Yes centralising and the setting of global "US" standards. You wanted to book a room, sell, buy, trade, fly, call, fax, email - a US entity was in someway setting global interconnects and multinational support. Your safe encryption was their joke.
Everything could be sold on for marketing, value adding, research, fine print.... all safe back to the 'allowed' buyers.
Yes new firms in distant lands will offer amazing new deals on servers, local support and boasting of no links in the UK or USA.
Hardware will be rebuild and air gapped. Many will still use and enjoy the 'free' US brands but trust is gone.
Most wanted to believe the articulate sock puppets:
Legally you had the US Constitution to keep the US gov away.
Legally you had teams of in house (corporate) lawyers defending the 'brand' from hints of warrantless gov collaboration.
Your political leaders that would 'out' any goverment domestic spying just for party political points.
The US stock market would never allow the US gov to risk its international sales and would side against warrantless gov and keep sales up.
You had the public, gov hardware and software 'interface' that would be uncovered very quickly with great press coverage by so many skilled staff.
You had staff, academies and skilled members of the press who would find some trace.... and then win media prizes with the story of the decade...
Skilled academics, code reviews, gov standards, software brands and teams of individuals had all looked over net encryption and found it usable for consumers.
After Snowden it was all found to be a hoax.
Political leaders did nothing, lawyers said nothing, academics educated the junk code to generations of fee paying students, the tame press never followed any stories, corporations took gov cash and helped, telcos ensured the optical was in place. Mercenaries and contractors enjoyed the overtime.
The brands are now a joke.
"different statutory authority" sounds like color of law. US law reform groups and constitutional law experts often win when such cute efforts are exposed.
Tax law in the US is public, while a persons accounts are been frozen, they can still find a lawyer to read the letters and have them explain very limited future options.
The US and UK seems to have gone to great lengths to have to out smart their own gov staff as their gifted staff seem to know their countries laws and legal protections.
Its all fun when your looking down at the Soviet Union/Russia/China/EU.... When that tech is tuned back onto the domestic setting... very good lawyers are ready:)
Yes Nic, it was always interesting in the UK. From the first staff asking legal questions about UK satellite call tracking and local UK calls mixed in back in the late 1960's.
The computers kept running and everything was just fine. Then came voice prints from the US drug wars in South America (for wider use). CCTV tracking, cell phone decryption and finally the bulk of all UK internet traffic per day.
As for the use of analysts, you have a lot of private sector pre sorting for 'advertising' contracts that can cover some aspects of any group for a well funded gov 'front company' that pays on time, every time.
That would provide a very clean, formatted, neat input over years. You would also have 'talks' with the tame private sector on "legal" sharing. The data in could be managed much more carefully allowing fewer gov analysts. New US super computers, better software could help with some tasks.
Recall how the US gov worked on telco data, the telco kept the data and special telco staff where on hand to 'sort' as needed with a few US gov people been in on the results.
The problem for East Germany was the good computers they had where for sending daily reports/files back to the Soviet Union.
The rest was magnetic audio tape, paper files, induction from per person phone lines, some optical splitting for West Berlin links, efforts with early consumer computers.. The cash and hardware was never ready in time.
The UK and US shows what larger budgets would have done. You keep it all and can really sort it. East Germany could really just add to files and hope staff where not reporting on their own gov missions.
In the end East Germany had one option - order the ~tanks in and trust their 'special forces' mil would clear the streets as ordered. Informants and gov staff working undercover would have been hard to pull out in time. Western TV would be on the rooftops with some of the footage making it out.
Young protesters had also done their mil duty and knew what they faced and how ~tank crews would respond.
LOL cold on 5-7 years. Thanks to the great work by whistleblower the world now understands a lot of the telco data is long term - 10's of years to life.
The past sock puppets tried hard to shape the wider computer-centric community on data been hard to keep, hard to search, political or legal protections, the protection of the marketplace and stock values, domestic protections, courts...its all turning out to be a huge joke with each new press release:)
Readers now know the legal and real world domestic results as "parallel construction": http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/05/us-dea-sod-idUSBRE97409R20130805
i.e. DEA’s Hemisphere program, i.e. records of every phone back to 1987. Just a bit longer than a nice sounding '5-7 years".
