion. Out of that $2,655.90 billion of total income-based taxes, we spend $1,346.20 at the Federal level on retirement, disability, food security services, unemployment, and housing assistance.
Excluding many poverty-reducing services from the model entirely (see "Restructuring Target"), that's $1,279.70 of spending to restructure. As a percentage of income taxes, it's 48.18%; and then to have WIC (entirely childcare and pregnant women support), TANF (childcare, basic aid, and administrative costs only), and HUD still operate, you need an extra $28.69 billion or about 0.2% income taxes.
So flush all the FICA tax to income--the 6.2% on payrolls comes out of paychecks instead--and then cut 48% out of the combined tax brackets (this slightly-reduces the deficit) and out of the corporate tax rate (35%). Add 0.2% to that to capture the services mentioned above, and also drop in a 15% separate Universal Security funding tax on all income (corporate and individual).
That gives you $2,183 billion moving around. The top tax bracket is now 35.8%; business tax rate is 33.20%; and, in 2016, each adult receives $8,751/year or $729.25/month disbursed as $364.63 twice each month. The net-effect, with the new tax rates minus the benefit, is a reduction in income taxes retained at every level; at the lowest end, the benefit exceeds the tax burden.
The 6.2% FICA tax on payrolls has been removed here. To pay the full benefit--without raising the retirement age, cutting disability eligibility, or reducing cost-of-living adjustments--we need to put a 5.15% FICA tax back on payrolls and pay the difference between this new Universal benefit and the original Retirement, Survivors, and Disability Insurance pensions. So if you get $1,200/month in retirement today, then instead every adult receives $729.25, while you receive an additional $470.75 as your Social Security retirement, netting the same $1,200. By taking 5.30%, we tip the balance some, giving the Trust better cash flow.
The Universal benefit has grown by 8% since 2013 in the model, whereas retirement has grown by 5.10% and OASDI benefits reaching those on the program in total has grown by 6.72%. That means this benefit overtakes OASDI eventually, and so that 5.30% can come down; as well, the OASDI tax funds the Trust and ensures its solvency (as of 2016, Social Security claimed the Trust would be insolvent by 2034).
The new Universal benefit can't become insolvent unless the United States suffers an unrecoverable total economic collapse: the adjusted payout follows the take per adult each year, and that only goes down when the country is economically damaged. This funding structure also survives the 2008 Great Recession as a new recession model, without compromising its ability to sustain low-income households. It also increases proportionally to productivity: it's essentially a chunk of GDP-per-capita, an economic dividend of a sort.
So at this point, you have most Federal welfare services still operating. The means-test for many services faces higher-income, better-means households, and so the benefits required and the associated costs are lower. This constant payment replaces Federal unemployment insurance (and probably SNAP--I want to investigate that further before actually submitting a draft bill, should I get elected, but that requires CBO access and you kind of have to be a Congressman to get that), while the State uninsurance programs continue to take their tax and pay their own benefits. I've targeted childcare
My major plan is to build our social insurances on top of a universal social security. This improves the financial position of all households, most-importantly the lowest-income households. When you do the computation for necessary aid, you're starting from a higher annual income, so the amount of necessary aid is smaller.
Can these apps provide deal tracking and budgeting from cash for lower-income households without EBT services?
The correct answer is to use UAF or U2F. The U2F keys all have UAF capability.
You walk into a bank, present your ID (driver's license, etc.), and they can see it's you. Online, you tell them what car you had in 1999, where you lived 6 years ago, and which bank holds a current loan. One of these is stronger than the other.
So what you do, you walk into a bank, present your ID, and then you take a brand-new, personally-owned, $20 security key to their terminal. You plug it in or wave it at the NFC, and it sends separate keys to Equifax, TransUnion, etc. Done. You now have an established trust with the credit reporting agency.
When you open a new credit account, the bank checks the CRA for your history. If you have a hold on your credit, the CRA tells them no loans. Same deal: when the bank talks to the CRA, the CRA sends a challenge; you use your security key to digitally sign the response, proving your physical possession of the correct key, thus your identity. Generally this is RSA or elliptical curve; and the devices are non-cloneable.
Lost your key? Call your bank and tell them. They'll put your trusts on hold with the CRA. You show up with ID and your key to re-establish trust. In the mean time, it's impossible to open a new loan account.
