I am bemused that you listed 'karate' as a martial art.
To be fair, if Tae Kwon Do (which actually significantly de-emphasizes punching) is not a martial art, than neither is Karate- what you want is something like Krav Maga.
That is not to say, however, that defensive arts that deal mostly with the sword (although I'll argue that fencing is, as you pointed out, mostly a sport) do not have their place. There are plenty of useful things you can do when you know how to effectively wield a sword in combat.
You do know that to post a $5000 bond, you generally don't actually have to post $5000, right?
I believe the cost to post a $500,000 bond for someone with a fairly good credit record and sufficient security was about $1500/yr when last I checked.
I have heard from friends who should know this sort of thing that it's closer to 1 nautical mile/hour of flight time divergence for USN/USAF munitions INS.
(Although it may be different for JDAMs, which are necessarily much shorter ranged than cruise missiles).
Well, the swing vote was almost certainly Kennedy's here. I wouldn't be surprised if, in fact, he put a lot of pressure on the majority to go rather moderate in order to keep the Court from totally fragmenting as they seem to be entirely on the brink of doing.
I appreciate your reply; perhaps you could use block-quotes next time for easy of reading. In any case...
Believe me, it isn't being overlooked - it's the one damper on what would otherwise be celebrated as total victory.
But further analysis of that section reveals an interesting omission. He tacitly agrees (nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt)with existing laws on criminals, the insane, "sensitive locations", and CONCEALED weapons. Note that he does not address laws that ban the carrying of weapons openly. That, combined with his excruciatingly detailed dissection of what the word "bear" means (he used one of Ginsburg's quotes to HELP him), leave a hole big enough to drive a truck through. My own state of Maryland blanket bans the open carry of arms unless one is a police officer, etc., but a reading of this opinion makes that wholly unconstitutional.
I'm not sure you can go that far. Given that he essentially ignored concealed carry, I think it would be fallacious to assume something either way. More likely, he simply decided that it was out of the scope of the current case to analyze (see page 63 of the decision, 66 of the PDF, where he writes that "...since this case represents the Court's first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field..."
Nope - Handguns are banned outright. Long guns - rifles and shotguns - are the ones with the "locked or disassembled" qualification. Both got struck down. The District law already allowed firearms to be assembled or unlocked when self defense is required immanently, so the opinion must be construed to mean that firearms are allowed to be kept assembled and unlocked. "Loaded" is the funny part - many gun locks preclude a firearm being loaded, and many states define "loaded" many different ways. This will probably be one that will vary state to state.
You're right, I meant to write long-arms there. I was specifically referring to the section on pg 58 (61 of the PDF) where they talk about the trigger lock.
There has always been a type of "popularity" test in the Constitution - specifically, the ban against "cruel and unusual" punishment. Both of them have their root definition in what the populace thinks.
That is what I was referring to when I mentioned Kennedy v. Louisiana. However, it runs into the same problems here as it does there; i.e., that it is essentially fluid to whatever the judges interpreting it happen to think of it at the time.
You are interpreting "classes" inconsistently. Heller views "handguns" as a class - not pistols, not revolvers, not muzzleloading. But then you begin to dissect the class of shoulder fired weapons into "submachine guns, assault rifles, and sniper rifles". Submachineguns are a type of handgun, "assault rifles" are a type of long gun, and "sniper rifles" were in common use at that time - only they were just called rifles, which are what current military "sniper rifles" are as well. Hell, many of the rifles in the Revolutionary War have a larger caliber than the.50 caliber rifles sometimes used today as sniper rifles. But there is another item you are overlooking - Scalia took great pains to point out that a right doesn't change because something new is invented.Specifically, from Page 8: "Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only those arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional rights that way. Just as the First Amendment protects modern forms of communications, e.g., Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 849 (1997), and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern forms of search, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27, 35-36 (2001), the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not
This is probably the Catch-22 that the dissent was referring to with regard to the use of the term 'in common use'.
The real problem as I see it is that it is definitely a slippery slope. As armament gets more complicated and more developed, it becomes far more difficult for the citizenry to keep up. Attempting to hold off a Russian invasion (for example) with small arms would be ridiculous in the extreme. And yet, the Russians would have the ability to dramatically escalate their use of force to a level the citizenry simply could not match unless the citizenry also had their own close-air-support aircraft, nuclear bombers, and so on.