Re https,br>
Thats what smart people have been warning about for years. Once the nets basic cryptography is a junk standard thanks to gov - anyone can be anything online and its all perfectly trusted..
The ex staff, fired staff, mercenary, contractor - they all take the complex skill set with them and sell it.
Other govs, firms, foreigners with cash, faith groups with cash... thats why junk crypto is so useless - all the interesting people can pay to learn about the 'net' and always know to avoid it or create complex legends.
All the random silly people using terms and words they copy and past from other open news sites just get to fill gov databases tracking.com
Over time the UK will have a massive East German like database filled with many quotes and people. Did the rows of East German files alter the politics and mil of East Germany? i.e. great for tracking workers comments, people protesting outside churches.
What would that get them? Many OS would be running new updated heuristic behaviour tests as part of anti-virus settings just waiting for any such attempts?
i.e. get the browser and then what on a modern OS? Just pass the ip back and then?
So the entire internal network is flat? A cloud? Searchable and saveable with the correct clearance from any location? Thats like having a free staff photocopier next to the secure document safe. Thats really sad, could have so been avoided and issues with such a layout where always very predicable.
The other fun aspect is where the US human spies data ends up... 'we keep you off the network'
Its gets fun then, a group of contractors or political leaders went to the NSA and told them to just get with the new "sharing" cloud?
Instant quality intel for cleared staff in the mil been requested and send around the world?
To get a huge grab bag of stuff by new staff would seem to point to a lot of generational compartmentalised security knowledge been lost? Downgraded? Knowingly turned off for years of new upgrades and expensive outside contractor expansion?
Would the CIA just sit back and watch such security holes form around its covert intel?
So NSA internal security can control/run telco intercepts on a global scale for decades via different networks, nations but now just finds out it "forgot" to watch its own new contracting staff...
If Russia/Soviet Union knew too much, the CIA/MI6/FBI would find out over time and the NSA would fix their staff issue...
i.e. Russia was alway trying to get in via US staff but found what it could get back was always compartmentalised and only hinted at wider issues of interest.
i.e. would magic escalated settings to lock out or undo or find logs... really be left in a usable form in the internal networks for any new cleared staff to find and 'try' spanning vast networks?
They have to redo all the contractor security clearances in the real world now and feel its better to start with new gov staff.
The kind of individual who has seen the warrantless surveillance press reports yet still clicks the ads.
Cold the US gov has been doing good, large, very secure digital databases since the ~1960's... the idea that a contractor could just walk in after some CIA work and get to much more data seems LOL.
Everything is always logged, watched and very secure. If not any Soviet or Russian spy would have long since been very happy.
Based on people who got and stayed in Canada, the UK, Australia, W Germany, NATO at a top gov level and with ongoing KGB links...
The KGB was always looking for cash poor or unhappy or fired staff or staff with issues. How many they got is really a reflection of the NSA/GCHQ and working conditions/staff security of that decade.
Russian thinking has changed - quality over quick, risky data.
In the past you could say the CIA and NSA where very aware and totally understood all past KGB work when thinking of US security. They knew to keep conditions positive and offer good wages, track staff for emerging issues.
Now with contractors, political visions for a war on a tactic and the huge cash flows...over a few short years...black sites, drones and domestic legality...
Russia would be very careful - this could all be plots within plots. The CIA could be wanting to reduce the political influence of an emerging domestic "digital" NSA.
Russia would guide its gov spies up or try and guide a mid ranking spy up further to the top levels over a slow climb of positive gov work.
Russia can take its time to be very sure of the individual they select and take time to reflect on all data sent back. Russia only has to replace their retiring spies in the US system. Few risks for Russia and like the UK in the past the US will spend many years trying to undo what very predicable 'contracting' rapid security growth did.
The only trap for Russia is the limited hangout game - but they know the US history of such events now.
