I said that the constitution does not make corporations responsible for the rights of citizens, so it is via the standard lawmaking power ('general welfare', anyone?) that Congress creates the rules to prosecute them for offenses against the rights of citizens.
It is via that same process that Congress can immunize them from prosecution.
Where in the constitution, however, are corporations responsible for the rights of citizens? They are not.
As a result, Congress can immunize them from doing so because it is Congress that created the laws to punish them in the first place; if those laws to punish them were unconstitutional, so be it, but it renders unnecessary the need to immunize them.
You misunderstand me; the version of the first amendment in Oregon's constitution is no more 'strict' in real sense, and it is no more enforceable in its wording.
The real enforcement of these clauses is by the electorate- what the society supports, the society will make law.
Court documents are publically accessible, yes. There are a handful of exceptions (they can be sealed by judicial order, although it is rare) and accessing the dead-tree versions is simply more time-consuming than accessing the online documents, but they're still there.
In many cases, it's also possible to simply call or fax the court office and ask for the information to be sent to you, so you don't even need to poke through the information yourself.
That said, I don't think it's either possible or reasonable to change the fact that all court documents are publically accessible. They're that way for a reason- to ensure transparency in the judicial process and to ensure faith in that process. 'secret evidence' is very much not something the court system likes, although it is grudgingly accepted in national security matters (and even that, to some degree, might be changing with the new proposals to allow national security evidence to be visible to people with the proper level of security clearance).
Sure, but then Ebay would have to pay that $20 million.
Which, in essence, values the company.
There are other ways to do it; you could allow the company the right to buy back the shares at a certain price, for example, regardless of other offers, if the shares were for sale.
While you may have said essentially the same thing as I did, I think you misinterpreted my reason for saying it.
Civil copyright infringement, by necessity, can only provide for equitable and monetary relief; that is, the court can only order that the infringer stop or pay fines (or both).
However, that said, in many ways, civil copyright infringement can be far more damaging than mere theft. Theft of a CD is a fairly minimal occurrence which perhaps costs the store in direct costs ten dollars; copyright infringement of a massive scale (like the massive DVD pirating efforts and efforts to pirate Microsoft Windows in the third world) is a much larger operation with much higher associated costs. It is fairly reasonable, therefore, that there would be more significant punishments added onto it.
Essentially, copyright infringement covers a much, much wider spectrum of illegality and damages done than theft under $5000. That is the reason for the quantum of damages being set the way it is.
Excellent, so you suggest that jailtime is appropriate for file-sharers? Or perhaps that shoplifting should be punishable by statutory damages of $150,000 per act?
The thing is, shoplifting and copyright infringement are very different- copyright infringement isn't a crime, to start with. The punishments should be different, and the punishments for copyright infringement can be only monetary and equitable relief.
There are a variety of Windows versions that run on MIPS operating systems, including Windows NT, Windows CE, and their variants.
Also, I do not know what the Windows CE licensing costs are, but CE starts at $15 per seat and only goes down, especially if you buy in significant quantity (like any Windows licensing).
USB dongle. It doesn't drive anything heavy (although I haven't tested it out with 3D acceleration) but it works alright. I had to use it on the 1280x1024 monitor because it wouldn't drive anything with a higher resolution.
I have to say that I'm far happier more horizontal screen real-estate than vertical real-estate, and I would argue that aside from a relatively small group of coders, the tasks best performed with horizontal widescreen (comparison, reference+writing, etc) are more frequently performed than those which prefer vertical screen realestate (coding, mostly).
Personally I have a 22" 1680x1050, a 15.4" 1280x800, and a 17" 1280x1024, attached to my laptop (in that order from left to right.)
For the limited amount of coding I do, I never have any problems- and being able to see three or four documents across is invaluable to me. I don't have to tilt my head up, just scan my eyes across.
Most of my classes (law classes, by the by) are conducted in a relatively informal, round-table like discussion forum (same with all of my upper-year undergraduate courses, actually).
The professor both lectures and leads the discussion. However, it is a rare occasion when the professor has at the tip of his or her tongue exact citations, dates, names, or quotations. Some of these they may find in their notes; some of them they do not because the topic has shifted to something related but not specifically defined.
In those cases, most professors don't have laptops- it is up to a student or students to quickly look up the material and present it's highlights quickly and concisely to the professor and the rest of the class.
This is, of course, a vital ability I would expect to be taught at any law school, as it is an important litigation skill (amongst being an invaluable life skill).
If students are being disturbing, by all means, eject them from the class.
That is now and always has been the professor's right and responsibility.