In this respect, basically, I see the whole 'militia' argument as being patently useless in the modern day. A militia assembled of average people with small arms would prove entirely useless in resisting an actual military force, which was nowhere near as true as when the document was written. More appropriate, therefore, would be the analysis of the use of small arms for self-defense and the public policy analysis and limitation of where to draw that line based on what weapons can be reasonably used for self-defense and which cannot.
As I said in my original post, nobody expects to go hunting with an automatic grenade launcher.
In the section I cite, they clearly indicate that modern advances may be bearable arms, though again the section you cite modifies this. Bearable arms appear to be something that an average citizen might reasonably have, such as a handgun, shotgun, or hunting rifle, semi-automatic or manually operated, but would not include a specifically military weapon such as a fully automatic machine gun.
I don't disagree. What I'm saying, specifically with regard to classes, (and which I think is unclear as you're the second person who seems to have misconstrued my meaning) is derived from this section on page 56 (59 ofthe PDF) where they say:
But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.
Essentially, I interpret that as saying the fact that a Militia in the 18th century would have no anti-tank guided missiles does not mean that a Militia in the 21st would not; however, those weapons are not protected in the Constitution.
Then, too, as I mentioned, they seem to have created classes which encompass modern weapons (like handguns; handguns in the 18th century are certainly not handguns in the 21st, but both are permitted), but not other, heavier weapons.
In this respect, however, I have to agree with the dissent, where they say that Scalia's argument creates a catch-22- weapons cannot be in common use unless Congress allows them to be, but laws against them cannot be struck down unless they're in common use.
Nowhere did the Court say that there was an unlimited right to bear arms. They specifically said:
"From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose."
Perhaps one of the most likely to be overlooked lines comes at the end of page 57, where Scalia writes: "Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms."
Moreover, he then continues to write: "We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep an carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those 'in common use at the time.' We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of 'dangerous and unusual weapons'."
Further, interestingly, at page 64, Scalia appears to leave open the possibility for attaching summary judgment offenses to the discharge and/or loading of firearms, so long as those penalties are minor.
In any case, the meat and bones of the judgment appears to be this, as stated at pages 58 and 60: The weapons protected by the Second Amendment are those that 'were in common use at the time'. However, this appears to extend to 'classes' of weapons, rather than specific designs (for example, semi-automatic and automatic firearms were not around until the middle of the 19th century, and would therefore certainly not have been 'in common use at the time' and would likely be prohibited), so essentially limits the second amendment to pistols and rifles; I am unsure how this would apply to things like submachine guns, assault rifles, and sniper rifles which likely did not even exist as 'classes' at the time; they don't really say, except to say that "It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service -M-16s and the like- may be banned..." which does imply in fact that assault rifles as a class do not survive the 'in common use' test.
Fairly interestingly is the Court's statement at page 59, that "The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of 'arms' that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful purpose." This interestingly folds back into its prior decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana of earlier this week that 'what the public thinks' is becoming a relevant constitutional test. I'm not sure, and they don't elaborate, on how this would come into conflict with the 'in common use' test. For example, imagine the American public decided that automatic grenade launchers were the best method of hunting- would they then also be allowed? If that is not true, I'm not really sure what Scalia's purpose for pointing out that Americans like handguns happens to be. It seems like he's saying that weapons which are overwhelmingly used for a lawful purpose are to be given more legal defense than those which are not.
At page 61, the court overturns the requirement that 'firearms in the home be rendered and kept inoperable at all times'; as this apparently invalidates their core lawful purpose, it is unconstitutional. However, the Court appears to say, that were a self-defense exception included it would be acceptable. How this would work is sort of confusing. The District's statute says, essentially, that every handgun should be kept unloaded and dissassembled or trigger locked unless the firearm is kept at a place of business or being used for lawful recreational purposes. It is unclear exactly what self-defense exemption the Court would prefer; i.e., whether such an exemption would require that firearms be able to be kept loaded and ready to fi
is a drastic oversimplification of the issue at hand.
A judge's order bears the force of law unless and until it is later overturned by a higher court.
You can't simply ignore it on the grounds that
He also maintains he had long ago proven in Court that the injunction was incorrect in fact and law but that the judge simply ignored the law and evidence.
The proper procedure is to ask for an interlocutory motion to allow the site to remain up, and if you don't get it, you take the site down.
Respect the authority of the Court- or the Court will show you why the government's authority is backed by force of arms.
Right then, why don't we just add up the total page sizes for all the tabs I have open at the moment (23 in one window, 85 in a second). That's 108 tabs. Firefox is using 869,408 KB of RAM.