In the past 10 years the US dropped many of its really well thought out air gaps and systems. The private cloud and 'sharing' become a new culture vs generations of CIA and MI6 reality of why you would never do that. Great for private contractors, political leaders pushing for a new vision of 'their' war, the 'win' of easy domestic spying...
Vast electronic networks sealed against Soviet and Russian efforts where gifted to 'cleared' new contractors...
Its just a list of data points on a clean resume entered into state and federal networks now by a really trusted contractor.
The databases confirms your schooling, education, mil, clearance levels, family tree, net use.
The US is basically confirming your presented docs match known data..... and that your past work is as listed...
Its on to the next resume to research and clear from a desk.
The other aspect is the CIA knew of computer issues and that past was not shared with the NSA. Who cleared the file and when..
Was it done at the CIA, by a contractor who needed staff 'fast' and had the political connections to clean up files or did the NSA did not look deep into contractors pasts?
The easy clearance powers and ideology of contracting. The US flooded its once smart, compartmentalized, air gapped gov networks with groups of privatised workers as needed to expand.
The clearances where done in hast, digitally via database searches and warnings not passed on (the CIA showed it could still understand its network access issues). Languages, admins, security staff, the people doing the clearances, support staff..cloud experts.. where all drawn from any US communities with "skills" and spread over existing sensitive projects and once very secure US gov departments.
The entire US security system became a huge boondoggle for 10 years pumping cash into the private sector and letting unknown people into the US gov.
Clearances to the private sector where given to cleared bosses to distribute to their 'loyal' staff as needed to fill lucrative gov contracts.
The life stories of new entrants where no longer been tracked down by US gov staff. Databases where searched and if it looked "ok" you got what past generations would only get after exhaustive interviews and reviews.
Yes thanks to Snowden the unconstitutional spying was exposed in the press.
The telco firms, OS developers, hardware designers, software coders, crypto experts, gov standards, trusted academics, computing press, internal legal teams, political oversight groups have all been exposed as tame, incompetent, junk, a joke or as willing collaborators.
Very few wanted to understand or talk about what was been done in terms of on going unconstitutional domestic spying.
Thanks to many whistleblowers and now Snowden the world can fix the junk US/UK crypto and software.
RE What's really going on here? The millions would pay for cleared support never to talk to a boss, contractor or staff i.e. trusted support teams to be on call 24/7.
Its a very interesting point fuzzy and worth exploring. The CIA was well known for its under embassy telco work around the world. Teams, experts but always seen as direct or per mission, bases, spy planes, tunnels, people in firms: equipment out. The idea that the CIA had its "own" larger internal bulk telco clearing network is not really well understood.
Why where they doubling up on work perfectly done by the NSA and GCHQ/contractors globally?
Why did the CIA feel it was not getting everything from the NSA that would clear the way for another 'risky' interface with telcos?
A past rift and the rise of the digital warfare NSA over the past 10 years would be very politically influential. Power that the CIA wants back at any price?
Or does the CIA worry about its own operations leaking and wants to see all telco data in real time as the NSA/GCHQ and many other "staff" members do?
Or did the CIA just want their own backup for when the NSA has issues every few decades for a few days?
Big international trade deals ensuring a constant flow of peering via the USA. i.e. cash, size, global standing, ability to set global standards 'first' or keep old tech for a bit longer and then upgrade at will.
All that well lit optical not providing profits to local interconnects - been routed all the way to the USA and back thats the 'gift' that keep on giving.
Its more for people moving around the world. But the main risk is having your media looked at and someone seeing your need for the use of encryption.
You could have all other data quickly captured and end up on a few gov lists with your computer returned.
The NSA mostly seems to like to track all net use globally and then zoom in on users, their OS, files reviewing their digital lives.
Tame OS, telcos and software seem to help the NSA with the final steps i.e. the end users encryption and saving the keystrokes for easy very decryption.
But just the act of requesting an audit does make 'easy' past with some software more difficult.
Slashdot Mirror
Yes centralising and the setting of global "US" standards. You wanted to book a room, sell, buy, trade, fly, call, fax, email - a US entity was in someway setting global interconnects and multinational support. Your safe encryption was their joke.