I have an acquaintance going to the University of Chicago law school and a friend going to the University of Chicago, and as their impressions had to date been generally positive, I am surprised at such a boneheaded step being taken.
Paper works terribly. My writing is not only slow, but it's almost illegible; organizing notes is a nightmare, as is attaching handouts and sending them to other students if necessary, and have you ever tried to run a search on a piece of paper?
It doesn't work. All my notes are typed, and I use the internet ceaselessly in class- as an immediate, on-the-spot information resource for discussion and in-depth reference on a specific topic.
I would refuse categorically to attend any institution which prohibits me from making use of the two most effective educational tools ever invented, after books.
And that's sort of my point- if we expect that here, someone is not responsible for their computer doing something because they didn't know what was going on, how can you then turn around and say that wireless access you haven't been explicitly granted access to should be legally acceptable to use?
I must say, I am somewhat bemused at your comment, however I will pick out two specific items:
Firstly, civil entities cannot entrap.
Secondly, I think you are misinterpreting 'making available' here, and your examples are in no small part responsible for dramatically confusing the issue. Moreover, you then go on to misinterpret the 'equal protection' doctrine fairly drastically.
I think it was quite obvious from the "down and somewhat sideways" part onward that I was referring only to binding precedent. International legal cases can be used as persuasive precedent, and I've seen people use law textbooks, too. That's not really relevant, though.
No, the problem is not people confusing precedent with law; the problem is people confusing precedent with stare decisis. Stare Decisis is the binding legal principle that lower courts must obey a higher court on holding. Precedent just means that it's happened before and, as a result, can be referenced.
The difference between the two is simple. If the Supreme Court says something and a trial court contradicts that finding, the trial court judgment can be thrown out on that basis. Trial courts can contradict each other all the time. The same happens with appeals courts in a specific circuit; if a trial court contradicts an appeals court of the same circuit, the appeals court as a matter of principle will just throw out the trial court finding (most of the time; there are of course exceptions that prove every rule.)
However, there is something to what you say that other, non-binding precedents can and are referenced; they often are. In fact, it's not really rare that references will be made to courts in other countries to support a specific line of reasoning, especially in matters of international law and so on.
But do not make the mistake of arguing that there is no substantive difference between stare decisis binding precedent and other binding precedent. Circuit courts disagree with each other on basic points of law all the time, regardless of non-binding precedent.
In this case, this is a trial court judgment in a specific circuit. It may be referenced by defendants or plaintiffs in another circuit. But there is no reason to assume it will be accepted by those circuits, or even in other courts in the same circuit at this point. In other words, if it is a victory, it is a hollow one in that respect.
You do realize precedent is only downward (and to some extent sideways).
Precedent set in one circuit does not hold for another circuit and only the Supreme Court can set precedent for all courts, and trial courts can't set precedent at all.
I find it perhaps ironic that this is what you're saying, when I was arguing very similarly in another thread- unsecured WAPs, where I argued that the software's authorization was not necessarily the person's authorization.
It seems like Slashdot (if it could be described as one homogeneous entity, of course) believes that to be sufficient authorization to immunize one from liability but this to not be sufficient authorization to incur it, despite the scenarios being very similar.
If I recall correctly, there are some seven or eight thousand requests for Certiorari from the Supreme Court every year and they grant about 100 or so.
The point is that Congress is also BOUND BY laws. Just because Congress is empowered to create and pass legislation doesn't mean that they are somehow immune from existing laws. Furthermore, their powers are specifically elaborated in The Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land. If they were defending the Constitution, they would have, for instance stopped a renegade executive from stripping them of their exclusive power to declare war. They'd also be holding hearings into why the executive branch is spying on U.S. citizens without probably cause, etc. etc.
Yes, Congress is bound by the laws. However, what you are talking about with regard to the Executive are not issues of constitutional jurisdiction but of political will. Congress has many avenues legally available to it, but it chooses not to exercise them. In this case, you have Congress tactictly agreeing with the executive. If you feel that's inappropriate, there is recourse via the Court.
Perhaps "subverted" would have been a better description? Yes, they're making rulings all the time, but if their rulings are no longer in line with the Constitution, then they are failing to uphold the law and should be removed from their positions . . . but now we're back to Congress again.
In your opinion. Given that the Court is given the JOB of interpreting the constitution, perhaps a rational entity would conclude that if you and they disagree on whether something is in line with the constitution, we might merely give them the benefit of the doubt.
As for whether it is in line to impeach judges for refusing to toe the line of Congress, that's arguable at best, and Marbury v. Madison and Powell v. McCormack both point out that the Court feels it may have jurisdiction in cases where they are not mere 'political issues'. In practice, if I recall correctly, this means that impeaching judges is only really done when they have committed crimes.