That means each tab is averaging about 8,050KB.
Now, none of these pages have large files open (No PDFs, no Youtube, etc). They're all basically text websites with a smattering of images, like Slashdot.
This slashdot page, my browser says, is just a hair under 400KB, and a random sampling of pages say that this is relatively standard. Even assuming, however, the average page size is double this at 800KB, Firefox is still using ten times that amount of memory.
Don't try to take quotes out of context to change my meaning.
I don't have to try to take quotes out of context. You aren't using them in context. You're mixing sociopolitics and the law where they shouldn't be mixed- someone's guilt or innocence before the law does not determine either their actions or their ability to integrate into society. Guilt or innocence before the law is purely a legal construct.
As is the difference between "lawful combat" and "murder". As is the difference between "statutory rape" and "consensual sex". I could do this all day, really.
Yes, indeed. Hence my point that one who is guilty of murder may, in fact, have killed no-one. The two are not directly linked concepts, and they're certainly not equivocal.
Yes, and that's my point. An individual guilty of murder in the first degree is beyond help. They have proven they have the capability to purposely deprive another person of their life in a situation where a reasonable person would have have "cooled off" or reconsidered. That is what sets them apart from those guilty of second degree murder, manslaughter, or justified homicide. All four classes of individual have taken a life, but only one has done it in a premeditated manner.
Again, you make the same errors in logic you made originally. A person guilty of first-degree murder has, in fact, proven or shown nothing of the sort. A person guilty of first-degree murder has had it shown beyond a reasonable doubt that in fact they committed a crime which was classified as first-degree murder.
The distinction is obvious, because soldiers also have proven that they have the capability to purposefully and intentionally deprive another person of their life (I have no idea from where you drew the 'in a situation where a reasonable person would have 'cooled off' or reconsidered as that is not a part of the law in any jurisdiction I am aware of). However, as the law defines what constitutes a murder, soldiers are not guilty of first degree murder under the law. (Even, in fact, in situations where a reasonable person would have cooled off or reconsidered.)
Yes, I am guilty of making the assumption that any civilized society recognizes an individual's right to exist. If one is being re-integrated to a society where this is not the case, then my entire argument does fall apart, admittedly.
Civilized society does no such thing. Civilized society realizes an individual's right to exist balanced against numerous other rights, and realizes therefore that sometimes that right can be violated.
In what way did I tie Israel or Jews to an unrelated murder? I used it as an example, nothing more.
Your comment is nothing more than knee-jerk reactionism.
I could, in fact, have made the (likely better) comparison with Werner Von Braun, the Nazis, and rocketry, but I didn't think of it at the time.
Moreover, it is hardly sociopolitically implausible for the Israelis to engage in widespread use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East during times of conflict- they were apparently prepared to do so more than once.
They've taken away someone's most basic right, the right to their own life. Law exists to protect rights, and so there can be no compromise in this regard.
You are changing your statement, then?
The logical analysis of this statement is that there can be no legal compromise on those who take life.
This is especially true because the definition of 'murder in the first degree' is solely a legal construct, and people who are guilty of committing it may or may not actually have taken a life (and there is very little other than legal technicalities that separates murder in the first degree from, say, murder in the second degree).
There is a distinct difference between someone who is guilty of murder in the first degree and someone who takes a life; the two concepts may overlap at various points but they are in no way synonymous.
It appears you are mixing two dissimilar concepts (taking a life and first degree murder) and then comparing them through two different lenses (societal reintegration and the law) and coming up with necessarily muddled and indistinct answers.
Moreover, you seem to be taking the ground that societal integration is a static concept that does not take into account the society one is integrating into.
That was not the logical conclusion of your argument, however.
The logical conclusion of your argument is that anyone who takes life is entirely unable to integrate into society, and you state it yourself, although in many more words.
As that is obviously foolish, why should this reduction of your argument be any less foolish?
I guess this marks the end of ReiserFS. I'm sure no one in the Linux community wants to be associated to that piece of work.
Which, while it might be true, is still stupid.
Imagine if Albert Einstein had accepted the position of leader of Israel after World War II and ordered some massive war crime, like say slaughtering the Arabs with nukes.
Would we just toss aside General Relativity, never to see it again, because we don't want to be associated with the author?
With a good slipstreamed install image, 'repairing' any system is basically as quick as the time it takes to copy the image over onto the hard disk- minutes to an hour at most.
