Philosophers do not perform "experiments," in any way that can be meaningfully analogized to experimental physics or any science. A philosopher's "experiment" if it can be called that, involves the "experimental" nature of saying anything at all. One might say something that is appropriate or inappropriate, correct or incorrect, etc.; sophistry is having the grace to make what is incorrect pass for correct, not what is false for truth. The point here is that philosophy is about the experimental nature of "transaction," not the content of the transaction. The laws of logic shape what we can say about the laws of nature, and the philosopher helps us understand this; in doing so the philosopher uses analogy, thought experiment, demonstration, to explain why the shape of one follows from the shape of the other. The philosopher explains why "morality is up" or "logic is flat"; statements which {appear} metaphysical but are only so in appearance (all those statements that actually hold up against Logical Positivism, and do not immediately suggest a metaphysical realm or a Meinongian jungle.
The philosopher clarifies where things are confused. In order to clarify, a philosophy may have to engage in "experimental" activity, where "changing variables" looks like changing compounds or adjusting measuring devices, but these descriptions of scientific activity are themselves metaphorical, as the "adjustment" to a measuring device only makes sense with respect to the features of the thing to be observed, and thus leads to a measurement.
I mean, one can quite clearly see that "experiment" in your second sentence hardly fits the shape of "experiment" in the first if one turns one's head in the direct of paraconsistent logic or free logic, where the laws aren't so clear. What's more, it goes without saying "hey, I don't need to describe what an experiment looks like" but to someone uninitiated. one may think that scientist dabble in conclusion when more often than not they dabble in conjecture and adaptable future-science.
Philosopher's tend to future-proof meaning, while scientists stretch meaning. I believe this more actually grasps the distinction.
In cases like this, it seems like the Sorite's Paradox, or the problem of the heap. Does the law possess a flexible enough structure to tolerate indeterminacy?
Is it a matter of the {kinds} of TCP traffic which may serve an "empirical criterion" function, like hair follicle or fingerprint, for determining identity? An IP address alone says nothing, indeed, and what's more, one doesn't simply have an IP address but a wealth metadata (hypermedia application data) that shapes, or frames, how one should interpret what that IP means. Investigators will define an IP, it seems, using a scope of relevant TCP traffic.
Slashdot Mirror
A simple solution is to add
127.0.0.1 facebook.com
127.0.0.1 facebook.net
127.0.0.1 www.facebook.com
127.0.0.1 www.facebook.net
127.0.0.1 static.ak.fbcdn.net
to your ``hosts`` file.
Philosophers do not perform "experiments," in any way that can be meaningfully analogized to experimental physics or any science. A philosopher's "experiment" if it can be called that, involves the "experimental" nature of saying anything at all. One might say something that is appropriate or inappropriate, correct or incorrect, etc.; sophistry is having the grace to make what is incorrect pass for correct, not what is false for truth. The point here is that philosophy is about the experimental nature of "transaction," not the content of the transaction. The laws of logic shape what we can say about the laws of nature, and the philosopher helps us understand this; in doing so the philosopher uses analogy, thought experiment, demonstration, to explain why the shape of one follows from the shape of the other. The philosopher explains why "morality is up" or "logic is flat"; statements which {appear} metaphysical but are only so in appearance (all those statements that actually hold up against Logical Positivism, and do not immediately suggest a metaphysical realm or a Meinongian jungle. The philosopher clarifies where things are confused. In order to clarify, a philosophy may have to engage in "experimental" activity, where "changing variables" looks like changing compounds or adjusting measuring devices, but these descriptions of scientific activity are themselves metaphorical, as the "adjustment" to a measuring device only makes sense with respect to the features of the thing to be observed, and thus leads to a measurement. I mean, one can quite clearly see that "experiment" in your second sentence hardly fits the shape of "experiment" in the first if one turns one's head in the direct of paraconsistent logic or free logic, where the laws aren't so clear. What's more, it goes without saying "hey, I don't need to describe what an experiment looks like" but to someone uninitiated. one may think that scientist dabble in conclusion when more often than not they dabble in conjecture and adaptable future-science. Philosopher's tend to future-proof meaning, while scientists stretch meaning. I believe this more actually grasps the distinction.
In cases like this, it seems like the Sorite's Paradox, or the problem of the heap. Does the law possess a flexible enough structure to tolerate indeterminacy? Is it a matter of the {kinds} of TCP traffic which may serve an "empirical criterion" function, like hair follicle or fingerprint, for determining identity? An IP address alone says nothing, indeed, and what's more, one doesn't simply have an IP address but a wealth metadata (hypermedia application data) that shapes, or frames, how one should interpret what that IP means. Investigators will define an IP, it seems, using a scope of relevant TCP traffic.
If DNA can, why not IP? Is this a question of fact or law?