Everything could be sold on for marketing, value adding, research, fine print.... all safe back to the 'allowed' buyers.
Yes new firms in distant lands will offer amazing new deals on servers, local support and boasting of no links in the UK or USA.
Hardware will be rebuild and air gapped. Many will still use and enjoy the 'free' US brands but trust is gone.
Most wanted to believe the articulate sock puppets:
Legally you had the US Constitution to keep the US gov away.
Legally you had teams of in house (corporate) lawyers defending the 'brand' from hints of warrantless gov collaboration.
Your political leaders that would 'out' any goverment domestic spying just for party political points.
The US stock market would never allow the US gov to risk its international sales and would side against warrantless gov and keep sales up.
You had the public, gov hardware and software 'interface' that would be uncovered very quickly with great press coverage by so many skilled staff.
You had staff, academies and skilled members of the press who would find some trace.... and then win media prizes with the story of the decade...
Skilled academics, code reviews, gov standards, software brands and teams of individuals had all looked over net encryption and found it usable for consumers.
After Snowden it was all found to be a hoax.
Political leaders did nothing, lawyers said nothing, academics educated the junk code to generations of fee paying students, the tame press never followed any stories, corporations took gov cash and helped, telcos ensured the optical was in place. Mercenaries and contractors enjoyed the overtime.
The brands are now a joke.
"different statutory authority" sounds like color of law. US law reform groups and constitutional law experts often win when such cute efforts are exposed. :)
Tax law in the US is public, while a persons accounts are been frozen, they can still find a lawyer to read the letters and have them explain very limited future options.
The US and UK seems to have gone to great lengths to have to out smart their own gov staff as their gifted staff seem to know their countries laws and legal protections.
Its all fun when your looking down at the Soviet Union/Russia/China/EU.... When that tech is tuned back onto the domestic setting... very good lawyers are ready
Thanks for that. So they would risk it all and go for the consumers machine?
Yes Nic, it was always interesting in the UK. From the first staff asking legal questions about UK satellite call tracking and local UK calls mixed in back in the late 1960's.
The computers kept running and everything was just fine. Then came voice prints from the US drug wars in South America (for wider use). CCTV tracking, cell phone decryption and finally the bulk of all UK internet traffic per day.
As for the use of analysts, you have a lot of private sector pre sorting for 'advertising' contracts that can cover some aspects of any group for a well funded gov 'front company' that pays on time, every time.
That would provide a very clean, formatted, neat input over years. You would also have 'talks' with the tame private sector on "legal" sharing. The data in could be managed much more carefully allowing fewer gov analysts. New US super computers, better software could help with some tasks.
Recall how the US gov worked on telco data, the telco kept the data and special telco staff where on hand to 'sort' as needed with a few US gov people been in on the results.
The problem for East Germany was the good computers they had where for sending daily reports/files back to the Soviet Union.
The rest was magnetic audio tape, paper files, induction from per person phone lines, some optical splitting for West Berlin links, efforts with early consumer computers.. The cash and hardware was never ready in time.
The UK and US shows what larger budgets would have done. You keep it all and can really sort it. East Germany could really just add to files and hope staff where not reporting on their own gov missions.
In the end East Germany had one option - order the ~tanks in and trust their 'special forces' mil would clear the streets as ordered. Informants and gov staff working undercover would have been hard to pull out in time. Western TV would be on the rooftops with some of the footage making it out.
Young protesters had also done their mil duty and knew what they faced and how ~tank crews would respond.
LOL cold on 5-7 years. Thanks to the great work by whistleblower the world now understands a lot of the telco data is long term - 10's of years to life. :)
The past sock puppets tried hard to shape the wider computer-centric community on data been hard to keep, hard to search, political or legal protections, the protection of the marketplace and stock values, domestic protections, courts...its all turning out to be a huge joke with each new press release
Readers now know the legal and real world domestic results as "parallel construction":
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/05/us-dea-sod-idUSBRE97409R20130805
i.e. DEA’s Hemisphere program, i.e. records of every phone back to 1987. Just a bit longer than a nice sounding '5-7 years".