Slashdot Mirror
That wasn't my argument.
I said that the constitution does not make corporations responsible for the rights of citizens, so it is via the standard lawmaking power ('general welfare', anyone?) that Congress creates the rules to prosecute them for offenses against the rights of citizens.
It is via that same process that Congress can immunize them from prosecution.
Where in the constitution, however, are corporations responsible for the rights of citizens? They are not.
As a result, Congress can immunize them from doing so because it is Congress that created the laws to punish them in the first place; if those laws to punish them were unconstitutional, so be it, but it renders unnecessary the need to immunize them.
You misunderstand me; the version of the first amendment in Oregon's constitution is no more 'strict' in real sense, and it is no more enforceable in its wording.
The real enforcement of these clauses is by the electorate- what the society supports, the society will make law.
Court documents are publically accessible, yes. There are a handful of exceptions (they can be sealed by judicial order, although it is rare) and accessing the dead-tree versions is simply more time-consuming than accessing the online documents, but they're still there.
In many cases, it's also possible to simply call or fax the court office and ask for the information to be sent to you, so you don't even need to poke through the information yourself.
That said, I don't think it's either possible or reasonable to change the fact that all court documents are publically accessible. They're that way for a reason- to ensure transparency in the judicial process and to ensure faith in that process. 'secret evidence' is very much not something the court system likes, although it is grudgingly accepted in national security matters (and even that, to some degree, might be changing with the new proposals to allow national security evidence to be visible to people with the proper level of security clearance).
There are always going to be exceptions to the First Amendment; this is necessitated by the overly vague and broad manner in which it was written.
Moreover, I don't see why Oregon's constitution would be any different in this respect.
Sure, but then Ebay would have to pay that $20 million.
Which, in essence, values the company.
There are other ways to do it; you could allow the company the right to buy back the shares at a certain price, for example, regardless of other offers, if the shares were for sale.
While you may have said essentially the same thing as I did, I think you misinterpreted my reason for saying it.
Civil copyright infringement, by necessity, can only provide for equitable and monetary relief; that is, the court can only order that the infringer stop or pay fines (or both).
However, that said, in many ways, civil copyright infringement can be far more damaging than mere theft. Theft of a CD is a fairly minimal occurrence which perhaps costs the store in direct costs ten dollars; copyright infringement of a massive scale (like the massive DVD pirating efforts and efforts to pirate Microsoft Windows in the third world) is a much larger operation with much higher associated costs. It is fairly reasonable, therefore, that there would be more significant punishments added onto it.
Essentially, copyright infringement covers a much, much wider spectrum of illegality and damages done than theft under $5000. That is the reason for the quantum of damages being set the way it is.
Excellent, so you suggest that jailtime is appropriate for file-sharers? Or perhaps that shoplifting should be punishable by statutory damages of $150,000 per act?
The thing is, shoplifting and copyright infringement are very different- copyright infringement isn't a crime, to start with. The punishments should be different, and the punishments for copyright infringement can be only monetary and equitable relief.
There are a variety of Windows versions that run on MIPS operating systems, including Windows NT, Windows CE, and their variants. Also, I do not know what the Windows CE licensing costs are, but CE starts at $15 per seat and only goes down, especially if you buy in significant quantity (like any Windows licensing).
USB dongle. It doesn't drive anything heavy (although I haven't tested it out with 3D acceleration) but it works alright. I had to use it on the 1280x1024 monitor because it wouldn't drive anything with a higher resolution.
I have to say that I'm far happier more horizontal screen real-estate than vertical real-estate, and I would argue that aside from a relatively small group of coders, the tasks best performed with horizontal widescreen (comparison, reference+writing, etc) are more frequently performed than those which prefer vertical screen realestate (coding, mostly).
Personally I have a 22" 1680x1050, a 15.4" 1280x800, and a 17" 1280x1024, attached to my laptop (in that order from left to right.)
For the limited amount of coding I do, I never have any problems- and being able to see three or four documents across is invaluable to me. I don't have to tilt my head up, just scan my eyes across.
As it is, this is a law school.
The internet is an invaluable tool. The smartest institutions just kick out people who are disruptive.
The professor both lectures and leads the discussion. However, it is a rare occasion when the professor has at the tip of his or her tongue exact citations, dates, names, or quotations. Some of these they may find in their notes; some of them they do not because the topic has shifted to something related but not specifically defined.
In those cases, most professors don't have laptops- it is up to a student or students to quickly look up the material and present it's highlights quickly and concisely to the professor and the rest of the class.