People can't hack the CRA or the bank and steal your identity to open new loans in your name if there's no shared secret to steal. You have the only secret; you can prove you have that secret; and you can prove it without revealing the secret. An adversary can only steal the secret by stealing a physical device; and they use secure hardware that resists physical and logical attack, so cloning is destructive at best, and destructive attacks tend to completely-fail on these devices.
That's the solution. It's the cheapest, most-effective, simplest option available today.
Hmm, seems you're right. They have a lot of statements about OpenPGP, but apparently it's a separate applet on the key; the Yubikey implements a suite of OpenPGP-standard algorithms for U2F, which seems to be an implementation detail. Thanks for making me take a second look!
WEP was deprecated because RC4 was theoretically-unsafe at one time (it's currently speculated some state agencies might actually have a full break), largely because a bad implementation can make RC4 breakable. ECDSA isn't weak so much as it's unsafe compared to what's currently known about 25519. Some of us like the low-effort, high-paranoia route; there are conspiracy theorists who all want to take the high-effort, high-paranoia route, but that's impractical.
I've seen those kinds of places get hacked. It just happens almost-never. "Almost" means you still failed to stop it; it's an improvement, but it's not enough.
I would not install an explosive into the base of my skull and then place the trigger to detonate it on your network. Maybe it's nigh-on-unhackable, but it's not impossible. Your security means nothing to the attacker who walks right in the front door. In your case, maybe it takes someone who can actually understand your security--give me time to sit around and be a good boy and I'll get to know the details of your countermeasures--but it can be done. Your work is forever-unfinished.
We give Equifax and TransUnion the trigger to create accounts in our name. The banks ask them about credit, and use them to validate our identities. Why would you do that? They shouldn't possess any secret information allowing an attacker to impersonate you.
It won't stop businesses from being hacked and losing your information. The OP wants security standards so that your secret information is nice and safe--well that's not happening. Your secrets are going to leak, and there's nothing you can do about it; you can only make it happen less-often.
We need a system which doesn't rely on secrets known by more than one party. The party to whom we are proving ourselves needs to not know secrets. I should not have to identify by a shared secret; the secret is mine, and I can prove I know it without letting you know it.
What weakness in ECDSA?
Let's ask a better expert.
That's because U2F is a one-way authentication standard. It authenticates you to the service.
U2F is a wrapper around OpenPGP in one direction. It could have easily been a wrapper around OpenPGP in its entire, but it's not.
Yubi's more expensive/featureful devices add a built-in OpenPGP Smartcard [wikipedia.org] -- which is an entirely different standard.
They don't provide an open standard to implement OpenPGP to these devices through the browser, across generic carriers (USB, NFC, BTLE, etc.), and so forth. They don't say, "When you build a device to do this, build it to talk this way".
U2F and UAF have caught on pretty well across several services. They've got browser integration in Chrome. We didn't get integration in e-mail clients, phone SMS apps, and the like to encrypt and thus make secret your conversations in a nice, user-friendly manner--which would have happened if it were in the standard.
That irritates me. The damned things are capable, the protocol specification is capable, and they didn't take advantage of the opportunity.
How do you initially verify someone is who they say they are to assign them a hardware device?
You don't. They assign a credential to identify themselves. If someone else assigns it to them, then you've already lost control.
Who holds the database of keys to know that public key X ties to individual X?
The entity with which the trust is established--that is, Equifax has their own, TransUnion has their own, and so forth. A trust is a very personal relationship between two single entities, such as a CRA and an individual; Equifax shouldn't trust your identity just because TransUnion says so.
Who generates the secret key? How is it loaded onto the device?
It's generated on the device itself.
I walk into a bank. I have a Maryland-issued ID card. It's multi-layer polycarbonate with a laser-etched multi-image, and currently pretty difficult to duplicate without multi-million dollar equipment. That's a bit different than filling out an online form, punching in my Social Security number, and having a loan opened--which is how I open all of my loans; I don't physically present at a bank to get credit.
When I walk into a bank, I bring my own key. I present my hard ID--physical forms of identification, State-issued, passports, the like. The bank has now identified me. Then I wave my key over the NFC terminal, push the button that blinks on it, and it generates a new key pair and sends the public key down to Equifax and TransUnion as my new trust relationship with them.