Diagnostics is a hit and miss thing; if you know what the problem is, maybe you can fix it faster. Of course, you have to FIND the problem first, and that's tricky.
Moreover, with an image install, you don't actually have to do anything- there's probably five minutes worth of actual work, which involves in the worst case putting in a CD/DVD and pressing the button.
Diagnostics may be faster in the best case, but it's never easier.
Ah, no, and you're not only pretty wrong, you're blatantly wrong. The case of Aubry v. Duclos was based along these exact lines.
The issue was that "The respondent brought an action in civil liability against the appellants, a photographer and the publisher of a magazine, for taking and publishing, in a magazine dedicated to the arts, a photograph showing the respondent, then aged 17, sitting on the steps of a building. The photograph, which was taken in a public place, was published without the respondentâ(TM)s consent."
As the Supreme Court of Canada put it:
"The right to oneâ(TM)s image is an element of the right to privacy under s. 5 of the Quebec Charter. If the purpose of the right to privacy is to protect a sphere of individual autonomy, it must include the ability to control the use made of oneâ(TM)s image. There is an infringement of a personâ(TM)s right to his or her image and, therefore, fault as soon as the image is published without consent and enables the person to be identified."
By the way, damages were awarded against the magazine.
Slashdot Mirror
I am bemused that you listed 'karate' as a martial art.
To be fair, if Tae Kwon Do (which actually significantly de-emphasizes punching) is not a martial art, than neither is Karate- what you want is something like Krav Maga.
That is not to say, however, that defensive arts that deal mostly with the sword (although I'll argue that fencing is, as you pointed out, mostly a sport) do not have their place. There are plenty of useful things you can do when you know how to effectively wield a sword in combat.
That is the job of a consultant, not a salesperson.
Ideally, the two are not the same person.
You do know that to post a $5000 bond, you generally don't actually have to post $5000, right?
I believe the cost to post a $500,000 bond for someone with a fairly good credit record and sufficient security was about $1500/yr when last I checked.
I have heard from friends who should know this sort of thing that it's closer to 1 nautical mile/hour of flight time divergence for USN/USAF munitions INS.
(Although it may be different for JDAMs, which are necessarily much shorter ranged than cruise missiles).
Well, the swing vote was almost certainly Kennedy's here. I wouldn't be surprised if, in fact, he put a lot of pressure on the majority to go rather moderate in order to keep the Court from totally fragmenting as they seem to be entirely on the brink of doing.
I appreciate your reply; perhaps you could use block-quotes next time for easy of reading. In any case...
I'm not sure you can go that far. Given that he essentially ignored concealed carry, I think it would be fallacious to assume something either way. More likely, he simply decided that it was out of the scope of the current case to analyze (see page 63 of the decision, 66 of the PDF, where he writes that "...since this case represents the Court's first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field..."
You're right, I meant to write long-arms there. I was specifically referring to the section on pg 58 (61 of the PDF) where they talk about the trigger lock.
That is what I was referring to when I mentioned Kennedy v. Louisiana. However, it runs into the same problems here as it does there; i.e., that it is essentially fluid to whatever the judges interpreting it happen to think of it at the time.
This is probably the Catch-22 that the dissent was referring to with regard to the use of the term 'in common use'.
The real problem as I see it is that it is definitely a slippery slope. As armament gets more complicated and more developed, it becomes far more difficult for the citizenry to keep up. Attempting to hold off a Russian invasion (for example) with small arms would be ridiculous in the extreme. And yet, the Russians would have the ability to dramatically escalate their use of force to a level the citizenry simply could not match unless the citizenry also had their own close-air-support aircraft, nuclear bombers, and so on.
In this respect, basically, I see the whole 'militia' argument as being patently useless in the modern day. A militia assembled of average people with small arms would prove entirely useless in resisting an actual military force, which was nowhere near as true as when the document was written. More appropriate, therefore, would be the analysis of the use of small arms for self-defense and the public policy analysis and limitation of where to draw that line based on what weapons can be reasonably used for self-defense and which cannot.
As I said in my original post, nobody expects to go hunting with an automatic grenade launcher.
Lots of comments. Good, I enjoy that.
I don't disagree. What I'm saying, specifically with regard to classes, (and which I think is unclear as you're the second person who seems to have misconstrued my meaning) is derived from this section on page 56 (59 ofthe PDF) where they say:
Essentially, I interpret that as saying the fact that a Militia in the 18th century would have no anti-tank guided missiles does not mean that a Militia in the 21st would not; however, those weapons are not protected in the Constitution.
