ESA mostly does rational, beneficial missions. Astronauts do not factor in most of those. The US does many "patriotic" missions (i.e. publicity stunts for the stupid), these need people on board.
And to all the nay-sayers: Cisco has just decided that now they need to audit their code after all as well. So tell me again how Juniper did badly here after they had a suspicion?
Destructive tests are for show. They are not done here by competent engineers as they do generally do not tell you what precisely failed. Would also be bad press.
You are very, very wrong on this. With a good key-schedule and a maximum message size used per key, even the Enigma is provable "hard to break", or rather impossible to break. It requires random keys and something like a maximum of 4k characters encrypted per key (if I remember the numbers right).
Your NP argument completely misses the point in several regards: First, for practical attacks, P is not "efficient". Second, what makes you think you can verify the correctness of decryption in the first place? That is not generally true, unless you only think simplistic toy examples happen in practice. And third, you can get information-theoretical security with quite a few practical set-ups for ciphertext-only attacks.
Wrong even for non-crewed launches. The key-term here is "reliable". Of course, that gets downplayed by the media and is never repeated later. "Patriotism" (a.k.a. targeted stupidity) at work.
Ah, yes. If you US people keep at it, then in a few years you may again have a reliable launch vehicle. You know, like ESA and the Russians have and a few other countries are working up to.
I expect similar things are present in a lot of other security products, just that there they are still undiscovered. Criticizing Juniper for this is entirely the wrong reaction.
Well, yes, and anybody with a clue has de-installed Flash long ago anyways, but Windows is the OS that is supposedly "easier" and aimed at non-experts. This means a lot of people will get hit by this.
There is theoretically unbreakable crypto and crypto that is provably hard enough to break as to be unbreakable practically for a long, long time. The quantum-snake-oil "encryption" is neither. First, it has the requirement that some physical models are absolute truth. That would be a first in physics, so far there were always inaccuracies, and circumstances where the theoretical models failed. And second, it relies on a physical, analog implementation being perfect. That is uisually not possible to achieve.
GRUB 2, same as systemd, suffers from gross KISS violation. GRUB 2 also suffers from the "Second System Effect", where they put in everything and the kitchen sink. Systemd has the same problem, but _they_ managed to make this basic mistake on the first try.
In CS papers "efficient" means polynomial (theoretical paper) or something like O(n) or O(log n) depending on problem. It does not mean "fast". Similar for space-efficiency.
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Given facts like this, how does anyone claim with a straight face that government can do things about as efficiently as private-sector efforts can?
Simple: "patriotism". It makes people stupid.
Keep kidding yourself. Your question was refused because it has no relevance. Just like the other nonsense you seem to honestly believe.
ESA mostly does rational, beneficial missions. Astronauts do not factor in most of those. The US does many "patriotic" missions (i.e. publicity stunts for the stupid), these need people on board.
Stay stupid (clearly your preference) or google "US rocket explodes".
And to all the nay-sayers: Cisco has just decided that now they need to audit their code after all as well. So tell me again how Juniper did badly here after they had a suspicion?
Destructive tests are for show. They are not done here by competent engineers as they do generally do not tell you what precisely failed. Would also be bad press.
You are very, very wrong on this. With a good key-schedule and a maximum message size used per key, even the Enigma is provable "hard to break", or rather impossible to break. It requires random keys and something like a maximum of 4k characters encrypted per key (if I remember the numbers right).
Your NP argument completely misses the point in several regards: First, for practical attacks, P is not "efficient". Second, what makes you think you can verify the correctness of decryption in the first place? That is not generally true, unless you only think simplistic toy examples happen in practice. And third, you can get information-theoretical security with quite a few practical set-ups for ciphertext-only attacks.
Wrong even for non-crewed launches. The key-term here is "reliable". Of course, that gets downplayed by the media and is never repeated later. "Patriotism" (a.k.a. targeted stupidity) at work.
Ah, yes. Ignorance of the facts is a side-effect of patriotism.
What you are doing is criticizing the action of the murderer to turn himself in, not the murder. Looks kind of different, doesn't it?
Ah, found it above. Thanks to those that posted the Youtube link.
Ah, yes. If you US people keep at it, then in a few years you may again have a reliable launch vehicle. You know, like ESA and the Russians have and a few other countries are working up to.
Wrong question, unless you are thinking of failure rates. With a bit of luck, these should eventually go down to a number small enough to not matter.
The right question is how much effort and wow much cost in parts they have to invest to re-use it _after_ they have optimized parts for durability.
And congrats to SpaceX, this is a very important step in the right direction!
I expect similar things are present in a lot of other security products, just that there they are still undiscovered. Criticizing Juniper for this is entirely the wrong reaction.
Because if they had that, then all code would be authorized and signed off on. At least they found the problem, but this is really amateur-level.
Well, yes, and anybody with a clue has de-installed Flash long ago anyways, but Windows is the OS that is supposedly "easier" and aimed at non-experts. This means a lot of people will get hit by this.
More like AIDS...
What we actually show in the paper is that the security proof is flawed. Fix the security proof and I won't ever be able to break it.
Unless physical reality turns out to not quite follow the theoretical models precisely. So far that has always been the case.
There is theoretically unbreakable crypto and crypto that is provably hard enough to break as to be unbreakable practically for a long, long time. The quantum-snake-oil "encryption" is neither. First, it has the requirement that some physical models are absolute truth. That would be a first in physics, so far there were always inaccuracies, and circumstances where the theoretical models failed. And second, it relies on a physical, analog implementation being perfect. That is uisually not possible to achieve.
Forget it. Lockpicking is not hard.
ILOs must be secure by themselves, or an attacker can use them to reboot your system with a CD image or the like.
GRUB 2, same as systemd, suffers from gross KISS violation. GRUB 2 also suffers from the "Second System Effect", where they put in everything and the kitchen sink. Systemd has the same problem, but _they_ managed to make this basic mistake on the first try.
An attacker with physical access and some minimal skill has won anyways.
In CS papers "efficient" means polynomial (theoretical paper) or something like O(n) or O(log n) depending on problem. It does not mean "fast". Similar for space-efficiency.