This is, of course, a vital ability I would expect to be taught at any law school, as it is an important litigation skill (amongst being an invaluable life skill).
If students are being disturbing, by all means, eject them from the class.
That is now and always has been the professor's right and responsibility.
I have an acquaintance going to the University of Chicago law school and a friend going to the University of Chicago, and as their impressions had to date been generally positive, I am surprised at such a boneheaded step being taken.
Paper works terribly. My writing is not only slow, but it's almost illegible; organizing notes is a nightmare, as is attaching handouts and sending them to other students if necessary, and have you ever tried to run a search on a piece of paper? It doesn't work. All my notes are typed, and I use the internet ceaselessly in class- as an immediate, on-the-spot information resource for discussion and in-depth reference on a specific topic. I would refuse categorically to attend any institution which prohibits me from making use of the two most effective educational tools ever invented, after books.
In many places, the representative of the company is required to be its attorney in a Small Claims Court matter.
And that's sort of my point- if we expect that here, someone is not responsible for their computer doing something because they didn't know what was going on, how can you then turn around and say that wireless access you haven't been explicitly granted access to should be legally acceptable to use?
I must say, I am somewhat bemused at your comment, however I will pick out two specific items:
Firstly, civil entities cannot entrap.
Secondly, I think you are misinterpreting 'making available' here, and your examples are in no small part responsible for dramatically confusing the issue. Moreover, you then go on to misinterpret the 'equal protection' doctrine fairly drastically.
Really, that's actually three issues, I suppose.
I think it was quite obvious from the "down and somewhat sideways" part onward that I was referring only to binding precedent. International legal cases can be used as persuasive precedent, and I've seen people use law textbooks, too. That's not really relevant, though.
No, the problem is not people confusing precedent with law; the problem is people confusing precedent with stare decisis. Stare Decisis is the binding legal principle that lower courts must obey a higher court on holding. Precedent just means that it's happened before and, as a result, can be referenced.
The difference between the two is simple. If the Supreme Court says something and a trial court contradicts that finding, the trial court judgment can be thrown out on that basis. Trial courts can contradict each other all the time. The same happens with appeals courts in a specific circuit; if a trial court contradicts an appeals court of the same circuit, the appeals court as a matter of principle will just throw out the trial court finding (most of the time; there are of course exceptions that prove every rule.)
However, there is something to what you say that other, non-binding precedents can and are referenced; they often are. In fact, it's not really rare that references will be made to courts in other countries to support a specific line of reasoning, especially in matters of international law and so on.
But do not make the mistake of arguing that there is no substantive difference between stare decisis binding precedent and other binding precedent. Circuit courts disagree with each other on basic points of law all the time, regardless of non-binding precedent.
In this case, this is a trial court judgment in a specific circuit. It may be referenced by defendants or plaintiffs in another circuit. But there is no reason to assume it will be accepted by those circuits, or even in other courts in the same circuit at this point. In other words, if it is a victory, it is a hollow one in that respect.
Perhaps it can't. But you have to start somewhere.
You do realize precedent is only downward (and to some extent sideways).
Precedent set in one circuit does not hold for another circuit and only the Supreme Court can set precedent for all courts, and trial courts can't set precedent at all.
I find it perhaps ironic that this is what you're saying, when I was arguing very similarly in another thread- unsecured WAPs, where I argued that the software's authorization was not necessarily the person's authorization.
It seems like Slashdot (if it could be described as one homogeneous entity, of course) believes that to be sufficient authorization to immunize one from liability but this to not be sufficient authorization to incur it, despite the scenarios being very similar.
Any ideas why?
If I recall correctly, there are some seven or eight thousand requests for Certiorari from the Supreme Court every year and they grant about 100 or so.
Yes, Congress is bound by the laws. However, what you are talking about with regard to the Executive are not issues of constitutional jurisdiction but of political will. Congress has many avenues legally available to it, but it chooses not to exercise them. In this case, you have Congress tactictly agreeing with the executive. If you feel that's inappropriate, there is recourse via the Court.
In your opinion. Given that the Court is given the JOB of interpreting the constitution, perhaps a rational entity would conclude that if you and they disagree on whether something is in line with the constitution, we might merely give them the benefit of the doubt.
As for whether it is in line to impeach judges for refusing to toe the line of Congress, that's arguable at best, and Marbury v. Madison and Powell v. McCormack both point out that the Court feels it may have jurisdiction in cases where they are not mere 'political issues'. In practice, if I recall correctly, this means that impeaching judges is only really done when they have committed crimes.