This is a much smaller attack surface than "I know what car I drove in 1999, where my parents lived (I lived with them), and roughly how much income I had." It's a smaller attack surface than a stolen credit card number or driver's license number. Only the person in physical possession of the hardware device can authenticate as me without physically presenting real (read: stronger than verbal attestation via pop quiz) forms of identification face-to-face.
Millions of hackers can't all simultaneously have access to my trust relationship; only one, and it's a physical object.
Ah yes, easy denial of service. Hello, Shit Ass Bank? This is bluefoxlucid, I've lost my key. I have a new one, and I'm coming down next week to prove it. Until then, please freeze everything. Kthx.
I can verbally-attest that I've lost my card over the phone to my bank. They can quiz me on something like my driver's ID or a soft credit check if they want--you know, the things that, if you answer them today, will get you a $50,000 loan in my name. Today, to close someone's credit card account, you call their bank with their last name, address, and birth date.
As well, it's not as big a deal as you make it out. Hard credit checks are used to open accounts; I don't need hard credit checks to work at all unless I'm applying for a loan at that given moment--which is essentially what a hardware-driven trust does.
You keep relying on that "secure hardware token". There is no such thing. "Secure hardware tokens" are simply computers that run a deterministic algorithm based on a secret key and time.
Actually, Universal Authentication Framework and Universal Second-Factor use OpenPGP to sign a challenge message originating from the provider--that is: TransUnion or Equifax send a packet (JSON crap) to your bank, who forward it to your device, which then signs it with an RSA or elliptical curve private key and sends it back. Then TransUnion or Equifax verify that the content is what they expect, and verify your signature based on your established trust.
What happens when someone steals your device? What happens when someone X-Rays your device or dumps it in liquid nitrogen or otherwise takes a really close look to extract your key or Oprah's key or Bill Gates's key?
Current devices are EAL
No regulation would stop this. Computers are enormous and complex; either Equifax writes in-house software or hires out for someone to write their software; and credit reporting agencies are dealing with a unique business situation requiring some kind of unique front-end to their clients. Even Windows, Linux, Oracle, Adobe, and Chrome have security bugs.
Regulation can't prevent them from putting forth all due diligence and still failing. Equifax was founded in 1899 and has been the front-line CRA for decades; they got the tech first, they got the Internet services first, they got the Web sites first, and now they got hacked first. It's been a long time coming and they've gotten hacked once. You can't stop that.
You want security against identity theft? Here it is: hardware identification. U2F devices--I hate them, rant in a minute--can identify a user without relinquishing a key. You want to know I'm who I say I am? Then I register with Equifax, I give them an identifying key, I authorize your credit check with my key. You can't hack that. It's unhackable, or else somebody has figured out how to break encryption that should not be breakable yet--in which case nothing is safe.
I would not be above passing legislation specifying that a person's credit history cannot be impacted by non-challenge-response, user-presence-based authentication in line with modern standards. That is: you have to have something that can be handled entirely in the open and still not allow impersonation, such as RSA or Ed25519 challenge-response exchange with a secure hardware device. These devices cost all of $20 at the lowest end.
If the banks want to go ahead and verify your ID by other means, that's fine; and when you have presented your case in dispute and filed for small bankruptcy, we bail you out of only those unauthenticated accounts, and don't mark it on your credit history, at all. They can validate your identity later and confirm those accounts only with your informed consent.
Lost your key? Call your bank; all banks are required to file a Lost Key hold for anyone with a credit account with them, which freezes all your credit. You have to show up to a bank, present valid ID (e.g. a real Driver's ID), and then prove you still have your key or provide a new key to re-establish a trust relationship between you and the CRA. No verbal verification; you physically come here and show me your ID, or you're full of shit and have a print-out of stolen Social Security numbers at your desk.
The states or the SSA could supply similar attestation, with those smart chips (they're actually miniature computers, in full) embedded into multi-layer polycarbonate Driver's IDs and Social Security cards functioning as U2F devices with a trust relationship to the Government agency. These cards are tamper-proof: your photograph is laser-etched into a mult-image across multiple polycarbonate layers. You're not going to clone someone's Driver's ID with a non-readable private key inside, not without stealing the original Driver's ID. If your state supplies this, you can easily attest to your bank that you are in fact holding a real Driver's ID, and they can verify who you are, and you can use your own personal security key device to set up a trust relationship to the CRA and not to the bank (again: the CRA is authenticating you; it's working on your behalf, not on the behalf of the bank).
