According to the Atomic Bomb Museum in Hiroshima (and some of my own history research) one of the primary reasons for choosing Hiroshima was that the Japanese 5th Army was located there.
Add to that the fact that Mitsubishi had a production facility there didn't make it any less of a target.
The second target of Nagasaki was chosen in part because it was a major port city and because most of the major cities on the main island of Honshu had been destroyed by conventional bombs.
Kyoto was considered a target, but passed over due to its position as a historical center and as such it was not a priority - (much like Rome was protected in Italy). Beyond that, Kyoto was not a military target...there was no measurable industry there contributing to the Japanese war effort. Finally, Truman and his staff had the impression that an attack on this cultural center of Japan would only strengthen the resolve of the Japanese to continue fighting to the last man.
The timeline was accelerated from later in August to the first part of August due in large part to reports that Russia had decided to focus on the Pacific theater after the war in Europe had come to an end, and it's impossible to determine if Stalin would have shown restraint once the Russians crossed 400 miles of the Sea of Japan.
Truman made a decision based on the information he had at the time...a decision which has left an indelible impression on military strategies the world over for decades.
I'm not saying it was the right decision or the wrong decision, but he had to make some decision...and days later the Japanese signed a declaration of surrender which ended the war. Perhaps the war could have reached the same end, but it's doubtful that it could have been done in the same timeframe and with as few casualties as were incurred (to either side).
After reading the not-so-very-detailed article (not surprising since it's little more than concept phase right now), they're only 'likening' this technology to the Internet.
My interpretation has this being most useful on an INTRAnet where a company can call up an RFID that may have various category tags that would allow them to see that there are only 18 on the shelf, 42 on order, and 235 other products that meet the same criteria that are readily available.
I know a guy who works in IBM's Global Services (consulting) group...they're pushing RFID like it's the second coming. In many ways I think it can be seen as the next barcode, only better.
Because we've been dealing with barcodes for years and years, we can now right some wrongs that manufacturers and their customers may feel exist in the simple barcode...they can go a long way towards getting the job done right the first time (or at least 'right' as far as today's standards are concerned).
The accessibility thing for vision impared customers at a store is a clever idea too - however I don't think this product is going to be end-consumer driven at first.
After describing a DOS service and e-mail attack on the publisher of an article that portrays a woman in an unintelligible light (I can't figure out what the original article was about), Enderle writes:
"This is power that Microsoft, Oracle, IBM and many governments could only dream of having. The power to control the press and the skills contained in this organization are likely capable of disrupting travel, power grids and other broad national infrastructure systems if their demands are not met."
That statement is shortsighted and naive. It's also a rather irresponsible.
Microsoft, Oracle, IBM, Cisco - those companies can easily disrupt services on a massive scale. Look at blaster, sasser, etc. - what if the manufacturer (with their intimate and proprietary knowledge of the inner workings of their subsystems) intentionally did something along those lines?
Once infected, we would be for all intents and purposes be completely at their mercy for resolution.
Fortunately ethics and common sense prevent them from doing that (or has thusfar).
Perhaps I'm taking Enderle's article the right way, but it seems to me that a few crackpot OpenSource users out there who read this article as if it were a manifesto might feel justified in unleashing unspeakable havoc over the public Internet and against corporations and other services...which ultimately may not produce their desired results.
According to the Atomic Bomb Museum in Hiroshima (and some of my own history research) one of the primary reasons for choosing Hiroshima was that the Japanese 5th Army was located there.
Add to that the fact that Mitsubishi had a production facility there didn't make it any less of a target.
The second target of Nagasaki was chosen in part because it was a major port city and because most of the major cities on the main island of Honshu had been destroyed by conventional bombs.
Kyoto was considered a target, but passed over due to its position as a historical center and as such it was not a priority - (much like Rome was protected in Italy). Beyond that, Kyoto was not a military target...there was no measurable industry there contributing to the Japanese war effort. Finally, Truman and his staff had the impression that an attack on this cultural center of Japan would only strengthen the resolve of the Japanese to continue fighting to the last man.
The timeline was accelerated from later in August to the first part of August due in large part to reports that Russia had decided to focus on the Pacific theater after the war in Europe had come to an end, and it's impossible to determine if Stalin would have shown restraint once the Russians crossed 400 miles of the Sea of Japan.
Truman made a decision based on the information he had at the time...a decision which has left an indelible impression on military strategies the world over for decades.
I'm not saying it was the right decision or the wrong decision, but he had to make some decision...and days later the Japanese signed a declaration of surrender which ended the war. Perhaps the war could have reached the same end, but it's doubtful that it could have been done in the same timeframe and with as few casualties as were incurred (to either side).
After reading the not-so-very-detailed article (not surprising since it's little more than concept phase right now), they're only 'likening' this technology to the Internet.
My interpretation has this being most useful on an INTRAnet where a company can call up an RFID that may have various category tags that would allow them to see that there are only 18 on the shelf, 42 on order, and 235 other products that meet the same criteria that are readily available.
I know a guy who works in IBM's Global Services (consulting) group...they're pushing RFID like it's the second coming. In many ways I think it can be seen as the next barcode, only better.
Because we've been dealing with barcodes for years and years, we can now right some wrongs that manufacturers and their customers may feel exist in the simple barcode...they can go a long way towards getting the job done right the first time (or at least 'right' as far as today's standards are concerned).
The accessibility thing for vision impared customers at a store is a clever idea too - however I don't think this product is going to be end-consumer driven at first.
After describing a DOS service and e-mail attack on the publisher of an article that portrays a woman in an unintelligible light (I can't figure out what the original article was about), Enderle writes:
"This is power that Microsoft, Oracle, IBM and many governments could only dream of having. The power to control the press and the skills contained in this organization are likely capable of disrupting travel, power grids and other broad national infrastructure systems if their demands are not met."
That statement is shortsighted and naive. It's also a rather irresponsible.
Microsoft, Oracle, IBM, Cisco - those companies can easily disrupt services on a massive scale. Look at blaster, sasser, etc. - what if the manufacturer (with their intimate and proprietary knowledge of the inner workings of their subsystems) intentionally did something along those lines?
Once infected, we would be for all intents and purposes be completely at their mercy for resolution.
Fortunately ethics and common sense prevent them from doing that (or has thusfar).
Perhaps I'm taking Enderle's article the right way, but it seems to me that a few crackpot OpenSource users out there who read this article as if it were a manifesto might feel justified in unleashing unspeakable havoc over the public Internet and against corporations and other services...which ultimately may not produce their desired results.
Climbing off the soapbox.
-Al