Then, too, as I mentioned, they seem to have created classes which encompass modern weapons (like handguns; handguns in the 18th century are certainly not handguns in the 21st, but both are permitted), but not other, heavier weapons.
In this respect, however, I have to agree with the dissent, where they say that Scalia's argument creates a catch-22- weapons cannot be in common use unless Congress allows them to be, but laws against them cannot be struck down unless they're in common use.
Nowhere did the Court say that there was an unlimited right to bear arms. They specifically said:
"From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose."
Perhaps one of the most likely to be overlooked lines comes at the end of page 57, where Scalia writes: "Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms."
Moreover, he then continues to write: "We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep an carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those 'in common use at the time.' We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of 'dangerous and unusual weapons'."
Further, interestingly, at page 64, Scalia appears to leave open the possibility for attaching summary judgment offenses to the discharge and/or loading of firearms, so long as those penalties are minor.
In any case, the meat and bones of the judgment appears to be this, as stated at pages 58 and 60: The weapons protected by the Second Amendment are those that 'were in common use at the time'. However, this appears to extend to 'classes' of weapons, rather than specific designs (for example, semi-automatic and automatic firearms were not around until the middle of the 19th century, and would therefore certainly not have been 'in common use at the time' and would likely be prohibited), so essentially limits the second amendment to pistols and rifles; I am unsure how this would apply to things like submachine guns, assault rifles, and sniper rifles which likely did not even exist as 'classes' at the time; they don't really say, except to say that "It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service -M-16s and the like- may be banned..." which does imply in fact that assault rifles as a class do not survive the 'in common use' test.
Fairly interestingly is the Court's statement at page 59, that "The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of 'arms' that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful purpose." This interestingly folds back into its prior decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana of earlier this week that 'what the public thinks' is becoming a relevant constitutional test. I'm not sure, and they don't elaborate, on how this would come into conflict with the 'in common use' test. For example, imagine the American public decided that automatic grenade launchers were the best method of hunting- would they then also be allowed? If that is not true, I'm not really sure what Scalia's purpose for pointing out that Americans like handguns happens to be. It seems like he's saying that weapons which are overwhelmingly used for a lawful purpose are to be given more legal defense than those which are not.
At page 61, the court overturns the requirement that 'firearms in the home be rendered and kept inoperable at all times'; as this apparently invalidates their core lawful purpose, it is unconstitutional. However, the Court appears to say, that were a self-defense exception included it would be acceptable. How this would work is sort of confusing. The District's statute says, essentially, that every handgun should be kept unloaded and dissassembled or trigger locked unless the firearm is kept at a place of business or being used for lawful recreational purposes. It is unclear exactly what self-defense exemption the Court would prefer; i.e., whether such an exemption would require that firearms be able to be kept loaded and ready to fi
is a drastic oversimplification of the issue at hand.
A judge's order bears the force of law unless and until it is later overturned by a higher court.
You can't simply ignore it on the grounds that
The proper procedure is to ask for an interlocutory motion to allow the site to remain up, and if you don't get it, you take the site down.
Respect the authority of the Court- or the Court will show you why the government's authority is backed by force of arms.
Right then, why don't we just add up the total page sizes for all the tabs I have open at the moment (23 in one window, 85 in a second). That's 108 tabs. Firefox is using 869,408 KB of RAM.
That means each tab is averaging about 8,050KB.
Now, none of these pages have large files open (No PDFs, no Youtube, etc). They're all basically text websites with a smattering of images, like Slashdot.
This slashdot page, my browser says, is just a hair under 400KB, and a random sampling of pages say that this is relatively standard. Even assuming, however, the average page size is double this at 800KB, Firefox is still using ten times that amount of memory.
Where is it all going?
Um... so I can give credit and it's not considered stealing? I'll remember that next time the RIAA comes after me.
"But your honor, I attributed the songs correctly!"
I don't have to try to take quotes out of context. You aren't using them in context. You're mixing sociopolitics and the law where they shouldn't be mixed- someone's guilt or innocence before the law does not determine either their actions or their ability to integrate into society. Guilt or innocence before the law is purely a legal construct.
Yes, indeed. Hence my point that one who is guilty of murder may, in fact, have killed no-one. The two are not directly linked concepts, and they're certainly not equivocal.