Re https ,br>
Thats what smart people have been warning about for years. Once the nets basic cryptography is a junk standard thanks to gov - anyone can be anything online and its all perfectly trusted.. .com
The ex staff, fired staff, mercenary, contractor - they all take the complex skill set with them and sell it.
Other govs, firms, foreigners with cash, faith groups with cash... thats why junk crypto is so useless - all the interesting people can pay to learn about the 'net' and always know to avoid it or create complex legends.
All the random silly people using terms and words they copy and past from other open news sites just get to fill gov databases tracking
Over time the UK will have a massive East German like database filled with many quotes and people. Did the rows of East German files alter the politics and mil of East Germany? i.e. great for tracking workers comments, people protesting outside churches.
What would that get them? Many OS would be running new updated heuristic behaviour tests as part of anti-virus settings just waiting for any such attempts?
i.e. get the browser and then what on a modern OS? Just pass the ip back and then?
So the entire internal network is flat? A cloud? Searchable and saveable with the correct clearance from any location? Thats like having a free staff photocopier next to the secure document safe. Thats really sad, could have so been avoided and issues with such a layout where always very predicable.
The other fun aspect is where the US human spies data ends up... 'we keep you off the network'
Its gets fun then, a group of contractors or political leaders went to the NSA and told them to just get with the new "sharing" cloud?
Instant quality intel for cleared staff in the mil been requested and send around the world?
To get a huge grab bag of stuff by new staff would seem to point to a lot of generational compartmentalised security knowledge been lost? Downgraded? Knowingly turned off for years of new upgrades and expensive outside contractor expansion?
Would the CIA just sit back and watch such security holes form around its covert intel?
So NSA internal security can control/run telco intercepts on a global scale for decades via different networks, nations but now just finds out it "forgot" to watch its own new contracting staff...
If Russia/Soviet Union knew too much, the CIA/MI6/FBI would find out over time and the NSA would fix their staff issue...
i.e. Russia was alway trying to get in via US staff but found what it could get back was always compartmentalised and only hinted at wider issues of interest.
i.e. would magic escalated settings to lock out or undo or find logs... really be left in a usable form in the internal networks for any new cleared staff to find and 'try' spanning vast networks?
They have to redo all the contractor security clearances in the real world now and feel its better to start with new gov staff.
The kind of individual who has seen the warrantless surveillance press reports yet still clicks the ads.
Cold the US gov has been doing good, large, very secure digital databases since the ~1960's... the idea that a contractor could just walk in after some CIA work and get to much more data seems LOL.
Everything is always logged, watched and very secure. If not any Soviet or Russian spy would have long since been very happy.
Based on people who got and stayed in Canada, the UK, Australia, W Germany, NATO at a top gov level and with ongoing KGB links...
The KGB was always looking for cash poor or unhappy or fired staff or staff with issues. How many they got is really a reflection of the NSA/GCHQ and working conditions/staff security of that decade.
Russian thinking has changed - quality over quick, risky data.
In the past you could say the CIA and NSA where very aware and totally understood all past KGB work when thinking of US security. They knew to keep conditions positive and offer good wages, track staff for emerging issues.
Now with contractors, political visions for a war on a tactic and the huge cash flows...over a few short years...black sites, drones and domestic legality...
Russia would be very careful - this could all be plots within plots. The CIA could be wanting to reduce the political influence of an emerging domestic "digital" NSA.
Russia would guide its gov spies up or try and guide a mid ranking spy up further to the top levels over a slow climb of positive gov work.
Russia can take its time to be very sure of the individual they select and take time to reflect on all data sent back. Russia only has to replace their retiring spies in the US system. Few risks for Russia and like the UK in the past the US will spend many years trying to undo what very predicable 'contracting' rapid security growth did.
The only trap for Russia is the limited hangout game - but they know the US history of such events now.
Yes its all out in NSA speaking points http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-10-31/document-reveals-official-nsa-talking-points-use-911-attacks-sound-bite
From been pro USA, bringing up 911, lawful acts, a count of the number of issues 'detected', the media makes it all so hard, the US gov needs the telco/OS/crypto/academic community...