As for why I hate U2F devices? Yubico built them right. They use secure hardware--specialized, physically-unhackable without some serious high-end equipment, and potentially impossible to get into without destroying it unless you can remove ceramic in atomic layers--and they accept a challenge, then issue a response. You have a parent key, which the device uses to create child keys, and then sends the certificate (public key) to whoever wants it. No exposure of the identity credential: you can only identify t
Well, my new Chromebook's uptime is... huh, it browses Drive files just fine.
Revolution Remix boots pretty fast.
If I physically steal your phone, an unlocked bootloader lets me replace your firmware with a custom, insecure firmware that bypasses your lock screen and everything.
If you lock your bootloader, I can use an exploit to hack into your phone and take control.
If you upgrade your phone's official OS image, I can load an earlier version of the OS image and then hack into it anyway.
This anti-rollback mechanism stops that last one. Remember: A brick costs $0.89 at Home Depot. I can probably get most people's phones out of their possessions. Prostitutes have been able to pull it off while getting paid by the person they're robbing.
Maybe because nobody lied to them about not being able to install custom ROMs?
The frigging summary is like, "It will prevent you from installing custom firmware by checking the roll-back index of official, signed firmware and refusing to boot official, signed firmware with a lower roll-back index". That doesn't say it will do anything special for unofficial firmware.
There were probably a lot of automated systems in the chain and not a lot of humans, so of course nobody cared.
"Most premium brands" is a subset of "most bottled water".
IoT is getting a lot of bad publicity for being an enormous security nightmare. It needs a standard. Not another standard so we have 14 standards; it needs a standard that people follow. As for regulations... Congress should stop at accountability for reasonable security measures; legislating technology creates inflexibility.
I've left mine stillborn, though. I wanted IoT devices to have a near-process set-up (i.e. you have to put the devices together, tell them they're setting up, and they open a window to communicate with one device) to exchange keys between an IoT hub and either an IoT device or client. Yes, I said either: your IoT device does not talk to clients because I don't want it managing its own security.
The whole purpose is to have the IoT device access-controlled by the IoT hub, listening to no other connections. Today, you plug an IoT device in and you can hit Telnet, a Web server, the like. The devices find each other, network together, and talk to a service in the cloud. I don't want them accepting any connections; instead, you connect to the hub, and it proxies the connection.
The IoT hub would use the small negotiation window (activated by a hardware button) to establish a credential--it and the client exchange public keys either internally-generated, from U2F (a Yubikey), or some other mechanism. They trust each other by the identity of that key. When a device--your phone, computer (U2F), etc.--connects to the IoT hub outside the negotiation window, the IoT hub checks for certificate validity. That means the only code run on outside, unauthenticated connections is the kernel's network stack, the Web server's connection handling, and the TLS library's certificate validation. If you don't have a first-factor U2F trust established with anything, then it flatly rejects any U2F authentication; otherwise it also runs through some U2F code, and validates the certificate through the same TLS library code.
Until you're authenticated in that way--which is user-transparent--the attack surface is tiny. It's possible to have a miniature Web server handle these new connections and then sendmsg() them to nginx, handing off a completed TCP connection with a fully-authenticated client TLS certificate; you'd have to write the module to transfer the relevant connection state information (session key, etc.) to nginx, but POSIX does allow you to give an established TCP connection to another process.
Now your devices are secure.
The other part is to run services inside Docker containers. NestCam should be able to run its service on an IoT server, which connects to the IoT hub. The IoT hub can allow communication between NestCam and the NestCam local service. That can communicate with a storage back-end (FreeNAS, SMB, FTP, whatever). Further, when you pair your phone (e.g. via Bluetooth) to the IoT hub and authenticate the Nest app, the Nest app would be able to retrieve the IoT Hub's IPv6 address, thus becoming capable of accessing your Nest cameras from anywhere in the world--through a TLS-authenticated, encrypted connection, directly to your house, passing through the IoT Hub, using only the local service on your IoT Server.
You don't even need a certificate authority. You physically walked up to a device in your house, pushed a button, paired with it over Bluetooth, and carried out a key exchange. You have a direct trust.
Sadly, I don't have the patience or depth of knowledge to produce a full specification or reference implementation.
"They say a future technology will make them more-competitive but aren't using cold fusion RIGHT NOW!"
Not only that, but imagine the economic consequences when the states finally do get their shit together.