Again, you make the same errors in logic you made originally. A person guilty of first-degree murder has, in fact, proven or shown nothing of the sort. A person guilty of first-degree murder has had it shown beyond a reasonable doubt that in fact they committed a crime which was classified as first-degree murder.
The distinction is obvious, because soldiers also have proven that they have the capability to purposefully and intentionally deprive another person of their life (I have no idea from where you drew the 'in a situation where a reasonable person would have 'cooled off' or reconsidered as that is not a part of the law in any jurisdiction I am aware of). However, as the law defines what constitutes a murder, soldiers are not guilty of first degree murder under the law. (Even, in fact, in situations where a reasonable person would have cooled off or reconsidered.)
Civilized society does no such thing. Civilized society realizes an individual's right to exist balanced against numerous other rights, and realizes therefore that sometimes that right can be violated.
In what way did I tie Israel or Jews to an unrelated murder? I used it as an example, nothing more.
Your comment is nothing more than knee-jerk reactionism.
I could, in fact, have made the (likely better) comparison with Werner Von Braun, the Nazis, and rocketry, but I didn't think of it at the time.
Moreover, it is hardly sociopolitically implausible for the Israelis to engage in widespread use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East during times of conflict- they were apparently prepared to do so more than once.
You are changing your statement, then?
The logical analysis of this statement is that there can be no legal compromise on those who take life.
This is especially true because the definition of 'murder in the first degree' is solely a legal construct, and people who are guilty of committing it may or may not actually have taken a life (and there is very little other than legal technicalities that separates murder in the first degree from, say, murder in the second degree).
There is a distinct difference between someone who is guilty of murder in the first degree and someone who takes a life; the two concepts may overlap at various points but they are in no way synonymous.
It appears you are mixing two dissimilar concepts (taking a life and first degree murder) and then comparing them through two different lenses (societal reintegration and the law) and coming up with necessarily muddled and indistinct answers.
Moreover, you seem to be taking the ground that societal integration is a static concept that does not take into account the society one is integrating into.
That was not the logical conclusion of your argument, however.
The logical conclusion of your argument is that anyone who takes life is entirely unable to integrate into society, and you state it yourself, although in many more words.
As that is obviously foolish, why should this reduction of your argument be any less foolish?
Wooosh.
I ask you to do nothing except think through your argument, and then take it to the logical conclusion.
Are you sure that's an argument you really want to make?
If conviction for murder required that they have actually found a body, getting away with murder would be trivial.
Which, while it might be true, is still stupid.
Imagine if Albert Einstein had accepted the position of leader of Israel after World War II and ordered some massive war crime, like say slaughtering the Arabs with nukes.
Would we just toss aside General Relativity, never to see it again, because we don't want to be associated with the author?
Give me any creative work that doesn't have roots in other works.
That, of course, depends what you mean by 'right'.
Yes, it was 'right' for the corporation to do that because it was the course of action that best suited the corporation's reason for existing.
In fact, IBM was involved in a fairly similar manner with the Nazis, and at the time they considered it perfectly acceptable to do so.
It was just... carrying on business.
I think you're really missing the point.
With a good slipstreamed install image, 'repairing' any system is basically as quick as the time it takes to copy the image over onto the hard disk- minutes to an hour at most.
Diagnostics is a hit and miss thing; if you know what the problem is, maybe you can fix it faster. Of course, you have to FIND the problem first, and that's tricky.
Moreover, with an image install, you don't actually have to do anything- there's probably five minutes worth of actual work, which involves in the worst case putting in a CD/DVD and pressing the button.
Diagnostics may be faster in the best case, but it's never easier.
Ah, no, and you're not only pretty wrong, you're blatantly wrong. The case of Aubry v. Duclos was based along these exact lines.
The issue was that "The respondent brought an action in civil liability against the appellants, a photographer and the publisher of a magazine, for taking and publishing, in a magazine dedicated to the arts, a photograph showing the respondent, then aged 17, sitting on the steps of a building. The photograph, which was taken in a public place, was published without the respondentâ(TM)s consent."
As the Supreme Court of Canada put it:
"The right to oneâ(TM)s image is an element of the right to privacy under s. 5 of the Quebec Charter. If the purpose of the right to privacy is to protect a sphere of individual autonomy, it must include the ability to control the use made of oneâ(TM)s image. There is an infringement of a personâ(TM)s right to his or her image and, therefore, fault as soon as the image is published without consent and enables the person to be identified."
By the way, damages were awarded against the magazine.