In the past 10 years the US dropped many of its really well thought out air gaps and systems. The private cloud and 'sharing' become a new culture vs generations of CIA and MI6 reality of why you would never do that. ...
Great for private contractors, political leaders pushing for a new vision of 'their' war, the 'win' of easy domestic spying...
Vast electronic networks sealed against Soviet and Russian efforts where gifted to 'cleared' new contractors
Its just a list of data points on a clean resume entered into state and federal networks now by a really trusted contractor.
The databases confirms your schooling, education, mil, clearance levels, family tree, net use.
The US is basically confirming your presented docs match known data..... and that your past work is as listed...
Its on to the next resume to research and clear from a desk.
The other aspect is the CIA knew of computer issues and that past was not shared with the NSA. Who cleared the file and when..
Was it done at the CIA, by a contractor who needed staff 'fast' and had the political connections to clean up files or did the NSA did not look deep into contractors pasts?
The easy clearance powers and ideology of contracting. The US flooded its once smart, compartmentalized, air gapped gov networks with groups of privatised workers as needed to expand.
The clearances where done in hast, digitally via database searches and warnings not passed on (the CIA showed it could still understand its network access issues).
Languages, admins, security staff, the people doing the clearances, support staff..cloud experts.. where all drawn from any US communities with "skills" and spread over existing sensitive projects and once very secure US gov departments.
The entire US security system became a huge boondoggle for 10 years pumping cash into the private sector and letting unknown people into the US gov.
Clearances to the private sector where given to cleared bosses to distribute to their 'loyal' staff as needed to fill lucrative gov contracts.
The life stories of new entrants where no longer been tracked down by US gov staff. Databases where searched and if it looked "ok" you got what past generations would only get after exhaustive interviews and reviews.
Yes thanks to Snowden the unconstitutional spying was exposed in the press.
The telco firms, OS developers, hardware designers, software coders, crypto experts, gov standards, trusted academics, computing press, internal legal teams, political oversight groups have all been exposed as tame, incompetent, junk, a joke or as willing collaborators.
Very few wanted to understand or talk about what was been done in terms of on going unconstitutional domestic spying.
Thanks to many whistleblowers and now Snowden the world can fix the junk US/UK crypto and software.
RE What's really going on here? The millions would pay for cleared support never to talk to a boss, contractor or staff i.e. trusted support teams to be on call 24/7.
Its a very interesting point fuzzy and worth exploring. The CIA was well known for its under embassy telco work around the world. Teams, experts but always seen as direct or per mission, bases, spy planes, tunnels, people in firms: equipment out. The idea that the CIA had its "own" larger internal bulk telco clearing network is not really well understood.
Why where they doubling up on work perfectly done by the NSA and GCHQ/contractors globally?
Why did the CIA feel it was not getting everything from the NSA that would clear the way for another 'risky' interface with telcos?
A past rift and the rise of the digital warfare NSA over the past 10 years would be very politically influential. Power that the CIA wants back at any price?
Or does the CIA worry about its own operations leaking and wants to see all telco data in real time as the NSA/GCHQ and many other "staff" members do?
Or did the CIA just want their own backup for when the NSA has issues every few decades for a few days?
Big international trade deals ensuring a constant flow of peering via the USA. i.e. cash, size, global standing, ability to set global standards 'first' or keep old tech for a bit longer and then upgrade at will.
All that well lit optical not providing profits to local interconnects - been routed all the way to the USA and back thats the 'gift' that keep on giving.
Its more for people moving around the world. But the main risk is having your media looked at and someone seeing your need for the use of encryption.
You could have all other data quickly captured and end up on a few gov lists with your computer returned.
The NSA mostly seems to like to track all net use globally and then zoom in on users, their OS, files reviewing their digital lives.
Tame OS, telcos and software seem to help the NSA with the final steps i.e. the end users encryption and saving the keystrokes for easy very decryption.
But just the act of requesting an audit does make 'easy' past with some software more difficult.